THE

HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA

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





GEORGE WASHINGTON

The painting by James Peale, made at the time Washington assumed command of the Revolutionary army at Cambridge.

The crayon drawing made by James Sharpless. The last, and considered by Washington the best portrait.

The painting by Robert Edge Pine, made for Washington's godson, G. W. Phillips.

Photogravures from the originals now hanging in Independence Hall, Philadelphia.

THE HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA

VOLUME SIX *THE REVOLUTION*

BY

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PRINTED AND PUBLISHED FOR SUBSCRIBERS ONLY BY

GEORGE BARRIE & SONS, PHILADELPHIA

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

THIS volume upon the American Revolution was wisely planned and has been well constructed. Its authors have avoided that method of historical writing which prescribes instead of a lively narrative, an amplified chronology—a table of events and dates; and at the same time they have eschewed that no less condemnable plan by which hypotheses and philosophy are made to take the place that properly belongs to exact statement. Professors Veditz and James have given us ample data, they have presented all that material necessary to a thorough understanding of the Revolution and its genesis, but they have made no attempt to detail the minutiæ of the struggle for American independence. Because of this process of construction there has been found opportunity to include in the present volume enough of the historical philosophy of the Revolution to give to the work before us the power to stimulate the intellect as well as to satisfy its demand for facts.

The period of the Revolution presents to our contemporaries a mass of contradictions. They find, in the majority of instances, that any study of this first pivotal decade of the history of the United States is hampered by the clogs set upon impartial investigation by conventional patriotism. For a century, the myths of history have obscured the facts, and from childhood until old age the average person has imbibed erroneous ideas concerning not only the causes and events of the Revolution, but the conditions existing in the

patriotic party. For years the general reader and student have held to a theory that the American colonists were somewhat on a parity—as far as freedom was concerned—with the Israelites in their bondage to the lords of the two Egypts, and that the movement against the continuance of British control was a great and spontaneous one in which took part all the colonists except a few—a very few—of the less worthy members of certain communities. This false opinion of the cause and force of the outbreaks that developed into the Revolution has been fostered by well-nigh every popular historian of the nineteenth century. During this period hatred for the "redcoat" and the "minions of the tyrant king" has been sedulously inculcated and self-glorification, that misplaced the credit for the happy ending of the struggle between Great Britain and the United States, has been strongly encouraged. True it is that a correct view of the Revolution has been at all times easily accessible and scholars have learned the truth from the sources of history, but their voices were not loudly raised during the hundred years next following the recognition of the independence of the United States by Great Britain. It is only within the last decade that any perceptible impression has been made upon the prevailing ignorance concerning the true history of the Revolution.

The present volume is in no wise radical; it aims to present a conservative view of the period to which it is devoted, yet its conservatism is of that quality that shrinks as far from the ill-balanced enthusiasm of chauvinism as from the iconoclastic fervor of those who reject patriotism as mere sentiment. We find that Professors Veditz and James have not hesitated to show the worth and importance of the American Loyalists to whom separation between the colonies and Great Britain seemed an unmitigable evil; while the endless bickering, indifference, selfishness, and treachery that were rife in the ranks of the Revolutionists are unsparingly laid bare. To France and to the British well-wishers of the American cause due credit is accorded for the

aid that may well be said to have directly given independence to the United States. As these points are treated,—that is fairly, impartially, and with due regard to their relative importance,—so are considered and described the other matters of the history of the Revolution.

Popular judgment, without due ground however, may declare that when the truth is told concerning the Revolution, or if the modern view of it is accepted, that the struggle is stripped of all romance and that patriotism finds nothing in which to glory. Such an opinion may easily be confuted, for the more closely we get to the actual facts of the Revolution the more does our admiration for true patriotism increase. To show that the Loyalists were numerous and wealthy gives a clear idea of the great opposition which faced the Revolutionists and the dual nature of their tremendous struggle is the more evident. The disclosure of fraud, cowardice, treason in the ranks of the men who warred for independence accentuates the merit of those who were steadfast through desperate straits. We may give credit to French and British aid and take not one jot from the praise due to the patriots for their courage and self-sacrifice. We aid patriotic enthusiasm by demolishing the historical myths that have long prevented full appreciation of the merit of the participants in the Revolution.

The present volume in its breadth and comprehensiveness, its accuracy and impartiality forms a fitting conclusion to the volumes upon colonization that precede it, and it is no less valuable as an introduction to the volume upon the Constitution, which is next in sequence in THE HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA, of which the Revolution is a worthy part.

GUY CARLETON LEE.

Johns Hopkins University.

AUTHORS' PREFACE

THE American Revolution is to many persons a strictly military subject. Their attention is fixed upon skirmishes and battles, defeats and victories; the sounds of drum and fife, of musket and cannon, drown the words of propagandists and legislators, of financiers and diplomats. True, the military side of the subject is of prime importance; for by force of arms was independence gained by the Americans, and, therefore, in this volume military movements are given the description that their effect warrants. To both of the present authors, however, the economics and philosophy of the struggle between Great Britain and her rebellious colonies make strong appeal. They have on this account laid more stress upon these phases of the Revolution than is usual in the preparation of narrative histories of the great revolt. It is believed that because of this method of construction the volume will be of far greater value to the general reader and to the student than it would have been if it had been but one more of the large number of existing military histories. The authors have sought to present conditions antecedent to as well as contemporary with the Revolution, to show reasons and causes, to ascertain motives, and to appraise results, and all with an impartiality that will cause the reader to see the Revolution as it was, not as it has been too often described by fervent partisans.

C. WILLIAM A. VEDITZ,
BARTLETT BURLEIGH JAMES.

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THE REVOLUTION

VEDITZ—JAMES

CHAPTER I

THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN 1763

THE Treaty of Paris, dated February 10, 1763, terminated a great international quarrel known in Europe as the Seven Years' War, and in America as the French and Indian War. From the British standpoint this struggle was simply a continuation of the long conflict between France and Great Britain for political supremacy and economic triumph. And although this underlying issue was somewhat obscured by the immixing of half a dozen other nations in the Old World, there could, in the New World at least, be no doubt whatever as to the real purpose of British warfare and British diplomacy. Since the foundation of the first permanent colony in North America, every great European conflict has had its counterpart in an intercolonial war. The war which William of Orange was compelled to wage against France in order to retain his throne had its New World accompaniment in what his American subjects called "King William's War." Again, the War of the Spanish Succession had its American concomitant in "Queen Anne's War," and the War of the Austrian Succession figured in colonial history as "King George's War." But however diverse in detail and in results these European wars may have been, the corresponding American conflicts could always be summed up in the simple issue of colonial supremacy in America. The territorial rivalry between France and England had been manifested as early as 1689, and continued

without interruption until 1763, when France was compelled to accept peace upon terms which meant the annihilation of her proudest colonial ambitions, and the abandonment of a Western empire which her adventurous subjects had made a heroic effort to retain.

When the state of war was formally recognized in 1756, the French colonists in America, together with their Indian allies, had already exchanged shots with their British rivals. As early as 1754, Major George Washington, at the head of some Virginians, engaged in hostilities with a party of Frenchmen, and thus opened the final conflict which determined that Britons and not Frenchmen should be masters of the New World. For some years, the final outcome was in doubt. The excellence of the French leaders and the incapacity and absurd arrogance of the British made it for a time not unlikely that the French would hold their own, if, indeed, they would not assert by force of arms their right to the disputed sections of American territory. The change of policy and of men, however, which followed immediately upon Pitt's ascendency in the counsels of the government of Great Britain resulted in a change of fortune; and from 1758 onward British leaders and British troops, aided by the colonial forces, gradually gained the upper hand. The fall of Quebec in 1759 marked the beginning of the end; after the capture of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and the subsequent surrender of Montreal, there could be no doubt that the French forces throughout Canada must surrender to the British. This surrender took place in 1760. In Europe the war dragged on for more than two years longer. But the new King of England, George III., was decidedly in favor of peace, and peace was therefore concluded in 1763.

By the terms of this peace, which now concerns us only in so far as the future destinies of America are involved, France divided her American possessions between Spain and Great Britain. The manner in which Spain had been drawn into the controversy, and therefore became a party to the

negotiations marking its settlement, requires a word of explanation. While the war was still under way, Spain made a secret compact with France; and when this became known to Great Britain, hostilities were also begun against Spain. France's new ally, however, availed her nothing, and certainly Spain had no reason to rejoice at her interference in the war; for by the end of 1762 Havana, the fortress of the Spanish island of Cuba, and Manila, the capital of the Philippine Islands, were both in British hands. The news of the fall of Manila, however, came too late to influence the peace negotiations. In exchange for Cuba, which Great Britain agreed to give back, Spain gave up Florida. To compensate her for this loss of territory, France ceded to Spain the island of New Orleans in the Mississippi and all the French possessions west of that river. The greatest question to be decided was, of course, that with regard to the disposition of the British conquests. During the war, the British had taken possession of the Ohio country, Canada, and the West Indies. The Ohio country Great Britain regarded as hers by right. But which of her two conquests should she insist upon retaining,—Canada, or Guadeloupe and the neighboring islands? These islands were the centre of a profitable commerce and the source of considerable wealth. They were readily accessible and could easily be kept in subjection to the home government. To establish the authority of Great Britain over eighty thousand Canadians was, moreover, a problem of momentous import. And if French authority were ousted from North America, would not the British colonies to the south be likely to lose that feeling of dependence upon Great Britain which they had undoubtedly felt in all times of difficulty with their French rivals? But Canada had been so great a burden on the French treasury that the French ministers decided to give up Canada rather than Guadeloupe, and in this plan Great Britain ultimately acquiesced. Along with Canada went Cape Breton and all of North America which France had claimed east of the Mississippi, except

the island of New Orleans and two small islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence,—St. Pierre and Miquelon. These insignificant islets were all that was left of New France, whereas Great Britain's sovereignty now extended from the Atlantic Ocean to Mississippi River, and from the Polar Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico. The navigation of the Mississippi was to be free to both Spain and Great Britain, without liability to stoppage, search, or duty.

The terms of the treaty thus being agreed upon, British statesmen felt that the way was now unobstructed for the appropriation and settlement of the territory west of the Alleghanies. In this assumption, however, they were somewhat mistaken, for they had reckoned without the original occupants of these lands. Not only were the Indians unlikely to accept the new order of things which had been provided without consulting them, but they were, in the case of very many tribes, bitter enemies of the British, who made no effort to conciliate them as the French had done. Had it not been for the friendly sufferance of the natives, and, in many instances, their active coöperation, the French could not have held for so long all the territory which they called their own. In view of previous relations between the Indians and the British, it is not surprising at this juncture that a conspiracy against the British was prepared by a large number of tribes at the instigation of a shrewd Ottawa chief named Pontiac, who seems to have possessed to a remarkable degree the power of combination and leadership which, fortunately for our colonial ancestors, was so uncommon among the redskins. While feigning friendship for the British, he planned a simultaneous attack upon all their outposts along the whole frontier of Pennsylvania and Virginia. The commanders of these outposts appear to have had no apprehension of the threatened attack, and had not an Indian woman betrayed the conspiracy to her British lover at Detroit it might have been crowned with complete success. Even as matters went, the Indians took eight important outposts out of twelve, and massacred or dispersed

their garrisons. The bravery and intelligence of Colonel Bouquet saved Fort Pitt; Fort Niagara was not attacked; and Detroit, after a siege of six months led by Pontiac himself, was relieved by Colonel Bradstreet in 1764. After this, the Indians disagreed, and the whole conspiracy—without question one of the most cunning schemes ever devised by an Indian brain—came to naught. Never again were the Indians able to offer any formidable resistance to the westward advance of British civilization.

Fear of the Indians and of the French had been serious hindrances to the westward movement of the British colonists, and few of them were bold enough to penetrate beyond the Alleghanies. But the relatively rapid growth in population of the settlements along the coast made it desirable to find some outlet; and now the almost simultaneous removal of the two greatest obstacles to the English advance toward the Mississippi made it possible for the colonists hitherto confined to the Atlantic coast to develop without restraint, and slowly but quietly to take possession of the territory between the mountains and the Mississippi.

The significance of these new opportunities cannot be fully understood without a consideration of the social, economic, and political conditions of the thirteen colonies in 1763. These conditions, moreover, constitute the background for the momentous struggle which was soon to begin between the mother country and her American subjects. We shall therefore undertake in the following pages to give a description of these conditions, laying particular stress on those circumstances of colonial life which furnish a clue to subsequent events. This is no easy task. We are so prone to assume that life then was like life now, that a considerable effort of the imagination is required to obtain an even approximately correct picture of the life of 1763. It is, furthermore, probably well within the truth to assert that the changes which have taken place in one hundred and forty years are more numerous and more radical than those accomplished during any previous period of twice that

duration. Then, the colonies were in many respects the followers and the imitators of European countries; now, on the other hand, the nation born of those colonies stands in the front rank of civilization. An unparalleled advance of population, the growth of great cities, the rise and development of intercourse between one part of the country and another by means of railroads, canals, and telegraph lines, the rapid succession of inventions which have multiplied the productivity of labor and greatly increased wealth and comfort, a more universal spirit of generous toleration, the diffusion of political privileges, the gradual spread of education, a better sense of social solidarity and righteousness,—these are essentially the achievements of the past sevenscore years.

In 1763, Great Britain was the most powerful nation in the world. She was practically the only nation to gain any material advantage from the Seven Years' War, although the population of her native isles did not exceed eight million, whereas France had three times that number. Besides her American possessions, Great Britain had a foothold in Africa and India, as well as innumerable small islands scattered through many seas.

With regard to the population of the colonies before the Revolution there is a considerable difference of opinion. To determine the number, Mr. Bancroft has constructed, retrospectively, general tables based on the increase of the American population since 1790, when the first census was taken. This method, however, is likely to induce error, because the average number of immigrants arriving each year before the Revolution probably bore a much higher ratio to the existing population and was more spasmodic and irregular than subsequent immigration. It is true that the provincial governments were from time to time called upon by the home ministry to furnish estimates of the population. But as these estimates were intended to serve as a basis for calculating the number of men which each colony would be required to supply for the purposes of naval and military expeditions, they probably underrated the

colonial population. In editing the census returns for 1750, Mr. De Bow estimated the population of the American colonies at two hundred and sixty-two thousand in 1707; one million and forty-six thousand in 1749; and two million eight hundred and three thousand in 1775. The estimates which the British Board of Trade received from its agents in the colonies did not indicate a substantial difference from this estimate, although the dates were not the same as those chosen by Mr. De Bow. The Board's figures were as follows: 1714, four hundred and thirty-four thousand; 1727, five hundred and eighty thousand; 1754, one million four hundred and eighty-five thousand six hundred and thirty-four. The most reasonable estimate fixes the total population in 1763 at about one million eight hundred thousand, of which more than three hundred thousand were slaves. This aggregate population of the thirteen colonies at the end of the Seven Years' War was scattered over a narrow strip of sea-coast twelve hundred miles long, the larger part of which, even along the coast, was still an uninhabited wilderness. The population, of course, varied greatly from one colony to another; and even within the same colony there were periods of sudden growth as well as some of rapid decline. In 1763 Virginia could look back upon one hundred and fifty years of development, whereas Georgia had existed only thirty years.

Differences in age and development, however, were not the only variations presented by the colonies. Each of them, in fact, had its own individuality, its own traditions, and its own ambitions. And in view of the almost insurmountable difficulties which attended intercourse between one colony and another, it is not in the least surprising that throughout many generations the people of the several provinces manifested no consciousness of a common interest and a common destiny. Historians have generally found it convenient to divide the colonies into three groups; and although we must bear in mind the dissimilarities of origin and interests which separated even neighboring colonies, it is true that each of the three groups we are about to describe possessed many traits

in common,—climatic, geographic, social, and economic. The Eastern or New England colonies (New Hampshire, Massachusetts,—which included Maine,—Rhode Island, and Connecticut), the Middle colonies (New York,—including Vermont,—New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware), and the Southern colonies (Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia), constituted three separate groups, not only from a geographical point of view, but also because the people, the customs, the manners, and the occupations in each of these groups were unlike those of the others.

Throughout the pre-Revolutionary period the Southern colonies were looked upon as the land of wealth and material splendor, and among the colonies of this group Virginia felt that the leadership belonged to it. Its population, especially after the exodus of Cavaliers which followed the execution of Charles I. and which brought so many Royalists to the New World, grew by leaps and bounds, reaching a total of forty thousand in 1670. By the end of the century, the province possessed a population of one hundred thousand, including blacks; and at the end of the war which drove the French out of the country, Virginia had about four hundred thousand people within its borders. It had so far surpassed all the other colonies as to seem almost the mother and mistress of them all. Its own people called it the "ancient dominion." With a population twice that of New York, it seemed unlikely that any other colony could ever compare with it in wealth or power. Its exports of tobacco, corn, and other products amounted in 1763 to nearly $3,000,000.

Tobacco was the very life of trade and intercourse in Virginia. Prices were expressed in it, and the salaries of the clergy were paid in so many pounds of tobacco. All other plants of the soil were neglected in order to raise it. Immense plantations of this staple stretched out along the river banks. Here the wild plant was raised, gathered, cured, packed away into hogsheads, and rolled away to the nearest wharf, where ships from England came annually to

gather large cargoes of it in exchange for hardware, glass, crockery, clothing, furniture, household utensils, and wines, which the planters needed. Many of the things which they thus purchased from the mother country could readily have been produced at home; yet the profits of the tobacco trade were so great that the planters turned their attention almost exclusively to that single product. Although the country abounded in trees, the tables, chairs, boxes, cart wheels, bowls, and birch brooms all came from England. We are told that the wood for building houses was actually cut, sent to England as logs to be dressed, and then brought back to Virginia for use.

The planters were often cultivated men, many of them having received their education in English universities. Their large estates, handed down intact from generation to generation because entails prevented any division of the family property, were increased so rapidly in extent that the complaint arose before the Revolution that all the land of Virginia was owned by a few families. The estate of Lord Fairfax, the early patron of Washington, contained more than five million acres. Not until after the Revolution was the system of entails broken up and a new impetus thereby given to the prosperity of the colony. A tradition soon arose in Virginia, according to which the planting class was not allowed to engage in mechanical or commercial pursuits. These occupations were regarded as beneath the great families, and were therefore left to Scotch immigrants and to foreign adventurers, who engrossed the wealth of the country while the land owners slumbered in indolence and frequently sank into poverty on their ancestral estates. In the solitude of their plantations the ruling families frequently wasted their wealth in building immense mansions, where they sought to imitate the splendid hospitality of English country seats.

It would be wrong to suppose that efforts had not been made in Virginia or the other colonies of the South to introduce manufactures. The second vessel that was sent to

Jamestown by the London Company, in 1608, had brought a number of skilled mechanics; and the first cargo of exports sent to England consisted, with the exception of a cargo of "sassafras" gathered in the vicinity of Cape Cod in 1608, of a quantity of goods accompanied by an invoice written by Captain John Smith as follows: "Trials of pitch, tar, glass, frankincense, and soap-ashes, with what wainscot and clapboard as could be forwarded." Writing of the condition of the colony in 1620 in his *History of Virginia*, Beverly says that "a salt-work was set up on the eastern shore and an iron-work at Falling Creek, on Jamestown River, where they made proof of good iron ore and brought the whole work so near perfection that they sent word to the company in London that they did not doubt but to push the work and to have plentiful provision of iron for them by next Easter." Repeated efforts were made to develop by legislative encouragement, in the shape of prizes, the culture of silk and the manufacture of linen and woollen cloth. The Virginia Assembly in 1662 offered a prize of fifty pounds of tobacco for each pound of wound silk produced in the colony, and it was also provided that for every hundred acres of land held in fee the proprietor should be required to plant and fence twelve mulberry trees. But despite frequent efforts to introduce other pursuits than tobacco raising, the fertility of the soil and the mildness of the climate proved antagonistic, and the rapid rise of slavery discouraged the formation of a class of free artisans such as might have made the development of manufactures possible.

In its economic condition Maryland closely resembled Virginia. Its people raised tobacco and exchanged it with Great Britain for clothing, household goods, brass and copper wares, and iron utensils. The colony still belonged to the heir of the Calvert family, but its people cared little for a degenerate race whose only title to respect consisted of virtues which had not proved hereditary. Here, as in Virginia, there was an Established Church, episcopacy having

been rigorously insisted on after 1688. Here, too, slavery prevailed, and there was a rigid division of rank and caste which left little opportunity for the development of a class of free artisans. A colony of Scotch-Irish which had settled at Baltimore was probably of greater value to the rising community than most of its planters and all its proprietors.

In the Carolinas, tobacco was not so all-important a crop as in Virginia and Maryland, for here rice and indigo came to be close rivals. Naval stores were also a staple export. It is said that a governor of South Carolina had been in Madagascar, where he had seen rice cultivated in the hot swamps, and the thought suggested itself to him that the soil near Charleston Bay would be favorable to the plant. So it proved, and in a short time the marshes of South Carolina and Georgia were covered with rice plantations. A large part of the crop was exported to England, and in 1761 the value of the South Carolina rice production was more than $1,500,000. As the white population then probably did not greatly exceed forty-five thousand, it is easy to conceive how profitable this crop must have been for the small band of planters in that colony. The colony early became noted for the haughty manners of its planters, their costly mansions and luxurious method of living, and for the ignorance of the great bulk of the population. There was a greater area devoted to mixed tillage in South Carolina than elsewhere in the South, corn and cotton being raised in considerable quantities. Although there were nearly twice as many slaves as whites, some of the leading men of the colony appear to have regarded slavery as a disgraceful institution.

North Carolina was more populous than South Carolina, although the slave population was not so preponderant. As in Virginia, there were practically no professions. The lumbering industry attracted many immigrants, for the most part French Huguenots, Moravians, and Germans, with some Swiss and Scotch-Irish. The Huguenots, however, were stronger in South Carolina than in any other American

colony; their intelligence and industriousness made them a desirable element. In both Carolinas foreign immigration increased rapidly both in extent and variety; and although the British were dominant in all the colonies, their supremacy in the South was more strongly marked in Virginia and Maryland, which were settled chiefly by immigrants coming directly from Great Britain, than in the Carolinas, which were largely peopled from the other British colonies in North America, the Bahamas and the West Indies.

Throughout the entire pre-Revolutionary period North Carolina possessed an unenviable reputation for disorder and a low state of morals and education. Corruption in office was common, and contests over questions of public policy not infrequently resulted in rioting and anarchy.

Georgia, the last and southernmost of the thirteen original colonies, was exceedingly slow in its early development. The land was parcelled out to immigrants upon such restrictive terms that they preferred to cross over into Carolina, where they could obtain land in fee. The territory, moreover, covered by the Georgia grant was claimed by Spain, and the Spaniards were not disposed to leave the British in undisturbed possession. The corporation which for over twenty years held and managed the colony "in trust for the poor," did not admit the people to representation in the government. Slavery and the sale of intoxicating liquors were prohibited by law. These prohibitions were too far in advance of the times, and were finally abandoned when, in 1752, the trustees surrendered their charter to the crown. Even for ten years after it became a royal province the growth of the colony was slow. Thus, at the Albany Congress of 1754 it was not represented, and in the plan for union outlined at that Congress by Franklin there was no provision for delegates from Georgia,—probably because the colony was too insignificant for recognition. Not until the treaty of 1763 relieved Georgia of a dangerous neighbor by ceding Florida to Great Britain did the colony grow rapidly in wealth and population.

Natural conditions are largely responsible for the political and economic characteristics of this Southern group of colonies. The rich soil was apparently unlimited in extent and although a succession of tobacco crops exhausted a given area in a few years there always remained an abundance of virgin land. All the Southern colonies are intersected by navigable rivers, and, with the possible exception of the Carolinas, they are well provided with good harbors. This made it possible for each plantation, no matter how far from the coast, to have its own private wharf, where ships from England could take on board the colonial products and unload their cargoes of tools, cloth, or furniture. There was thus no occasion for the kind of local trade that builds up towns and commercial centres. Had there been any serious or continued danger of attack from Indians or foreign enemies, the Southern colonists might perhaps have provided for the more compact massing of the people. But this necessity was never felt keenly enough to overcome the geographical and economic influences which pointed to a scattered population. Plantations were made along the broad rivers, often many miles apart and separated by dense forests. Although there were in 1763 probably more than eight hundred thousand people in the colonies south of Pennsylvania, Baltimore and Charleston were the only towns of any importance south of Philadelphia. The oldest of the colonies had half a million inhabitants, but there was not a single place in all Virginia worthy to be called a city. Jamestown, the old capital, was a favorite resort for the wealthy and fashionable during the sessions of the legislature and at gubernatorial inaugurations; but it was a small, untidy village, and Williamsburg, its successor, was only a little better.

The original capital of Maryland, St. Mary's, could hardly be called a city. The only place in the South entitled to such a designation was Charleston, the capital of South Carolina. As many of the wealthy planters left their estates in charge of overseers and lived at Charleston, the

city gradually became the centre of trade, fashion, and politics; in fact, it ranked with Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. All the social, commercial, legal, and political life of South Carolina centred in this city, from which a direct trade was carried on with London. Here the people lived in very much the same fashion as in England, but with more ostentation and a more generous hospitality. They loved sports and social amusements, and gave Charleston a wide reputation for eminence in matters of fashion and high living.

The governments of the Southern colonies had, almost from the very beginning, endeavored to encourage the rise and development of cities. But their efforts, however persistent, were of no avail. The Virginia legislature wanted towns to be built at certain places; made them the only ports where ships from abroad could be entered; established tobacco warehouses in them; offered special privileges to tradesmen who would settle in them; and provided that each town should have a market and a fair. But Fredericksburg, Alexandria, and Petersburg, the artificial results of legislative enactments, were straggling villages; for there were no incentives in Virginia to build towns. Thomas Jefferson probably saw the reason for this when he declared: "Our country being much intersected with navigable rivers, and trade brought to our very doors instead of our being obliged to go in quest of it, has probably been one of the causes why we have no towns of any consequence." The plantation, in reality, was a small community almost sufficient unto itself. What commodities it lacked were brought to it without intervention of local tradesmen. It formed an economic unit, the centre of which was the planter's home, built of wood or brick, surrounded by a little village of negro cabins. Within his own domain, the planter was a patriarchal despot. But although his independence may have made him haughty, extravagant, and impetuous, he was also likely to be "straightforward, hospitable, honest, with a keen sense of honor and

a thorough devotion to his rights and liberties." The exercise of authority gave many of the planters an advantageous training for leadership in the public affairs of the Revolutionary period, and explains why Virginia furnished more than its portion of leaders in the Revolution and in the politics of the Union for some decades after the foundation of the national government.

Class distinctions were most notable in the South. In Virginia and Maryland, property passed to the eldest sons, as in England. This system naturally tended to keep up the family name and position, and to establish a permanent landed aristocracy. Education, moreover, was in the South almost a monopoly of the rich. The College of William and Mary, chartered in 1693, was the only higher educational institution south of Pennsylvania. But the college languished; its students were few; its early history is chiefly memorable only for having furnished Jefferson with some facilities for study. The sons of the great planters often studied in Europe, or received their education at the hands of private tutors. Even ordinary schools were extremely rare. Martin, the last royal governor in North Carolina, stated that in his time there were only two schools in the whole colony. As a consequence, the industrial classes of the South were kept in stolid ignorance. Indeed, the wish had been expressed by Governor Berkeley in 1671 that Virginia should have no printing presses, colleges, or schools for at least a hundred years. And for over half a century after this date, there were as a matter of fact no printing presses in the province,—the first one in Virginia being established at Williamsburg in 1729.

The most characteristic economic institution of the South was slavery, which affected almost every aspect of colonial life. There were, to be sure, slaves in all the colonies; but of the total slave population, which in 1763 exceeded three hundred thousand, but a small number lived north of Mason and Dixon's line. In Virginia in the eighteenth century half the population were slaves, while in South Carolina the

blacks far outnumbered the whites, and their number was rapidly increasing by importations from Africa and the West Indies. The possibility of an insurrection among the slaves early presented itself to the mind of the colonial governments, and rigorous laws were passed in all the colonies to prevent such an uprising. But, on the whole, the slaves were well treated.

The traffic in these unwilling immigrants was a source of great profit to the colonial and British merchants. Many of the colonies, however, soon came to a realization of the objections against this species of trade. New England, Pennsylvania, and even South Carolina were anxious to discourage it by imposing a heavy tax on slaves. Among the Southern leaders, Jefferson and Lee were opposed to the practice and persistently sought to put it under the ban of the law. But the British Parliament abrogated all measures aimed at legal interference with the traffic, and British merchants insisted upon its continuance. In 1761, for instance, it was proposed in the legislature of Virginia to suppress the importation of Africans by levying a prohibitory duty. The act was passed; but in Great Britain it met the fate of all similar bills, and was sent back with a veto. The king in council issued an instruction under his own hand on December 10, 1770, commanding the Governor of Virginia, "upon pain of the highest displeasure, to assent to no law by which the importation of slaves should be in any respect prohibited or obstructed."

The traffic therefore continued. In one year, six thousand slaves were brought to South Carolina, and fifteen thousand were forced upon all the colonies. It must, however, be admitted that behind the moral considerations which in the North were so frequently urged against slavery, there came the fundamental fact that it had never been profitable in the North, while it enabled Southern slave owners to accumulate vast wealth.

Totally different from the Southern group, and in many respects offering the sharpest contrast to it, were the New

England colonies. The circumstances which gave rise to their original settlement, the nature and ideals of their settlers, and the influences which determined their development, were unlike those that characterized the Southern group. The mean annual temperature of Maine is not far from that of southern Norway, while that of Georgia hardly differs from northern Africa. New England is a distinct geographical province. The Berkshire barrier runs from southern Connecticut to its culmination in the Green Mountains of northern Vermont and separates the eastern territory from the western. Northward, the St. Lawrence is the boundary, while on the south and east is the ocean. The rivers, except those in Maine, and the Merrimac and the Connecticut, are small and have their sources in innumerable small lakes; the upper streams form a succession of cascades which furnish water power for manufacturing enterprises. Many of the towns owe their origin to the existence of this motive power at the points where they were founded. The soil is for the most part thin, interspersed with gravel and rocks; but the banks of some of the principal rivers are better suited for farming, and there are fair pasturage lands in some parts of New England. Originally, the whole country was one vast forest, and the trees had to be cleared away by the settlers. But the rugged hills, the gloomy forests, the harsh climate, and the poor soil did not daunt the colonists, who wrested a living from the rocks and made the waterfalls turn the wheels of their mills.

At the end of the French War the New England colonies had a population of nearly six hundred thousand. Massachusetts alone counted almost half this number. The Northern provinces were not alike in their social, industrial, and political conditions; but they had many traits in common. Their forms of government, their laws, their courts of justice, their manners, and their religious doctrines were nearly the same. Although there had been a small infusion of Normans from the Channel Islands, Welsh, Scotch-Irish, and Huguenots, ninety-eight per cent of the

New Englanders at the opening of the Revolutionary War were either British by birth or unmixed descendants of Britons.

The isolated life of the plantation was unknown to New England, where a host of circumstances prompted the settlers to congregate in towns along the coast. Boston, Newport, New Haven, Salem, and Providence were the chief towns. The most important of these was Boston, which in 1763 certainly did not have more than fifteen thousand inhabitants, closely confined to the neighborhood of the bay. This city was supposed to have "a more general turn for music, painting, and the fine arts" than any of the other large colonial cities. It is rather difficult for the present-day American to realize that Salem once led the shipping of the United States, and Providence sent more vessels from her harbor than set sail from the piers of New York. New Haven was famed for its prosperous appearance, and the houses of its rich men were of a better style of architecture than was customary in the colonies. Throughout all the colonies of New England, with the possible exception of that part of Massachusetts which is now called Maine, which was still sparsely settled, small villages abounded everywhere. Many of the causes of this concentration of the population were natural and physical; others sprang from the purposes and characters of the colonists.

In the first place, the long and dreary New England winter brought the people together for companionship and protection. The rigor of the climate obliged them, even if they were not so disposed, to keep in constant touch with each other. Again, the soil was poor and yielded its crops only to the diligent toiler, and there were many inducements which attracted him away from agriculture and led him to engage in commerce or manufactures. Commerce, to be sure, could not be carried on by means of the rivers, whose swift currents prevented their serving as highways from the sea, but were well suited to turn the mill wheel. The thick forests, however, naturally suggested shipbuilding, and, next

to agriculture, this was the most important single occupation of the New England population. Since the sea was often more fruitful than the land, little fishing villages dotted the coasts. On the island of Nantucket the whale fishery was established, and for a period proved a source of great profit and a school of accomplished seamen. So diligent and successful did the colonists prove in the arts of fishing that, as Burke said of them: "No sea but what is vexed by their fisheries, no climate that is not witness to their toils. Neither the perseverance of Holland, nor the activity of France, nor the dexterous and firm sagacity of English enterprise ever carried this most perilous mode of industry to the extent to which it has been pushed by this recent people—a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened to the bone of manhood."

Besides the natural inducements which prompted the formation of compact towns, it must be noted that the early colonists came to New England because they wished to bring about an ecclesiastical reform by which the members of a congregation should have more voice than formerly in the church government. Welded together by the long-continued opposition which was offered to their reforms in England, it was quite natural that they should come to the New World in congregations, led by their favorite ministers. When they landed, they chose some convenient locality where they might build their houses near together and all go to the same church. The early New Englanders were full of religious enthusiasm, and throughout the colonial existence of the Northern colonies the religious beliefs of the people strongly affected their manners and their habits. Religion was part of the daily social life of the colonists, and, although in the latter part of the eighteenth century the severe angularity of the primitive Puritan had been largely worn off, society was still largely ruled by the early conceptions.

Still another circumstance must be pointed out in this connection. For a century before the Revolution the colonists

in New England lived in permanent dread of the Indian; the town was frequently transformed into a fort, and the New Englander was at all times ready to abandon his economic activity and for a while become a soldier.

It was of course necessary for a part of the population to devote itself to the production of those food stuffs which could not be easily imported from abroad or from the other colonies. The more fertile areas were therefore devoted to agriculture; but, especially in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, many persons engaged in manufacturing; and the New Englanders, almost without exception, were in a way mechanics, perfectly able to make with their own hands those implements which they needed. The branch of manufacturing industry to which the attention of the colonists was at first directed was the manufacture of lumber, for which there was a constant and remunerative demand in England and throughout the West Indies. Shipbuilding was commenced in the Plymouth colony within three years after the landing, and the business was prosecuted with such vigor that within ten years after the launching of the first vessel ever built in Massachusetts, the General Court of that colony in 1631 passed the following resolution: "Whereas the country is now in hand with the building of ships, and therefore suitable care should be taken that it be well performed, it is therefore ordered that surveyors be appointed to examine any ship built, to see that it be performed and carried on according to the rules of the art." In the year 1676, just a century before the Declaration of Independence, five hundred and fifty vessels are reported to have been built in Boston and the vicinity, of which two hundred and thirty ranged from fifty to two hundred and fifty tons' burden; and in 1731 the trade of Massachusetts alone employed six hundred sail of ships and sloops, having an aggregate of thirty-eight thousand tonnage,—one-half of which traded to Europe,—in addition to over one thousand sail and from five thousand to six thousand men employed at the same time in the fisheries.

Early in her history New England became independent of the mother country for the greater part of her manufactured goods. In Connecticut and in Massachusetts there was profitable iron mining, which gave rise to kindred productions. Small saw and grist mills were numerous. There were many tanneries and distilleries. As early as 1635, a saw mill was erected on Salmon Falls River, New Hampshire, near the site of the present city of Portsmouth. The first water mill in New England is supposed to have been put up at Dorchester, Massachusetts, as early as 1628. In 1640, the General Court of Connecticut declared that it was "thought necessary for the comfortable support of these plantations that a trade in *cotten wooll* be sett upon and attempted." In Maine and New Hampshire the manufacture of spars, masts, and ship timber for export early became a leading and profitable industry. The Assembly of Connecticut in 1666 exempted shipbuilding from taxation. Similar examples of the early development of manufactures and of the spontaneity with which all the New England colonies turned to trading and manufactures might be given by the score. Had it not been for the repressive policy of the mother country, the nature and precise effects of which we shall examine in a subsequent chapter, the hum of factory wheels would have been heard along many more of the swift watercourses that provided such cheap and abundant motive power. Even in the face of continued opposition and discouragement from Great Britain, linens and woollens were woven, beaver hats and paper were manufactured on a small scale, numerous articles of daily use were made by the farmer and his sons, and a spinning wheel was to be found in every farmhouse.

Small landholdings had always been the rule in New England, and agriculture required such persistent and intelligent effort that even upon the farms, to say nothing of manufactures, slavery could never become an indigenous institution. There were no great extremes of fortune. Burke, who was admirably acquainted with American life,

questioned whether there were two persons either in Massachusetts or Connecticut who could afford to spend £1,000 a year at a distance from their estates. The expenses for education were drawn also from the whole public, and this contributed to the further development of a democratic spirit such as was unknown in the South or even in the Middle colonies. But it would be a mistake to suppose that there were no class distinctions in New England. Although politically New England was nearly a pure democracy, yet there were clearly marked distinctions of rank, due not to superior wealth but rather to superior culture. The "old families" were preferred to the "newcomers." Society was divided into gentlemen, yeomen, merchants, and mechanics. And although the lines between these divisions were not sharply drawn, certain families were considered to be entitled to the best pews in the churches and to the deference and respect of the community at large. The gentry dressed in one fashion, the working classes in another. For a long time the family rank of students determined their places in the lists of the Harvard and Yale catalogues.

John Adams declared that "the public institutions of New England for the education of youth, supporting colleges at the public expense and obliging them to maintain grammar schools, are not equalled, and never were, in any part of the world." The New England colonies throughout were founded by men who respected learning, and in the middle of the eighteenth century the majority of the people could read and write. Connecticut imposed a heavy fine upon every father of a family who neglected to teach his household the elements of knowledge. Massachusetts enforced a similar provision. In most of the colonies it might be said with perfect truth that the settlers refused to live beyond the sound of the church bell, or far away from a schoolhouse. Burke says that almost as many copies of Blackstone's *Commentaries* were sold in America as in England, and General Gage wrote from Boston that the people

of his province were either lawyers, or smatterers in law. We shall have occasion later on to refer to the importance of the circumstance that lawyers as a class exerted a considerable influence upon many of the colonies. Of the seven institutions of higher education which existed in 1764, three belonged to New England. First and foremost was Harvard, founded in 1636; then Yale, opened at New Haven in 1700; and Brown, established in Warren in 1764.

The founding of the first of these institutions, Harvard, took place about sixteen years after the landing of the Pilgrims, when the General Court of Massachusetts agreed to give what was then the munificent sum of £400 toward the founding of a school or college. A year before this the Public Latin School of Boston had been established, and thus acquired the distinction of being the oldest public school in the United States. At the end of the French War the former institution, which subsequently came to be known as Harvard College, had acquired a high renown even in Europe, and had been fostered by liberal donations from English Dissenters. Samuel Adams, John Adams, John Hancock, Jonathan Trumbull, Elbridge Gerry, Joseph Warren, Jeremy Belknap, Timothy Pickering, and a host of others among its graduates, played a prominent part in the Revolutionary era.

Yale College, the third of the higher institutions to be established in the American colonies, owed its inception to the ministers of Connecticut, who in 1698 took steps that led to its foundation. In 1718 the institution took its present name of Yale. Throughout the Revolutionary era Yale College was intensely patriotic.

Other educational factors of no less importance than the colleges were printing presses, newspapers, and books, in respect of all of which the New England colonies early acquired a leading position.

The first printing press in what is now the United States was set up by a printer named Day, at Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1638, only eighteen years subsequent to the

landing of the Pilgrims in the wilderness. His first production was *The Freeman's Oath*, a broadside; the second, an almanac, in 1639; and in 1640 the first book was printed. Characteristically enough, this volume consisted of "the Psalms newly turned into metre," and was known as *The Bay Psalm-Book*—a work which is said to have gone through seventy editions. Although for forty years this was the only press in the colonies, a large number of pamphlets, sermons, and political pieces were struck off. We are told that at an early period Cotton Mather alone had printed in England and America three hundred and eighty-two of his own productions. The first printing press in Connecticut was established at New London in 1709; in Rhode Island, at Newport in 1714; in New Hampshire, at Portsmouth in 1756; and in what is now the State of Maine in 1780.

All these presses were very primitive affairs, for between the latter part of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth there were practically no improvements made in printing presses. In all the colonies there were in 1763 probably less than fifty presses. They were all small, worked by hand, and slow.

The first periodical to appear in the United States was called *Public Occurrences*, which was issued in Boston in 1690. This paper appears to have been so radically democratic that only one issue of it was published. The first permanent newspaper made its appearance in April, 1704, and was called the *Boston Newsletter*. At the time, this was the only periodical printed in British America; it was a foolscap half-sheet, and was thought sufficient to contain all the news of the day. Some years later, James and Benjamin Franklin edited at Boston a newspaper called the *New England Courant*, in which the editors freely discussed public affairs in such violent language that suits for libel, imprisonment, and fines showered upon the editors. James Franklin was once in jail for four weeks. The press in New England was not free until 1775; before this time the censorship was rigorously maintained, and newspapers

were not allowed to criticise the acts of the government. By the close of the year 1765 over forty newspapers are said to have been established in America. The circulation of these papers was much larger in New England than anywhere else. Noah Webster is authority for the statement that the circulation of newspapers in the single New England State of Connecticut was equal to that in the whole American territory south of Pennsylvania. By the time of the Revolution, the printing press had passed successfully through all its early trials, and the newspaper had become a necessary and important institution to the colonies.

Very few American books of importance had been published up to 1763. Books, to be sure, were not wanting; but those most frequently sold by the dealers were the works of the standard English authors,—Burke, Johnson, or the famous Dr. Goldsmith. The absence of any considerable production of colonial publications was due especially to the intensely commercial and money-making character of the colonists, which was not conducive to the rise of an extensive original literature.

The staple of New England reading matter consisted of theological writings by the Puritan ministers of that section. One of the best-selling books of the pre-Revolutionary period was Wigglesworth's *Day of Doom*, a realistic description of "the great and last judgment," published in Boston in 1662. But the two writers who best represent the literature of this period were Jonathan Edwards and Benjamin Franklin. Edwards was a remarkable theologian and metaphysician, and his influence on the minds of his contemporaries can scarcely be overestimated. He graduated from Yale College in 1720, preached to a Presbyterian congregation for a number of years, carried on missionary labors among the Indians, and in 1754 published his greatest work, entitled *The Freedom of the Will*, generally accepted as one of the most acute intellectual productions of its kind and a permanent contribution to the American literature of philosophy. Franklin, in many respects, offers a sharp

contrast to Edwards. The former was a practical man of the world; the latter, a man of the next world, a Puritan minister of the strictest sort. Franklin, although born in Boston, properly belongs to Philadelphia; for the latter city was the scene and centre of his greatest achievements. Shortly after he was established at Philadelphia as a printer, he began to issue the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, and for many years published an almanac which became widely known as *Poor Richard's Almanac*, containing an abundance of common-sense maxims. So popular did this publication become that whenever we think of Franklin, we associate him with the somewhat worldly and prosaic philosophy of "Poor Richard," although Franklin himself was far from narrow-minded, hard-hearted, or mean. Franklin also wrote numerous political pamphlets and scientific papers, not one of which but had a direct bearing upon some important question relating to the welfare of the colonists or to matters of scientific interest.

CHAPTER II

THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN 1763—(Continued)

HAVING attempted to characterize the Southern colonies and the New England colonies, it still remains for us to consider the distinctive features of those provinces which lay between these two groups of settlements. The natural road of access to the northern portion of this territory is by way of Hudson and Mohawk Rivers, and to the southern, by way of the Delaware. As one of the decisive campaigns of the Revolution afterward proved, the possession of the Hudson valley was one of the great prizes to be sought by an invading army. Before the British troops evacuated Boston, General Lee prepared for the defence of New York and the Hudson. For if Clinton had gained control of the city and the river at that early day, he would have cut off New England from the Southern colonies and made the independence of all a matter of very grave doubt.

The soil of the Middle colonies, back from the sandy coast belt, was generally fertile, although the land, as in New England, was everywhere covered with thick forests. The mean annual temperature lies between that of the Northern and that of the Southern colonies; but the changes of climate are singularly abrupt. A variety of geographical conditions suggests a corresponding variety of occupations. These colonies, moreover, were inhabited by a very heterogeneous population, which increased the likelihood of an extensive diversification of pursuits.

The total population of the four Middle colonies before the beginning of the Revolution was probably about four hundred thousand. New York was first settled by the Dutch, and for half a century the Dutch ruled the colony. Numerous French Huguenots who had fled from persecution in Europe and those New England reformers who found the religious system of the Northern colonies too rigid to make life bearable were also among the population. As early as 1643 it was reported that eighteen languages were spoken in New Amsterdam. Numerous settlements in what is now Delaware were first made by Swedes, while in Pennsylvania Germans and Scotch-Irish early formed an important element of the population. Besides the nationalities already named, there were also a few Jews and some Welsh. Around Philadelphia the English predominated, but with them were mingled the other nationalities. In the mountainous regions of the Appalachian frontier the Scotch-Irish were most numerous. Throughout Pennsylvania, which in the period we are considering meant practically nothing more than the territory between the Delaware and the Susquehanna, the Germans and the Scotch-Irish far outnumbered the English. These two non-English elements, however, mingled little better than fire and water, and the racial antipathy was so great that in settlements situated side by side,—and such settlements stretched for miles,—those inhabited by Germans did not tolerate the use of the English language any more than those inhabited by the Scotch-Irish tolerated the use of German. Pennsylvania in those days was a frontier State, protecting Delaware and New Jersey from attack by the Indians. Pittsburg was a military post. Woods, mountains, and morasses filled the region which is now noted for its unequalled coal and iron mines.

Here, as throughout most of the colonies, agriculture was of chief importance, although in New York commerce, and in Pennsylvania manufacturing, constituted profitable and extensive occupations. Travellers from Europe were struck

with the skill shown in the cultivation of the rich and abundant soil, with the stone farmhouses, the admirable harvests, and the fine cattle. In New Jersey, the well-kept farms that spread from Trenton to Elizabethtown aroused the enthusiastic praise of the scientific Kalm. Long Island was the garden of America, and all along the valleys opening upon the Hudson the Dutch and Huguenot colonists acquired an abundant income by carefully tilling the soil. The principal crop was wheat, although there was much variety in the products of the farms, and New Jersey raised large herds of cattle.

In Pennsylvania, manufacturing commenced almost at the beginning of the colony. Many of the people of Virginia and Maryland came long distances to patronize the mills of Pennsylvania. The most important manufacturing centre of the colony was Germantown, where paper and glass and the coarser varieties of knit goods and cloths were made and offered for sale in small quantities. At the time of the French and Indian War there were over a score of paper mills in the Middle colonies, most of them in the vicinity of Philadelphia, which was at that time the centre of literary activity. The first of these mills was erected by a German named Rittenhouse as early as 1690. Four years after the landing of William Penn, moreover, a printing press was established in the colony—the third in all the English colonies. The first font of type made in America was cast by another German inhabitant of this province, and was in the German character. The first grist mill in Pennsylvania was erected by Colonel John Printz, governor of what was then called New Sweden, in 1643. Earlier than this, the first Van Rensselaer, in 1631, sent from Holland to Albany a master millwright and two small millstones for a small grist mill.

In the Middle colonies, as in New England, each farmhouse was a domestic manufactory. While the men labored in the fields, the mothers and daughters spun wool and flax, and prepared a large part of the clothing for the family.

Many articles of daily use were manufactured in the farmhouse or the barn. In the winter and in times of inclement weather, the farmer hammered out nails, made and repaired his tools, or helped to make woollen and linen goods. Among the articles mentioned as produced in Pennsylvania as early as 1698 were "druggets, serges, camblets, and a variety of other stuff." So rapidly did the manufacture of these textiles increase that there gradually arose a class of dyers, fullers, combmakers, cardmakers, spinners, weavers, etc. In his report to the English Board of Trade in 1708, Colonel Heathcote, a member of the Council of the Province of New York, declares that he labored to divert the Americans from their woollen and linen manufactures, which were already so far advanced that three-fourths of the linen and woollen used was made among them; "and," he continued, "if some speedy and effectual ways are not found to put a stop to it, they will carry it on a great deal further, and perhaps in time very much to the prejudice of our manufactures at home."

The people of the Middle colonies had also a keen sense for trade,—trade with the Indians, trade with the neighboring colonies, especially those to the south, and trade with Great Britain, Spain, and the West Indies. The Indian tribes of central New York and of western Pennsylvania brought furs to Pittsburg or Albany, or to some other frontier post, and exchanged them for wampum. While the dangers of this traffic were great, the profits on packs of peltries brought to the seaport towns, especially New York and Philadelphia, were so considerable as to warrant the risks of traversing the western forests. The principal commodities sent to Europe in exchange for the sugar, wines, and miscellaneous manufactured articles brought from abroad were, besides these furs obtained largely from the Indians, grain, flour, and lumber. For the intercolonial trade, vessels built in New England were very extensively used, although Philadelphia early began to build ships. The products which these ships carried from the Northern and

Middle colonies to the Southern provinces were food stuffs and small manufactures.

The two great cities of pre-Revolutionary days were Philadelphia and New York. Philadelphia was first in size and importance. Its fame was not confined to the New World, but extended to the Old as well, largely because of Franklin's connection with it. Its wide streets, lined with trees, were well paved and well lighted. They crossed each other at right angles, and gave to the city an appearance of prim regularity. According to Burnaby, who visited the city in 1759, Philadelphia then had a population of eighteen to twenty thousand; it possessed two public libraries, numerous churches, almshouses, and schools; about twenty-five ships were annually built in its docks; and some of the fine houses were let for what was then the very large sum of £100 a year. Many of the houses were surrounded by gardens or orchards. The standard of living of the population had reached a level of prosperity unknown to the larger part of the colonists, for the use of tea was universal in the homes of Pennsylvania farmers. Yet, despite the rapid growth of the city, in which thousands of immigrants landed every year, it clung closely to the banks of the river.

At the Peace of Paris (1763), New York was still behind Boston and Philadelphia in point of population and influence. The city, as well as the entire colony, which at this time consisted almost exclusively of a line of settlements along the coast and along Hudson River, still showed numerous traces of the Dutch period of its rule; for when New Netherland became New York the English had sought to do little violence to the customs and institutions of the original settlers. Some of the great patroon estates of Dutch creation had survived on the Hudson, and others of like magnitude had been acquired during the English rule. These estates were kept intact by the law of primogeniture, and handed down from father to the eldest son from generation to generation. In this manner there arose a class of feudal aristocrats who owed their position

to hereditary wealth in land. These New York land owners are said to have treated many German immigrants so badly that the Germans left the colony in large numbers for Pennsylvania and induced their compatriots to avoid the northern colony. In the city of New York, society was gayer than in Boston; it was the centre of a far-reaching foreign trade, and extremely cosmopolitan in character. The architecture of the city bore innumerable traces of its Dutch beginnings. Brick had been imported from Holland for some of the first buildings; the frontier towns, Albany and Schenectady, were still essentially Dutch in appearance. The New Yorker boasted of his cosmopolitanism; and in the eventful period that was now to come, the political indifference of the city and the colony was a source of great anxiety to the patriots.

Education was, as a rule, not so well provided for in the Middle colonies as in New England. In New Jersey, thanks to the New England element settled there, a few good schools were to be found, and at Philadelphia there were several excellent institutions for the education of the youth. Penn himself had liberal ideas of education, to which the now famous Penn Charter School is ample testimony. But in New York the schools were neither good nor plentiful. William Smith, himself a New Yorker and a graduate of Yale College, and historian of his native colony, frankly declared: "Our schools are of the lowest grade." Smith, in fact, was the only college man "at the bar," and there was only one college graduate "on the bench" in New York; while there was at that time no person of college education in either branch of the provincial legislature. Steps were then taken toward the founding of "King's College," afterward Columbia College, the colonial Assembly voting to raise £250 for this purpose by lottery. The college opened in 1754 with a class of eight and a single instructor, who was also president. Its growth was slow and the number of students remained small; but among them were Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, Robert Livingston, and Gouverneur Morris.

The College of New Jersey, founded by the Presbyterians of that colony in 1746, was better frequented in point of numbers. Its president, Dr. Witherspoon, and two of its alumni, Benjamin Rush and Richard Stockton, subsequently became signers of the Declaration of Independence.

The University of Pennsylvania was at this time a flourishing institution, the most important and influential college in the Middle colonies, in many respects the equal of those in New England. Franklin's proposal for the establishment of an academy to supplement the education then given in the existing schools was the first impetus that led to the founding of this university, which was built upon a school established in 1740. No one did more for the education of the people of his own colony than Franklin, himself distinctly a "self-made man." He was the chief founder of the Philadelphia Library, in 1731, and encouraged the formation of a number of small libraries in that city. While it is impossible to make any definite statement with regard to the number of books and pamphlets printed in the colony before the Revolution, it is interesting to note that the Philadelphia Library contains as many as four hundred and fifty-nine works printed in that city alone prior to that event.

The authorities in Pennsylvania were better disposed toward printing presses, books, and newspapers than were those of New York. In the latter colony, under Dutch rule, no printing presses had been allowed, and even in 1671 Governor Dongan was especially instructed to "allow no printing press." In 1725, however, William Bradford, who had previously printed an almanac in Philadelphia and who had removed to New York in 1693, issued the *New York Gazette*, a foolscap sheet. Bradford was the government printer, and his newspaper was the organ of the governor and his party. A political quarrel broke out in the colony in 1732. Zenger, a German printer, formerly an apprentice of Bradford, published, in 1733, the *New York Weekly Journal*, which became the organ of the popular party.

Through its columns the administration was severely criticised, and on November 2, 1734, the Provincial Council ordered certain numbers of the *Journal* to be "burnt by the hands of the common hangman;" and a few days later Zenger was cast into prison on a charge of libel. The most eminent lawyer in the colonies, Andrew Hamilton, of Pennsylvania, obtained Zenger's acquittal. This put an end to the censorship of government officials, and established the liberty of the press. Of the outcome of this important and characteristic trial, Gouverneur Morris said that it was the "germ of American freedom—the morning star of that liberty which subsequently revolutionized America."

All the colonies, whether they belonged to the Northern, the Middle, or the Southern group, were confined closely to the Atlantic coast, and only the most adventurous of the population dared penetrate beyond the Alleghanies. Of the innumerable great cities which to-day are scattered all over the territory bounded by the Mississippi and the Atlantic Ocean, we find that except along the seacoast hardly one existed in 1763. Although the population spread more rapidly in the South than in the North, the Alleghanies marked the limit of the civilized portions of Virginia. North and South Carolina had not yet reached beyond their mountains. Some emigrants, of course, had wandered to what is now western Tennessee. In May, 1759, Daniel Boone, whose subsequent exploits played so prominent a part in the western movement, explored the forests of Kentucky. A few English and Americans had colonized Natchez, on the Mississippi; but the whole country spreading from the forests of Pennsylvania and Virginia to the Mississippi was called the Wilderness, and was practically unknown. The few frontiersmen who had penetrated this territory gave glowing accounts of its fertility, its forests, and its meadows. But the fear of the savage still guarded the region from permanent invasion. It was no place for the pacific settler; the Wilderness was pathless, and from Baltimore to Pittsburg was a journey of twelve days in wagons. St. Louis was

settled in 1763 and soon became the emporium for the fur trade of the Missouri and Mississippi valleys. For a long time after this, even as late as 1803, it was thought that Missouri River might in some way lead to the Pacific Ocean. In the territory ceded by France was Detroit, a little French settlement surrounded by a high stockade. Indiana had one settlement, Vincennes, nearly as old as Detroit, with four hundred to five hundred inhabitants. Mobile and Pensacola consisted of a few huts gathered about the old French forts. Nor is this surprising, when we recall that even in the East, near the coast, there were few cities which could boast more than a few thousand inhabitants. The hardy frontiersmen who ventured into the western territory did this not so much from a spirit of adventure as from a desire to reap the profits of the fur trade, a valuable industry which aided in building up a thriving commerce and in preparing the way for the advance of civilization across the Appalachian ranges. The fur traders followed along the Indian trails and were the pioneers of Anglo-Saxon civilization, the advance agents of the cattle raiser and the farmer. The furs and skins which the traders or the hunters and trappers obtained were exported in large quantities to Europe. As the Indians from whom the furs were bought did not care for gold and silver in return, they were paid in wampum, or strings of shells—a currency that passed freely over all the continent. Sometimes the Indians preferred powder, shot, and muskets, sometimes rum, and sometimes articles of dress. From the redskins the frontiersman learned to be patient of cold and hunger, and to adopt the Indian's moccasins and his leather hunting shirts.

It was in quest of furs that the Dutch and English traders pushed up Hudson River, reaching through the Mohawk valley to the Great Lakes and the Illinois country. It was the same object that led Virginia traders to cross the Alleghanies toward the close of the seventeenth century and to explore parts of Tennessee and the western Carolinas. The settlers in the dangerous frontier towns were compelled to

live with their rifles in their hands, constantly on the alert for an attack by the Indians. This life of constant watchfulness constituted excellent training for the men who, in the war for independence, made corps of sharpshooters noted for their skill in many engagements of that war. Washington himself, in his youth, was educated in the arts of frontier life. Men trained in such a school of hard experience would be little likely to endure what they regarded as tyranny; they were not disposed to favor aristocratic principles of government.

Although throughout the colonies agriculture was the most important occupation of the people, and although in the Middle colonies an abundant variety of crops testified to the skill of the farmer, the success which he achieved was won in spite of many obstacles and dangers. None of the appliances of modern agriculture lay at his command. "His tools were rude yet costly, his plow a heavy mass of iron, his cattle expensive and at first scarcely to be obtained." There was, moreover, in many cases, constant danger that the savage might destroy the farmer's home, crops, and entire possessions. Present improvements in appliances for harvesting, tilling, and planting are almost entirely products of the past half-century; before 1850 the scythe and sickle were the almost universal tools for cutting. Agriculture as a science, moreover, is something entirely modern. For many processes new machines have been invented, and where the old tools still remain they are improved in quality and cheapened in price. Scarcely one of the implements of tillage remains the same as it was in 1763. European cattle were imported into the colonies at an early date, and thousands of head grazed upon the western lands of the Carolinas and Virginia and the Middle colonies. But before the American Revolution, American sheep were, as a rule, coarse-woolled and very inferior animals. Cotton, which has since acquired such enormous importance as an export from the Southern States, was at this period only cultivated in small quantities for the use

of the farmers. It was spun into coarse cloths; not until near the end of the century did Whitney's invention of the cotton gin make it possible for cotton to become an important commercial commodity. The manufacture of hemp and flax was commenced early in the seventeenth century, and many of the colonies attempted to stimulate it by means of bounties; but even in 1763 the entire hemp crop was of little value. The earliest American colonists, in their endeavor to raise such crops as would furnish an adequate supply of food, had discovered that maize, or Indian corn, was best adapted for this purpose. They learned from the Indians how to plant this hardy cereal, and in a short while corn became the most important native food stuff.

It would be more or less futile, although it might be an interesting occupation, to enumerate some of the conveniences and familiar appliances of modern life which were unknown to our ancestors of sevenscore years ago. Even the commonplace operation of lighting fires was so tedious and complicated a process in those days that housekeepers were unwilling to let a fire go out overnight. The old-fashioned match was simply a splint dipped in brimstone and kindled from a piece of tinder set on fire by a spark from the flint and steel. If perchance fires were extinguished or died out, a favorite method of starting them again was to hurry to a neighbor's house in quest of a shovelful of burning coals. This, however, was a dangerous process in villages of wooden houses; therefore the law put a penalty upon so risky a method of starting a fire. The primitive appliances upon which the farmer depended we have already named, but the multitude of modern conveniences unknown at that period would furnish a list of surprising length. In 1763 electricity was a scientific toy, a plaything that promised little of practical value. Although coal had been found within the colonies at the beginning of the Revolution, nothing was known of the great coal fields of Pennsylvania. Indeed, the development of our mineral resources is almost entirely an achievement of the nineteenth century. The

existence of iron manufactures dates from the introduction of the steam engine, which increased the power of the blast for smelting. But Watt's first patent was not taken out until 1769. The first two engines in the colonies were of the Newcomen pattern, one imported in 1736 for the Schuyler copper mines at Passaic, New Jersey, the other built in 1772 by Christopher Coles, of Philadelphia, for use in a distillery. Not until the end of the century was there, even in England, an extensive employment of the improved steam engine for operating machinery. In fact, Watt's first engine in England was not built until 1770. The succession of inventions which now took place in England and which effected that radical change in the organization of production which historians have not improperly called the "Industrial Revolution" was hardly begun when the Revolutionary War commenced. The inventions of Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton, and Cartwright were made between 1764 and 1786,—that is to say, during the very period when a political Revolution was being accomplished in North America. There was not a cotton mill in America until 1787, and even at the beginning of the nineteenth century the spinning of cotton and wool in this country was still done upon the old-fashioned hand spinning wheel, whether the product was intended for home use or for sale upon the markets. In the latter case the spinning master of a neighborhood distributed the materials to the spinners, who did the work at their own houses. Factories, and the whole economic system which is typified by the factory, belong to a later epoch.

Mills, daily newspapers, and our elaborate postal and telegraph systems were unknown in 1763. Our ancestors led a life of simplicity and uneventfulness. The farmhouses in which they lived were generally built of logs, or of rough, unpainted clapboards. The cooking was done before huge open wood fires or in large brick ovens. Many of the vegetables which are now placed upon our tables—among them the tomato, the cauliflower, and the eggplant—were

unfamiliar. Many varieties of summer fruits were likewise unknown. "Salt pork was the meat most commonly eaten, but venison and other game were by no means rare. Corn in the form of hominy, mush, oatcake, and rye bread were more generally seen on the table than bread made of wheat."

Tallow candles, whale-oil lamps, and open wood fires gave light in the evening. In the neighborhood of some of the larger cities the forests were cut down upon so large a scale for home use and for exportation that the timber supply frequently fell short of the demand. Not long before the Revolution, complaints of its dearness were frequent in the city of Philadelphia. The supply of food, however, seems everywhere and among all classes to have been abundant. The slaves of the South, the "indentured servants," as well as the free mechanic, never suffered want. Those persons who worked for hire generally received probably three times as much as the corresponding English laborer. In 1723 a leading royal official observed that "everyone is able to procure a piece of land at an inconsiderable rate, and therefore is fond to set up for himself rather than work for hire. This makes labor continue very dear, a common laborer usually earning three shillings by the day." The land was very fertile and the returns to the farmer were large; hence employers found it necessary to pay high wages to deter people from securing land and engaging in agriculture. Until quite recently, this abundance of cheap, fertile land has been an important factor in the maintenance of high wages for hired labor throughout the country.

There were newspapers in 1763,—probably a dozen of them in all the colonies. But the largest of them was about the size of a pocket handkerchief, was published only once a week, and bore but little resemblance to the modern daily, with its dozen or more large pages full of telegraphic news from all parts of the world, a multitude of advertisements, and a whole vocabulary of expressions which would have meant nothing to our colonial forefathers. A New York or Philadelphia paper of to-day would have been something

of an enigma to the contemporaries of Benjamin Franklin. Its "want" column contains references to a score of occupations which had no existence then,—telegraph operators, stenographers, typewriters, bookkeepers, canvassers, commercial travellers, engineers, hackmen, conductors, motormen, gripmen, brakemen, electricians, linemen, automobile operators, elevator boys, and a host of others. There were, on the other hand, many things in the newspapers of those days which would appear strange to us now. The frequent announcement that a steamer would leave for some distant port in a few days, or that certain goods were for sale at such and such a shop, would, of course, not surprise us, for there are many similar announcements to-day in the advertising columns of the modern daily. We might have some difficulty, however, in understanding what was meant by the statement that a certain plantation was to be sold "at vendue," *i.e.*, at auction. We should be surprised to learn that prizes were publicly offered for the arrest and return of runaway negroes, or "indentured servants" or "apprentice lads." We should, moreover, seek in vain for any mention in those days of people now generically known as the "laboring class,"—the class consisting of the thousands of free mechanics, factory employés, and all those men and women and children who offer their labor for sale in return for regular wages.

There were many families that employed no outsiders whatever to assist them in their work, especially in the North. But, as a rule, each household South and North contained a number of dependents,—persons who occupied a position of economic, if not of social, inferiority, and who performed the labors that were assigned to them by the head of the household. These economic dependents were of three classes. First, and numerically foremost, especially in the South, were the slaves. Slavery, in fact, was the fundamental economic institution of the Southern colonies. We have already had occasion to state that in 1763 more than one-sixth of the total colonial population consisted

of slaves. These were very unevenly distributed throughout the several provinces. The simple agriculture of the South made a large slave class useful and desirable. But it took many years to become an important feature of Southern life. Thirty years after the first negro slaves had been landed, unrequested, in the colony of Virginia, there were only three hundred of them to be found there. By 1661 there were two thousand; but at the end of the century the blacks were as numerous as the whites, and in South Carolina two-thirds of the population were slaves. At the time of which we are writing (1763), Virginia, with a total population of three hundred thousand, had over one hundred and twenty-five thousand blacks. In Maryland and Virginia slavery assumed a patriarchal form. The slaves worked under the eye of the owner, and not, as in South Carolina, under the oppressive supervision of the owner's agent. The culture of tobacco was comparatively easy, and although there were severe laws to prevent the negroes from meetings, carrying arms, and running away, the practice was more humane than the rules laid down by these laws. But in South Carolina and Georgia, where the raising of rice and indigo prevailed, slavery was not only more indispensable than in the other colonies, but the proportionally large number of blacks made severe laws necessary to preclude an insurrection against their white masters. In the eye of the law, which, as we have said, was more severe than the practice, slaves were simply chattels, not human beings. A master could kill a slave, just as he might destroy any other part of his property. Runaways could be slain at sight by anyone, the owner being reimbursed from the public treasury.

In the North, on the other hand, there were very few slaves. The cold climate in the winter made the exclusive practice of agriculture impossible, and, even in the summer, farming required an intelligent and persistent activity such as the slave was incapable of manifesting. But the foreign slave trade was to a great extent in the hands of New England

men. There were merchants in Salem, Boston, and Newport who regularly sent out cargoes of trinkets and rum to Africa in exchange for shiploads of negroes. These unwilling immigrants were then usually sold at auction in the South. What little demand there was for them in the North was due to the desire of the wealthier classes for negro servants. The aristocratic classes in New York had at one time taken rather favorably to the idea of possessing a large number of slaves as household servants; but the so-called "negro plot" of 1741 aroused such hatred for the Ethiopians, such fear of them as a class, and caused such repressive laws against them, that in 1755 a census of New York shows that there were then only a few thousand slaves in the province. The number in Massachusetts in 1754 was carefully calculated at less than four thousand five hundred. After that date the number probably declined rather than increased.

Another class of subservient laborers consisted of those whites whose servitude, sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary, was only temporary. Among those bound to labor against their will were large numbers of convicts, not only men and women who had been guilty of stealing or other minor offences, but also forgers, counterfeiters, and oftentimes murderers, who were transported from British prisons to the colonies and sold into service for a number of years or, in a few cases, for life. The records of these prisons bear frequent accounts of highway robbers and other offenders who had been reprieved that they might go to Virginia. On one occasion, London sent "one hundred of its worst-disposed children, of whom it was desirous of being disburdened, to be apprenticed in the colonies." One Act of Parliament permitted convicts sentenced to death to commute the sentence by serving a master in the colonies for fourteen years. Another act provided that persons sentenced to be whipped or branded might if they wished escape the punishment by serving seven years in the colonies and never returning home. While many of these

offenders were shipped to the American colonies, it must be noted that a great part of them were also sent to the British West Indies.

But all the laborers who were bound to service for a number of years were not criminals. Many of the indentured apprentices sold themselves voluntarily into service for a term of years in return for transportation to America. Still others, usually boys and young women, had been kidnapped and sold by the persons who stole them. The "indenture" was a contract, carefully drawn up in writing, by which the laborer agreed to work, usually three or five or seven years, in consideration of gratuitous passage to America. Many of these contracts were made with the captain of the ship, who, after the arrival of the vessel in America, would advertise that he had carpenters, tailors, farmers, shoemakers, etc., for sale. Whoever wanted the laborers might purchase them for perhaps $50 apiece, and keep them by virtue of the "indenture" for the specified number of years in return for clothes, food, and lodging. These voluntary bondservants, including not only men, but also women and children, were sometimes called "redemptioners," because they redeemed their time of service with labor. Their position, especially in the South, was unfortunate; they were continually running away, and rewards were constantly being offered for their arrest. The laws concerning them were harsh. "They might not marry without the consent of their masters; an assault upon the latter was heavily punished; to run away was but to lengthen the term of service, and for a second offence to be branded on the cheek. For numerous petty offences their service could be prolonged, and masters could thus retain them legally for years even after the term fixed in the bond." In the eighteenth century, the system of indentured servitude declined in the Southern colonies; yet it continued everywhere until the Revolution. When the term of service expired, indentured servants became free and might offer their services to whomsoever they chose. In the South

they could not successfully compete with slave labor. But in the North many of them rose in the social scale, some of them attained positions of prominence, while the larger part became landholders and swelled the number of small proprietors.

Thus slaves and indentured servants were at one end of the social ladder, and the few professional men that were in the colonies were at the other end. The clergy from the very start held a position of prominence, especially in New England. At the time of the Revolution, the members of the legal profession rose to social eminence. The physicians of the several colonies were usually trained in Europe, if, indeed, they were trained at all. Not until 1765 was there an American medical college. In that year the Medical Department of the University of Pennsylvania was founded. Two years later, the College of Physicians and Surgeons, the Medical Department of King's College at New York, was also established. Until after the war these two medical institutions were the only ones in the colonies. The education of the majority of physicians and surgeons was obtained by a period of from three to seven years' apprenticeship to a medical practitioner. But the duties of apprenticeship consisted, besides a certain amount of study and the compounding of medicines, largely of certain menial offices. Only the favored few were able to study in the celebrated schools of London, Edinburgh, and Leyden. Prior to the Revolution, moreover, there was but one medical society, formed in New Jersey in 1766, and one general hospital, opened at Philadelphia in 1756. The standard medical works and textbooks were almost entirely of foreign authorship. Vaccination was as yet undiscovered. Auscultation was unknown. The thermometer was not used in practical medicine. Chloroform was not employed as an anæsthetic until the middle of the nineteenth century. The use of ether for the same purpose was first demonstrated in Boston in 1846. Patients doomed to undergo surgical operations were usually forcibly

restrained by powerful assistants, or confined by straps to the operating table.

In the more cultivated portions of the colonies the most influential person was usually the clergyman. In the beginnings of New England history the ministers were practically the heads of society. At the time immediately preceding the Revolution, however, their influence had considerably waned and was no longer what it had been in the time of Cotton and the Mathers. But the New England pastors, usually scholarly men, continued to retain a degree of social prominence. These men were, as a rule, ardent patriots during the Revolutionary period, and played no small part in the struggle for freedom. Their patriotism, however, was stimulated quite as much by the dread of religious as of political tyranny. There was a general fear in New England that the home government was determined to impose bishops upon each of the colonies and to enforce by law the ritual of the Church of England. It was even rumored that Cambridge had been suggested as the seat of a colonial bishop. This rumor was one of the causes which in Massachusetts brought on the Revolution. When it first became loud, Jonathan Mayhew, of Boston, a Harvard graduate, began a series of publications that sounded an alarm throughout the colonies. "Will they," he cried, "never let us rest in peace, except where all the weary are at rest? Is it not enough that they persecuted us out of the Old World?"

In the beginning of American colonial history, religious toleration was unknown. New England had persecuted Episcopalians, Quakers, and Dissenters. A Dutch governor of New York, Stuyvesant, had sent Quakers in chains to Holland. Virginia was bitterly intolerant, and even the Maryland Constitution of 1649 imposed the death penalty upon Socinians, and provided for fining, imprisoning, or banishing whoever reproached the Virgin Mary. But by the time of the Revolution these harsh laws had been almost entirely swept away, and practically a considerable degree

of religious toleration prevailed in all the colonies. Almost all the clergymen of New England made common cause against Great Britain when the Revolutionary conflict began, and Congregationalists, Huguenots, and Covenanters fought side by side.

In the Middle and Southern colonies the clergy were less distinctly the leaders of the people than in New England. Many of the Episcopalian ministers cared little for politics. Some of them were bitter and relentless in their Toryism; but their very violence brought discredit on the cause they represented. In Maryland the Church of England was completely established by law, and all taxpayers were compelled to contribute to the support of the Established Church. In Virginia the Church was also established, but, as the eighteenth century advanced, the growth of dissent was so rapid that at the opening of the Revolution the Dissenters were more numerous than the Churchmen. So rapid in fact, had been the increase in the number of Dissenters that stringent laws were frequently passed against them. But they were of little or no avail. In Pennsylvania, as in Rhode Island, religion was absolutely free. The fear of an American episcopate which gave rise to so much alarm in Massachusetts was also felt in Virginia and in several of the Middle and Southern colonies, where the laymen were unwilling to give up the control which they exercised over the clergy of the several parishes. It should be noted, however, that although Protestants of all sects were granted a kind of toleration throughout the colonies, the Roman Catholics were, except in Pennsylvania, debarred from civil rights or else subjected to severe penalties.

In colonial days, churchgoing was the chief occupation of Sundays. Although even in cold New England the churches were rarely if ever heated, and the sermons lasted two or three hours, there seems to have been no widespread unwillingness on the part of the people to sit patiently through it all on the rough hard benches of the village church and listen attentively to a tirade in which fire and

brimstone were depicted as the sure punishment of a sinful career. Those who neglected to attend church regularly were hunted down and admonished, fined, or, if they persisted in wrongdoing, were even imprisoned. To travel on Sunday was a serious and punishable offence. Severe as were the punishments inflicted for things which are now not even regarded as misdeeds, the so-called "Blue Laws of Connecticut" must be stamped as a wretched imposture, due to Peters's *History of Connecticut*. The New Englanders were perfectly capable of amusing themselves at times, by house raisings, dancing parties, husking, spinning, quilting, and apple-paring bees, into which the whole neighborhood, and especially the young people, entered with enthusiasm.

Although drunkenness was grimly frowned down, and only decent, God-fearing men were allowed to keep taverns, wines and liquors were everywhere frequently consumed, and even New England had as yet no reputation for temperance. Cider and rum were favorite beverages. Those who indulged too freely and acquired a reputation for intemperance had their names posted up in the taverns as a warning to the proprietor that he should sell them no liquor. Every town in New York and Pennsylvania had its tavern, which was the favorite meeting place for the people of the community and of the surrounding country. In New Jersey, however, laws had to be passed to induce villages to maintain places where travellers might find a decent, inexpensive lodging. In the Middle colonies and the South, the people were not content, as a rule, with the amusements of the New England farmers, at which, it must be admitted, hard drinking was not infrequent; they encouraged horse racing, bull baiting, cock fighting, tavern parties, balls, and picnics. The poor whites of the South, who early had a reputation as reckless, rollicking fellows, met frequently around the country tavern to engage in wrestling and gouging matches.

The English law, which was enforced throughout the colonies generally, recognized and punished as crimes many

things, like the failure to attend church, which have now ceased to be so regarded. Apostasy, heresy, witchcraft, prophesying, divination, and sorcery in various forms were dealt with as crimes. The merchant was forbidden to "engross," that is, to buy up quantities of provisions with a view to enhance the market price; to "forestall," or hinder merchandise upon its way to the markets; and to "regrate," or buy provisions within a market with the intention to sell them again within the same market. It was punishable, moreover, to exercise a trade without having served a due apprenticeship. But besides many matters which the English law made criminal, there were semi-religious offences recognized only by provincial laws. In Connecticut, tobacco was forbidden to anyone under twenty years of age, unless on the express order of a physician; those who were over twenty years were only allowed to smoke once a day, and then not within ten miles of any dwelling. Punishments, too, were more severe in those days than in ours. The death penalty was imposed for almost any of the graver offences, instead of being reserved for two or three, as it is to-day. The attitude of the courts toward those accused of crime was arbitrary and positive. Hangings and whippings were frequent public spectacles. The stocks, the pillory, and the stool of repentance were to be seen in every village. Except in the South, however, crime was nowhere so prevalent as to be a troublesome question, with the single exception of piracy. Pirates infested the coast, frequently with the connivance of public officials. Public sentiment was not strong against a set of men who brought wealth to the seaboard towns and spent it lavishly. The most cruel forms of punishment were reserved for the negro offenders, several of whom were burned at the stake for arson or murder. Criminals were frequently branded and mutilated, and not infrequently they were obliged to wear, sewed to their garments in some conspicuous fashion, colored letters indicative of the offences committed. The Quakers, it should be noted by way of exception, were

quite lenient in their treatment of evildoers throughout the early history of Pennsylvania. The prisons in which offenders were kept were, as a rule, beyond description. In several of the colonies they were nothing better than underground dungeons, into which all offenders were thrown regardless of age or sex,—"the trembling novice in crime, the debtor, the disgusting object of public contempt besmeared with filth from the pillory, the unhappy victim of the lash streaming with blood from the whipping post, the half-naked vagrant, the loathsome drunkard, the sick and condemned criminal, were all huddled together in the same dark, damp compartments." A large proportion of the prison inmates were incarcerated for debt. Even as late as 1829, it was estimated that there were three thousand imprisoned debtors in Massachusetts, ten thousand in New York, seven thousand in Pennsylvania, three thousand in Maryland, and a like proportion in other States. Not a small number of them were put in jail for debts of less than $5. Many of them, moreover, were honest debtors, unable to pay solely because of misfortune. In most of the prisons, no attendants were provided for the sick, no medicines, no additional nourishment; none of the prisoners received bedding or a supply of clothing; the poorest class slept on the floor. Oftentimes there were taverns connected with the jails, and a common custom among prisoners was what was called "blanketing a stranger," an operation which consisted of tossing a newcomer in a blanket until he parted with all his superfluous clothing, to be used in exchange for liquor.

There was a full system of courts, ranging from the colonial judges to the justices of the peace and what were known as the "commissioners of small causes," appointed by colonial authority in each town. The New England magistrates were usually men of good character, although they were not especially trained in the law. In Pennsylvania and Delaware each village had its Quaker "squire," or magistrate, who dispensed justice in the neighboring tavern and was

highly regarded by the people. Throughout the colonies, however, and practically until the second part of the eighteenth century, the study of the law was neglected. There were no opportunities for its pursuit, and the ministry was regarded as the only distinguished profession. But there was no lack of litigation. Personal disputes of all kinds were frequent, and in some of the colonies there were many contests between towns regarding lands, and between colonies regarding boundary lines. At the close of the French and Indian War, in 1763, so many eminent men had taken up the law as a profession that it stood fully on a level with the ministry. At that time many of the lawyers were well-read and accomplished men, who joined with their technical knowledge a considerable acquaintance with literature, or were noted for their natural eloquence. The prominence of legally trained men, such as John Adams, James Otis, Thomas Jefferson, John Dickinson, and many other lawyers, gave the Revolutionary struggle a particularly legal character. The legal profession contributed more to the Revolution than any other single class of men. To the supporters from its ranks is due that nicety and clearness with which the various points in dispute between the colonies and England were discussed in every part of the country; the legal writers of America showed a superiority in argument over their opponents in London whenever they treated of the professional elements of the controversy.

With regard to their political organization, there was less difference between the colonies than in economic or religious respects; it is therefore not merely by a coincidence that the lawyers were the spokesmen of the movement toward union and independence.

Besides the innumerable differences which distinguished the colonies from each other, and of which we have given a brief account, there was another circumstance which made close sympathy and united action extremely unlikely if not altogether impossible. We refer to the great difficulty of transportation and intercourse between the several provinces.

We have already had occasion to remark that the population of all the colonies clung to the seacoast. So sparse, however, was the population, that even along the coast there were often hundreds of miles of unbroken solitude from one settlement to another. A journey of many days, and sometimes weeks, by sea or land, separated the Northern colonies from those of the South. In fact, the sea was the best means of intercolonial communication. On land innumerable obstacles had to be overcome. The roads themselves had to be cut through the dense forests that covered the Atlantic coast region, although in many cases the Indian trails suggested the lines along which highways might be built. Wagon roads did not exist far from the seacoast until after 1750. The largest streams which intersected the country were crossed by ferries. There were no bridges across the principal rivers; indeed, iron bridges were entirely unknown, even in England, until 1779.

The colonial roads were in charge of the local political units, the towns and the counties. They were constructed only as local needs demanded, and without reference to any general plan for colonial highways. "Road taxes" were paid in labor, not in money, and the work of road building was very badly done. Although in Massachusetts good roads were more frequent than in most of the colonies, they were exceedingly wretched where they passed over the hills. In New York, a good road ran through Orange and Ulster Counties to Albany. From Boston to New York was a tedious journey. Roads which in fair weather were tolerable became little better than quagmires in spring and winter. In fact, almost all interior communication, whether by land or by water, between the colonies was cut off during the winter months. Country squires and patricians rode in their coaches and four, or even six, when the journey was long or the season unfavorable. Especially in the Middle colonies, postilions and outriders were the acme of style. But these equipages were clumsy and slow. After 1756, a stage coach ran from New York to Philadelphia once a

week, at an average speed of rather less than three miles an hour. As the roads were rough and the wagons had no springs, it is not likely that the passengers clamored for faster travel. Pennsylvania boasted a number of fairly good roads which radiated from Philadelphia, but many of these were often impassable, especially in winter, and travel was quite as difficult as in any of the Southern colonies, where but little attention was paid to road building. In 1766, an enterprising citizen advertised what he called "the flying machine," which started from Powles' Hook three times a week and performed the journey during the summer season in a day and a half, at a price of twenty shillings per passenger. Travellers, however, were obliged to cross the ferry the evening before the departure of the machine, which under favorable circumstances *flew* at a speed of perhaps five miles an hour. The usual mode of travel between the principal seacoast cities was by sailing vessel. But the time required for making a journey in this fashion was exceedingly uncertain, and many travellers preferred going on horseback to avoid delays. If a wife accompanied her husband on a journey of this kind, she usually rode behind him on a pillion.

When the Revolutionary War broke out, there were no means of signalling news other than by semaphores, or similar devices, such as had existed in one form or another for twenty centuries. Nor was there a regular or reliable postal system. In 1692 a royal patent had appointed a postmaster-general of the British colonies in North America. But nothing whatever was done, we are told, "on account of the dispersed situations of the inhabitants," and letters could be sent only once in six weeks from the Potomac to Philadelphia. In 1710, Parliament passed "an act for establishing a General Post Office for all Her Majesty's dominions." The postmaster-general was authorized to keep "one chief letter-office in New York, and another chief office at some convenient place or places in each of Her Majesty's provinces or colonies in America." A line of posts was

established from the Piscataqua to Philadelphia, and later extended to Williamsburg in Virginia. The post left as often as letters enough were lodged to pay the expenses. The mails were scanty and were generally carried on horseback. The rates varied according to distance, from eight cents to twenty-five for a single letter. In 1753, Benjamin Franklin was appointed postmaster-general for America. He retained this position until 1774, and during his characteristically energetic and business-like administration of the American office the service was improved and the office came to yield three times as much revenue to the crown as the post office of Ireland, whereas before 1753 it had yielded nothing. By 1765, a post rider left New York City every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday for Philadelphia. Every Monday and Thursday another left New York for Boston. Once every week a rider left for Albany on his way to Quebec. On the first Wednesday of each month a packet boat sailed from New York for England with the mail; this was the only mail between Great Britain and her American colonies.

Yet, in spite of the difficulties which beset intercourse between the several colonies, and in spite of the diversities which seemed to make united action among them impossible, the reasonable observer could easily detect certain elements which pointed in the direction of a community of interests and a sympathy of purpose. The colonies were, in the main, English in speech and institutions. A common blood, a common tongue, a common pride of race, and common political ideals built upon the fundamental principles of English freedom, brought the colonies together in spirit and character. The pressure of circumstances had frequently resulted in united action where previously nothing but jealousy and rival interests appeared to prevail. Of the features manifested to a greater or less degree in all the colonies, none was more characteristic than the tendency toward democratic institutions,—the acceptance of the principle that the people should have a share in the government.

There were, to be sure, differences in the strength of this sentiment and differences in the scope of privileges reserved to the representatives of the people. But everywhere, as we shall later point out in detail, the theory of government, or at least its practice, was different in the colonies from what it was in England at the time of the Revolution. The sentiment of human equality had already prevailed in most of the colonies over the influence of English caste and Puritan theocracy, and there were indications of a bolder, freer spirit than could be found across the Atlantic.

CHAPTER III

THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN 1763—(Continued)

It is customary to divide the thirteen original colonies, with regard to their internal polity, into the three Blackstonian classes: provincial establishments, proprietary governments, and charter governments. Objections have been made to this classification on the ground that the term "charter government" is loose and inexact, and that instead of three forms of colonial government there were really only two, the corporations and the provinces. But for all practical purposes the threefold division is a useful one; it is, moreover, consecrated by tradition, and we shall therefore adhere to it. In 1763, the charter colonies were Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island; the proprietary colonies were Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland; the others, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, were royal or provincial colonies. But the colonies differed not only with regard to the nature and organization of their central government. In the organization of their local affairs, they are also usually divided into three classes, as we shall see hereafter.

We may most appropriately begin a study of the political organization of the colonies by considering their central governments. In the first place, it is a notable fact that many of the early charters granted by England to her American colonies were exceedingly liberal in their terms. This liberality, this tendency toward the acceptance

of democratic ideas on the part of English rulers who at home were utterly opposed to free institutions, can best be explained by their fervid desire to be rid of their rebellious subjects,—Puritans, Quakers, and Roman Catholics,—who would be attracted to the New World by the prospect of unwonted liberty. In fact, no other colonists in the world enjoyed the political liberty which England permitted her American subjects to enjoy, either purposely or because her attention was too largely engrossed by other matters to note the growth of free institutions in the New World. The Spanish and French governments in this country, unlike the English, were practically military despotisms, and admitted the settlers to no voice in legislation or administration. Holland was somewhat more liberal than Spain or France; but the Dutch colonists enjoyed fewer privileges than the English. The English colonists brought with them national traditions and political theories which they immediately began to adapt, consciously or unconsciously, to the needs of their new environment. Their remoteness from Europe, the high degree of social equality which existed in many of the colonies, and the seeming indifference of the mother country, contributed to the development of an independent and democratic spirit.

As the king could not himself attend to all the details of government in his American possessions, a body called the "Lords of the Board of Trade and Plantations" was commissioned in 1692 to exercise a general supervision of the colonies. This body, popularly called the "Lords of Trade," had its headquarters in London and received annual reports from the governors concerning the general condition and growth of their respective provinces. These Lords of Trade made recommendations to the provincial governors, bade them carry out this or that policy, instructed the colonial governors to encourage or to veto certain classes of laws. They examined all the laws sent over by the legislatures, and advised the king which of them should be disallowed or vetoed.

Two of the so-called charter colonies, Connecticut and Rhode Island, were republics in all but name. The charter of Connecticut had been obtained from Charles II. in 1662. It made that colony almost independent. Like Rhode Island, Connecticut elected its own legislature and governor, and did not even have to send its laws to England for approval. Neither of these colonies, to be sure, could make treaties with foreign countries; but in all other respects they were, so to speak, independent States, under the protectorate of Great Britain. So liberal and democratic, indeed, were the charters of these two colonies that Connecticut retained it as a State of the Union until the year 1818, and Rhode Island kept its charter until 1842. The status of the other so-called charter colony, Massachusetts, had originally approached that of a republic; but subsequent interference from the mother country reduced it to a condition that may be described as half free, half under royal control. Under the original charter, Massachusetts elected its legislature and governor. The colonists of Massachusetts at one time even coined their own money, and issued the famous "pine tree shilling." They had established a Congregational Church, ceased to issue writs in the king's name, and went so far as to drop the oath of allegiance to England and to oblige public officers and the people to swear allegiance only to Massachusetts.

The charter colonies were so called because their political organization was based upon written contracts between the king and the colonists, or between the king and a corporation representing the colonists. These charters or contracts defined the share which each party should have in the government. It was assumed that they could not be changed without the consent of both parties. But, as a matter of fact, the king and his ministers devised innumerable pretexts for withdrawing or changing the charters, usually on the ground that some feature of them had been violated by the colonists.

In the colonies of the second group, some individual called the "proprietary" was given a tract of land by the king,

and empowered to sell the land to settlers, to establish a government, and to appoint the governors of the colony. The proprietary was, in a sense, substituted for the king.

In the third group of colonies, the king appointed the governors directly and instructed them as to the way in which they should carry on the affairs of their respective colonies.

The difference between these three groups, it will be observed, related primarily to the character and method of filling the governor's office. In the republican colonies, where the governor was chosen by the people, he naturally represented the interests of the people. In the proprietary colonies, he was the agent of the Penns or the Calverts. In the royal colonies, he was an agent of the king. But in all the thirteen colonies there was a legislative assembly elected by the people. The basis of representation in the Assembly differed, of course, in different colonies. The Assembly controlled the expenditure of public money. Even in the South, where the forces making toward a democratic government were less pronounced than in the North, the people obtained a share in the government, which was by no means left to the exclusive control of the governor and his Council. In fact, legislative institutions seemed to arise spontaneously in all the colonies. In a quaint but characteristic phrase, the Tory historian Hutchinson tells us that in the year 1619 a House of Burgesses "broke out" in Virginia.

In all the colonies the governor was assisted by an executive and advisory Council, sometimes called the Upper Chamber. Although this body was originally an imitation of the king's Privy Council in England, it took part in the work of legislation and thus sat as an upper house, with more or less power of refusing and amending the acts of the Assembly,—except in Pennsylvania, where the legislature really consisted of but one chamber. The members of this council were appointed in different ways. In Massachusetts they were chosen by the outgoing legislature; in

Connecticut, by the people; in other colonies, by the king or the proprietary.

Thus the political organization of the colonies was closely patterned upon that of England. The governors corresponded to the king. The Council stood for the House of Lords, and the Assembly or House of Burgesses answered to the House of Commons. Just as in England political history consisted in the main of a conflict between the Commons and the king, so in the colonies there was a constant succession of differences between the popular Assembly and the governors, especially where the governors were not elected by the people. The members of the Assembly made their right to levy taxes a powerful weapon in opposition to the royal officers. In fact, the history of the colonies was largely made up of petty bickerings between the popular Assembly and the royal governor. The latter, as chief executive officer, might have ruled in most despotic fashion had not the Assembly continually kept him in check. This was done chiefly by controlling the governor's salary. Although the executive in each colony insisted on being paid a fixed and regular amount, the Assembly always refused to do this and would only consent to vote from time to time such sums as it thought right and proper. The salary of the governor not infrequently amounted to £1,000 in English currency annually. It must not be thought, however, that he was entirely dependent for an income on the salary which the Assembly voted to pay him. There were other sources of revenue. Such, for example, were the quitrents, payable to the king or the proprietary or the governor, which the latter could farm out. He could, moreover, collect fees for patenting lands, and could assess office holders. So good were the opportunities for reaping a rich harvest, that broken-down court favorites considered an appointment to the colonies as governor a means of retrieving fallen fortunes, and made little attempt to conceal their sordid purpose. Other sources of revenue over which the Assembly exercised little or no control were

export duties and port duties for the benefit of the provincial government, and regular parish and county levies.

The frequent disputes with regard to salary matters were manifestly a disturbing element in colonial history; but they served as an excellent training school for the agitation preceding and accompanying the Revolution. Nowhere did the Assembly display a more stubborn spirit of opposition, nowhere were the conflicts with the governors more violent, than in Massachusetts. In this colony the Assembly declared that it was "the undoubted right of all Englishmen by Magna Charta, to raise and dispose of money for the public service of their own free accord, without compulsion." Although the governors were backed up by writs from England, and although the home government insisted most strenuously upon the point at issue, yet the colonists were triumphant in 1735, and the Assembly retained the power to determine annually what salary the governor should receive. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, which retained their old charters under which the governor was elected by the people, these quarrels between the Assembly and the governor did not arise, for both departments of the colonial government owed their authority to the people. Connecticut, like Massachusetts, was successful in preventing legal appeals to England. In the Middle colonies, and especially in Pennsylvania, there was the same conflict of interests as in Massachusetts. Throughout a considerable period in Pennsylvania, the successors of William Penn refused to permit the taxation of their lands for the conduct of military operations. The Assembly would not pay the governor's salary except on condition that the proprietary estates paid their share in the cost of defence. Here, too, the Assembly ultimately triumphed in 1759. The governors of New York were in almost continuous controversy with the Assembly, whose consent was necessary in order to raise the supplies requisite for resisting the invasions of the French and Indians. New Jersey offered the curious example of a governor who understood how to work in

harmony with the representatives of the people. Governor Belcher, who was the first benefactor of the College of New Jersey, had learned from his previous experience in Massachusetts that an attitude of complaisance was more likely to secure the objects which he had in view than stubborn opposition to the will of the Assembly.

In Virginia, the Assembly had adroitly made the colonial treasurer an officer of its own appointment; and when, subsequently, the governors asserted their claim of prerogative and their right to certain fees, the burgesses simply refused to vote money for the public defence. But the governors of the Southern colonies usually triumphed over the opposition made by popular Assemblies, while in the colonies north of Maryland the Assemblies generally won the day. Although the contests were not solely over salaries, they were usually narrowed down so that the Assembly refused to vote the governor's salary until he would agree to do as it wished. Franklin called this system one of "bargain and sale proceedings in legislation." Indeed, measures were often passed with the express provision that if the governor pass "such bills as now lie before him, there shall be paid him the sum of five hundred pounds." Without this system, the legislature would have been powerless to accomplish the popular will; but under it, the governor, who could call and adjourn the legislature at his pleasure, was compelled to call it because he was dependent upon it for financial aid. This power over the purse gave the legislatures virtual control of the government; and as the lower house was elected by the people, the people were the real rulers. In spite of the governor's power to veto the laws, to prorogue or dissolve the legislature, and, if the king approved, never to call it together again, the popular Assemblies secured the passage of laws which they regarded as necessary to the colonial welfare,—laws which otherwise would probably never have been allowed by the royal governors.

Not only the governors were at the mercy of the representatives of the people, but the colonial judges as well.

The judges of the superior courts were, except in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and the three proprietary colonies, directly or indirectly appointed by the crown, whose interests they were thus bound to maintain; especially as they held their office not upon good behavior, as in England, but at the pleasure of the king or the royal governor. As their salaries were fixed and paid from year to year by the legislature, they were not disposed to ignore the desires of the people. In New York, for example, where the judges were supposed to have a keen sense of their dependence on the legislature, that body immediately reduced by £50 the salary of a certain chief justice who gave a decision against a member of the legislature. This condition of affairs was set aside in 1761, when the salaries of judges were paid out of the king's land rents, and the judges were bound to the interests of the crown; whereupon the colonies offered to fix regular salaries for the judges, provided the home government would agree to appoint them for life or for good behavior. But the home authorities refused to accept this offer, fearing that the judges might become American in their sympathies through long residence in the colonies. The control which the Assemblies had obtained over judges and governors was no part of the original plan of colonial government, but the result of that policy of neglect which was abandoned at the accession of George III.

The colonial legislatures, while they possessed the power to make laws valid within each colony, were subjected to numerous limitations. Their acts, as we have already stated in another connection, were subject to the approval of the governor, who had an absolute veto on all legislation, subject to revision by the king. It should be noted, however, that in many of the colonies bills were proposed by the governor, and the Assembly had little more than the power of approval. Even in the colonies where the legislature introduced most of the bills the influence of the governor upon legislation was considerable.

When a bill had been passed by the legislature, though it escaped veto by the governor, it might be set aside because it was considered to be in conflict with the charter or with the laws of England. This annulment might be done by the judges of the colonies, but was more commonly the action of the Lords of Trade. Moreover, an act might be rejected by the Lords of Trade because it was objectionable to the king. Thus, bills which had been passed by the colonial legislature and approved by the governor could, except in the case of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maryland, be disallowed or vetoed by the king at any time within three years. This power was used so frequently that the colonial legislatures learned to pass laws valid for two years; and when that period had expired they would reënact them for another period of two years in order to avoid the veto. It was assumed everywhere, and as a rule expressly stated in the colonial charters, that no laws should be passed which were repugnant to the laws of England.

The relation of Parliament to the colonies throughout the colonial period, but more especially after 1760, was a matter of considerable dispute in the early years of American colonial history. In the earliest period of colonization the English Parliament had no share in the direction of colonial affairs. It was generally believed that the American wilderness was part of the king's private domain and not subject to Parliamentary control. It was the king who, as the owner of all the land, made all the grants, gave all the charters, created the colonies, and governed many of them directly. In the course of political evolution in England, this theory died out; but in America it continued to be accepted by the colonists. The Long Parliament took charge of the management of the American colonies after the execution of Charles I.; and although much of the original power returned to the king at the Restoration in 1660, Parliament still continued to pass laws which applied to the colonies. Parliament, for example, established the colonial postal service and fixed the rates of postage.

Parliament, again, regulated the currency and enacted a universal law of naturalization. From time to time, Parliament passed acts for the purpose of regulating colonial trade. The colonies, be it noted, had not protested against these laws,—perhaps because of the fact that they were not enforced. It appears to have been admitted both at home and in the colonies that no law of Parliament should apply to the colonies unless they were especially mentioned in it. The theory which came ultimately to be accepted by the colonists was that both Great Britain and the colonies had the same king, but different legislatures; and that each colony possessed its own rights of legislation, over which the British Parliament had no more control than had the legislature of one colony over that of any other. While the colonists thus regarded Parliament as merely a British legislature, it was looked upon in Britain as the lawmaking body of the empire. According to the democratic theory, moreover, taxes were a grant of the people.

The degree of self-government enjoyed by Connecticut and Rhode Island, the two republican commonwealths in which practically all the officers, local or general, were elected by the people, was of course greater than that of the colonies south of Virginia, which had no local self-government and whose popular Assemblies possessed but little real power. In many instances the Assemblies were called irregularly and represented but a small fraction of the people, because their members were chosen on the basis of a limited popular suffrage.

With regard to the character of their local government, in which there was a wider divergency than in their central governments, it is customary to separate the colonies into three distinct classes. First, there was the township system, developed in New England; secondly, the county system of Virginia and the South; thirdly, the compromise or mixed system of the Middle colonies. Geographical, social, and religious circumstances to which reference has already been made account to a large degree for these differences in local government.

In New England, the town was the social and political unit. The early settlers had lived in English towns. They came to the New World as an organized religious and political community. In several of the settlements church membership was recognized as identical with citizenship. Indeed, it was the Church that contributed the principle of popular government. Each town became the prolific parent of other towns, some of them representing secessions from the older settlements because of their rigid exclusiveness. As the towns grew, persons not members of the recognized Church outnumbered the others, so that the suffrage became really quite restricted. Before 1700, however, many persons not church members obtained the right to vote. In Massachusetts, in 1671, "freemen" were required to be twenty-one years of age, sober and peaceable, orthodox in the fundamentals of religion, and possessing at least £20 of ratable estate. Full-fledged members of the body politic, that is to say, "freemen," held meetings at least once a year, usually in the spring, where matters pertaining to local or central government were discussed and decided. The freemen elected their officers at the town meeting. These officers were responsible to the electors and always rendered careful accounts to the town meeting. Generally, the most important of these officers were the selectmen, who decided upon matters which came up between the sessions of the town meetings. Other officers, such as the overseers of the highway, overseers of the poor, and the town clerk, were chosen annually, and had no authority to go beyond the exact limitations set for them by the town meeting. As the towns grew larger and more numerous, townships were combined into counties for judicial purposes, and it became necessary to introduce a legislative system in place of general meetings of all the freemen for the conduct of public affairs. Thus, in 1638, each of the eight towns of Massachusetts chose two freemen as deputies who were to act with the governor and assistants as a legislative body. Through the efforts of the crown, the religious qualifications

for voters were wholly abolished in New England before the eighteenth century, and a property qualification was substituted. This excluded about nine-tenths of all adult males from participation in colonial elections, and at least half from taking part in town meetings.

The Constitution of Connecticut, which is regarded as the first regular constitution in America, provided for a governor and six magistrates to be elected by a majority of the whole body of freemen. As the colony spread, voting by proxy was allowed. At the same time, each town was empowered to dispose of its own lands, to choose its own officers, and to manage its own local affairs. In each town, three, five, or seven men might be chosen annually who should have the power to decide all controversies when the amount at issue did not exceed forty shillings. The town system that grew up under these arrangements closely resembled that of Massachusetts. In New Haven colony, as at first in Massachusetts, only church members were freemen empowered to choose magistrates. The Connecticut charter of 1662, however, by which New Haven was absorbed by Connecticut under a very democratic form of government, provided, as we have already stated, for a governor, a deputy governor, twelve assistants, and a house of deputies composed of two members from each town, all elected annually by the freemen. Here, the term "freeman" was applied to any adult male twenty-one years of age owning real estate to the amount of £20 and recommended by the selectmen of his town as of honest, civil, and peaceable conversation. The so-called Providence agreement which founded the colony of Rhode Island was the most completely democratic government in New England. In fact, it was too democratic to work successfully in those days, and Rhode Island abandoned its earlier principles and joined in the general movement which limited the right of suffrage to those possessing certain property qualifications and certain moral requisites. In Rhode Island and in New Hampshire, however, church

membership was not a necessary qualification for the exercise of suffrage.

The striking feature of New England was unquestionably the town meeting. All political power emanated from this gathering. It was the political foundation of the New England colonies. It was the mouthpiece and administrative machinery of the town, and the town was the political unit. Virginia and the Southern colonies, on the other hand, had no towns. Those forces which in New England occasioned the rise of towns were wanting, and even legislative enactments could not create them. In the South, political growth was from above downward, not from below upward; in the Southern colonies generally, the English county government was introduced. Many of the colonists were descended from the county gentry of rural England and were most familiar with the county type of government, for which the large estates of Virginia and the South were peculiarly adapted.

With the development of the counties in the Southern colonies came the county court, which exercised administrative as well as judicial functions. The judges were appointed by the governor; but as he usually commissioned those who were nominated by the justices themselves, the court became a close corporation composed of the leading gentry of the county. This court computed the county expenses for the care of the county buildings, for roads, bridges, and for other purposes, and assessed the same. The sheriff was the executive officer and one of the most important functionaries of the county, precisely as in England. The other important executive officer of the county was the lieutenant, whose duties corresponded roughly to those of the lords-lieutenant in England. He was appointed by the governor, was chief of the military organization of the county, and, by virtue of his place in the Governor's Council, exercised certain judicial functions in the county. Although the county was the local unit in the Southern colonies, it was usually divided into two or more parishes, each in charge

of a vestry of the Episcopal Church, which sooner or later received the same official recognition in most of the Southern colonies as in England. The vestry, a group of officers originally elected by the members of a church, but which later elected its own successors, was given control of certain less important duties than those which devolved upon the county government. Such "closed vestries" were of course fatal to the political development of the people, who became indifferent to questions of government and did not use opportunities that were offered them to improve their condition.

Thus the two striking features of Virginia local government were, first, the conduct of public affairs by select bodies of men without the active participation of the mass of voters, and, secondly, the exercise of the principal functions of local government by officers of the county. Whereas in New England the towns sent deputies to the colonial Assembly, in Virginia the members of the House of Burgesses were sent from the counties. The county officers, the lieutenant, the sheriff, and the justices of the peace, who had administrative as well as judicial duties, held office through appointment by the governor. The people were debarred from any share whatever in the direct conduct of affairs. While the New England type of local government gave the people much practical political education, that of Virginia developed a class of intelligent, public-spirited leaders. It must be admitted, moreover, that in spite of the aristocratic and centralizing tendencies of the Southern colonies, the spirit of English self-government was not permitted to die out entirely.

The type of local government developed in the Middle colonies was a compromise or combination of the two systems we have been considering. Like New England, the Middle colonies had both townships and counties, but there was a much more equal division of powers between these units. New York had from the very outset the rudiments of a more or less satisfactory system of local government.

The manor, which was the local political unit under the Dutch, was rarely, if ever, self-governing. Under English control, the town or parish government was made to consist of the constable and four or eight overseers elected by the freeholders. The constable, however, was chosen from among the retiring overseers, and together with the overseers exercised both judicial and legislative functions. They had authority to assess tax rates and to manage many other purely local affairs. More important in area than the towns were the "ridings." They were really rudimentary counties. County officers were appointed by the governor. The county was the unit of representation in New York, two delegates being elected from each county by the freeholders. By the act of 1703 the method was introduced of having the towns in each county choose supervisors as an administrative assembly for the county.

In Pennsylvania the system of local government was influenced by the county system which prevailed in the neighboring Virginia colony. Instead of having overseers from the townships as in New York, the county was governed by commissioners elected from three or five districts. There was little or no township government at first, and the county officials were given extended powers. When the people elected their county commissioners, they at the same time elected their sheriffs, coroners, assessors, and members of the Assembly and Council. As Pennsylvania grew in population, the townships began to participate in the work of government, each township choosing its overseers of the poor, highway inspectors, and inspectors of elections. The necessity for a more subdivided system of local government ultimately gave rise in Pennsylvania to the township, the borough, and the municipality.

Concerning the limitations of suffrage in the colonies, it should be remarked, in addition to what has already been said upon this point, that the right to vote at elections was at all times illiberal and largely dependent on the will of the governor. Rhode Island, as we have stated, departed from

its original principle of pure democracy. Even in Pennsylvania, which remained faithful to the principles laid down by Penn, the voter had to be a freeholder or a taxpayer. In general, we may say that during the eighteenth century religious tests excluded all except Protestants from voting, while in the North property of a fixed value was required, and in the South estates of a certain size were necessary. It is of course true that the property qualification was less difficult of fulfilment in America, with its abundance of uncultivated land, than in Great Britain. The Assembly of Massachusetts was vastly more representative than Parliament, and the suffrage in Connecticut was five times as liberal as that in Yorkshire, while the proportion of voters in Pennsylvania was twice as great as in Connecticut. Compared with the number of persons who shared in the government of Great Britain, the colonies were decidedly democratic, and the colonists therefore were much more jealous of their rights than was the average Englishman. The development of political institutions in America had carried the colonists far away from the state of affairs still prevailing in the mother country.

CHAPTER IV

THE BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

HAVING outlined the political, industrial, commercial, and social development of the American colonies, we will now consider the attitude of the mother country toward that development. We must inquire whether colonial progress was due, and, if so, to what extent, to the attitude of Great Britain toward these colonies. Enough, however, has already been said of the political condition of the colonies to suggest the thought that the great distance which separated the Old World from the New, the force of circumstances influencing the conduct of British statesmen and rulers, as well as the adroitness and tenacity with which the colonies in many instances preserved and developed their democratic institutions, account to a large degree for the progress of liberal practices in the colonies at a time when the cause of democracy was making little progress elsewhere. Throughout the eighteenth century there were repeated evidences of a desire on the part of the home government to secure a firmer and more direct control over political affairs in the colonies and to curtail the opportunities for popular intervention in matters of colonial policy.

When, in 1763, the overthrow of the French in America removed a problem which had previously occupied the attention of both the home government and the provinces, there seemed to be no reason why England should not succeed in tightening her political control over her American possessions, thus accomplishing a purpose conceived long before

and but partially fulfilled. At the same time, there arose a determination to impress upon the colonies a sense of economic dependence on Great Britain, and to direct their development into channels regarded as clearly beneficial to the mother country. It must be admitted that neither the idea of their greater political dependence nor that of a more absolute commercial dependence was new at the time of George III. The desire, moreover, to reduce the colonies of Great Britain in America to a position of subserviency, political and economic, must not be regarded as a proof that that nation was an exceptionally selfish or unprogressive one in those days. The contrary statement would be nearer the truth. Compared with the attitude of France and Spain toward their respective colonies, Great Britain was a model of generosity and kindness. Her restrictions on the commerce of the American colonies must not be regarded as instances of extreme and exceptional tyranny. The historian Lecky judiciously remarks that a knowledge of the practices of other European nations reveals the fact that the British commercial policy was simply the expression, the moderate expression, of ideas then almost universally prevalent in regard to the relations of dependencies with a mother country. Nor is it strictly within the truth to maintain that in shackling the trade of the colonies the mother country made no concessions to the colonies in return. In compensation for the advantages which Great Britain sought to guarantee to herself, she frequently conferred some special privilege on the colonies or burdened herself with some restriction calculated to benefit the latter. Even though in this exchange of advantages the mother country may have observed her own interests more frequently than those of her colonies, it is in a sense true that she gave them defence, without which they might easily have fallen a prey to foreign invasion and conquest.

The economic doctrines which underlay the commercial and colonial policy of Great Britain have generally been grouped under the name of the "mercantile system," so

called because it regards a nation in practically the same light as a private merchant and measures its progress and prosperity by the same standards as those employed in trade. The policy of England was based upon these principles for nearly two centuries. Applied to the colonies, they taught, as expressed by a contemporary economist, that when the trade of colonies is not confined by severe laws to the mother kingdom and those laws are not well executed, such colonies only do injury to the mother kingdom.

Long before the days of Charles II., under whose rule England appears to have definitely adopted the mercantile policy, there were embryonic suggestions of this policy. During the reign of Edward IV. a statute was passed requiring merchants to send their goods by English vessels, provided a sufficient number of them could be found. There was, in fact, a succession of laws passed for the protection of British shipping. Schemes for colonization were closely allied with these commercial laws. They sprang from the same fundamental conception. In our own times, colonial expansion is prompted largely by the need for an outlet for surplus population. In the English colonization of North America, this motive, however, played little or no part; for when the Revolution broke out, the whole population of the mother country was hardly eight millions, and there were still large tracts of unsettled and uncultivated land in England. A specific object of the earlier expeditions was the discovery of gold and silver mines. In the mercantile theory of economics, gold and silver constituted an exceptionally desirable kind of wealth. If a nation did not possess mines of these metals within its own borders, it should attempt to acquire colonies possessing them; and if, as proved to be the experience of England, even its colonies were without them, the next best plan was to adopt protective and restrictive measures designed to attract gold and silver from countries having them. The best way to accomplish this was supposed to be by encouraging the sale of goods abroad in quantities exceeding the amount bought abroad, thus giving

rise to a favorable balance of trade paid by foreign nations in gold and silver. The nation that succeeds in selling more than it buys levies tribute, as it were, on its commercial rivals. Among the items for which some nations collect payment from abroad is the service of transporting goods, a service which nations sought to develop if they accepted the principles of mercantilism.

If a nation owns vast colonial possessions, the mercantilists argued, it would be foolish to permit foreigners to usurp the profits of carrying goods to and from these colonies. The colonial population, which gives rise to a demand for goods from abroad, ought not to be allowed to satisfy that demand in any alien market and perhaps fill the coffers of foreign merchants. Whatever goods the mother country can produce, the colonies should buy from her; and if there be a demand in the colonies for goods which are produced neither by the colonists themselves nor by the mother country, the profits involved in carrying such commodities from abroad to the colonies naturally belong, in the opinion of the mercantilists, to the mother country. It is a logical part of this system of thought that the colonies be restrained from competition with the mother country. The colonies, it was believed, should confine themselves to the production of raw materials, so far as their exports were concerned. Britain, by purchasing her raw materials from her own colonies, could then escape the necessity of purchasing these materials from her rivals; and, instead, help to develop her own colonies. By controlling the exportation of colonial products she could, furthermore, exact a tribute on this score from nations in need of these products.

Such, in brief, was the logic underlying mercantilism. Many of the early American charters illustrate the practice. In 1621 the Privy Council directed that goods from Virginia could not be shipped to foreign countries without first landing in England and paying the duty. In 1641, Governor Berkeley was instructed to be careful that vessels leaving the colony gave bonds to guarantee that they would

take their cargoes to England. One object of this instruction was purely fiscal, for it was expressly said that his majesty should "not be defrauded of what is justly due for customs on the goods." Indeed, the quarrels between the Stuarts and their parliaments drove the kings to the practice of granting all manner of monopolies, commercial and otherwise, in order to raise revenue. Another circumstance which prompted the commercial laws of the seventeenth century was the rivalry between the English and the Dutch. After the truce of 1608 with Spain, the Dutch had turned their attention to the development of commerce. This they did with such success that they ultimately acquired almost absolute mastery of the world's carrying trade. They gained control of the fisheries in the North Sea. They secured an overwhelming share of the trade with America and the West Indies, as well as with the East. The Dutch had possession of the Baltic trade, and were preventing the English from obtaining such things as tar, timber, and hemp, which were needed for building up the British navy. In the East, they drove the English out of the Spice Islands and forced them to confine their trade to India and other parts of the mainland. As if to facilitate the growth of Dutch trade at the expense of English, some of the American colonies, apparently to show their dissatisfaction with the government of Cromwell, gave preference to Dutch vessels and traders over those of the mother country. An ordinance was passed in 1645 prohibiting the importation of whale oil and other products of the whale fisheries in other than English vessels manned by English seamen. In 1649, the importation of French wines, wool, and silk into England "or any of the dominions thereof" was expressly prohibited. Cromwell's government, which undertook systematically to develop British commerce and to destroy that of Holland, in 1650 passed an act which forbade foreign vessels to trade with the colonies at all save under license from Parliament or the Council of State. Although this act stated that its purpose was to "hinder the carrying over of any such persons as are

enemies to this Commonwealth,"—Virginia and certain of the West Indies having made a display of their Royalist sympathies,—it was quite as much a purpose of this law to destroy Dutch trade with America.

The next important measure, that of 1651, unequivocally sought to keep for England, by means of coercion pure and simple, all her colonial trade; it was likewise intended to encourage her shipbuilders, ship owners, merchants, and manufacturers, through the adoption of measures which other nations also employed. It was urged that the empire could be defended only by aid of an overwhelming mercantile marine, and that oversea commerce and the security of the realm were but two sides of one and the same necessity. Had not the Dutch menaced the very shores of Great Britain twice within a few years? Even should the Navigation Acts work some injury to the colonies, did not the interests of the colonies themselves, as well as those of the mother country, demand perseverance in the policy of the Navigation Acts? These acts, it must be remembered, were not framed on merely economic grounds, and cannot properly be condemned solely on such grounds. Indeed, as a means for developing the mercantile marine of the country, they must be regarded as an extraordinary success.

The act of 1651 contained the following provisions:

"I. No goods produced in Asia, Africa, or America shall be imported into England or her dominions except in ships owned, mastered, and manned for the major part by English subjects.

"II. No goods produced in Europe shall be imported into England or her dominions except in English ships and in such foreign ships as belong to the country where the goods are produced.

"III. No goods of foreign production that are to be brought to England shall be brought from any other place than the place of production, or from those ports where alone the goods can be shipped, or whence they are usually first shipped after transportation."

In its ultimate effects this act accomplished the objects for which it was passed. It did so, however, at heavy cost, and during the time that shipping interests were built up other interests suffered grievously. Trade was lost; many industries were crippled; consumers paid high prices because of the scarcity or total absence of many commodities. But in the end the English were masters of a greater carrying trade than the Dutch. Sir Josiah Child, in his famous *Discourse on Trade*, remarked that before 1651 nine out of ten of the ships laden at Barbadoes were Dutch; but after the Navigation Act of that year the situation was inverted.

When the protectorate of Cromwell was superseded by the royal government of Charles II., the Cromwellian commercial policy was not given up. Indeed, the act of 1660, usually known as the First Navigation Act, embodied in more systematic form the important provisions of the earlier acts, and carried the mercantile policy a step further. There were in this act, besides the provisions taken over from the law of 1651, several new regulations, which may be summarized as follows:

"I. No goods shall be taken to or from the colonies except in ships built as well as owned by English subjects, and of which the master and three-fourths of the crew was likewise English.

"II. Foreigners are forbidden to exercise the business of merchants or factors in the colonies.

"III. Dried or salted fish, oil, whalebones, etc., usually produced or caught by English subjects, must, when imported into England by foreigners, pay double alien customs.

"IV. No sugar, tobacco, cotton-wool, indigo, ginger, fustic or other dyewood produced by any English colony shall be carried to any other place than England or her colonies. Ships sailing from the colonies with any of these goods on board are required to give bond to land the same at some English port."

The law of 1660 re-enacted the provision of the preceding navigation law to the effect that the coasting trade

of England, Ireland, and Wales should be confined to English ships.

The evident object of these provisions was to give English merchants a share of the colonial export trade to foreign countries. By this arrangement, English merchants might resell colonial goods at a profit to colonial merchants. The specified commodities which would not be carried directly to continental Europe were designated as "enumerated articles." Most of them were the products of the West Indies and of the Southern colonies; the Northern colonies still possessed the right to export their grain and naval stores wherever they pleased.

By this arrangement, the colonies were designed to become the source of England's raw materials, on the one hand, and the market for England's manufactures, on the other hand,—a division which was regarded as profitable both to the colonies and to the mother country. None of the enumerated commodities except tobacco could be raised in England; and the production of tobacco in that country was forbidden in order to give Virginia and Maryland a monopoly in return for the restrictions imposed upon the colonial tobacco trade. It should be noted, however, that all the enumerated commodities were required to pay heavy import duties when shipped to England; the purpose of this arrangement, therefore, was to some degree fiscal, and it was expected to prove very lucrative. Partly with this object in view, and partly because of new circumstances which arose from time to time, the list of enumerated articles was frequently changed, as we shall have occasion to indicate hereafter.

In 1663 another act was passed, commonly known as the Second Navigation Act. By the earlier acts, English vessels had obtained a monopoly of the carrying trade between the colonies and England; but, except as to the enumerated articles, English and colonial vessels might still trade directly between the colonial and foreign borders. The act of 1663 was passed to secure to English merchants a larger control

of the colonial import trade. Its purpose was expressly stated to be to keep the colonies in a firmer dependence upon England, to render them still more beneficial to English shipping and seamen, and to provide an outlet for English woollen goods and other manufactures. There were features of this act which were favorable to the colonists. So far as the act gave Virginia and Maryland a monopoly of tobacco raising, there could, of course, be no objection to it from the standpoint of these colonies. The colonists looked less favorably, however, upon those clauses of the act which forbade any European commodity to be taken to the colonies except in English ships sailing from English ports. Had the colonists observed these regulations, they would have worked great damage. This navigation law sought to force the colonists to procure in England such supplies as they could not themselves furnish. The exclusive position of factor between the colonists and foreign markets would have been an exceedingly lucrative one. But the actual results of the law did not satisfy English merchants, and in the year 1672 the so-called Third Navigation Act was passed. The immediate object of this act was to prevent illegal trade in tobacco between the American colonies and the continent of Europe. The increasing demand for tobacco, which was one of the enumerated articles, and as such could be exported only to England or to another colony, together with the high price which must be paid for such tobacco as had borne the English customs duty, served to encourage the systematic violation of the navigation acts. The trade between the several colonies had developed so rapidly as to attract the observation of English merchants, who now demanded the control of it, and who secured those provisions in the act of 1672 which subjected any enumerated commodity to a duty specified in the statute, and which thus destroyed the freedom of intercolonial traffic. Under the regulations of this act it became impossible, for instance, for the producer of one of the enumerated articles in Massachusetts to furnish a consumer in Rhode Island without

first sending the commodity in question to England and then back to Rhode Island. Should the parties to this transaction desire to avoid the risk, expense, and delay incident to such an absurd journey, they could do so by paying all the duties prescribed by the Navigation Act.

During the period from 1651 to 1764, no less than twenty-nine Acts of Parliament were passed for the regulation of traffic between England and her colonies. Of several of these acts we have already given some account. The next navigation act of importance was that of 1696, prompted primarily by a desire to provide for a more rigid enforcement of the trade laws. In the years immediately following the English Revolution of 1688, these laws had been more extensively violated than ever before. The lack of a system of registry for English-built ships made their enforcement difficult, and led to complaints of a loss of revenue. By the act of 1696, the purpose of which was stated to be "for preventing frauds and regulating abuses in the plantation trade," the system designed to introduce a monopoly of the shipping between England and her colonies was practically completed. All further laws were for the most part detailed amendments or extensions of this system. We shall now attempt to discover its precise effects on the trade and industry of the American colonies.

With regard to the earlier trade laws of England, it must be noted that the monarch was empowered to grant exceptions to the law and made frequent use of this power. Even after 1651, the enforcement of the navigation laws seems to have been lax. Sir Francis Brewster declared that "under Oliver's government, the act of navigation had little force; both government and the merchants were willing to let it sleep." In 1655, Hutchinson speaks of the trade of Massachusetts as flourishing. Ships of the colony traded to and from France, Holland, and other countries. In Virginia, however, the act seems in later years to have been better executed, probably because of the strength of the Cavalier party in this colony. But even in Virginia the acts

were not executed very stringently, especially after the peace with Holland. It was no secret that ships of many nations went to Virginia, and surreptitiously carried away tobacco and other colonial products to foreign countries. Yet the Virginians—perhaps for form's sake—petitioned against the act of 1651, claiming that the cessation of trade with the Dutch would ruin them, and that they were forced to carry on much of their trade secretly. In 1660 they passed an act declaring that the Dutch and all other Christian nations at peace with England had the right to trade with the colony for all allowable commodities.

It will be recalled that the act of 1660 permitted colonial goods of all kinds, including the enumerated articles, to be sent from one colony to another, but not to continental European nations. This statute was evaded in three ways. First, by delivering the goods to foreign vessels at sea. Secondly, by carrying tobacco, for instance, to New England and thence shipping it in Dutch vessels to Europe. Thirdly, by direct shipment to the Dutch colonies. This direct trade with the Dutch is said to have caused a loss to the revenue of ten thousand pounds a year. When goods were sent directly to foreign countries in violation of the law, the foreign merchant was thus placed in a position to sell goods more cheaply than the English merchant, who was obliged to pay duties. To prevent this, the act of 1672 compelled merchants to give bonds that they would bring the enumerated commodities to England, or declare themselves willing to pay heavy duties on these products. This regulation was in 1675 interpreted to mean that the laws imposing duties did not repeal the regulation requiring the bond, and that when the duty was paid security must also be given to carry the product to a dominion of the crown. James II. wrote explicitly that "the payment of the said rates and taxes doth not give liberty to carry said goods to any other place than to some other of our plantations or to England."

In 1731 began a systematic endeavor to extend the restrictive system to manufactures, and to keep the colonies in

economic dependence upon Great Britain. Thus, in addition to the laws which were designed to secure the naval and maritime supremacy of Great Britain, and to those acts of trade advocated by the mercantile class in order to monopolize the trade of the colonies, acts were now passed at the instigation of British manufacturers by which the colonies were prevented from engaging in the production of manufactured goods. In other words, if there were any colonial manufactures which could possibly compete with the manufactures of Great Britain, they were deliberately crushed. Several acts previous to that of 1731 had, it is true, aimed to encourage the development of English manufactures. As a rule, however, they sought to do this not by crushing out of existence those competing American manufactures which had already begun to acquire some importance, but by developing the agriculture and shipping of the colonies and thus discouraging the rise of manufactures in the New World. It was hoped that the act of 1663, as we have already stated, would develop a colonial market for English woolens and other manufactures. An act of 1697 declared that "no woolen yarn or woolen manufactures of the American plantations should be shipped there, or even laden, in order to be transported thence to any port whatever." It was felt that if the colonies had their own manufactures little attention would be given to raising the raw materials which England needed to import, and those that were raised would probably be consumed at home. Thus the colonies would cease to import manufactures from England; they might even export their own to foreign markets and there compete with English manufactures. The good results, moreover, obtained by enumerating the raw materials would be lost. If, through turning their productive energies in the direction of manufactures, the colonies should produce the enumerated commodities in smaller quantities than the English manufacturer required, the latter would have to pay more for his raw materials. The cost of his manufactured articles would

consequently be enhanced and the market for them curtailed. The restriction of colonial manufactures was thus felt to be an essential part of the mercantile policy.

It would, of course, have been practically impossible to prevent absolutely the manufacture of goods among the colonists. The force of circumstances obliged the New Englander to be his own mechanic. Not until the American colonists began to turn their attention to the manufacture of goods for sale, therefore, was it considered imperative for Parliament to intervene in defence of English manufacturers. In New England and in the Middle colonies the embryonic beginnings of manufactures were early perceptible. In 1705, Lord Cornbury wrote that the colonists had entered "upon a trade which I am sure will hurt England in a little time; and I am well informed that upon Long-Island and Connecticut they are setting up a Woollen Manufacture, and I myself have seen Serge from Long-Island that any man may wear." British statesmen were far-sighted enough to recognize that the economic independence of the colonies would be likely to lead to a desire for political independence. Lord Cornbury was most emphatic in his declaration that the colonies "ought to be kept entirely dependent upon and subservient to England, and that can never be if they are suffered to goe on in the notions they have, that as they are Englishmen, soe they may set up the same manufactures here as people may do in England . . . those who are already not very fond of submitting to Government would soon think of putting in Execution designs they had long harboured in their breasts." In 1719, the House of Commons declared that "the erecting of manufactories in the colonies tended to limit their dependence on Great Britain."

With the increase of colonial population and the growing diversity of colonial products, complaints became more numerous in Great Britain that the colonies were not only carrying on trade, but setting up manufactures detrimental to the mother country. In 1731, the House of Commons

directed the Board of Trade to inquire and report concerning this matter. As the result of their investigations, the Board reported that paper, iron, flax, hats, and leather were manufactured in the colonies; that there were more manufactories set up in the colonies north of Virginia, particularly in New England, than in any other of the British colonies; that they were capable of supplying their own wants in manufactured goods, a condition of things detrimental to British interests and jeopardizing the dependence of the colonies on the mother country. The hatters of London complained to the home government that large numbers of hats were manufactured in New England and even exported to foreign countries. Through their influence an act was passed by Parliament in 1732 not only to prevent such exportation and to prevent hats being sent from one colony to another, but to restrain to a certain extent their manufacture in the colonies. It was forbidden to ship them or even to load them upon a horse or cart for the purpose of exportation to any place whatever. Colonial hatters, moreover, were forbidden to employ more than two apprentices at the same time, and no negro was permitted to work at the business.

This effort to prevent the rise of colonial manufactures affected the several colonies differently. As we have already pointed out, the Southern colonies were exclusively agricultural communities. In Virginia, the raising of tobacco always remained the principal occupation, and repeated attempts to foster manufactures proved unavailing. In exchange for their tobacco, which the law required them to send to Britain if they sent it abroad at all, the Virginians received British manufactures. Maryland, too, paid for the manufactures she consumed by exporting tobacco to Britain. The inhabitants of both colonies wore British clothing. Their houses were built of wood imported from Great Britain. Their homes were filled with English furniture and utensils. What tobacco was to Maryland and Virginia, rice was to South Carolina. Throughout the Southern

colonies there was a total absence of manufacturing, even in its most rudimentary forms. The staple products of the South found a ready market in Europe. It was easy to transport them, and more profitable to exchange them for manufactures than to attempt to produce manufactured goods at home.

In New England, however, manufacturing became an important occupation early in colonial history. It is not an easy matter to account for the early and rapid rise of manufactures in a country where land was cheap and labor dear. We should naturally expect the colonists in New England to turn their attention to the production and exportation of cereals and provisions. For a time, indeed, this was the case. But before the exports to England became large, this trade was checked by the policy of the mother country. During the reign of Charles II. the importation of salt provisions from the colonies, including beef, pork, bacon, and butter, was absolutely prohibited. In addition to this, the whale fisheries of New England were discouraged by discriminating duties on oil and blubber imported into England in colonial ships. But these goods, the exportation of which was discouraged by England, were precisely those that New England would most naturally send in exchange for manufactured goods from the mother country. Even if these goods were exported to other countries than England, the colonists found their profits seriously reduced by the circumstance that no manufactures could be taken directly back on the return voyage. Vessels were obliged either to return empty or make a roundabout trip by loading in England. This condition of things would make it difficult for New England—and later for the Middle colonies—to dispose of their normal products abroad, curtailing their power to purchase English manufactures and forcing them to manufacture for themselves. Contemporary records show that this is precisely what took place. A report of 1721 states that "necessity, and not choice" gave rise to the growth of manufactures, "not having sufficient commodities of their

own to give in exchange for those they do receive already from Great Britain."

As the danger of American competition with British manufacturers increased, additional hindrances and prohibitions were enacted by the British Parliament, although some show of reciprocal concessions was made by increasing the number of enumerated articles which Great Britain was compelled to purchase exclusively from the colonies. Thus, in 1705, rice was added to the list of goods of which the colonies were given a monopoly; in 1722, copper, raw silk, beaver and other peltries; in 1729, so-called naval stores, including lumber, pitch, tar, turpentine, rosin, hemp, and flax. The government paid bounties for the colonial production of naval stores, and the large sums which the colonies received on this account were in themselves regarded as offsetting the disadvantage due to restrictions on colonial manufactures. As we have already seen, Virginia and Maryland had a monopoly of tobacco raising. South Carolina and the neighboring colonies were subsequently given a bounty on indigo, and could carry rice to all European ports south of Cape Finisterre, provided it was taken in British ships.

The system rested, at least theoretically and in part, upon the idea of reciprocity and mutual concessions. It showed greater fairness to the colonists than other European nations were in the habit of showing. Whereas most nations compelled their colonies to pay the full duty imposed by the mother country upon imported goods, even though they were sent out to the colonies, Great Britain usually allowed the same drawbacks on goods that were reëxported to the colonies as those allowed on goods sent abroad again to foreign nations. As a result, it was possible to buy many kinds of foreign goods more cheaply in the colonies than in Britain. The complaint was frequently made in Great Britain that German linens, for instance, were sold in the colonies much more cheaply and therefore more extensively than those of British production. Again, the colonies not

only had a monopoly of the British market for "enumerated articles," but they could send all unenumerated goods to any foreign country, without any other restriction than that of sending them in ships built and chiefly manned by British subjects. Such non-enumerated goods were among the important productions of the colonies, and included the great staples of grain, timber, salted provisions, fish, and rum. The colonists were forbidden, however, in the ordinary state of the law, to send salted provisions or any kind of grain, except rice, to Great Britain. In the interest of the British sugar colonies, the importation of sugar, molasses, and rum from the French West India Islands was virtually forbidden. But this prohibition of a commerce which was of extreme importance to the New England colonies was allowed with the tacit connivance of the British government to become a dead letter. The colonists continued to carry their goods to the French and Spanish islands in exchange for spirits and sugar and for the gold and silver they needed with which to buy goods from Great Britain.

It would be possible to multiply illustrations of the general principle above stated as underlying the British commercial policy of the eighteenth century. That policy was continued down to the eve of the Revolution. In fact, it was the effort to enforce the trade laws that led to the first sharp clash of interests between the colonies and the mother country. By the law of 1750 the colonies were permitted to send pig and bar iron to England free of duty; but this permission was merely supposed to offset the simultaneous prohibition to erect mills for rolling or slitting iron, forges to work with a tilt-hammer, or furnaces for making steel. Heavy penalties were imposed for the violation of this law. All such mills, forges, and furnaces were declared to be "nuisances" which, if not abated within thirty days, were subject to a forfeit of £500 each. Indeed, it had been originally proposed that all existing forges in the colonies should be demolished; but finally, and by only a slender majority, the statute took this milder shape. Evidently

Chatham gave expression to a widespread sentiment when he swore that he never would allow the colonies to manufacture even a hobnail for themselves.

Thus the trade and industry of the colonies were hedged about by an elaborate system of restrictions that were more than vexatious. Had they been enforced they would have had the most disastrous effects on the economic development of the colonies. It will be remembered that by the act of 1651 goods could be exported only in English ships; by the acts of 1660 and 1663 the same rule was extended to imports; by the act of 1672 the freedom of trade between the colonies was destroyed by laying imposts on commerce between them; by the act of 1669 no wool, either in fleece, spun, or woven, could be exported; in 1719 American manufactures were declared by Parliament to be dangerous and conducive to independence; in 1732 the colonies were forbidden to export hats; in 1733 a duty was laid on the enormous imports of molasses, except that which came from the British West Indies; and in 1750 rolling mills, forges, and furnaces were, as we have just said, ordered to be suppressed as "nuisances."

Fortunately for the economic development of the New World, English statesmen from the time of Cromwell to that of Walpole had been wise enough to allow these restrictive laws to fall into neglect. After the accession of George I. in 1714, the ministers of the king devoted all their attention to securing the safe establishment of the House of Hanover on the British throne, and sedulously avoided all measures which might arouse opposition at home or in the colonies. Sporadic efforts, to be sure, were made to secure the enforcement of the restrictive laws in some of the colonies. But in no colony was there a genuine and consistent attempt to carry them out. Massachusetts, when called upon on one occasion by the Board of Trade to provide for their more rigorous execution, openly refused to do so, and coupled this refusal with the characteristic assertion that the colonists were as much

Englishmen as those in England, and therefore had a right to enjoy all the privileges which the people of England enjoyed.

Smuggling was lucrative and almost universal. It did not arouse the disapproval which usually attaches to the violation of law. When the colonists began to feel that the laws were unjust, the practice of smuggling even assumed the character of a proper assertion of natural rights. Did not the greatest of British political economists, Adam Smith, subsequently declare the English colonial system "a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind?" The New Englanders, whose commercial and manufacturing interests made them most bitterly opposed to the restrictive laws, violated them almost openly. The royal customs officials learned that the easiest road to wealth lay in collusion with the importers. It was not uncommon, therefore, for collectors of customs in the British West Indies to grant fraudulent clearances which were accepted by the collectors of customs in New England. Again, merchants were often permitted to discharge vessels laden with dutiable goods in the absence of the customs officials. At the very time when Great Britain, with the help of the colonies, was straining every nerve to drive the French out of North America, when great sacrifices were being made for the defence of British colonial possessions in the New World, and when the mother country was not only incurring an enormous war debt but was sending large sums of money to the colonies for participating in the French and Indian War, the New England colonists were actually providing the common enemy with supplies. Under the cover of flags of truce granted ostensibly for the exchange of prisoners of war, these colonists carried goods to the French fleets, the French garrisons, and the French West Indies. For this unpatriotic service they were, of course, well paid; and the practice was sometimes cynically defended on the ground that it was perfectly justifiable to make money out of the enemy. It is significant indeed that the customs revenue

received by Great Britain from the colonies amounted to less than £2,000 annually, while it cost over £7,000 to collect it.

Pitt ordered the colonial customs officials to do their duty, and for a time they made zealous attempts to atone for their former laxity. But it was no easy matter to seize dutiable goods which had been smuggled on land. It was practically impossible to secure a conviction of the offender at the hands of a colonial jury. The ordinary method to authorize the seizure of suspected goods was to issue a "search warrant," which empowered the person named in it to go to a designated place and take possession of the goods therein deposited. The goods subject to seizure were named in the warrant, together with the person furnishing the information. As the warrant was afterward kept in the records of the court, the name of the informer became known, and he was sure to be severely dealt with by his fellow citizens. Even could anyone be found bold enough to defy a community in which the general sentiment was one of fierce opposition to the enforcement of these laws, the owner of suspected goods usually received prompt notice of an intended seizure, and removed them to another warehouse; in this event, the customs officials were powerless, as the warrant authorized them to seize only particular goods in a stated place.

The accession of George III., however, marks the beginning of a different régime. The new king had ideas of his own with regard to the true function of an English monarch,—ideas which exerted a great influence on the trend of subsequent events. When, on the 25th of October, 1760, the death of his grandfather called him to the throne, George III. was twenty-three years old. Unlike his two royal predecessors of the House of Hanóver, he was an Englishman by birth and education. In his first speech before Parliament he expressed great pride in this fact. Historians are unanimous in describing him as more honest and virtuous than was customary among the royalty and nobility of his day. But they are equally unanimous in

describing him as exceedingly obstinate. His education, which was in the hands of his mother and the Scotch Earl of Bute, had been carried on in the spirit of Bolingbroke's *Patriot King*. This book conceived the idea of a government approaching the "enlightened despotism" of which Frederick of Prussia offered an excellent example. Bolingbroke believed that the king should "govern as soon as he begins to reign"; that he should "call into the administration such men as he can assure himself will serve on the same principles on which he intends to govern"; that he should "put himself at the head of his people in order to govern, or, more properly, to subdue all parties". In accordance with these ideas the young king was not satisfied with the legitimate influence of a constitutional monarch. His predecessors had left the real control of government in the hands of the Whig aristocracy which dominated Parliament. George III. was determined to choose ministers not because they had the confidence of the legislature, but because they were agreeable to himself and willing to carry out his policy. He was possessed with the idea that the power of the throne should be greatly strengthened. When ministers not of his own choice were in office, he plotted against them. The great minister who was in power at the time of his accession, Pitt, he drove out of office. Freeing himself from the dictation of ministers having a will of their own, he finally succeeded in surrounding himself with mere puppets of his own selection. To gain the necessary control of Parliament he made effective use of the corrupt devices by which the Whigs had so long kept themselves in power. By bribes of money and public office he built up a parliamentary party of his own, recruited largely from the old Tories who had strenuously opposed the preceding Hanoverian rulers as German usurpers. With the aid of this party, which came to be known as the "king's friends," he secured control of all matters of foreign and domestic policy, even the management of debates in Parliament. It is not difficult to understand that a show

of resistance against the authority of the home government would irritate the king like a personal affront, whether the resistance came from at home or from the colonies. Nor is it difficult to foresee the effect on the colonies of his experiments in high-handed government, whatever might be their effect at home.

So disastrous, indeed, were the effects of this last experiment in dictatorial government that many historians have been led to lay the blame of the Revolutionary War on George III. Had it not been for George III., says an eminent English historical writer, the two peoples would have been knitted together in an enduring league. The breach between the colonists and the mother country may certainly be traced in a large measure to the king's meddling in state affairs, to his lack of genuine political ability, and to the stupidity of the admirers whom his policy forced upon him. But the ultimate causes of the Revolution lie deeper than the personal characteristics of an obstinate king. The struggle was precipitated by the determination of the king's government to enforce the navigation and trade laws, and to tax the colonies for the support of additional troops stationed at colonial posts. But the conflict had long been brewing. Kings and ministers alike would have been powerless to prevent it entirely. The forces that were making toward independence were beyond the command of parliamentary enactments. The population of the colonies had doubled in less than twenty-five years. Three thousand miles of ocean separated them from the mother country. The social ties which had bound the early settlers to their native land had weakened from generation to generation. Their territory was almost boundless in its extent and resources. The colonists had begun to conceive the possibility of an independent life. They were beginning to have a consciousness of political ambitions and economic interests unlike those of England. The boundless possibilities of the future were beginning to dawn upon them. Meanwhile, Englishmen at home knew but little of the life and

ambitions of the colonies, which they regarded as trading corporations founded for the benefit of the mother country rather than as political communities with a keen sense of their own rights and privileges. Sooner or later, conflict was inevitable, and statesmen were not wanting who felt that the conflict was imminent. Montesquieu, in his *Notes on England*, written about 1730, pointed out the restrictive character of the British commercial code and declared his belief that England would be the first nation abandoned by her colonies. The Marquis d'Argenson, in his *Memoirs*, published before George III. was born, predicted that the English colonies in America would one day rise against the mother country, that they would form themselves into a republic, and that they would astonish the world by their prosperity. In 1748, the Swedish traveller Kalm contended that the presence of the French in Canada, by making the English colonists depend for their security on the support of the mother country, was the main cause of the submission of the colonies. Two years later Turgot compared colonies to fruits which only remain on the stem till they have reached the period of maturity; and he prophesied that America would some day detach herself from the parent tree. And when, at the Peace of Paris, France gave up Canada to Great Britain, the French statesman Vergennes remarked that England would soon repent of having removed the only check that could keep her American colonies in awe. "They stand," said Vergennes, "no longer in need of her protection. She will call on them to contribute toward supporting the burdens they have helped to bring upon her, and they will answer by striking off all dependence." These prophetic words summarize the history of the next twenty years.

Before 1760, the disputes between the colonists and the home government had been essentially local and personal. They turned upon such matters as the taxation of lands held by the proprietaries, the franchise, the importation of convicts, the issuance of paper money, the raising of troops,

the organization of banks, and the establishment of courts of law. The opposition of the colonists almost invariably took the form of a refusal to vote money until their demands were complied with by the king's representatives. But throughout these conflicts there seemed to be an underlying confidence in the justice of the British government. In several instances, as in the dispute over the taxation of proprietaries' land in Pennsylvania, and the establishment of a religious test for voters in South Carolina, the colonists had carried the matter to England and had won their point. Now, however, came a succession of events which led them to extend their opposition from the representatives of the home government to that government itself.

It would be utterly erroneous, however, to regard the ensuing conflict, by which the colonies ultimately severed their political connection with Great Britain, as a struggle between two peoples. There was among the colonists no uniform opposition to the demands of the royal government. Indeed, there was a large, eminently respectable and powerful class of colonists who would have nothing to do with organized resistance to British authority. In England, on the other hand, a political party of no mean importance, counting among its adherents some of the ablest statesmen the country ever possessed, was bitterly opposed to a "personal" government such as George III. sought to reintroduce. The Whigs in England felt instinctively that the defeat of the colonists would not make for additional liberty at home. British Whigs and Radicals were equally active in the defence of the American cause. The Radical Cartwright in 1774 published *Letters on American Independence*, and subsequently hung a copy of the Declaration of Independence in his dining room; while Fox and his party in the Commons are said to have worn uniforms of the colors which Washington chose for his troops. Certain it is that the War for Independence must not be regarded as a conflict of Americans against Englishmen, of New World Anglo-Saxons against Anglo-Saxons of the Old World,—but

as a strife between two parties. Not all the loyal subjects of King George, nor perhaps even the most loyal subjects, were to be found in Great Britain; nor were the friends of colonial resistance to be found only in America. The most important encounters, not of war but of debate, between the contending parties took place—especially in the early incipient stages of the conflict—in England, not in America. And long after the appeal to argument made way for an appeal to force by actual warfare on American soil, the deliberations of Parliament, the policy of British ministers, the stubbornness of the British king, and the attitude of the British people, were quite as important features of the war as the battles waged by colonial and British troops. The war, in the widest and truest sense of that term, was waged not in one but in both countries.

It must be admitted that the people as a whole were not opposed to the king's ambition to rule as well as to reign. For at that time political corruption in England was so rife, so altogether shameless, that Parliament could not be regarded as "representing," in the modern sense of the term, the people of the nation. Whigs and Tories alike made use of corrupt methods. The Whigs, during their long lease of power, had persistently abused the privileges in their control. Like all parties, they regarded politics as a business which differed from ordinary commerce only in that it dealt in political patronage and public offices instead of in the ordinary commodities of trade. A majority in either house was simply a question of so much cash down. As Walpole put it, every man had his price. Parliamentary representation, except in a few constituencies, existed only in name; and as the people had but little voice in the selection of their so-called representatives, the king was quite as competent as Parliament to represent the people.

There was much disappointment, however, when Pitt was forced out of the government. "The Great Commoner" had been called into the ministry by a wave of popular feeling, as the first secretary of state and the actual prime

minister. Pitt's partner in political leadership, Newcastle, managed the House of Commons, while Pitt himself, to use his own expression, "borrowed Newcastle's majority" to save the British Empire. Pitt was incorruptible; he was arrogant and affected. Between him and the king there could be little harmony. His overshadowing influence was distinctly an obstacle in the king's path. From the very first, George III. made but little disguise of his opposition. In March, 1761, upon the retirement of Holderness, Pitt's colleague in the secretaryship of state, Bute, the former tutor of the king, was put in his place. Soon afterward there arose such differences of opinion with regard to the war with France as to lead to a split in the ministry. Pitt not only favored the continuance of the war, which had already brought so much glory to the British flag, but he proposed that the hostile purposes of Spain, which had already made a secret treaty with France, should be anticipated by an immediate declaration of war against that country too, and the despatch of a British fleet to Cadiz. The king, however, did not favor prolonging the war. He felt that a period of peace was requisite for the establishment of the strong personal government which he proposed to introduce. Bute and several influential members of the Cabinet argued for peace, in opposition to Pitt's policy of "coloring the map red." The majority voted against war, and on October 5, 1761, Pitt offered his resignation. He had, he said, been called to the ministry by the voice of the people, and as he was accountable to them he would not remain responsible for measures which he was not allowed to guide. The Duke of Newcastle remained as the nominal head of the ministry; but he was treated with so much contempt by the king, and given so small a share in the distribution of royal patronage, that he resigned in May, 1762,—whereupon Bute became the nominal as well as the real head of the ministry. With the objectionable Whig leaders thus disposed of, the king now intended to govern with the aid of a parliamentary party of his own,—one that

should be bound to him by flattery, bribery, and sentiments of loyalty. He saw no reason why he should not buy the support of a party in Parliament just as Walpole, Pelham, and Newcastle had done. The king's "friends," as a matter of fact, soon came to be known as a potent factor in Parliament.

Bute's ministry, however, promised ill for the success of the king's plans. In the first place, circumstances compelled Bute to carry on the war with Spain which Pitt had foreseen. The naval campaign of 1762 was a glorious one for the British; but it was generally known that Pitt had made all the preparations for it. Bute, who was hopelessly incompetent to conduct the war, began in the face of these victories to negotiate for peace; and on February 10, 1763, the Treaty of Paris was signed. The terms of this treaty, with which we are already familiar, were generally felt to be much less favorable to Great Britain than those which Pitt would have obtained. The unpopularity of Bute grew so rapidly from this time on that he resigned on April 8th of the same year, and George Grenville took his place at the head of the ministry. Grenville was probably honest; but he was compelled to yoke with the Duke of Bedford in a combination closely resembling that of Pitt and Newcastle. During the two years of his office, Grenville did more to bring about a permanent breach with America than any other minister accomplished in a like period.

It was during the Grenville ministry that the royal proclamation was issued which provided for the division of the newly acquired territory in North America. By the terms of this proclamation, three new provinces or "governments" were created. Canada became the province of Quebec, bounded on the south partly by a line which now marks the northern boundary of New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. Out of the territory given by Spain, the two provinces of East and West Florida were made. The northern boundary of East Florida was part of the boundary of the present State. The territory between Altamaha and

St. Mary's Rivers was "annexed to Georgia." A line was drawn about the headwaters of all the rivers flowing into the Atlantic, and the colonists were forbidden to settle on the land beyond this line, which was set apart for the Indians. Those who had already made homes there were commanded to withdraw. The primary object of this measure was stated in a subsequent report of the Lords of Trade to be to confine "the western extent of settlements to such a distance from the sea-coasts as those settlements should lie within reach of the trade and commerce of this kingdom, . . . and also of the exercise of that authority and jurisdiction which was conceived to be necessary for the preservation of the colonies in a due subordination to and dependence upon the mother country."

Having thus arranged for the government of the acquired territory, it became necessary to provide for its defence. Fears were expressed that both France and Spain would some day attempt to regain their lost possessions. It was, therefore, proposed to bring over an army of ten thousand regular troops, scatter them over the country from Canada to Florida, and maintain them partly at the expense of the crown and partly at the expense of the colonies. There seemed to be more than sufficient reasons why the colonies should bear a part of this burden. They had grown rich and prosperous beyond expectation. It was but right that they should share the enormous burden which Parliament had incurred for their protection. The national debt had grown prodigiously. At the treaty of Utrecht (1713) it amounted to £54,000,000; at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) it had risen to £78,000,000; at the peace of Paris it exceeded £148,000,000, and the interest amounted to nearly £5,000,000 out of an annual revenue of £8,500,000. To meet this enormous burden, the population of eight million persons was weighed down by a heavy system of taxes on nearly every conceivable article. The colonists, on the other hand, had no taxes to pay but the very light ones which they levied on themselves by their own legislative

assemblies. With the king's approval Grenville, therefore, set about devising a plan for the general taxation of the colonies and for the severe enforcement of the laws against smuggling.

This matter of taxation, however, was an exceedingly delicate one in colonial politics. The taxation of the colonies had always been voluntary; that is to say, whenever the home government needed to raise money from the colonies, a requisition was made upon them through the colonial governors, stating the quota asked for from each. Thereupon each colonial assembly began the customary process of bargaining with the governor, and would usually vote the supply or part of it in consideration of some concession which the governor made to the assembly. In Britain, however, this system had long been abandoned in favor of the modern system of annual budgets. But the colonists were very much attached to the old method, and Grenville's plans aroused fierce opposition. When, moreover, the British ministers undertook, in 1763 and again in 1764, to enforce the payment of duties on sugar and molasses, and authorized the officers of the admiralty to seize and confiscate all vessels engaged in unlawful trade, they discovered that they had stumbled upon a hornet's nest.

The colonists might not have objected to the claim that they should bear a part of the burdens resulting from the late war, had they been allowed a voice in determining their part of the task. But the home government insisted upon determining what they should pay. Whereupon the colonists argued that under the British constitution taxation and representation were inseparable. As they were not represented in Parliament, it followed that Parliament could not tax them. In answer to this it was pointed out that ever since Cromwell's time Parliament had made laws for the colonies regarding numerous matters. The laws regulating the commerce of the colonies, moreover, were revenue laws; that is to say, laws imposing taxes on the colonists without their being represented in Parliament. The colonists

were compelled to admit this; but they proceeded to distinguish between laws concerning imperial matters, over which they did not deny the authority of Parliament, and laws governing the internal affairs of the colonies. The Navigation Laws, they held, governed the external relations of the colonies and were therefore binding. But for Parliament to pass laws taxing the colonies directly, for the support of troops quartered within their own borders, was an encroachment upon their sacred rights and privileges.

The fundamental difficulty, however, lay in the fact that "representation" did not mean the same thing in all parts of the British Empire. The British Parliament was composed of two houses,—the House of Lords, which comprised hereditary nobles and the bishops, and the House of Commons, which was held to represent the people. The members of the latter body were elected in accordance with an antiquated system. Only four new members had been added since the accession of James I. The unequal development of the several parts of the kingdom resulted in a very unequal representation, because no corresponding changes were made in the distribution of membership. Some of the boroughs which sent members to Parliament had literally no inhabitants. "Gatton was a park; Old Sarum was a mound; Corfe Castle a ruin; the remains of what was once Dunwich were under the waves of the North Sea." Yet all these were "represented" in the Commons, while great centres of trade and industry, such as Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, and Sheffield, were without representation in Parliament. England and Wales together had only one hundred and sixty thousand electors. In Scotland thirty members were sent by fewer than two thousand voters. In the colonies, on the other hand, representation meant something totally different from this. There, representation was apportioned on a territorial basis and constantly changed to suit the altered conditions of the several parts of each colony. As new towns or counties were formed, either by the growth of settlements already

made or by the colonization of new regions, the inhabitants of these new divisions sent representatives to the colonial legislatures. This right was regarded as a most valuable one; it was felt that all sections of each colony, and all the colonists, should be "represented." The representative of each section spoke in the name of that section. He was delegated by it to defend its interests in the enactment of laws.

This theory of the "agent" or "delegate" was not accepted in Great Britain. The British idea of representation did not at all signify representation by population or by sections. The great mass of Englishmen belonging to any particular class did not vote for a member of the Commons, but other Englishmen of the same class did. Hence, the whole class was supposed to be represented. Each member, moreover, did not represent the place or the people that sent him, but the whole population and the whole country. Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of England, the foremost constitutional lawyer of his day, summed up the matter in the words: "There can be no doubt but that the inhabitants of the colonies are as much represented in Parliament as the greatest part of the people of England are. . . . A member of Parliament chosen for any borough represents not only the constituents and inhabitants of that particular place, but he represents the city of London, and all the commons of the land, and the inhabitants of all the colonies and dominions of Great Britain." In answer to this argument it was contended that there was a wide difference between the city of London, which was near enough to exert some moral influence upon Parliament, and the city of Boston or Philadelphia. It was urged, moreover, by so eminent a statesman as Pitt, that a sharp distinction had always been made, since the Magna Charta, between internal taxation and customs duties.

In the matter of the franchise the divergence was equally great. In Great Britain the suffrage was confined to those who owned land or who enjoyed certain peculiar privileges.

One man, moreover, might possess several votes, while thousands of his neighbors had no vote whatever. As a result, comparatively a few persons controlled a majority of the seats in the House of Commons. In the colonies, on the other hand, the franchise was regulated by uniform, general rules, and was usually conferred on all free adult white men who possessed a moderate amount of property. It is true that in the South the suffrage was commonly restricted to land owners; but it was a comparatively easy matter to acquire the requisite amount of land, and this qualification, which resembled the English county franchise in form, was in reality quite different.

Here were certainly opportunities enough for misunderstanding. The measures which the home government was about to adopt were held by the colonists to be violations of their sacred rights as Britons. They were, moreover, injurious to colonial welfare. From the standpoint of strict constitutional law the ministers appeared to have the better of the argument. Jefferson and the other colonial leaders felt that their cause was a righteous one: they appealed from the narrowly interpreted constitution to the higher code of "natural rights," of which political philosophers, especially in France, had written so eloquently. Rights, they declared, do not rest on a charter, but are inherent in us as men. To this new political doctrine which the colonists were about to attempt to transfer from the domain of theory to that of practice, Adams gave expression in 1765 by declaring that "the people have rights antecedent to all earthly government."

While Adams was uttering sonorous periods with regard to liberty in the form he had derived the idea from the political philosophers of France, the English writers of the school of Locke, and the Italian doctrinaires, George III. was preparing to answer the American theorists with a practical condition more odious than anything of which they had as yet made complaint. This condition was brought about by the passage of the Stamp Act. When the measure was

passed, it was regarded from the point of view of Great Britain as simply a revenue act which involved no other principle than the right of Parliament to tax the colonies even though they had no representation in the body which imposed the tax. The flexibility of the idea of representation as it obtained in Great Britain furnished to the majority in Parliament sufficient reason for the right. To this view was opposed that of the colonies as expressed as early as 1763 by James Otis, who, in a town meeting, claimed that every British subject in America was entitled to the essential privileges of Britons.

One of the political movements in Great Britain which greatly disturbed the colonists was the appointment of Charles Townshend to the position of First Lord of Trade. Townshend was known to be zealous for an alteration of the local governments. On March 9, 1764, Lord Grenville read in the House of Commons a series of resolutions setting forth the intention of the government "to impose a revenue" upon the colonies in the form of stamped paper. But he further announced that the proposed action would be postponed until the colonies should have an opportunity of suggesting some other form of taxation which might be more agreeable to them. On April 19th the king prorogued Parliament and gave his sanction to the stamp tax proposition. The announcement in America of the proposed tax produced widespread discussion. Those who opposed it were variously called Whigs, Patriots, or Sons of Liberty; while its friends were denominated Loyalists and Tories. The agitation centred around the larger question of Constitutional Guarantees. Neither side yielded to the other in protestations of loyalty to the mother country. The Whigs in the first instance were the minority party, but they urged their position with such vigor as that they became numerically and influentially the more important. No measure of Britain had ever awakened such general interest as the Stamp Act, and even the anticipation of its passage made the colonies one vast arena of debate. The discussion,

which was carried on with cogency of argument and aptness of citation, proved of educational benefit to the people and aided in developing the practical side of the American character.

It was natural that Samuel Adams should have been the foremost man and Boston the first city to antagonize the proposed measure. This was done at the annual town meeting (1764) at which Instructions were ordered to be prepared for the town's representatives in the General Court. This paper was drawn up by Samuel Adams. After the usual expression of loyalty to the hand that was smiting, the Instructions dealt with the matter of taxation in the abstract and from the point of view of the British constitution. The paper closed with the following words: "As his majesty's Northern American colonies are embarked with us in this most important bottom, we further desire you to use your endeavors, that their weight may be added to that of this province; that, by the united applications of all who are aggrieved, all may happily obtain redress." Thus we see the first fruits of the proposed Stamp Act to be a suggestion for united action on the part of the colonies. Not only did the General Court adopt these Instructions but one of its representatives, James Otis, was directed to prepare a memorial on the Stamp Act and this was ordered to be sent to the colony's agent in London. A committee was appointed to bring to the attention of the other colonies the action of the Massachusetts Assembly and to solicit their joint action against the proposed measure. The general enthusiasm with which the colonies responded to the proposition presaged their probable federation for purposes of defence.

The discussion which had opened at Boston now spread to all the colonies. Liberty was the dominant note everywhere. Yet that word so suggestive of sedition was never uttered without being linked with Loyalty. Let us look at some of the current arguments which under one or another form of phraseology were advanced. One of them ran

as follows: "It is seldom, indeed very seldom, that any people have had more at stake than we at present have. Whether we shall be taxed arbitrarily or at the will of others in our internal police, is a question that is now deciding in Great Britain; and this question amounts simply to this, Whether we shall have any thing we can call our own or not." Another writer asked why the colonies should prefer the government of Great Britain to that of France or any other country. The only effect of the American contention upon the home government was to strengthen its purpose to impose the tax. It was argued that the right of sovereignty over the colonies had been made an issue. The bill was passed and on March 22, 1765, became a law. It provided that no contractual paper, such as bills, bonds, notes, leases, insurance policies, legal documents, and the like, should have validity in the courts unless drawn upon stamped paper which was to be sold by the public offices at a price that would constitute a tax. The colonists, when they found themselves face to face with the issue, were in doubt as to the best way to meet it. Some of the newspapers proposed a policy of passive resistance. At the next following session of the Massachusetts Assembly James Otis suggested that a meeting of committees from the various Assemblies should be called to consider the danger of the colonies and to unite in sending to Great Britain a petition for relief. The proposed action was adopted and a letter was sent out to the other colonies proposing a conference. New Jersey was first heard from and declined to enter into the arrangement, but in Virginia the letter had a different reception. The House of Burgesses hesitated about taking action, and in the meanwhile a new member in the person of Patrick Henry entered the body. He was a product of his environment. Coarse and ungainly in appearance, clad in homespun, the young lawyer, with but little preparatory education, had about him few of the marks of a great personality, though on the Parsons case he had already given proof of his power and eloquence.

He was a lover of music and dancing and was a favorite with the young people of his county. Shortly before the close of the session he wrote upon the blank leaf of a law book a series of resolutions to the effect that Virginians were entitled to equal privileges with the people of Great Britain, that they should be governed by their own Assembly in the matter of taxes and internal polities and that any attempt to wrest from them these rights was a menace to British as well as to American freedom. These resolutions he proposed and they were seconded, but they were instantly opposed by a number of leading members of the Assembly who regarded them as less in keeping with the true sentiment of the colony than other resolutions of a more conciliatory nature which had been introduced. In the debate upon the resolutions the natural eloquence of Henry found potent expression. In a peroration which startled its auditors he exclaimed: "Tarquin and Cæsar had each a Brutus; Charles the First his Cromwell; and George the Third . . ." He did not complete the sentence, for with quick interposition, the Speaker cried the warning word "Treason!" With remarkable adroitness Henry, after a momentary pause that seemed pregnant with defiance, calmly closed his sentence with the words "may profit by their example." The Boston *Gazette* in publishing the Resolves of Henry,—four of which, despite the efforts of his opponents, had been adopted by the House of Burgesses,—and a report of his speech added the following comment: "The people of Virginia have spoken very sensibly, and the frozen politicians of a more northern government say that they have spoken treason."

The action of Virginia was the strong note that gave courage to the other colonies. One after another echoed its sentiments until all the thirteen colonies had either expressed their endorsement of the proposed Congress or had actually appointed their delegates. A month after the Virginia resolves had warmed the hearts of the colonists and brought forth fruit in expressions of endorsement

of their sentiments, a list of the names of the stamp distributors was received in Boston. On August 14th, a great concourse of people gathered at what has since been known as the Liberty Tree, and marched through the streets shouting their antipathy to the Stamp Act in the words: "Liberty, Property, and no Stamps." These words became the slogan of the anti-Stamp Act movement.

On October 7th, pursuant to the agreement arrived at between the colonies, the Stamp Act Congress met in the City Hall at New York. This place was the headquarters of the British forces in America. General Gage had almost dictatorial power in the town; ships of war were moored in the harbor. Twenty-eight delegates assembled from nine colonies, Massachusetts was represented by James Otis, Oliver Partridge, and Timothy Ruggles. South Carolina chose Thomas Lynch, Christopher Gadsden, and John Rutledge; Pennsylvania sent John Dickinson, John Morton, and George Bryan; Rhode Island was represented by Metcalf Bowler and Henry Ward; Connecticut had as its delegates Eliphalet Dyer, David Rowland and William S. Johnson; Delaware selected Thomas McKean and Cæsar Rodney; Maryland, William Murdock, Edwin Tilghman, and Thomas Ringgold; New Jersey, Robert Ogden, Hendrick Fisher, and Joseph Borden; while New York was represented by Robert R. Livingston, William Bayard, and Leonard Lespinward; Virginia, New Hampshire, Georgia, and North Carolina did not send delegates. There was no uniformity followed by the colonies in selecting these representatives local customs or conditions prevailing in each case. The body represented both Tories and Whigs. In compliment to the former party Timothy Ruggles was made chairman of the body. John Cotton was clerk. After eleven days debate the Congress agreed upon a set of resolutions in the way of a Declaration of Rights and Grievances.

After reciting the usual claims to the same privileges as subjects within the realm of Great Britain itself, the

document set forth that taxes cannot be imposed without the consent of the taxed, and that as the colonists could not be represented in the House of Commons, taxes might be justly imposed only through their local legislatures. Trial by jury was declared to be an indefeasible right of British subjects everywhere and the Declaration concluded by deploring the evident tendency of the home government to subvert the rights and liberties of their subjects across the waters. The Congress also prepared an address to the king and a memorial to the House of Lords in which was averred an ardent desire for the continuation of the connection between the mother country and the colonies. The documents dwelt upon the remoteness of the colonies, the peculiar circumstances of their founding, and their history, as arguments for the need of allowing exceptional powers to the colonial legislatures. In the debate which cropped out in the framing of these resolutions and state papers some of the members were found to be desirous of basing the claims of the colonies upon their crown charters. Robert Livingston protested against referring American liberties to the pleasure of a monarch as their source. Christopher Gadsden objected upon principle to making any petition whatever to Parliament, and said: "A confirmation of our essential and common rights as Englishmen may be pleaded from charters safely enough; but any further dependence on them may be fatal. We should stand upon the broad, common ground of those natural rights that we all feel and know as men and as descendants of Englishmen. I wish the charters may not ensnare us at last, by drawing different colonies to act differently in this great cause. Whenever that is the case, all will be over with the whole. There ought to be no New-England man, no New-Yorker, known on the Continent; but all of us Americans." The Congress advised the colonies to appoint special agents to solicit relief from the Tax Act, and to pursue that course of action with the greatest energy. The action of the Congress was endorsed by sentiment in

the various colonies and a number of the assemblies approved of it in strong terms. Some of them [illegible] length of talking about armed resistance. [illegible] that found its best expression in sentiments [illegible] the Gadsden uttering: "Nothing [illegible] together. The province that endeavors [illegible] separate must fall with the rest, and be branded [illegible]."

The committees appointed [illegible] work of the Congress, [illegible] Tories regarded the Congress [illegible] of British sovereignty. [illegible] New York, [illegible] press on the ground that [illegible]

[illegible]

It is not easy to forecast just to what extent opposition to the Stamp Act might have gone, had not the colonies been thrown into a state of jubilation by the news that Parliament had repealed the obnoxious legislation and that the king had given effect to its action by affixing his signature to the repeal measure on March 18, 1766.

Although the colonists had won what appeared to be a signal victory, it really proved to be only a brush upon the skirmish line. The repeal of the Stamp Act was accompanied by the passage of the Declaratory Act, which threatened danger for the colonies. That act declared that Parliament had the right in all cases whatsoever to control the colonies. Even Pitt, who had proved himself such a valiant champion of America, was outspoken in his convictions of the absolute right of Parliament to govern the colonies, even though upon the ground of their lacking representation in that body he denied to it the power to impose taxation upon them. The spirit of the colonists was ill disposed to pass in silence this fresh challenge to their full pretensions. But as the Declaratory Act simply propounded an abstraction, they wisely concluded to await a concrete embodiment of the theory before further organizing hostility toward Parliament.

Townshend was of an arbitrary spirit and had become weary of the complaints of the colonists; and he therefore advocated stringent measures. He urged that the splendid mercantile development of America had resulted from the fostering care of Great Britain, and that it was but just that the colonies should provide a revenue for the mother country; and he urged that, if they continued recalcitrant, the collection of taxes from them should be enforced by the army. After delivering himself of this statement, he cynically added: "After that, I do not expect to have any statue erected in America." This speech of Townshend's was a prelude to the celebrated Townshend Revenue Acts. These imposed duties upon glass, paper, painters' colors, and tea. A board of customs, as a necessary part of the machinery of customs

collection, was provided, and writs of assistance were legalized. The first of these acts was introduced into Parliament on May 13, 1767, and became a law on November 20th following. The preamble set forth that the duties imposed by it were for the two objects of civil government in the provinces and for their common defence. In effect, this and the associate measures would have so provided for the support of the provincial governors, that these and other crown officers would be independent of the colonial Assemblies. An inkling as to the lengths to which Parliament might be expected to go in asserting authority over the local Assemblies was given in its action toward that of New York, which was suspended from exercising its legislative powers until it should agree to provide for the British troops quartered upon the colony. It was very clear to the minds of the colonial leaders that the ulterior purpose of the Townshend Acts was not revenue but political control. The line of distinction in the matter of taxation which was made in the colonies was that which divided external from internal. The colonists conceded the right of Parliament to assert British sovereignty, and to provide for revenue from the colonies so long as such grants were made by the local Assemblies. Charles Townshend, who was responsible for the new acts, died before they went into effect, and their execution fell to Lord North, chancellor of the exchequer. Colonial affairs had assumed such large proportions that a new office had been constituted for them, that of secretary of state for the colonies. The incumbent was Lord Hillsborough. This gentleman was remarkable for his devotion to the principle of prerogative, but, unlike Townshend, he had never sought to irritate those whom he was to govern. Personally, he was of a bland and ingratiating disposition.

We have already referred to the danger of mob control in America, and the Townshend Acts furnished new occasion for popular turbulence; spasmodic it was, but should it become settled the patriotic leaders foresaw that it would be ruinous to colonial aspirations. Firebrands were filling

Boston with broadsides calling upon the people to rise and fight for their rights. These inflammatory sheets called forth from James Otis a ringing speech in denunciation of mobocracy. With regard to the burdens of the people, he declared that be they ever so heavy or their grievances ever so great, no possible circumstances, though ever so oppressive, could be supposed sufficient to justify private tumults and disorders, either to their consciences before God or legally before men; that their forefathers, in the beginning of the reign of Charles I., for fifteen years together, were continually offering prayers to their God and petitions to their king for redress of grievances, before they would betake themselves to any forcible measures; that to insult and tear each other in pieces was to act like madmen. This speech produced a salutary effect and when printed in the newspapers served to restrain rash spirits. It was clearly to be seen that the campaign of liberty in America was to be made within legal limits.

The repeal of the Stamp Act led Jonathan Mayhew, a Boston divine, to suggest to James Otis the plan of having Massachusetts send letters of congratulation to the other colonies. The effect of keeping up a correspondence between the colonies and the colonial leaders as a means of unifying and strengthening opinion was dwelt upon in the press and at all public meetings. One of those who used this means of propagating patriotic sentiments and did so with remarkable success was John Dickinson, whose "The Farmer's Letters" are famous in the literature of the Revolutionary period. They appeared first in the *Pennsylvania Chronicle and Universal Advertiser*, printed in Philadelphia. The first letter was printed December 2, 1767, and the last appeared in type February 15, 1768. They were widely circulated throughout the colonies and were reprinted in pamphlet form and used to extend the propaganda of the anti-tax party.

The first response to the Townshend Acts was a renewal in the colonies of the non-importation movement. The

phrase of the day was: "Save your money, and you save your country." The effect upon the manufacturing towns of New England of this renewal of non-importation was greatly to promote certain industries which, in many instances, have continued to be their leading manufactures. The attitude of the colonial Assemblies toward the new acts is best seen in the spirit and action of that of Massachusetts, which in the nature of the case was the Assembly to which all the colonies turned for initiative action. On the opening of the Assembly, December 30, 1767, the Townshend Acts were read and a committee was appointed to take under consideration the state of the province. The committee, through Samuel Adams, drafted a letter to be forwarded to the colony's agent in London for presentation to the ministers. It reviewed the American position and reiterated the well-known arguments in its defence and concluded by declaring that the new acts were unconstitutional. Letters to various noblemen were also prepared and a petition to the king. These documents all appeared in the newspapers and their contents served as models for similar declarations on the part of the other colonies. On January 22, 1768, the House voted to consider the expediency of soliciting the colonies to act jointly in petitioning the king for relief from the Townshend Acts. The proposition at first met defeat, as it savored too much of a call for another Congress, but upon reconsideration, on February 11th, a letter to the purport of the resolution was presented and adopted and then sent to the various Assemblies.

This circular letter set forth that the Massachusetts Assembly having had under serious review the late measures of Parliament, and acting from the consideration that the common good dictated concurrence of opinion and action upon the part of the colonies, adopted this means of freely communicating to the other Assemblies the sentiments of that of Massachusetts. Then in a brief way were presented the contents of the various letters which had been

prepared and the petition to the king. The circular letter expressed the hope that the other Assemblies would not feel that Massachusetts was assuming to dictate to them, and apprehensive lest they might have been influenced by Royalist versions of the attitude of Massachusetts toward the home government that colony disclaimed any spirit of factiousness or disloyalty. Moreover, advice and counsel were solicited. It was further stated by the authors of the letter that they regarded it as prudent and directed only to the quieting of the public mind.

Although the letter elicited gratifying responses from the other colonies, it had no official favor shown it either in the colony from which it emanated or indeed in any other. A few days after the letter had been prepared Governor Bernard summoned the members of the House to the council chamber and sharply censured them for their action and declared that they were a contentious set who could not be happy save in an atmosphere of political controversy. In his report to the home government, Bernard put the worst construction upon the circular letter, and the light in which he represented it alarmed the ministry. Resistance to the Acts became more determined. Although the method of opposition was passive, its results were none the less irritating to Great Britain. It devolved upon Lord Hillsborough to apprise the colonies of the action of the king with regard to their recalcitrance. But before following further the devious courses of political argument and happenings which centred about the Townshend Acts we will pause to look at the man who was the leader of the colonial side of the controversy.

CHAPTER V

THE BEGINNING OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE

THE colonies were fast approaching the crisis to which led their experiments in self-administration; having withstood Parliament they next found themselves in opposition to the royal prerogative. Massachusetts took the initiative in 1767 by opposing the claim of the king to personal direction of the colonies. On the thirtieth of December of that year the General Court of Massachusetts, guided by such leading men as John Hancock, James Otis, and Joseph Hawley, and especially by Samuel Adams, the master spirit of the movement, issued a circular letter designed to further the sentiment of union among the colonies and to make effective opposition to the Townshend Acts. This action was followed by a series of occurrences which gave unmistakable evidence that Massachusetts had rightly gauged the feeling of its sister colonies. The man whose mind placed in convincing and incisive form the arraignment of the British policy which was contained in the circular letter and whose strength in argument was shown in a series of subsequent notable papers is deserving of more than passing notice in connection with the movements which he profoundly affected. He was a graduate of Harvard College, a small tradesman, and a collector of taxes, but his restless spirit was not to be bound by the routine of his daily duties and his natural inclination toward politics led him to express himself in frequent contributions to local journals and in

constant discussion of political questions. Intellectually, Samuel Adams stood in a medial relation between the old order of colonists and the new. Because of this mental attitude he has aptly been styled "The Last of the Puritans." His was the austere sense of righteousness of the Puritan, but his political views were broadly comprehensive; his perception of the trend of his times was acute, his sympathies were wide enough to embrace all the colonies, and his earnestness in seeking their advancement was due to his conviction as to their community of interest. Yet not this fact so largely as an overmastering love of liberty for its own sake impelled the sturdy publicist to the course that gave him the position of the American agitator. He was moved by the power of truth and of right; his faith in God and humanity was fixed, and in his earnest advocacy of the rights of the colonies, he, more than any other man of the period, clearly set forth the universal principle of liberty and of justice which was the theoretical foundation of the American position. The characterization of him by John Adams at the time of the Stamp Act excitement fittingly coördinates the various elements of his personality: "Samuel Adams had the most thorough understanding of liberty and her resources in the temper and character of the people, though not in the law and the constitution, as well as the most habitual radical love of it, and the most correct, genteel, and artful pen. He is a man of refined policy, steadfast integrity, exquisite humanity, genteel erudition, obliging, engaging manners, real as well as professed piety, and a universal good character, unless it should be admitted that he is too attentive to the public, and not enough so to himself or his family. He is always for softness and prudence, where they will do; but he is stanch, and stiff, and rigid, and inflexible in the cause." This was the man who followed the line of conviction from a position of loyalty to one of rebellion. Samuel Adams held that there was nothing, short of independence, in the measure of liberty which the colonies demanded,

incompatible with the true spirit of the British Constitution. Both by abstract argument and historical deductions he had, though fruitlessly, sought to justify the claims of the colonies in the eyes of the home government. But when it became needful to meet the issue of prerogative he was found ready to become a leader in the opposition. He well knew that the forces making for the impending revolution in America were but the more active expression of similar forces in England, which were as inevitably directed toward the modification of the prerogative of the crown. While the colonies uttered deep and bitter complaints against the discriminations which caused them to be treated differently from British subjects at home, they were perfectly aware that the position of Parliament and the assertion of prerogative were to them the Scylla and Charybdis of a doubtful destiny.

While the circular letter was being forwarded on its slow progress to the several colonies, and was being borne to England, the course of events in the colonies was giving definite expression to the rapidly growing sense of freedom of the people. In Boston, the anniversary of the repeal of the Stamp Act was celebrated with noisy demonstrations; the popular ill will expressing itself especially against the customs officials and the governor. The first act of violence was the seizure of John Hancock's sloop *Liberty*, which was freighted with a cargo of Madeira wine. This occurred on June 10, 1768. Upon the customs officer in charge refusing a bribe offered to secure the unopposed surrender of the cargo he was locked in his cabin and the greater part of the lading of the ship was removed, the remainder being entered at the custom house as the entire cargo. This overt act led to the seizure of the vessel by the royal commissioners, and she was anchored under the guns of a man-of-war which lay in the harbor. A mob of citizens thereupon roughly handled the revenue officers and burned their boat. These proceedings led to the despatch of additional military forces to Boston. The inhabitants held a

town meeting and protested to the governor against the appearance in the city of an armed force and, adverting to the flight of the commissioners to the Castle for safety, construed their action into a relinquishment of their authority, and expressed the hope that it might not be resumed. On June 30th, the Council passed a resolution discountenancing the riotous proceedings, and asserting its wish that the guilty persons might "be brought to condign punishment."

While the rebellious spirit of Massachusetts was thus finding expression in Boston, the circular letter was eliciting gratifying responses from the colonies to which it had been sent. The New Hampshire Assembly expressed their hearty commendation of the sentiments of the letter, but regretted that their session was so near its close as to forbid action upon the communication, but it was their opinion that the succeeding Assembly would take appropriate and favorable action. The House of Burgesses of Virginia applauded the action of the Massachusetts Assembly and endorsed its position, but disclaimed any intention of aiming at independence. They not only, like Massachusetts, petitioned the king for the redress of grievances but followed the example of that colony also in sending out a letter to all the colonial Assemblies inviting their concurrence. The New Jersey Assembly added to its endorsement of the Massachusetts circular a wish that the correspondence thus begun might continue. Connecticut made reply in the same vein. Governor Bernard summed up the satisfaction of the people of Massachusetts over the receipt of these letters from the colonial Assemblies with the remark that the representatives "have been much elated. within these three or four days, by some letters they have received in answer to the circular letter." But the king had not been unmindful of reports, sent to him by the Tories in America, declaring that the concert of the colonies was seditious and aimed at the severance of the ties binding them to the mother country. Bernard himself in correspondence with his relative, Lord Barrington, of the war department, spoke of the

colonies as fast moving toward a confederacy which would not only precurse rebellion on their part but would certainly inflame the continent as well. The king determined upon two royal orders, one to the Massachusetts Assembly, to rescind the circular letter, and another to the other Assemblies requiring them to ignore it. The mistaken view of contemporary British opinion as to the American spirit is expressed in the words of a British official who said, "I think this measure will bring matters to a crisis very speedily and if the colonies see this country is in earnest, they will presently make their option and take the part of peaceable subjects in future."

This personal entrance of the king into the affairs of the colonies added greatly to the interest of the American situation and gave it a prominence in the eyes of the other monarchs of Europe that it would not have had if it had remained merely a question of the enforcement of Parliamentary administration. On June 21st, Governor Bernard sent to the House of Deputies a message with reference to the order to rescind the circular letter, as follows: "I have His Majesty's orders to make a requisition to you, which I communicate in the very words in which I have received it. I must desire you to take it into immediate consideration, and I assure you, that your resolution thereon will have most important consequences to the province. I am myself merely ministerial in this business, having received His Majesty's instruction for all I have done in it. I heartily wish that you may see how forcible the expediency of your giving His Majesty this testimonial of your duty and submission is at this time. If you should otherwise, I must nevertheless do my duty." The news of the message spread through the community and inflamed the minds of the colonists with resentment. A large gathering of citizens heard the second reading of the message before the Assembly and hung with breathless interest upon the words of James Otis—who had acquired a great reputation by his speech as advocate-general in 1761 against the application of the

British authorities for "writs of assistance" for the discovery of goods that had been smuggled into the colony—when he took the floor and for two hours spoke upon the royal order. He characterized the letter from the Earl of Hillsborough, secretary of state, which was the basis of Bernard's message, as unworthy, in its style, of a schoolboy, and scorning the criticisms which it passed upon the circular letter, he defended the latter as being written more correctly than could have been done by the whole British legislature. Passing to the subjects in dispute he declared: "Let Britain rescind her measures, or the colonies are lost to her forever." Massachusetts, influenced by the firm stand of its leaders deliberately defied the royal mandate; and on June 30, 1768, the Assembly dissolved after having framed a message to the governor in which the questions in dispute were argued at length. A letter to the Earl of Hillsborough and a "Report" and "Resolve," the latter being a recital of the story of the colonial grievances and an account of the dispute with the home government, were also drawn up and adopted. Profound as was the impression made upon the king by the recalcitrance of his subjects in Massachusetts, the impression of a different sort which it created throughout the other colonies was even deeper.

More than ever the other colonies were fixed in their resolve to stand by Massachusetts, and when the ministers used an obsolete statute as the basis of a threat to bring to England for trial anyone who might be charged with treason in connection with the circular letter, the Virginia House of Burgesses declared in no uncertain terms that the right of petition for redress of grievances was inherent, and that a body of colonies no less than individuals might exercise it; and, further, that any attempt to transfer from the local courts to those of Great Britain the case of colonial subjects charged with any crime whatsoever would be "highly derogatory of the right of British subjects," and must be deemed an unrightful assertion of the power of the crown. This firm

declaration was followed by the dissolution of the House by the governor, but its members met in a private residence, and under the lead of Colonel Washington adopted a policy of trade retaliation toward the mother country. They pledged themselves to a general agreement to import no goods whatever upon which had been laid a tax. A number of the other colonies followed this example; and the American market for British products was virtually closed. The merchants and manufacturers of England besieged the government for a repeal of the Townshend Acts, and, consequently, in April, 1770, the taxes levied by these acts were taken from all the enumerated articles except tea, upon which commodity a tax was preserved in order that the principle involved in the contention of the home government might be preserved.

The colonies now had officially before them the circular letter of Massachusetts, the letter of Virginia and the king's order to take no action upon the Massachusetts communication. In Maryland, Governor Sharpe laid the king's requisition before the Assembly with a confident assertion that he was satisfied that they would not forfeit the favorable opinion of his majesty by giving consideration to the interdicted letter. To this communication the House responded: "What we shall do upon this occasion, or whether in consequence of that Letter we shall do anything, it is not our present business to communicate to your excellency; but of this be pleased to be assured, that we cannot be prevailed on to take notice of, or to treat with the least degree of contempt, a Letter, so expressive of duty and loyalty to the sovereign, and so replete with just principles of liberty; and your Excellency may depend that, whenever we apprehend the rights of the people to be affected, we shall not fail boldly to assert and steadily endeavor to maintain and support them, always remembering, what we could wish never to be forgot, that by the Bill of Rights it is declared, "That it is the right of the subject to petition the king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are

illegal.'" The House then, after due consideration, concurred in the Massachusetts circular, and framed a calm, serious, and firm response.

In South Carolina a committee of the Assembly gave warm indorsement to the circulars of Massachusetts and Virginia, commended them for their loyal and respectful tone toward his majesty's government, their affectionate references to the mother country and at the same time endorsed their statement of the constitutional claims of the colonies as being thoroughly well founded. The action of the Assembly in making these sentiments their own was rewarded by the governor with dissolution, which, at eight o'clock of the same evening, was announced by beat of drum. The favorable action of the Georgia Assembly upon the Massachusetts circular was likewise followed by involuntary dissolution. The Speaker of the Rhode Island Assembly communicated to the sister body of Massachusetts assurances of cordial approval by the Assembly which he represented. In Pennsylvania, upon the Assembly's announcing its agreement with the Massachusetts position, the usual recourse by the governor to dissolution of the popular House was had, but the Assembly declined to be dissolved, alleging that the governor had no such power and that their right to conduct correspondence with their peers of the other colonies was beyond question. They thereupon addressed a petition to the king for the redress of grievances, and in Philadelphia a largely attended mass meeting was held and sentiments and measures of concurrence with the other colonies were given enthusiastic agreement.

The Delaware Assembly asserted the right of conference and coöperation between the colonies and addressed a petition to the king, in which the affirmation was made that should the colonies perforce have to obey all the impositions in the way of taxation that Parliament had made and be deprived of the parts of their legislation which might contravene that of Parliament not a vestige of liberty would remain to them. The New York Assembly applauded the

Massachusetts House for its defence of American liberty and likewise gave its approval to every feature of the letter. It also sent petitions to the king and the House of Lords and a remonstrance to the House of Commons and adopted resolutions asserting its right to correspond and consult with any of the neighboring colonies. The North Carolina Assembly returned as hearty an answer to the circular letter. The principles of correspondence and consultation between the colonies and the right of individual or united petition for the redress of grievances having been asserted by all the colonies, the sentiments of the Massachusetts letter became the inspiration of the American people.

The various memorials and petitions were delivered by the agents of the colonies to Lord Hillsborough. All to no avail; they were regarded merely as the ill-tempered utterances of a disloyal people. Few of them came under the royal notice.

After the passage of the Virginia non-importation resolves, as they were called in 1769, the various Assemblies reiterated their sentiments, or otherwise gave practical endorsement to them. Delaware affirmed their expression; North Carolina, Rhode Island, and New York adopted them without alteration; Massachusetts added others to fit its local conditions; Maryland made some changes in their phraseology. It might well be said that "The whole continent from New England to Georgia seems firmly fixed: like a strong, well-constructed arch, the more weight there is laid upon it the firmer it stands; and thus with Americans, the more we are loaded the more we are united." It was in this spirit that the colonies declined to be propitiated by the repeal of other taxes so long as the continuance of a tax upon tea maintained the obnoxious principle of taxation without representation. During the remainder of 1769 the progress of events tending toward revolution was largely confined to Massachusetts, where the presence of the king's forces had become a settled grievance. The presence of the soldiers at the organization of the Assembly for its annual session, toward

the end of May of that year, greatly angered the patriots and a strong remonstrance was sent to Governor Bernard against what was regarded as a gross breach of privilege. He was requested to remove the garrison and to take away the cannon which were mounted so as to bear upon the State House. Although the occasion of this latter complaint was not novel, the tense state of public feeling construed as a menace that which had formerly had no meaning. The governor asserted that he had no such control over the military of the colony as he was asked to exercise, and, as the Court continued insistent in its demand, the governor adjourned the General Court itself to another place, Cambridge. On July 8th the House passed nineteen resolutions reviewing the dispute with the home government and making a number of charges against Bernard, who had already notified them of his purpose to return to Great Britain. His departure from the colony was made an occasion of popular rejoicing. The conduct of his administration had been weak and vacillating, which was due to his efforts to please all parties.

On March 5, 1770, occurred the clash between the troops quartered in Boston and the populace which is familiarly known as the Boston Massacre. The constant protest of Samuel Adams and others against the quartering of troops upon the people in time of peace had aroused popular resentment, and, during eighteen months preceding the street broil, insult and provocation were constantly interchanged between the soldiers and the people. At last a mob attacked a squad of the red coats—a term which had come to be one of derision—and freely pelted them with snowballs besides abusing them, as was customarily done. The soldiers turned upon their persecutors, there was a flash of musketry, and five or six civilians fell dead or dying. The city was horrified. The next day Samuel Adams headed a committee appointed by a large citizens' meeting held at Faneuil Hall, to repair to the governor and council to demand the immediate withdrawal of the

troops. In a manner imperious, and with a voice trembling with anger, Adams performed his mission, won his point, and returned to the people with word that the troops were to be withdrawn. This was done, but the rumblings of popular rage presaged future outbreaks. It was clear that the soldiers had fired without orders, but when those who were included in the unfortunate affair were brought to trial all were acquitted of the charge of murder and but two were found guilty of manslaughter. The trial of the accused soldiers was conducted under circumstances and in a manner to reflect credit upon the spirit of American fairness. Captain Preston appealed to Josiah Quincy to defend him. Although Quincy was an ardent patriot, whose eloquence had often been invoked in the cause of liberty, he unhesitatingly undertook to defend the object of popular wrath, and to his able conduct of the case an acquittal was largely due.

The manner in which the trial of the British soldiers had been held and the removal of the obnoxious troops had a conciliating effect, and this was strengthened by the disposition of Great Britain to attempt a settlement of her differences with the colonies. She seemed to be coming to a better understanding of her colonial subjects, the nature of their claims, and the grounds upon which the demand for redress of grievances was based. The dispute had a wide educative influence in the mother country; voices were uplifted in defence of the colonial attitude, and peace at almost any price was urged by many men of prominence as the truest policy to be pursued. Prophecies concerning the future of America were abundant and roseate. They depicted in language which was often regarded as pure hyperbole the destiny which the resources of a great continent held out to men of the spirit which the colonists had manifested. America was held up to the admiration of the British as the future glory of the empire. Many of those who thus wrote had resided in the New World and their opinions commanded greater respect on that account. Thomas Hutchinson wrote that the natural increase of population gave promise

in a few generations of a vast empire in the New World. William Livingston expressed himself in language which must have appeared extravagant, but which events have proved prophetic. "Never," said he, "was there such a Phœnix state. Liberty, religion, and science were on their wing to these shores. The finger of God pointed to a mighty empire. The mother and her sons would again be collected in one house, and in proportion to the abatement of national glory in Europe would be the brightness of its resurrection in America. The day dawns in which the foundation of this mighty empire is to be laid by the establishment of a regular American Constitution. All that hitherto has been done seems to be little beside the collection of materials for the construction of this glorious fabric. 'Tis time to put them together. The transfer of the European part of the great family is so swift, and our growth so fast, that before seven years roll over our heads the first stone must be laid."

Samuel Adams shared the sentiment for an amicable settlement of the differences between the British government and the colonies, but he saw little in the attitude of the British ministry to justify the belief that such would be found. The informed opinion of continental statesmen supported the belief that independence for the American colonies was in the near future. Such were the feelings of Durand, the French minister at London, and of his successor, Châtelet. The latter not only foresaw the achievement of liberty by the colonies, but something of the great influence which the new government in the New World would exert upon the political systems of Europe. The action of the colonies, elicited by the Townshend Acts, and the expressions in the American press attracted wide attention in Europe. We find Franklin writing home the encouraging message: "All Europe is attentive to the dispute between Britain and the colonies; our part is taken everywhere." A London letter, published in a Massachusetts *Gazette* October 19, 1769, commented as follows: "Your

late conduct is noble indeed: every ray is splendid with asserted right and vindicated freedom." A letter from Paris in the following year runs: "I imagine I see illustrious statesmen, eloquent orators, wise historians, and learned philosophers rising up among you, whose generous souls have espoused the interests of humanity, and are spreading the blessings of liberty throughout the world around them." Although the American Revolution was not fought in the defence of abstractions, and had little to do, in its incipiency, with liberty as a right of mankind, yet as the events giving strength and focus to the sentiment of freedom progressed, the colonists found that they were fighting for a cause that was broader than the American continent. It is no exaggeration to say that continental experience became the mould in which American independence was fashioned.

It was the influence of current opinion at home as much as the course of events in America which led the British ministry seriously to consider the propriety of rescinding the tax on tea. It was on the very day that the British troops came into conflict with the street mob at Boston that Lord North, chancellor of the exchequer, moved in the House of Commons the repeal of the duties levied under the Townshend Acts, excepting that upon tea. The Duke of Grafton, the titular head of the government, pleaded for the inclusion of tea in the act of relief. Grafton argued that the retention of the tax upon tea reserved to the country an insignificant revenue at the sacrifice of five thousand times as much money owing to the action of the colonies in adopting the non-importation agreements. He enlarged upon the disgust and ill will which were engendered by the measure and pointed out clearly the national dangers which it entailed. He succeeded in enlisting for the support of his position the men in the Cabinet who stood highest for personal probity and public achievements; such were Lord Camden, General Conway, and Lord Granby. Sir Edward Hawke, who was kept away by illness, would have voted with them. The opposition had the strength of Lord North's support and

the proposition to abolish the duty on tea was defeated. The casting vote of Lord North was not, however, a vote of conscience; it but reflected the will of his sovereign.

Something, however, was gained in America by concession in fact, if not in principle. New York, which had heretofore held rigidly to its agreement continued in the non-importation compact only as related to tea. The merchants of Philadelphia looked upon the letters sent out by New York to the principal commercial places, proposing a general agreement to limit non-importation to the single article tea, as a renunciation of a principle vital to the cause of independence. Massachusetts was thoroughly indignant at its sister colony and expressed its feelings in an unmistakable way. At a mass meeting in Boston, the New York letter was ordered to be torn into shreds and scattered to the winds. In New Jersey, South Carolina, and the colonies generally, the action of New York was repudiated; and the former harmony between the colonies gave place to discord and bitter reproaches levelled at New York. After the subsidence of the ill feeling created by the breach of the non-importation agreement, there came a reaction in popular feeling, marked by a temporary calm which seemed to augur an era of good feeling. The spirit of conciliation was, for the moment, dominant both in the mother country and the colonies. The principal causes of dissatisfaction remaining in some of the colonies grew out of a set of royal instructions which were sent to the various governors. These instructions took no account of local feeling, custom, or law. Under their authority the royal officials in North Carolina made assessments of enormous fees, following the action of the Governor of Maryland, who in violence of the rights of the Assembly undertook to revive an obsolete law which regulated the fees of officials. It was not the specific form that it took that irritated the colonies so much as the fact that the instructions gave to the ministry, acting through their agents, unwarranted and arbitrary powers. In Rhode Island, June 9, 1772, the *Gaspee*, which had shown too great

activity in the revenue service to please the people of Rhode Island, while undertaking to intercept the packet *Providence* for the purpose of searching her for contraband goods, ran aground. Taking advantage of her situation, a party of citizens boarded her, and, after wounding her commander, took forcible possession, and set fire to the schooner.

Another event of this same year was fraught with more significance than the burning of a revenue schooner. Pursuant to the invitation of Virginia, committees of correspondence were formed throughout the colonies. Massachusetts had already taken such action locally, for the determination of the British ministry to see that the provincial judges were paid, even though the colony refused to tax itself for that purpose, led the various towns to appoint committees of correspondence in order to take harmonious action in opposition to British encroachments. Having received the invitation from the House of Burgesses of Virginia to enter into correspondence, the Massachusetts House, on May 28, 1773, made hearty response in assent. Almost simultaneously, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and South Carolina took similar action, thus constituting a group of six colonies banded together for the purpose of keeping mutually informed as to their several political situations and to afford each other counsel and coöperation. This action was the most radical yet taken in America, and was the precursor of the Congress soon to be called.

The British government was not satisfied to let well enough alone, but proceeded to insult American sentiment by forcing upon them the abhorrent tax on tea. Not that the American colonists had any quarrel with tea, so long as it was not brought to them through the channels of British commerce. Indeed, the dames of the colonies had been regaling themselves and their friends with the finest brands of tea, notwithstanding the non-importation agreement. But the article had been smuggled into the colonies from France, Denmark, Sweden, and especially from Holland, and along

with tea other Oriental products were surreptitiously imported without the payment of tribute to the British treasury. The principal sufferer from these smuggling operations was the East India Company, which was anxious to break up the smuggling traffic, and to secure for itself the profitable trade. The tea-drinking habit was one of the strongest characteristics of the times in America. Legislative Assemblies, in order that the widow and orphans of deceased persons might not be impoverished, even passed sumptuary laws limiting the amount of tea which might be drunk at funerals. There were few occasions of social meeting which did not call for an inordinate consumption of the beverage. A plan to entice the colonies to secure the favorite article through the proper channels received the endorsement of the king and his ministers, but it only availed to bring about a further clash with the colonies. By this plan, the East India Company, which was obliged to pay into the British treasury twelvepence on every pound of tea it imported, was relieved of that tax on all tea carried to America, which left upon the commodity only the threepence colonial tax of the Townshend Act. This permitted the tea to be sold to the colonies at a lower price than it brought in England, and the British impression was that when price was opposed to principle the principle would be yielded. Franklin, commenting upon the fatuous notion, wrote: "They have no idea that any people can act from any other principle but that of interest; and they believe that threepence on a pound of tea, of which one does not perhaps drink ten pounds in a year, is sufficient to overcome all the patriotism of an American."

In the autumn of 1773, cargoes of tea were brought to the various seaports. At Boston, on December 16, 1773, a group of citizens, disguised as Indians, boarded three vessels in the harbor, broke open the chests, and threw the tea overboard. At New York and Philadelphia, the ships were "permitted" to carry out to sea again their obnoxious cargoes. In the latter city, the people were greatly stirred,

and the general feeling was well expressed in a broadside that was widely distributed signed "A Mechanic." In this document the East India Company was made the particular object of assault. Yet the opposition expressed therein was really directed less against the fiscal question involved in the tax on tea than against the dreaded control of colonial commerce by Great Britain through the factors of British merchants and the carrying of products in British vessels, which it was asserted threatened the very existence of American commerce, and the liberty of the people. At Charleston, the tea was landed and deposited in a damp cellar, where it soon lost all commercial value. Perhaps the boldest course was that followed in Maryland. When a ship, the *Peggy Stewart*, bearing chests of tea, entered upon its lists as East India goods, came into the harbor at Annapolis, it soon became known that her freight consisted in part of tea; whereupon the citizens of the place held a public meeting, and resolutely compelled the merchant who was responsible for the consignment to proceed with them to the water front and there, on October 15, 1774, to burn both the ship and its cargo. These actions of the American patriots carried their unmistakable meaning to the British home authorities: they read in them a lesson of defiance and of insistence upon a point of principle. In America, such radical measures did not receive universal sanction, even among those who were favorable to the American cause; the Whigs hesitated to approve the deeds and counselled payment to the owners for the value of the property destroyed. The Tories made the tea burning a new text for their predictions of disaster: if the colonists struck thus boldly in behalf of an abstract principle, what would they not do in defence of a catalogue of rights whose denial by the mother country had made them a list of grievances.

The effect of the Tea Act was to make the question of taxation without representation a burning issue. Brodie, in his *History of the British Empire*, comments as follows: "Popular movements have commonly been ascribed to the

principal actors in them as to their authors; but the utmost that can be accomplished by individuals, in such cases, is merely to avail themselves of a happy predisposition in the public mind, to give form and consistency to loose opinions, and to bring to the aid of an infant sect or party the weight of talent, learning, and character, or station. They may thus strengthen and direct the current." Ramsay, in his *History of the American Revolution*, in discussing the action of the Boston party, says: "Admitting the rectitude of the American claims of exemption from parliamentary taxation, the destruction of the tea by Bostonians was warranted by the great law of self-preservation." So general was American sentiment in its opposition to the principle of British taxation, that few among even those who ultimately fought against the American cause were found in this early stage of the controversy to be favorable to the claims of Parliament.

The action of the American colonies in placing their emphatic disapproval upon the principle of unjust taxation came as a shock to the king. It had appeared as if an era of good feeling had been inaugurated when on the 4th of June, 1766, the birthday of the king next following the repeal of the Stamp Act, the healths of George III. and Benjamin Franklin were drunk with enthusiasm at a banquet. The particular acts of a disturbing nature which, from time to time, had been reported from the colonies were attributed by the sovereign to the rude state of American society, and had not been permitted to disturb the royal complacency. Were there not at the same time isolated instances of disorder occurring in the realm itself? Indeed, his majesty enjoyed great satisfaction in the thought that his arrangement with the East India Company was in the nature of a generous concession to American antagonism to taxation. The news of the tea burnings aroused the king; there was no longer room to mistake the alarming condition of the colonies. Rebellion surely was rife. There was little likelihood that the king, now fully apprised of the

temper of his colonial subjects, would follow longer the counsels of prudence. The point of personal government toward which he had long been working had been completely attained; the men who had almost averted the contest over the tea tax had been eliminated from the Cabinet. The Duke of Grafton had been superseded by Lord North, and others of the friends of America and advocates of discretion in the treatment of the colonists had found more congenial placements than those connected with colonial affairs.

Well might the king be disturbed as to the course of events in the colonies, for opposition to the tea tax was but an expression of the coming together of a determined and united people; united in sentiment they must needs seek union in fact. Indeed, such expressions were coming to be commonly made. Samuel Adams was delighted at the lessened jealousies between the colonies, and his close friend Joseph Warren wrote on the 24th of January, 1774, as follows: "We can never enough adore that Almighty Disposer who has, as it were, by general inspiration awakened a whole continent to a sense of their danger." In the public press appeared such expressions as the following, which is taken from the Boston *Evening Post* of March 14, 1774: "It is now time for the colonies to have a grand congress to complete the system for the American independent commonwealth, as it is so evident that no other plan will secure the rights of the people; for this would unite all Americans by an indissoluble bond of union, and thereby make them formidable and superior to any kingdom upon earth." Notwithstanding that such views were freely indulged in, the colonies were not yet at the point of irritation with the mother country that would lead them to desire a severance of the ties binding them together. Had George III. possessed the wisdom to announce a repeal of the obnoxious tax his action would have been greeted in America with the greatest joy. Outside of Massachusetts there was little political agitation after the defeat of the attempt to enforce

the Tea Act, and even there it was so slight that we find John Adams writing under the date of April 4, 1774: "I am of the same opinion, that I have been for years, that there is not spirit enough on either side to bring the question to a complete decision. . . . Our children may see revolutions, and be concerned and active in effecting them, of which we can form no conception." Samuel Adams more correctly gauged the situation and clearly saw that only the yielding of the main point at issue could bring about peace; this he knew must be a concession not from the colonies, but from the mother country. So little prospect was there, however, that Great Britain would stultify herself—as a retirement from her stand would have been construed by the king and his advisers—that reports were current in America of armies and fleets ready to be sent to reduce the recalcitrant colonists to submission. In the face of these reports Samuel Adams in a letter to James Warren uttered the calm and forceful words: "It is our duty at all hazards to preserve the public liberty. Righteous Heaven will graciously smile on every manly and rational attempt to secure that best of all gifts [liberty] to man from the ravishing hand of lawless and brutal powers."

When the English papers brought to America British comment upon the tea burnings it was found that their true purport had not only been understood, but had awakened the profoundest opposition to the colonial attitude. The king pronounced the late proceedings in America as a subversion of the Constitution; Lord North regarded them as the legitimate fruits of years of social disorder, and there were not wanting voices to raise against Boston the ancient cry: *Delenda est Carthago.* This indicated the curious tendency to minimize the importance of the acts of the other colonies, and to deal with Massachusetts as if it alone were insubordinate. It was not believed that the colonies could harmonize sufficiently to make a united stand against the mother country, and it was thought that a policy of resolution would soon quell the rebellious spirits.

CHAPTER VI

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

DURING the early months of 1774 Parliament was engaged in considering what form of punishment would best serve to bring the colonies to respect the laws of the parent country and, particularly, how to make an example of Massachusetts, whose participation in the opposition to the enforcement of the Tea Tax overshadowed the similar action of its sister colonies. It was quite clear to Parliament that Boston must be made to atone severely for the affront which it had offered in the destruction of British property and the defiance of British law. Such an act as that of the so-called Boston Tea Party, if it had been performed in the port of a foreign country would have been a *casus belli;* why should it not be treated as of equal heinousness when the guilty persons were subjects of the British crown. It was further reasoned that the closing of the port of Boston would be a matter of satisfaction to the other seaports with which it competed; the misfortunes of Massachusetts would turn out to their advantage. Then, too, the isolation of the one colony as the object of punishment would tend to dissolve the bond of union between the colonies. Boston was regarded as being the hotbed of sedition and its population as both hypocritical and immoral. A letter to Lord Dartmouth, secretary of state for the American colonies, dated February, 1774, describes the Bostonians thus: "If large and loud professions of the Gospel be an exact criterion of vital religion, they are the best people on

earth. But if meekness, gentleness, and patience constitute any part, those qualities are not found there. If they could maintain a state of independence, they would soon be at war among themselves." General Gage, in 1774, having just arrived from Massachusetts, aided in convincing the king that what that colony most needed was firmness. "His language," said the king, "was very consonant to his character of an honest determined man. He says they will be lyons, whilst we are lambs; but if we take the resolute part, they will undoubtedly prove very weak." A coercive policy being decided upon it only remained to devise the particular forms it should be given. On the 7th of March, the king sent a message to the House of Commons in reference to affairs in the colonies and, upon the 14th of March, Lord North introduced a bill for the closing of the harbor of Boston and the transferring of the business of its Custom House to Salem. This was the first of a series of punitive measures. It is interesting to note some of the opinions which the bill evoked. In introducing it Lord North assured the House that the presence of a few frigates in Massachusetts Bay would suffice for an effectual embargo upon the trade of the colony. When the bill had come to its second reading the king recorded his satisfaction, saying that the fact "was so favorable to the measure that he could not refrain from expressing the pleasure it gave him," and added that "the feebleness and fatuity of the opposition showed the rectitude of the measure." There were not wanting however, men in both houses of Parliament who clearly foresaw the certain outcome of a policy of coercion toward the colonies and with great earnestness predicted calamity to the mother country. However, the bill was finally passed unanimously by both Houses, and on March 31, 1774, it received the signature of the king and became law. By its separate provisions it prohibited the landing of merchandise in Boston and the shipping of goods from that town on and after the first day of the ensuing June; Marblehead was made a port of entry, Salem

the seat of government. This law was to continue in effect until Boston had, for its fault, made suitable reparation, which included indemnity to the owners of the property that had been destroyed. News of the Boston Port Bill rapidly spread throughout the colonies. It needed no comment; its meaning was clear enough, even to those whose counsels were customarily guided by caution. Boston was to be made the scapegoat for a deed which had been applauded by them all, and which had been duplicated in essential respects by a number of them. An ominous feature of the Port Bill, to the minds of all the patriots, was its provision for the use of an armed force for the subjection of the alleged revolt. It must, however, be recalled in properly estimating the character of the Port Bill that many leading colonists deplored the tea burning and advocated compensation to the owners; among these was Franklin. Barré and Conway, staunch friends of the colonies in Parliament, also deplored the overt acts of hostility to the laws of the mother country and were disposed to regard the Boston Port Bill as a just and proper punishment. Many other Englishmen declared that to allow to pass unreproved such flagrant conduct as had caused the destruction of the tea would be subversive of the order and the authority of the realm.

It is easy to trace the course of error of Great Britain in her relations with the colonies: the despatch of troops to Boston had awakened resentment against the implication, necessity, and legality of military control, and led to the Boston massacre; the insistence of Parliament upon the preservation of the tea tax in the face of an almost united sentiment in the colonies against it was followed by the tea burning at Boston and Annapolis. The third great blunder was the Port Bill. The effect of each of these measures was to bind the colonies closer in interest and action. On the 19th of April of the eventful year of the passage of the Port Bill, a motion for the repeal of the tea tax was introduced into the House of Commons, an occasion which was

signalized by a splendid oration upon the attitude of Great Britain to her dependencies. The speaker was Edmund Burke, and his speech has become a classic. It was vain, however, for anyone to attempt to stem the tide that was setting against the colonies; having committed itself to a policy of force, and being urged in that direction by the king, Parliament was in no mood to be led to adopt conciliatory measures, whatever might be the consequences of its course. In vain it was argued by the patriots that the policy of the home government did not take account of the feelings of the colonists and disregarded local habits, customs, and law. It was urged that the Port Bill was a stringent measure of punishment for the action of a few persons, and that the usual avenues of criminal indictment in the local courts were open, and that the action of these courts in the case of the soldiers on trial in connection with the Boston Massacre showed that the sense of justice in the colony could be relied upon.

On the 13th of May, 1774, the town meeting of Boston passed the following vote: "That it is the opinion of this town, that if the other Colonies come into a joint resolution to stop all importation from Great Britain and the West Indies till the act for blocking up this harbour be repealed, the same will prove the salvation of North-America and her liberties. On the other hand, if they continue their exports and imports, there is high reason to fear that fraud, power, and the most odious oppression, will rise triumphant over justice, right, social happiness, and freedom. And, moreover, that this vote be transmitted by the moderator to all our sister Colonies, in the name and behalf of this town." Copies of the vote, in accordance with the resolution, were sent to the several colonies, and thus was furthered mutual discussion of political happenings. Massachusetts well understood that unless it received the support of its sister colonies it must be crushed. In regulating her action in the matter of the Port Bill upon the expectation that the other colonies would shrink from incurring the ban which

had been passed upon their New England neighbor, Great Britain had failed to take account of the essential identity of interests between the colonies. In coming to the aid of Massachusetts the other colonies felt that they were not fighting its battles, but were engaged in a contest in which they had hardly less at stake than it.

Pamphlets, essays, addresses, and newspaper articles in all the colonies spread intelligence with regard to affairs in Massachusetts, and educated public sentiment to an appreciation of the wide significance of Great Britain's latest move. It was pointed out that if the ministerial policy was successful in one colony it would not be long before it would be extended to all. The reasoning was cogent and convincing. The political leaders in the various colonies declared that it was time for a congress in order that community of interest might find a public opportunity for expression. The names Whig and Tory now became prominent as distinguishing respectively the adherents of the policy of making common cause with Boston and those who favored at best only palliative measures toward the action of Great Britain. The Tories formed a considerable element at this time in the colonies. For example, they numbered about one-half of the population of New York, but it may be added that they were unable to prevent a recommendation for the call of a Colonial Congress being adopted at a meeting of the inhabitants held for the purpose of considering the Boston resolution. Philadelphia was in the peculiar position of having as a large element of its population the peaceably disposed Quakers. So that at a public meeting held May 21, 1774, which in turn was called by a more informal gathering held the previous evening, the following letter was adopted, to be forwarded to Boston: "They acknowledged the difficulty of offering advice on the present occasion, sympathized with the people of Boston in their distress, and observed that all lenient measures for their relief should be first tried. That if the making restitution for the tea destroyed would put an end to the unhappy controversy

and leave the people of Boston upon their ancient footing of constitutional liberty, it could not admit of a doubt what part they should act; but that it was not the value of the tea, it was the indefeasible right of giving and granting their own money, which was the matter in consideration; that it was the common cause of America; and, therefore, it was necessary in their opinion, that a Congress of deputies from the several Colonies should be convened, to devise means for restoring harmony between Great Britain and the colonies, and preventing matters from coming to extremes. Till this could be brought about, they recommended firmness, prudence, and moderation to the immediate sufferers, assuring them that the people of Pennsylvania would continue to evince a firm adherence to the cause of American liberty." A campaign of education was carried on in Pennsylvania, and upon the governor refusing to convoke the Colonial Assembly, a general meeting of the inhabitants was held on June 18, 1774, at which the Boston Port Bill was denounced as unconstitutional, the expediency of the convening of a Continental Congress affirmed, and a committee appointed for the city and county of Philadelphia, to correspond with the other colonies as well as with the several counties of Pennsylvania; this committee was empowered to formulate a plan for the appointing of delegates to the proposed Congress. The committee performed its duties and secured such expressions of endorsement as to leave no doubt about the popularity of the idea of a general Congress.

Prior to the receipt of the Boston communication the House of Burgesses in Virginia, on May 26, 1774, had discussed the Port Act, all other matters of legislation being set aside so as to give full opportunity for the consideration of the matter of chief moment. The ever ready pen of Jefferson drew up a set of resolves which designated the first day of June, the date when the Boston Port Bill was to become operative, as a day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer, "devoutly to emplore the Divine interposition, for averting the heavy calamities which threaten destruction

to their civil rights, and the evils of a civil war—to give them one heart and one mind, to oppose by all just and proper means, every injury to American rights." Upon the publication of these resolves the House of Burgesses was dissolved by the royal governor, the Earl of Dunmore. Its members repaired to the Raleigh Tavern, and thence issued a call to the other colonies for a general Congress. This action was in response, as well, to the communication from Boston which had in the meanwhile been received. Washington was one of the few members of the House remaining at Williamsburg when the Boston resolution appeared, and so was of the number of those who issued the call. Rhode Island, in placing itself in line with the sentiment for a Congress, had given expression to the terse expression: "Join or die," a sentiment which soon became a slogan. The ready response to the recommendation for a Congress gave to the action of the colonial Assemblies an appearance of spontaneity which almost precluded the idea of leadership in the movement. The Continental Congress was called because the colonies were ripe for it. On June 1, 1774, the Port Bill went into effect, and Boston harbor was guarded by British men-of-war. Business was suspended, and the inhabitants of the town, garbed in mourning, betook themselves to the churches.

Flags were kept at half-mast and the bells tolled from morning until night. In Virginia the spirit of the day was as strikingly shown. The members of the House of Burgesses, with the Speaker at their head, marched to the church and listened to a discourse by the clergyman. In speaking of the day, Jefferson says: "The people met generally with anxiety and alarm in their utterances; and the effect of the day, through the whole colony was like a shock of electricity, arousing every man and placing him erect and solidly on his centre." Similar scenes signalized the day in the other colonies.

There was serious reason for Boston to assume sackcloth and ashes, for the closing of its port was a severe

punishment. Thousands of people were thrown out of work, food became scarce and prices rose to prohibitive figures. The price which Boston was required to pay for relief from the blockade was submission to the measure of taxation so summarily defied by it. Its acceptance of tea would have opened its port to the commerce of the world and have relieved it of the constant threat of starvation. However, Boston was not left to bear its burden alone. Throughout the country districts the people rallied to its assistance, and remoter communities hastened to afford succor, until a regular system of supplies in money and provisions was devised. The system of aid was continued for over a year. It was soon apparent that Great Britain's attempt to isolate Massachusetts had signally failed, and that she had not one but well-nigh all the colonies to deal with.

To the inconveniences of the embargo were added the annoyance and humiliation arising from the presence of fresh details of British troops. Cannon were planted on all the eminences about the city, troops were paraded in its streets. Nevertheless, the citizens of Boston carried on their political activities as boldly as when there were no troops to be seen in its streets. It is, however, true that the British were by no means aggressive or inclined to abuse the power that was seemingly in their hands. The sympathy expressed for Boston by the various committees which sent supplies for its relief strengthened the town in its stand. John Adams remarked that the colonies responded to the sentiment for organization as if the project were "a revelation from above as the happiest means of cementing the union." In the meantime, General Gage arrived from England on May 3, 1774. He returned not only as commander of the British army in America, but with a commission as Governor of Massachusetts in succession to Governor Hutchinson, who, upon the 30th of the month, departed from Massachusetts, bearing with him a commendatory address signed by many Tories. The new governor was

received with every mark of respect; the reading of his commission was attended with the firing of salutes and the cheers of the people. It was hoped thus to disabuse his mind of prejudices against the colony. On the 25th of May, 1774, the deputies met and organized, and upon the next day received the new governor's negative of thirteen out of twenty-eight persons they had elected to the Council. Among these was John Adams. The governor summoned the members of the House to the council chamber and informed them that after the 1st of June the General Court would convene at Salem until his majesty might signify his royal will that it should again hold its sessions at Boston. The governor then adjourned the Court to meet on the 7th of June. When assembled at Salem, on the 17th of June, it considered certain resolves submitted by Samuel Adams. These designated the first day of September as the time and Philadelphia the place for the holding of a General Congress, and provided for the appointment of five delegates as well as a tax to defray their expenses. While these resolves were under consideration, a messenger from the governor applied for admission; the doors being locked, as was customarily the case when serious business was being debated, and being denied admission, the messenger, from the steps of the hall, read to a crowd gathered about a proclamation dissolving the Assembly. However, the House continued its meeting until its business was performed. The resolves calling a Congress were duly forwarded to the other colonies, and were printed in the newspapers. The colonies acquiesced in the place and time designated by Massachusetts. This new forward movement on the part of the leading New England colony evoked renewed expressions of comity. The feeling against the mother country was fast becoming one of settled animosity. In Massachusetts, a covenant was drawn up and circulated for signatures, pledging the signers to a commercial policy of non-intercourse with Great Britain. This action found its echo in some of the other colonies. The determination to distress Great

Britain which was thus manifested drew out from General Gage fresh threats, and went far toward further embittering Great Britain toward her dependencies.

While the colonies were thus concerting for resistance to the mother country, another measure, which came to be regarded in America as a fit companion to the Port Bill, was being devised for the more stringent discipline of Massachusetts. On the very day of the passage of the Port Bill —March 14th—the king sent to Lord North a message urging the alteration of the charter of Massachusetts. On May 3d the second of the penal laws which made the year 1774 notable in the annals of American history was passed, and on the 20th of that month it received the king's signature. The Regulating Act, as it was commonly called, nullified the provision of the charter which provided for the election of the Council and vested the appointment of its members in the crown. The governor was given the power of appointment and removal of judges of the lower courts and other minor officers; in connection with the Council, he was given the same power with regard to sheriffs, who in turn, selected the jurymen. Excepting for the purpose of choosing officers, no town meeting might be held without a license from the governor. A feature of the new legislation which especially did violence to the feelings of the colonists was an Act which commanded that criminal offenders and witnesses should be transported to other colonies or to England for trial. This sweeping Act, annulling as it did the charter of Massachusetts and violating the constitutional rights of British subjects, was regarded as the death blow to the slight hope that the colonies might harmonize their differences with the mother country. The two measures embodied in this new coercive legislation were styled the Regulating Act and the Transportation Act. It is difficult to say which was more strongly condemned in the colonies. The Massachusetts committee lost no time in communicating with the other colonies in regard to the measures. In their letter they said "These edicts, cruel and

oppressive as they are, we consider but as bare specimens of what the continent are to expect from a parliament who claim a right to make laws binding us in all cases whatsoever."

Commenting upon the state of the colonies and the sincere desire on their part to maintain friendship with the mother country, Samuel Adams wrote as follows in a letter dated June 1, 1774: "Our people think they should pursue the line of the Constitution as far as they can; and if they are driven from it, they can then with propriety and justice appeal to God and the world—I would wish to have the humanity of the English nation engaged in our cause, and that the friends of the Constitution might see and be convinced that nothing is more foreign to our hearts than a spirit of rebellion. Would to God they all, even our enemies, knew the warm attachment we have for Great Britain, notwithstanding we have been contending these ten years with them for our rights." A convention of the counties of Pennsylvania, on July 15th, denounced the Acts as oppressive and dangerous. A convention "of the whole province of Maryland," on June 22d–25th, regarded the Acts as utterly destructive. Virginia expressed its feelings through a meeting of the freeholders of Fairfax County, on July 18th, over which George Washington presided; the measures were characterized as ruinous to the colonies. It was clear that the popular party was a unit in opposition to the further encroachments of Great Britain upon the liberties of the people; yet notwithstanding the sentiment of opposition engendered in America, the British Cabinet went placidly about devising the machinery for their execution. The king had an interview with Hutchinson, lately come from Massachusetts, and from the late governor's rather equivocal responses to questions propounded to him as to his views regarding the probable effect upon the colony of the three Acts of 1774, the king was strengthened in his conviction that the course of firmness would not only be the most successful to pursue but the kindest as well. On the 6th of August the governor received, officially, the Acts and the instructions in

relation to them, as well as the appointments for thirty-six councillors. Of this number twenty-four accepted. The governor notified the selectmen of Boston of his intention of putting in force the Regulating Act. A meeting of committees from several of the towns of Massachusetts was held at Faneuil Hall and discussed measures for opposing the Acts. In every instance when the attempt was made to put the laws into effect they were peaceably but firmly resisted. It had become not an unusual thing for "the arbitrament of the sword" to be sorrowfully referred to in addresses and newspaper articles as the only remedy remaining to the colonies for the protection of their rights. Washington is found uttering before the Virginia convention a sentiment of rank sedition: "I will raise one thousand men, subsist them at my own expense, and march myself at their head for the relief of Boston." By the fifth day of September, 1774, the delegates elected by the various colonial Assemblies had gathered at Philadelphia. At ten o'clock in the morning of that date the first Continental Congress convened in Carpenters' Hall.

When all the delegates had been seated it was found that the total number was fifty-five and that they represented twelve colonies. Georgia was not represented, but sent assurances to the assembled delegates of its hearty concurrence in their endeavors to maintain for themselves the guarantees of the British Constitution. The Congress was more representative of sentiment than of sections, for many of the delegates had been selected by methods which did not allow expression of the wish of a large proportion of the people of their colonies. In spite of the well-grounded complaint of the Royalists in the colonies, however, that in many cases the delegates had been irregularly selected, it was clear enough that the credentials of such delegates were not to be too closely inquired into by their fellows. The delegates representing Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland were chosen by the committees of correspondence; they were thus but the representatives of the

patriotic forces in those colonies. The delegates from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania were chosen by their respective legislative assemblies. Delaware sent delegates who appear to have been nominated by a convention largely if not altogether of members of its legislature. The delegates from South Carolina were probably designated by a convention of the white population. The method of selection of delegates by New York is not clear. In the town of New York the vote was apparently by wards. The delegates from New Hampshire were chosen by a convention made up of deputies from the various towns of the colonies. South Carolina appears to have been the only colony that selected its delegates by an impartial referendum. Whether representative or not in the sense of owing their selection to the total voting population of their respective colonies, the delegates convened at Carpenters' Hall unquestionably represented the majority sentiment of their professed constituency; the only colony in which this fact admits of doubt was Massachusetts, where the Royalist element, under the circumstance of British control of the colonies, had rapidly increased in numbers.

Of the whole number of the deputies, one-half were lawyers. Each section of the country, the northern, the middle, and the southern, had shown its appreciation of the dignity and character of the congress by delegating to it its foremost men. Samuel Adams had come from Massachusetts along with John Adams, Robert Treat Paine, and Thomas Cushing, the latter of whom was noted for his wide commercial knowledge. Hopkins, of Rhode Island, and Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, whose sterling worth was imaged in his grave and commanding features, were also noticeable in the New England group. South Carolina had sent two men who had been prominent in the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, Christopher Gadsden and John Rutledge. Of this delegation were also Edmund Rutledge and the homespun clad Lynch. New York sent John Jay, whose juridical knowledge and public virtue so greatly

enriched the counsels of the young republic. John Dickinson, "the Immortal Farmer," Thomas Mifflin, merchant, and Joseph Galloway, a leader of the Pennsylvania House of Assembly, were among the representatives of that great middle colony. Matthew Tilghman, Thomas Johnson, Robert Goldsborough, William Paca, and Samuel Chase were the prominent men from Maryland in the Continental Congress at this first session. No group, however, from any other colony represented as high an average of ability and character as that of Virginia, the names of several of whose members had already come to be regarded as a common possession of the colonies. In the number was Colonel Washington, concerning whom Patrick Henry remarked: "If you speak of solid information and sound judgment, Washington is unquestionably the greatest man of them all." The one who was thus denoted as the leading figure in the Continental Congress had worthy associates in the persons of Richard Henry Lee, whose prominence in the Assembly of his colony presaged for his statesmanship and high culture an equal prominence in the counsels of a nation; Edmund Pendleton, the eminent lawyer; Richard Bland, the mature student; Colonel Harrison, the brusque country gentleman with a machiavelian method of gaining his ends; and Peyton Randolph.

With Peyton Randolph for president and for secretary Charles Thompson, who, however, was not a member of the Congress, the body organized for work. It appointed a committee to draw up a statement of the rights of the colonies and to specify the acts and particulars of their violation. This was done on the second day of the session. That evening the startling cry of "War!" was heard in the streets. Congress assembled the next day under conditions of intense excitement, for report had it that the British ships were bombarding Boston. When, after an interval of several days, Congress reassembled it met behind closed doors; the members having bound themselves to keep silence with regard to the proceedings of the body until a majority should direct

their publication. The Declaration of Rights which was adopted declared that the inhabitants of the British colonies in North America by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the British Constitution, and the several charters or compacts, were entitled to life, liberty, and property; moreover, that they had never acknowledged the right of any foreign power whatever to do anything affecting these rights without their consent. It set forth that the foundation of British liberty and of all free government was the right of a people to participate in the making of legislation. Adverting to the clash between the claim of parliamentary supremacy and the independence of the colonial legislatures, Congress declared: "But from the necessity of the case, and a regard to the mutual interests of both countries, we cheerfully consent to the operation of such acts of the British Parliament, as *bona fide* restrained to the regulation of our external commerce, for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages of the whole empire to the Mother Country, and the commercial benefits of its respective members, excluding every idea of taxation, internal and external, for raising a revenue on the subjects in America without their consent."

The course of events in Massachusetts was such as constantly to afford new arguments for opposition to Great Britain and materials for the conflagration of war. Added to the measures which have already been noticed, and which drew the lines of control tighter about the restless spirits of that colony was the Quebec Bill of June 2, 1774, which extended the control of Canada over regions for which the New England colonies had earnestly contended and which perpetuated civil and ecclesiastical institutions which were hateful to men of Puritan extraction. The Regulating Act, the Transportation Act, and the Act for quartering additional troops upon the people combined with this measure to accentuate oppression; the clear note of warning which was struck by the Continental Congress served, however, only to confirm Great Britain in her course. In January, 1775,

Gage had thirty-five thousand men in the Boston garrison and almost as many more en route for the colony. Congress, nevertheless, had full knowledge of the plans of Gage for the concentration of large bodies of troops in Boston; for on October 6, 1774, Paul Revere arrived in Philadelphia bearing a letter from the Boston Committee of Correspondence advising Congress of the course of General Gage, and that he seemed to be proceeding on the idea that the period of controversy had virtually passed into that of conflict. The letter also described the fortification of Boston and gave full detail of all the military measures of the British. It stated further that the governor after summoning the legislature by proclamation dissolved it before it had time to convene. The advice of Congress was asked in the premises. On the 8th, 10th, and 11th of October, Congress passed several resolutions endorsing the opposition of Massachusetts to the recent Acts of Parliament; declared that all persons who consented to take office under the provisions of those acts ought to be held in abhorrence by all good men; and advised the colony to prefer a suspension of the administration of justice when it could not be obtained under the laws based upon their charter. They recommended a peaceable demeanor toward the troops and perseverance in the line of the defensive. Articles of Association designed to commit the concurring colonies to a common policy were signed on the 20th of October. The prelude was couched in the following language: "We do for ourselves and the inhabitants of the several colonies whom we represent, firmly agree and associate under the sacred ties of virtue, honor and love of our country." The salient features of the Association are found in fourteen articles providing for the form of government and declaring for non-importation, non-exportation, and non-consumption of British merchandise. One article pledged the association to a discontinuance of the slave trade. Another declared that any colony that did not accede to or should violate the articles of agreement should be cut

off from all intercourse with the rest. The good observance of the terms of the agreement on the part of the inhabitants of the several colonies was not only enjoined but the various committees of correspondence were instructed to see to it that all persons abided by them.

On the 21st of October a committee was appointed to prepare an address to the people of the British possessions to the north of the united colonies as well as to those of Georgia and Florida. His majesty was petitioned to consider the unhappy estate of the colonies and to receive assurances of their loyalty and earnest desire for the abatement of those grievances which had brought about the deplorable discord between them and the mother country. A vote of thanks was extended to the friends of the colonial cause in Parliament. The Tory element of the colonies was bitter in its denunciation of Congress and severe in its characterization of the men who composed it and freely aspersed their honesty and integrity. It was represented as a congeries of ill-assorted factions. Samuel Adams was spoken of as a shiftless agitator, and an oily demagogue. The men from the lower colonies were contemptuously referred to as the "haughty sultans of the South." Yet, in spite of this sweeping characterization, it was from South Carolina that the historic "Freeman" letter was sent to the Congress. This document is significant as an evidence of the change of attitude of conservative men induced by the passage of the obnoxious Parliamentary measures of 1774. The writer had been in determined opposition to the popular policy involving unconstitutional acts, but the march of political events had brought him to adopt an attitude of resistance to what he regarded as the British encroachments on the liberty of the colonists. Among the most bitter in vituperation was Galloway, who had entered into the Congress with royalist compunctions and had been swept out of it by his Tory convictions.

While criticisms were being passed upon Congress by its enemies, enthusiastic approval of its measures was being

received from the various colonies. The first Continental Congress closed its session in October amid well-nigh equally balanced praise and censure. At the same time words of cheer and encouragement were being sent to Boston, whose extremity was regarded as the key to the British policy to be unfolded toward all the colonies. In the meanwhile Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania were preparing for defence. On February 2, 1775, Washington presided over a meeting held in his county to enroll militia. The spirit of the South upon the advent of the Revolution is well expressed by General Charles Lee who, lately come from England, made a tour of the lower colonies. He said: "I have now run through the whole of the colonies to the South. I have conversed with every order of men, from the first estated gentleman to the poorest planters, and cannot express my astonishment at the unanimous, ardent spirit reigning through the whole. They are determined to sacrifice every thing, their property, their wives, children, and blood—rather than cede a tittle of what they conceive to be their rights. The tyranny over Boston, indeed, seems to be resented by the other colonies in a greater degree than by the Bostonians themselves." There was in truth reason enough for this observation; nothing seemed to be so evident as the unanimity between the sections. John Adams is found expressing himself in a burst of satisfaction thus: "The distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New-Yorkers, and New-Englanders are no more." The entrance of Georgia and New York,—the latter having hesitated long enough in affirming the Association to cause concern as to its attitude,—into the union had dispelled all doubt as to the colonies having an essential as well as a sentimental identity. Although there were not wanting evidences in this first Congress of the difficulty of harmonizing the representatives of all the colonies in matters of general policy, nevertheless the fact if not the full fabric of a united America was established. There was no possibility of compromising a situation to which both sides had fully committed

themselves. In one after the other the royal governors were firmly relieved of their offices and provincial Assemblies constituted by the freemen in harmony with the general Congress were elected. Revolutionary governments being thus in control in the colonies with a revolutionary Congress assembled at Philadelphia it needed only an actual clash of belligerent spirits to bring matters to a crisis.

The curious complacency of the British spirit and the prevailing sentiment even as late as 1775 and almost up to the very time of hostilities are shown by contemporary expressions. There were men, however, who had no visions of peace, and who clearly pointed out the disastrous course that Great Britain would pursue in courting a conflict with the colonies. Charles Lee, whom we have already quoted, declared "that it is no exaggeration to assert that there were two hundred thousand able-bodied men ready to encounter all hazards." At the close of 1774, members of Parliament received advices from the colonies that Virginia and Maryland and the four New England colonies were fully armed, that there were enough gunsmiths in Pennsylvania alone to make one hundred thousand stand of arms a year, and that nothing short of the repeal of the penal Acts could prevent civil war. The letters went on to dilate upon the popularity of Colonel Putnam and Colonel Washington, and affirmed that "there are several hundred thousand Americans who would face any danger with these illustrious heroes to lead them. It is to no purpose to attempt to destroy the opposition to the omnipotence of Parliament by taking off our Hancocks, Adamses, and Dickinsons. Ten thousand patriots of the same sort stand ready to fill up their places." Dickinson, in 1775, is found writing: "Everything may be attributed to the misrepresentations of Ministers, and universal peace may be established throughout the British world only by the acknowledgment of the truth that a half-dozen men are fools or knaves." Such sentiments were echoed in Parliament by far-sighted statesmen such as Chatham and Fox. It needed only the latest news

from America to confirm the developing sentiment in Great Britain that the colonies could only be retained to the crown by the employment of armed force.

Let us glance now at the people whom Great Britain proposed to rule by compulsion. In 1775 the United Colonies numbered a population of three millions, according to the estimate of Congress. The first tide of settlers had swept over the Alleghanies, and the pioneers' axes rang in the Ohio wilderness as settlers made clearings for their new homes. Indeed, the population beyond the Alleghany range had grown to considerable proportions by this time, although the great body of the people was still to be found along the Atlantic seaboard from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico. In the twenty years since 1754, the increase in the population of the sections had been about as follows: New England, from four hundred and thirty-six thousand, had increased to six hundred and ninety thousand; the Middle colonies, from five hundred and twenty-eight thousand to eight hundred and seventy thousand; the Southern, from four hundred and sixty-one thousand to one million and thirty thousand. This represented a virile population whose institutions had grown out of their needs and their experiences, and had been fashioned in the mould of Christian influences. They were a number of separate colonies which had associated themselves for mutual defence; the perception of the advantages of union for economic reasons had not yet appeared in a way to make such motives an important element of the association. Yet they were coming to a common consciousness and were proud to regard as Americans men like Dr. Franklin and the metaphysician Edwards. In recounting the advances made by the American settlements, Edmund Burke, in his speech in the House of Commons on April 19, 1774, observed: "Nothing in the history of mankind is like their progress. For my part, I never cast an eye on their flourishing commerce and their cultivated and commodious life, but they seem to me rather ancient nations, grown to perfection through a long series

of fortunate events and a train of successful industry accumulating wealth in many centuries, than the colonies of yesterday."

When on the 1st of February, 1775, the second Provincial Congress, assembled at Cambridge, issued a warning to the people of Massachusetts to prepare for a breach with the British authorities it was not known how close an espionage Gage was keeping upon their movements. A few days after the Congress assembled its members were alarmed by the report that troops had been sent from Boston to disperse them; they feared that they might be forced into hostilities and that war would thus become a fact without declarative act of the Continental Congress. On the 18th of February Peter Oliver wrote from Boston to London: "Great preparations on both sides for an engagement, and the sooner it comes the better." Joseph Warren, two days later, wrote in a similar vein. The Committee of Safety on February 9th had been authorized by the provincial Congress to assemble the militia. On the 21st it had voted to purchase supplies for fifteen thousand men; on the same day Samuel Adams and Warren addressed letters to Canada, soliciting support from that section. On the 26th of February hostilities were imminent. Colonel David Mason of Salem, under the direction of the Committee of Safety, was directing the mounting of some cannon, and Gage hearing of it sent a transport with three hundred men to effect a landing and stay these measures of fortification. The town was ablaze with excitement and the commander of the British force thought it wise to retire.

The anniversary of the Boston massacre occurred early in March, and the patriotic party, at the needless risk of bringing on a conflict made preparations for its commemoration. The date falling upon Sunday, Monday, the 6th, was set for its observance. The Old South Meeting House was thronged with people and Joseph Warren who had been selected to deliver the address had, perforce, to enter the edifice through a window at the rear of the pulpit.

A number of British officers were in attendance and the moderator of the assemblage courteously assigned them front seats, notwithstanding it was believed that they were there to break up the meeting. Although there were hostile indications the meeting proceeded to its close without an outbreak.

While events in Massachusetts were fast moving toward the outbreak of hostilities, which were actually aroused by the convening of the Provincial Congress at Concord on March 22, 1775, let us observe the effect of the measures adopted by the Continental Congress. Parliament was too close to its Christmas adjournment to take any action when the news from America was received. As soon as it met in January, however, the official copies of the various addresses and resolutions of the Congress were laid before it; and also many communications from Crown officials and private persons which gave a very different account of the real nature of the action of the American Congress from that which came from patriotic sources.

Chatham and Burke exerted their powers of argument and oratory in vain in an endeavor to lead Parliament to concede essential features of the claims of Congress. It is doubtful, however, if such friends of the American cause accomplished more than to deepen the resentment already felt toward the colonies or to strengthen the jealousy with which their commanding commerce had inspired the mercantile classes. Although petitions in behalf of the colonies were received by Parliament from the various commercial centres of Great Britain, counter petitions were likewise received from the same places; the latter affirming that so far from a break with the colonies portending commercial disaster to Great Britain it would prove a positive benefit, and that all statements to the contrary received their inspiration from persons in the colonies.

Noticing more particularly the attitude of the parliamentary leaders, we find Chatham presenting a proposition to the House of Lords which brought forth from Lord Sandwich

a petulant response whose point and venom were directed at Dr. Franklin, and which led that conciliatory patriot to cease his attendance on Parliament and to set sail for America determined to fully endorse the American programme as set forth by the Continental Congress. The plan of Lord Chatham, as matured in the bill which he introduced, proposed that the colonies should acknowledge the authority of the British Parliament and that "no tollage, tax, or other charge should be levied in America, except by common consent in their provincial assemblies."

The principal feature of Chatham's plan was its assertion of the right of the king to send an army into any part of his dominions at any time so long as such forces were not employed in contravention of the just rights of the people. It legalized the holding of a congress in the following May for the purpose of "recognizing the supreme legislative authority and superintending power of Parliament over the Colonies, and for making a free grant to the King, his heirs and successors, of a certain and perpetual revenue, subject to the disposition of Parliament, and applicable to the alleviation of the national debt;" judges in America were to be placed upon the same footing in the matter of their salaries and the conditions of holding their offices, as those in England; all privileges, franchises, and immunities, granted by their several charters or other instruments of government were to be secured to the colonies.

When Chatham took his seat, after delivering a speech in support of his bill, Lord Dartmouth expressed the hope that the bill might receive the deliberate attention which its magnitude deserved. Whereupon, Lord Sandwich interposed, as he turned to face Dr. Franklin, that "it ought immediately to be rejected with the contempt it deserved. That he could not believe it to be the production of any British peer—that it appeared to him rather the work of some American." Not content with thus directing general attention to Franklin, he added what was a lasting offence

to the one man who had stood as a mediator between the mother country and the colonies, that "he fancied he had in his eye the person who drew it up, one of the bitterest and most mischievous enemies this country had ever known." Other peers expressed their opposition to a consideration of the Bill and it was summarily rejected; not, however, before Lord Chatham had indignantly repudiated the aspersions of Lord Sandwich and had sought to minimize the effect of the latter's insult to Franklin by declaring that if he were prime minister and had the responsibility resting upon him "he should not be ashamed of publicly calling to his assistance a person so perfectly acquainted with the whole of the American affairs as the gentleman alluded to, and so injuriously reflected upon. One whom all Europe held in high estimation for his knowledge and wisdom, and ranked with her Boyles and her Newtons—who was an honour, not only to the English nation, but to human nature."

Having thus rejected a plan to compromise differences with the colonies—a plan, however, which had little prospect of stemming the strong tide toward independence which had set in—the large Tory majority proceeded to pass a number of measures which gave added offence to the colonies, but of whose actual effect they were to have little experience, as before they could become operative, war was in progress. Massachusetts was declared to be in a state of rebellion. Parliament promised the ministry every aid in subduing it. It voted an increase of the land and naval forces and passed an act known as the Fisheries Bill, the purpose of which was to prevent Massachusetts and the New England colonies generally from participating in the fisheries of Newfoundland. It was in vain that witnesses appeared before Parliament to show that not less than six thousand men were engaged in that industry and that it was the basis of the industrial life of New England; and that its prohibition would reduce one-half of the population to ruin or starvation. When further reports from

America showed that the spirit of rebellion was extending, the Fisheries Act was made to apply to all the colonies excepting New York and North Carolina, in which it was thought the loyalist element was in the ascendency and would remain so. Toward the close of February, Lord North presented in behalf of the ministry yet another measure providing that relief from imperial taxation for purposes of revenue should be the reward to any colony that should contribute voluntarily for the national defence, and also, of its own option, make provision for the support of a system of local government acceptable to Parliament.

While Parliament was thus engaged in passing acts for the support of its authority in the colonies, and the British position was being set forth with eloquence and argument, the colonies themselves were fired with devotion to freedom. Judge William Henry Drayton, of South Carolina, in February, 1775, declared from the bench that he owed allegiance not to the king but to the Constitution of the colony, and he charged his juries to maintain it at the hazard of their lives. At about the time these sentiments were receiving expression in the southern colony, Joseph Warren was writing a letter containing the following words: "America must and will be free. The contest may be severe; the end will be glorious. We would not boast; but we think, united and prepared as we are, we have no reason to doubt of success, if we should be compelled to make the last appeal; but we mean not to make that appeal until we can be justified in doing it in the sight of God and man." As early as the 1st of February, 1774, the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts had organized the militia, one-fourth of whom were to be ready to take the field at a moment's warning, and for this reason were styled "minute men."

The Committee of Safety, which was in charge of all matters relating to the security of the colony was empowered to call this force into service the moment that General Gage attempted to execute the Regulating Act, or should

otherwise actively threaten the liberties which it was the purpose of the Provincial Congress to protect. As discouraging reports continued to come from the mother country, it was deemed wise by the Massachusetts Provincial Congress to authorize the Committee of Safety to purchase and store arms and ammunition. Accordingly, Concord, distant about eighteen miles from Boston, was made a military depot; and a system of express riders was organized to carry intelligence of the movements of the British to the various towns of the colony, the moment General Gage should put his forces in motion. Gage had not been oblivious of the proceedings of the patriots, and was determined to frustrate them. Accordingly, on April 18th, a detachment of troops left Boston under cover of night with Concord as their destination. Their double purpose was to seize the munitions of war at Concord and to gain possession of the persons of Samuel Adams and John Hancock.

Since March 22d, the Provincial Congress had been in session at Concord and busily engaged in completing military organization and in devising means to secure an alliance with the Mohawks. The session of the Congress had adjourned when Gage's troops started on their expedition, but Adams and Hancock had not returned to Boston but were the guests of a minister at Lexington. As secret as had been the movements of Gage, the wary patriots were apprised of it, and Adams and Hancock, receiving due warning, made their escape. The story of the ride of Paul Revere is too familiar to need repeating. As he went, the minute men, hastily aroused by his alarm, donned their clothes and, arming themselves, prepared to resist the advance of the foe. When Lexington was aroused to the impending danger, the call for aid was being sent by swift expresses in different directions, and the minute men were soon flocking toward that town. Excepting in their lack of military training they were not different from the citizen soldiery of to-day. They represented all the common vocations of life: farmer and clerk, merchant and mechanic. Some were in militia uniform and

others in the garments of civil life. All hurried excitedly along the roads to meet the eight hundred British soldiers,—grenadiers, and light infantry,—the very flower of the royal army, under Lieutenant-Colonel Smith. By two o'clock in the morning of April 19, 1775, one hundred and thirty militia had assembled, but as the news of the approach of the British was uncertain they were dismissed, so that when they were hastily collected a second time upon the alarm being renewed, the colonial commander, Captain John Parker, found his force to be only about seventy fighting men. Major Pitcairn rode up at the head of the advance guard of six companies of the British and cried: "Disperse, you rebels; throw down your arms and disperse" As the command was not obeyed the soldiers were ordered to fire. For a moment the fatal shots were withheld; again came the order emphasized by the discharge of Pitcairn's weapon. A volley was delivered. Major Buttrick, the leader of the patriots, had taken his position at some little distance from the town and at first made no resistance. Moving against the British he was met by a sharp fire by which two of the minute men were killed. The volley was returned and a skirmish ensued in which several upon each side were slain. The British commander, Colonel Smith, now saw that his force was in a dangerous position, for the colonial forces were rapidly increasing, and though he was expecting reinforcements the prospect that he might be cut off from his base was alarming. He therefore ordered a retreat. The British realized that the hesitation of the colonial militia in the first instance had not been prompted by fear. From Concord to Lexington the regulars were subjected to a galling and constant attack on flank and rear. From tree, fence, post, and rock came the sharp crack of guns. The British for a time maintained a close formation, and thus were an easy mark for the attack of men who were skilled in the fighting tactics of the Indians. It was not long before the march of the British became an ignominious rout. The veterans who would not have turned

from a foe they could see, or flinch before an enemy's line of fire, were thrown into a panic by the persistent attack of men scattered along the road and hidden in coverts which only revealed their presence by the flash of a gun and a puff of smoke. Dead and dying marked the path that the fleeing soldiers took that sweltering hot day. On arriving at Lexington the utterly disorganized body found a force of nine hundred men under Lord Percy. These troops opened ranks to receive the fugitives, many of whom fell to the ground panting from the exhaustion of the night march and the day flight. The baggage train of Percy had been delayed in crossing the bridge from Brighton to Cambridge, and, with its guard, was captured by a crowd of old men at Menotomy. Percy for a time, by means of his cannon, held his position; but as soon as Smith's contingent had rested sufficiently to continue the march a retreat was begun, for the British leader realized that the whole countryside was in arms, and that it was a question of flight, surrender, or death. Pursuer and pursued crossed the West Cambridge plain, keeping up a sharp fire. The retreat was directed with as good order as the British general could command; the rifles of the patriots bringing terror to the hearts of his men as one after another dropped out of line under the deadly fire. It was the middle of the afternoon when Percy began his retreat from Lexington, and it was nightfall before his terrified forces found safety under the guns of the British ships at Boston. The British loss was two hundred and seventy-three and the American loss ninety-three.

Although there was no fixed plan of campaign as yet, the patriotic forces felt that their sudden call to arms was not for the service of a day. The British had been driven back to Boston, but they must not be permitted again to undertake an expedition fraught with peril to the leaders of the colonial cause, or otherwise to endanger the peace and security of the surrounding towns. Until they might receive directions from the Committee of Safety the leaders of the militia felt that they must keep their men in the field.

That night they encamped on the ground, and their numbers were constantly added to from every town and village of the surrounding country. The other New England colonies despatched companies to the support of the forces about Boston. Israel Putnam, of Connecticut, left his plow in the furrow to lead a band of fellow farmers to Cambridge; Benedict Arnold arrived with a contingent from New Haven; John Stark brought twelve hundred men as a pledge of New Hampshire's devotion to the common cause; Nathanael Greene arrived from Rhode Island with a thousand. Within a few days after the events of Lexington and Concord the patriotic army about Boston numbered sixteen thousand men.

On April 20th, the Committee of Safety summoned the towns to send recruits to Cambridge. Warren sought to obtain from Gage facilities for getting the women and children and family effects of the patriots out of Boston. The Provincial Congress assembled at Watertown and despatched Samuel Adams and John Hancock to the Continental Congress. The Provincial Congress on that and the days following was fully occupied with the momentous situation which confronted it, and was hard pressed to provide all the measures of security and defence which the state of war thus suddenly brought about, made necessary. General Gage, on April 22d, agreed to permit the patriots of Boston to leave the town; his purpose in so doing was to divest the city of a considerable belligerent element that might, now the town was invested, give aid and comfort to the enemy. This agreement was observed in good faith only for a few days. Passports were then given and refused in a way to divide families; the policy of the general seemed to be to keep the women and children in the town in order to ensure it from assault.

Upon the outbreak of hostilities the various colonies generally appropriated to their own uses the forts, magazines, and arsenals within their borders. During the previous winter it was learned that the British plan of campaign in

the event of war was to secure the line of the Hudson and so to separate the colonies. Benedict Arnold, one of the Connecticut captains who had led his company to Cambridge, proposed the seizure of Ticonderoga. On May 3d he was directed to proceed against the fort. But already Colonel Ethan Allen had perceived the advisability of this movement, and, with a force made up of men from Pittsfield, Massachusetts, and his Connecticut following, prepared to carry it out. A compromise with Arnold was effected by which the expedition proceeded under the joint leadership of the two men. In the early dawn of May 10th less than one hundred men had assembled at the point of attack. The sentinels were taken completely by surprise and overpowered. The garrison was asleep when the commandant was summoned to surrender. At the capitulation of the fort about fifty men were taken prisoners and two hundred cannon and a large quantity of military stores were secured. The capture of Crown Point by Colonel Seth Warner and Fort George by Bernard Romans on the 12th added more than one hundred additional pieces of arms to the munitions of the patriots.

In the meanwhile the siege of Boston continued and breastworks were thrown up in Cambridge. On May 8th it was reported that the British troops were planning a sortie and word was sent to the nearby towns. On May 13th Israel Putnam, with two thousand two hundred men, marched into Charleston and out again, part of the time within range of the British, in order to give confidence to the militia. The Committee of Safety took several measures looking toward the strengthening of the investment of Boston. It resolved to remove all the live stock from the islands in Boston harbor and as Gage procured forage for his horses from one of the same islands a number of skirmishes ensued. Connecticut was requested to send Arnold to Cambridge with some of his captured cannon. Artemas Ward was given a commission as commander-in-chief of the Massachusetts troops. The besieging force was in

constant dread of the arrival of reinforcements for the relief of Boston and its leaders were beset by the fear that through lack of sufficient organization the troops from the several colonies might not give a good account of themselves should a battle ensue. The need of a general commander whose personality would enlist the confidence of all was keenly felt.

CHAPTER VII

STEPS TOWARD UNION AND INDEPENDENCE

THE confederation of the American colonies which the Continental Congress represented was not the first effort at concerted action on their part, although no previous attempt had taken in all of them or had been based upon such important issues. The common descent of the settlers of New England, their similarity of traditions and beliefs as well as their common interest in protecting their religious persuasions conjoined to promote a sense of unity and to lead the colonies of that region to effect an actual union. The constant threat of attack by the neighboring hostile tribes had been the first incentive for the New England colonies to draw together. In 1638 a scheme of union was proposed by Massachusetts and was rejected by Connecticut upon a technicality in the plan of organization, which provided for a certain freedom of individual movement by the several colonies insisted upon by Massachusetts. Connecticut, however, was at odds with its Dutch neighbors of New York, so that after several years she was more responsive, and in 1642 a confederation including Massachusetts, Plymouth, New Haven, and Connecticut was effected. In May, 1643, commissioners from the three other colonies met at Boston and drew up Articles of Confederation, eleven in number. The three points given in the preamble as the reasons for forming the confederation were the preservation of religious rights, protection against the savages, and mutual help and strength.

The terms of organization provided that the colonies were to be known by the associate title The United Colonies of New England. No two colonies were to be permitted to effect a closer union or to take concerted action in matters pertaining to their welfare without the consent of their associates. The expenses of common undertakings were to be levied upon the colonies in proportion to their population. In case of invasion, without time for the calling together of the commissioners, Massachusetts was to send one hundred men and the other colonies fifty-five each. The affairs of the confederation were to be managed by two commissioners from each colony, who were to elect a president from their number with the powers of a presiding officer only. The vote of six commissioners was required to carry a motion, and where it was less than that, if the matter remained in dispute, it was to be referred back to the several colonial governments. Annual meetings of the commissioners were to be held in the colonies in rotation, although Massachusetts was to have two turns in succession. The only matter besides mutual defence which was committed by the colonies to the commissioners was the extradition of runaway servants. The two weak points of this confederation were its failure to provide machinery whereby its advantages might be proportioned to the amount that each colony contributed for its needs and its inability to bear directly upon the individual citizen. The New England Confederation affected in not the slightest degree the relations of a person to his own colony. The new allegiance was so different in its nature from local obligations that a true union of the colonies was not even potentially involved in the confederation.

It is important to bear in mind that the New England Confederation was formed without reference to the home government; there is no reason to believe that the colonists gave a thought to the question of how their action would be looked upon in England. The important particulars, then, of the New England Confederation are its absolute

preservation of the allegiance of the colonies to one another in matters of local interest, its purely defensive nature, and its complete ignoring of the mother country either by way of acknowledging responsibility of the colonies to her in matters of internal order or in the alleging of grievances due to her colonial policy. This confederation undoubtedly was in the minds of the Massachusetts men who sent out the circular letter which resulted in the formation of the Continental Congress.

The realization of the need of a defensive alliance which was expressed by the New England Confederation was again voiced in a letter sent out by the Lords of Trade in September, 1753, recommending the respective Assemblies to meet in convention, and to negotiate a treaty with the tribes of the Six Nations in order to prevent them from entering into an alliance with the French, as well as to enter into articles of union and confederation "with each other for the mutual defence of His Majesty's subjects and interests in North America, as well in time of peace as war." The Governor of New York was directed to appoint the time and place of meeting, "and to take care that all the provinces be comprised, if practicable, in one general treaty." The colonies were a unit in their desire to have the French expelled from America, but they had a different feeling toward a proposition which threatened their individual integrity. The Congress met in 1754 in the city of Albany on the 19th of June. Only seven, however, of the colonies were represented. There were five representatives from Massachusetts, four from New Hampshire, three from Connecticut, two from Rhode Island, four from Pennsylvania, two from Maryland, and the lieutenant-governor with four of the council of New York. Their instructions were dissimilar; some colonies did not mention the matter of union, while others gave instructions to their representatives to act upon all subjects proposed. After the discussion proceeded, it was unanimously resolved that some form of federated action, in view of the extension of French dominion in America, was absolutely necessary.

It was the genius of Franklin that devised a plan of union, which, although not acceptable, showed his ability in constructive statesmanship. In this plan of union, as modified by the Congress, the local constitutions were to be recognized. Each Assembly was triennially to elect delegates to a Grand Council; but this general government was not to impress men into military service without the consent of the local legislatures. Any colony, in an emergency, might defend itself; and the military and civil institutions of each were to remain as before union excepting as they might be altered by acts of Parliament. The Grand Council was to have power to make treaties with the Indians and to regulate all relations with the savages; to authorize new settlements; to nominate all civil officers provided for by its constitution; to approve all military officers; to appoint a general treasurer as well as a special treasurer for each of the colonial governments; to have an equal voice in the expenditure of moneys raised to enlist and to pay soldiers and build forts. The executive power was to be vested in a president-general supported and paid by the crown. He was to have the power of nomination of military officers, to commission all others, and, in connection with a council, to manage Indian affairs. He had also the right to negative any and all acts of the Grand Council. On July 10th it was voted to lay this plan before the respective colonies. An attitude of avowed hostility to it was shown notably by Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. Curiously enough the scheme which was found to be unacceptable to the colonies because it conceded too much prerogative to Great Britain, failed to receive sanction in that country because it was too democratic.

The rejection of the Albany Plan for a general government for the American colonies did not imply lack of appreciation by the colonial assemblies of the value of union. It was indirectly, by giving occasion for direct intervention on the part of Parliament in the internal affairs of the colony,

the means of drawing the colonies together in a union closer than that designed for them by the Lords of Trade even though it at first did not contemplate organic connection. The Stamp Act Congress represented the first general representative assemblage of the colonies in which was manifested the spirit of independence. Heretofore alliances had been suggested from the point of view of mutual defence against common enemies and for the promotion of identical interests. The Stamp Act Congress was an expression of opposition to a cardinal principle of British sovereignty. Rebellion was in its very nature. We have seen how its apparent success in securing the repeal of the objectionable measure but furnished further occasion for the home government to add to the irksomeness of the authority which so vexed the spirits of the American colonists. The character of the delegates to the Stamp Act Congress and the wide powers of petition and protest with which they were vested as well as the unanimous support which they tendered Massachusetts in her championship of the common cause were all significant of the march of sentiment. Henceforth colonial rights were not regarded as the rights of separate colonies, but of the colonies in their collective capacity. This accounts for the readiness with which, as we have seen, the proposals of the circular letter were received by the various Assemblies. The Continental Congress was a child of destiny and was born in due time. It met, deliberated, and adjourned with such rare wisdom, moderation, and decision as to evoke even from its enemies the encomium of being one of the most remarkable popular convocations of which history bears record.

The last proposition looking toward the granting of some of the things for which the colonies contended and giving to them a measure of unity followed the reception in Great Britain of the mass of papers relating to America and their consideration by Parliament at its session convening January 19, 1775. We have seen that neither Chatham nor Burke was able to stay the progress of administrative

measures hostile to the interests of the American protestants. Lord North, on February 20th, introduced his Plan of Conciliation. His proposition gave to each colony separately, exemption from taxation excepting such duties as were necessary for the regulation of the commerce of the whole realm, provided that these colonies would of their own option make suitable provision for the support of the civil government and for the general defence. This measure was carried in the face of a storm of opposition and the king assented to it in the belief that it would put an end to the dangerous tendency of the colonies to call irregular congresses. There were others, however, who saw in it an adroit scheme to segregate the colonies and to enable the home government to deal with them individually. Chatham's comment upon it was as follows: "Everything but justice will prove vain to men like the Americans, with principles of right in their minds and hearts, and with arms in their hands to assert those principles." To Franklin, Lord North conceded the likelihood that the tax on tea and the Port Act might be repealed but that the acts relating to Massachusetts were in the nature of amendments to the constitution of that colony, and for that reason as well as because they were a standing example of the power of Parliament would be continued. Franklin replied that to grant the claim of Parliament to change colonial charters would be to unsettle the foundations of all local government in America. It would be to place absolutely in the hands of Parliament every vital right that the colonies enjoyed. Lord Howe, who was the intermediary of Lord North in making known to Franklin the latter's proposals, received from that famous patriot the following declaration to be submitted to the minister: "The people of Massachusetts must suffer all the hazards and mischiefs of war, rather than admit the alteration of their charter and laws by Parliament. They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." The breaking out of hostilities would have rendered the proposals of North

abortive even had Franklin not indicated the impossibility of their receiving favorable consideration. The colonies were now too busy formulating their own plans of union and developing sources of revenue for mutual defence to give heed to any words which might come from Great Britain that did not accord the full measure of their claims. Let us now again take up the thread of colonial movements.

When the first Continental Congress adjourned on October 26, 1774, its members returned to their homes with the realization that at last a plan of union with sufficient elements of coherence had been matured; for prior to the dissolution of the Congress a recommendation had been adopted appointing May 10, 1775, as the date for the convening of a new Congress and requesting the several colonies to appoint delegates. It was hoped that before it should meet information of the action and plans of the British Parliament during the winter of 1774 and 1775 would be received. But when that news arrived it was found to be altogether of an unfavorable character, and in the meanwhile hostilities had actually begun, so that when Congress assembled upon the date fixed it was definitely known that its duties would be those pertaining to the direction of war. In this second Congress, Georgia had limited representation. Peyton Randolph was chosen president and Charles Thompson secretary of the Congress. Upon the second day of its meeting John Hancock laid before it testimonials relative to the battle of Lexington and other papers referring to the course of events in Massachusetts. These documents were intended to prove that the king's forces were the aggressors in the conflict and that Massachusetts had taken only such action as the premises not only warranted but compelled her to take. Congress thereupon resolved itself into a committee of the whole to consider the state of the country. Upon application from the city and county of New York for advice as to the attitude to be maintained toward the troops expected shortly to arrive there, Congress, on May 15th, replied that the

citizens were to "act on the defensive so long as might be consistent with their safety; to permit the troops to remain in the barracks so long as they behave peaceably, but not to suffer fortifications to be erected, or any steps to be taken for cutting off the communication between the town and the country." On May 17th, Congress passed a resolution prohibiting all exportation from the colonies to all parts of British America, which had not entered into their Association, and that no provisions should be furnished to British fishermen on the American coasts. Other prohibitions adopted were against honoring the commercial paper of British army or naval officials, and the furnishing of supplies to the British forces in Massachusetts. A policy of non-intercourse was thus adopted toward all representatives of British authority in America. In this way Congress made reply to the British acts for restraint of commerce and prohibition of fisheries. The effect of these resolutions would be to distress the British West Indies, which largely depended upon America for foodstuffs, and to add to the discomfort of the British troops.

The action of the Congress in passing these measures was in keeping with the instructions of its members from their several Assemblies. These were variously stated to be "to obtain redress of American grievances, . . . to recover and establish American rights and liberties, . . . to advance the best good of the colonies." They conferred ample power to consult and pass such measures as might seem necessary to the achievement of these ends. Although it did not possess the machinery to execute its will, yet the moral compulsion of determined sentiment was sufficient to insure the execution of such general acts as the Congress passed. Various questions were referred by the colonies to Congress for advisement. The taking of Ticonderoga raised a question as to the disposal of the captured stores. The patriots of New Hampshire, in a letter dated May 23d, stated that when they heard that the blood of their brethren had been shed at Lexington they hastened to give succor,

and to that end had voted to raise a force of two thousand men. They expressed the hope that, as they had not had opportunity to determine the general will of the colonies in an exigency of that sort, the principle of self-defence might be followed by all the colonies until they might have the counsel of Congress. A series of Resolves which were adopted in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, have commanded considerable attention at the hands of historians because it has often been affirmed that they furnished material for the Declaration of Independence. The committee upon the Resolves had been chosen under the advice given by the North Carolina Convention of 1774 and the Continental Association of the succeeding October. Each county was asked to appoint committees to act in concert with the General Congress in making its measures effective. The Mecklenburg committee met at Charlotte, May 31, 1775. After discussion, the Resolves, with a suitable preamble were adopted. They were drawn up by Dr. Ephraim Brevard. They affirmed that a joint address which had passed both Houses of Parliament in February, 1775, declaring the colonies in rebellion, annulled and vacated all offices and suspended the constitutions of the colonies; and, for the better preservation of order, provided a set of rules to serve for the county until the Provincial Congress should "regulate the jurisprudence of the province," or until Parliament should retire from its pretensions. Their purpose was also declared to be to enable county officers to be selected independently of the crown of Great Britain. These Resolves were read before a public assemblage and were printed in *The Cape Fear Mercury*, and copied widely in the press of the country. Several of the more important of the Mecklenburg Resolves were the following:

Resolved, That whosoever directly or indirectly abets or in any way, form, or manner countenances the invasion of our rights, as attempted by the Parliament of Great Britain, is an enemy to his country, to America, and the rights of men.

Resolved, That we the citizens of Mecklenburg county do hereby dissolve the political bands which have connected us with the mother country, and absolve ourselves from all allegiance to the British crown, abjuring all political connection with a nation that has wantonly trampled on our rights and liberties and inhumanly shed the innocent blood of Americans at Lexington.

Resolved, That we do hereby declare ourselves a free and independent people, are, and of right ought to be, a sovereign and self-governing people, under the power of God and the General Congress; to the maintenance of which independence, we solemnly pledge to each other our mutual coöperation, our lives, our fortunes, and our most sacred honor.

Resolved, That we hereby ordain and adopt as rules of conduct, all and each of our former laws, and the crown of Great Britain cannot be considered hereafter as holding any rights, privileges or immunities amongst us.

Resolved, That all officers, both civil and military, in this country, be entitled to exercise the same powers and authorities as heretofore: that every member of this delegation shall henceforth be a civil officer and exercise the powers of a justice of the peace, issue process, hear and determine controversies according to law, preserve peace, union, and harmony in the country, and use every exertion to spread the love of liberty and of country, until a more general, and better organized system of Government be established.

Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be transmitted by express to the President of the Continental Congress assembled in Philadelphia, to be laid before that body.

These Resolves of the Mecklenburg County committee were not formally laid before Congress. The delegates from North Carolina advised the Mecklenburg County committee to preserve patience until Congress should take determinative action.

These solicitations for counsel, coming as they did from several of the colonies brought the issue of general sovereignty

to the front. Authority implies a qualified dispenser of power. The Continental Congress was not such, yet nothing less than a central source of authority could either satisfy the needs of the associated colonies or be in line with their training. They had been accustomed as Englishmen to look upon the king and Parliament as a centre of governmental direction. It is true that the pendulum had swung widely in the other direction and that the people themselves as the source of sovereignty was not a strange tenet to the minds of Americans. The Continental Congress being constituted by the people must in the nature of the case represent somewhat of the sovereignty which they claimed for themselves. Yet in contradistinction to the growing idea of popular sovereignty were the sentiments of loyalty to the home government, which still lingered in the thoughts of the people. In the case of the local governments of the several colonies the process of reconstruction to bring them into harmony with the ideas for which they all stood was in the nature of adjustments to circumstances and needs. The problem before the general government was of a much more recondite nature. In their efforts toward the acquirement of individual liberties the colonies had as their guides charters which invested them with much for which they contended. Not so, however, with the general government, it was without a constitution, it had no precedent, its powers were undefined.

When Massachusetts laid before the Continental Congress a statement of the late transactions within its borders and sought advice, it was propounding questions which lay at the very base of centralized authority. Should Congress advise Massachusetts to "set up a government in full form" or otherwise assert independence of Great Britain it must at the same time assume the duties for whose performance such counsel would make it responsible. The issue presented was no less a one than to proclaim for all the colonies independence of Great Britain. By the nature of their compact the representatives of the other colonies had

either to repudiate the action of Massachusetts or else support it. To do the latter would be to place themselves in exactly the same relation to the home government as that colony sustained. The protestation that redress of grievances alone was sought could hardly be adhered to when belligerences received endorsement. Nevertheless, the colonies were not prepared to take the radical step of rebellion against the authority of Great Britain and affirmed, in spite of their declarations and actions with regard to parliamentary measures, that they were still loyal to their sovereign. Even Massachusetts insisted that any construction of the battle of Lexington as being tantamount to a declaration of war with Great Britain and an indication of a desire by that people for independence was "as great slander on the province as ever was committed to writing."

In order to preserve themselves from the taint of treason in their remarkable activities in the direction of securing the rights which they claimed, the colonists had recourse to an argument which they employed with good effect. They pointed to the various charters and advanced the incontestable claim that in but a single exception, that of the charter of Pennsylvania, these instruments made no mention of Parliament as a coördinate authority. That single instance, however, served as a strong argument in rebuttal for the loyalists. It provided that the king should not levy customs or taxes on the inhabitants of the province except "with the consent of the proprietors, or chief governor or assembly, or by act of Parliament in England." As all these charters emanating solely from the king were issued prior to the Revolution of 1688, the opponents of the popular party asserted with a large show of reason that Parliament had been excluded from participation in colonial administration upon the same grounds that it had been excluded from other matters of jurisdiction: it had not yet achieved its victory over the Stuart pretensions. Even if the charters had been purposely drawn to exclude Parliament from colonial administration, the course of political

events in Great Britain had rendered them void, for, since the Revolution of 1688, which put William III. on the throne, the right of the crown to dispense with or to abrogate the laws or rights of Parliament had been abolished. It was certainly straining a point of privilege for the colonies to repudiate the authority of Parliament over them on the ground that there was specific mention of Parliament in but one of their instruments of government, and that the single exception proved the rule. This could hardly be regarded as an ingenuous plea upon their part, especially in view of the fact that the first stage of their dispute with the mother country had been with regard to prerogative and that the contest with Parliament was an after fact. The claim of the Continental Congress that it was not seeking independence was not, as it appeared to be, equivalent to a profession of loyalty to Great Britain, for excepting upon the condition of concessions which would give the colonies virtual freedom there was little concern in the minds of the patriots in Congress to maintain relations with the mother country. Yet nothing was clearer than that the public mind was not prepared to accept independence. Accordingly, the Continental Congress strove to preserve the technical allegiance of Massachusetts by reverting to the precedent established in the case of the deposition of James II. The charter of the colony was held to be irrevocable and unalterable; the penal Acts of Parliament were regarded as illegal, hence null and void. As the governor and lieutenant-governor had recognized these acts, they were considered, like James II., in the case which furnished the precedent, as absent and their offices vacant. This involved a suspension of authority, and the Massachusetts Provincial Congress was accordingly advised to write letters, calling for the election of representatives under the charter, who, by the established method, should choose councillors to carry on the government until his majesty should appoint a governor to administer the affairs of the colony according to its charter.

On May 26th, Congress passed a resolution to present a petition to the king seeking a restoration of harmony. This was accordingly done on July 8th. In the meanwhile, however, it further resolved to put the colonies in a state of defence. To this end it assumed control of the forces about Boston, and adopted military regulations for the army of the United Colonies. We have already seen that the name of Washington as commander-in-chief of the allied forces of the colonies had been proposed at this time by Elbridge Gerry and Joseph Warren. In the course of the debate upon the adoption of the army no other name evoked such enthusiasm. John Adams expressed the general sentiment of Congress when he said: "I had but one gentleman in my mind for that important command, and that was a gentleman from Virginia, who was among us,—a gentleman whose skill and experience as officer, whose independent fortune, great talents, and excellent universal character would demand the approbation of all America, and unite the cordial exertions of all the colonies better than any other person in the Union."

Thomas Johnson, of Maryland, nominated Washington as commander-in-chief of the armies raised and to be raised for the defence of America. John Adams seconded the motion and the election, which was by ballot, was unanimous. This was on June 15, 1775. As soon as Washington's name was proposed, he, with characteristic modesty, rose and left the room. The commission which was issued to the man who undoubtedly was accorded this signal mark of universal confidence because he was generally recognized to be without a peer among the American patriots, had given to him no limitation upon the powers of his office saving only that he was to see "that the liberties of the country receive no detriment."

Notwithstanding that Congress had assumed the highest function of government, the control of military forces, it still proceeded upon the theory that it was but the servant of colonies contending for their proper rights. Despite the

paradox of fact they were within the reasonableness of theory when they prayed the blessing of heaven upon the reigning monarch of Great Britain. They solemnly protested that the United Colonies, having been forced to take up arms in support of their liberties, would not lay them down until these were redressed. Once again the points in controversy were stated in carefully prepared papers. An appeal was issued to the Canadians to cast their fortunes with those of the colonies. In declaring the causes which compelled them to take up arms, the charge of their enemies that it was but the concluding act in a series of well-matured plans to achieve for themselves independence was vigorously denied and an earnest desire was expressed to maintain political connection with the mother country upon terms of cordiality. An address was issued to the inhabitants of Great Britain in which they were styled "friends, countrymen, and brethren, fellow-subjects." A letter was addressed to the Lord Mayor of London in which the same protestations of loyalty upon terms which a brave and free people might receive were similarly made.

Franklin submitted to Congress a plan to put the union of the colonies upon a permanent basis. They were to adopt the title "The United Colonies of North America." His plan embraced Canada and the British West India Islands and even looked to the reception of Ireland. In this scheme the governmental independence of every colony was to be preserved under the direction of a general government which should have delegated to it sufficient authority for its administrative needs. Every colony was to have perfect freedom in the matter of local jurisdiction. The Union government was to have control of such general matters as commerce, currency, the post office, the general treasury, and the army. It might exercise such high functions of government as the declaring of war, the making of peace, and the settling of disputes between colonies; there was to be an annual Congress and a Cabinet, the latter to have charge of continental business and foreign

relations. This plan was submitted on July 21, 1775, but it did not come up for action at that session.

The Plan of Conciliation of Lord North, as well as a letter from that statesman, was referred to Congress by several of the Assemblies. The letter declared that the temper and spirit of the British nation was against concession and were the administration so disposed it could not yield more than it had already done. The proposition was characterized by Congress as unreasonable and insidious, and it was declared that being presented at a time when the fleets and armies of Great Britain were seeking to coerce it, the Plan of Conciliation must be regarded as addressed rather to the fears than to the choice of its members; it was further declared to be unnecessary, as the objects which it specified were fully guaranteed to the colonists as British subjects entitled to all the privileges of dwellers in Great Britain; unjust, as well, because it required equality of contributions while the trade laws of Great Britain cut the colonists off from the commerce of the world. Finally, the Plan of Conciliation was declared to be in contravention of the method of civil government best suited to the circumstances of the colonies, and which they claimed to have a right to enjoy unmolested. The disingenuousness of the proposition was ridiculed, as it sought to have the world believe that the matter of levying taxes was the only thing in dispute, when the persistent claim of the mother country to alter their charters at will was the vital point of difference. Congress, when it adopted its response to Lord North's plan, realized that it rested the future of the colonies upon the hazard of war.

Another attempt was made to secure royal favor for the colonies at the instance of Dickinson and Jay. A petition was drawn up and addressed to his majesty in which he was implored to suggest some way in which his faithful colonies might be brought into happy and permanent reconciliation with his royal self. It breathed such a warmth of regard and of concern for peace that those who still had faith in petitions believed that it would touch the heart of the king.

It was committed to the care of Richard Penn, a Loyalist, who sailed with it for England. On August 1st, Congress adjourned to meet again on September 5th. In addition to its provision for an army it had arranged a postal system which extended from New Hampshire to Georgia. It appointed joint treasurers of the United Colonies, assumed control of Indian affairs, and provided for a general hospital. It was still committed to a policy of defence. Moderation was the principle of the action that secured for it wide confidence.

There was considerable embarrassment in the colonies because of their divided duty toward their old governments and officers and the principles of free government by which these were being supplanted. In most instances the Provincial Congresses continued to assure their respective governors of their loyal regard. For the present it was considered to be important that hostilities should be confined to Massachusetts.

Congress reconvened September 5th, but adjourned until the 13th, to await a fuller representation. Georgia for the first time was fully represented, by virtue of having delegates accredited from its Provincial Congress. Those members of Congress who had pinned their faith to the second petition to the king were anxiously awaiting information of its result. Samuel Adams on September 24th, in a private way declared that if the "second petition to the king were rejected or neglected, or not answered favorably, he would be for acting against Britons, as in open war against France or Frenchmen,—fit privateers, and take their ships anywhere." It was beginning to be felt that the colonies had burned the bridges behind them. Thomas Johnson, of Maryland, October 6, 1775, said he saw every day less prospect of reconciliation; but that he was not yet ready to make reconciliation impossible. Like sentiments were expressed in many Provincial Congresses as well as by various county committees. Great pressure at this crisis was brought to bear upon the Continental Congress. This fact accounts for the uncertain and vacillating policy pursued by that body.

It did not feel authorized to outrun public sentiment and as that was in a state of flux Congress had perforce to employ the days largely in marking time.

In the meantime Richard Penn had arrived in England and found the king keenly occupied with American affairs. On January 12th, the Privy Council had decided that the action of Congress did not furnish a basis for conciliation and that measures should be adopted to protect the loyalists in the colonies and that all others should be declared traitors. Impatient at the delay of the Cabinet in acting upon the proclamation of rebellion which had been agreed upon, the king ordered one to be framed, and on August 18th Lord North was directed to fix a day for its promulgation. On August 23d, such a promulgation was made by the king. It set forth that the colonies in North America had violated their allegiance, had obstructed lawful commerce and under the influence of the counsels of various wicked persons in the realm of England had proceeded to open rebellion. All civil and military officers and loyal subjects were commanded to do their utmost to suppress the rebellion and condign punishment was threatened to be imposed upon anyone who might covertly correspond with rebels in arms in North America. Such was the state of things when Richard Penn, on August 21st, presented to Lord Dartmouth a copy of his petition of placation. August 23d was the day fixed for the formal presentation of the original petition. But as upon that day the king issued his proclamation, delivery was delayed until September 1st, at which date Dartmouth received the original petition, but it produced no effect. The king declined to see Penn. The king's proclamation and intelligence of the scant courtesy which was accorded the petition arrived in America October 31st. Chagrin was followed by alarm, for rumor had it that ten thousand Hanoverian troops were to reinforce the British in America. Action for defence was the one thought and a congressional committee for secret correspondence with the Provincial Congresses was appointed.

CHAPTER VIII

UNION AND INDEPENDENCE

To UNDERTAKE to specify the sources which contributed to the idea of independence as it came to obtain in America would be to trace the history of economic development in the New World; for in a very important sense the idea of independence was an economic one. It was the product of colonial manufactures and colonial commerce. Was this commerce to have unfettered opportunity to enter the markets of the world and to secure in return the shipment to the colonies of the multifarious products of continental and Eastern countries? Deprived of such freedom of opportunity the American colonies might not hope to secure either the advantages of their vast resources or the stimulation to production necessary for their development. At the first, Great Britain had taken but little commercial account of the struggling settlements along the Atlantic coast of America. When, however, the exports from the colonies came to be of wider importance than fish, furs, and ship timber, she became concerned to derive the major benefits of colonial commerce. Then began the struggle for commercial freedom upon the part of the colonies. Any attempt to refer the idea of independence to sources which do not take account of the educational effect of the colonial struggle for freedom in trade would result in an imperfect conception of its most important element.

The colonists did not enter upon their struggle with the mother country with a fund of abstract principles of civil

rights. Some of the colonies, however, had at their beginning well-defined religious abstractions to supplement the concrete facts of their untried careers, and, although the principle of religious liberty seems remote from the facts of economic progress, nevertheless it served the colonies of New England as an excellent guide from material experiences. Infractions of personal rights vary little in essential respects. Whether the occasion be religion, trade, or politics, the fundamental fact in all cases is the usurpation of rights which find their sufficient warrant in the nature of man. The method of protest in any case must be much the same; so that the experience derived from a contest for the preservation of rights of conscience served an excellent turn in instructing the oppressed how to win in struggles for more material privileges. That New England was keenly and constantly aware of the probability of an issue with the mother country upon the subject of commercial liberty is clearly indicated from the action of its leaders in the early days. Moreover, the lesson of seclusiveness—the very instinct which drove the Separatists to America—as the best method of preserving religious liberty was conned again in the anticipatory stages of commercial contest, so that an early governor of Massachusetts, Winthrop, is found discouraging a suggestion made in an emergent strait of the colony, to turn to Great Britain for aid, upon the ground that to ask assistance of the mother country might incur material obligations toward it.

The chief contention between the mother country and the colonies centred about their different notions as to the nature of a colonial dependency. The idea in America was that a colony should have full direction of its destiny and unfettered control and development of its resources under the protection of the mother country, to which it should be willing to contribute in ways provided by its own legislature. The colonies were also willing to concede to the mother country a privileged relation in the matter of trade. Upon the other hand, the idea which obtained in England

regarded a colony as being under the authority of Parliament and with only such self-government as might be necessitated by circumstances, but which could not be construed as according any measure of political independence. The controversy about the matter of mutual rights and obligations involved so many theoretical propositions that when debate passed into a deadlock, the patriots sought support of their position from the group of writers who at that period had given to the subject of the rights of man a definite place in political thought. Although the whole process of the achievement of independence had been a developing sequence of circumstances, when the attitude of the colonies required formulation in a paper which should be addressed to the world at large, the colonial leaders sought to clothe their views in the language of political abstraction. The citations of the particular points in controversy would find but limited comprehension upon the continent, but when interpreted in the spirit of Locke, Grotius, Montesquieu, Burlamaqui, and Puffendorf, they would be made a part of the general instances upon which the conclusions of these writers were based. It is not speaking too broadly to affirm that much of the effectiveness of the action of the patriots in their final severance of relations with Great Britain was due to the inspiration they received from these doctrinaires. In a word, the idea of independence, when derived from practical experience, was brought into conformity to the general ideals of freedom.

Better authentication of their claims the Americans could not have had than was furnished by these men. Hooker, in his *Ecclesiastical Polity*, propounded the theory that the legitimacy of government was derived from the sanction of the governed; a theory which was so congenial to the mind of the philosopher Locke that he made wide use of it in his political dissertations. The particular work of Locke's which was most prized in the colonies was his *Two Treatises on Government*. In the preface to this book he declares it to be his purpose to show that the title of William III. to the

throne was entirely legitimate because it had for its sanction the consent of the people. This phrase formed the mold for the matter of the American position. It became the sentence upon which the patriotic leaders rang their changes. It furnished alike the prelude and the peroration of the American argument. The Italian writer Beccaria broadened the propositions of liberty to include individual acts of authority. Succinctly stated, his doctrine was that absolute necessity was the only warrant for authority, and that every act of one man toward another which was not so derived was tyrannical. He pointed out that liberty was a social mean and that the principle was developed through strife inasmuch as "in every human society there is an effort continually tending to confer on one part the highest power and happiness, and to reduce the other to the extreme of weakness and misery." Burlamaqui in his *The Principles of Natural Law*, which was translated into English in 1748, brought the conception of the rights of man into harmony with contemporary thought and conditions. Liberty was to be secured by conformity to natural law, and the only way to become acquainted with that law was "to consider attentively the nature and constitution of man, the relations he has to the beings that surround him, and the states from thence resulting. In fact, the very term of natural law and the notion we have given of it, show that the principles of this science must be taken from the very nature and constitution of man." It was not inapt that the Americans should find in the conclusions of the Italian philosopher warrant for their own claims. These conclusions were derived from the primitive facts of human association and the conditions of the American colonies in their early history were these facts *in replica*.

Such were some of the theories of liberty which found acceptance with the colonists and the sources from which they were derived. Such views are found so involved in the papers of the period and especially in those able pronouncements upon the claims of the colonies that are contained in

the *Federalist* that to dissociate them would be to leave little more than the bare statement of matters of fact. To the remarkable faculty for argument possessed by the leaders of the Revolutionary party must be ascribed the vividness and vitality these theories received in the political discussions of the day. It cannot truthfully be said that the study on the part of the American leaders of the social philosophy of the day was in any sense an inducing cause of the Declaration of Independence; the doctrines so derived served only to give form and character to the convictions which were independently arrived at. The proclamation by George III. of a state of rebellion in the colonies was the circumstance which crystallized the tenets of the independence party, and when crystallized they naturally took the form of the thought which the patriotic leaders had been imbibing.

When the king's proclamation of a state of rebellion existing in the colonies reached America, Congress, for a month, had been anticipating such an eventuality, and the consciousness of an impending crisis seemed to draw its members into a closeness of sympathy which augured well for the future of the colonies should they find themselves cast upon their own resources for governmental expedients. "Thank God," wrote Samuel Ward, a member of Congress from Rhode Island, "the happy day which I have long wished for is at length arrived: the Southern colonies no longer entertained jealousies of the Northern: they no longer looked back to Great Britain." Another member commented upon the king's proclamation thus: "We have got a sufficient answer to our petition: I want nothing more, but am ready to declare ourselves independent." Again we find Samuel Adams referring to the irrevocable step of severance of union as a forward step in the history of the colonies. On November 3d, the committee of Congress to which had been referred the memorial of New Hampshire with regard to the hostilities which had been begun in Massachusetts and proposing independence, reported a recommendation to the Provincial Congress of that

colony that it should call a "full and free representation of the people and the representatives" if it thought necessary, and to establish such a form of government as in their judgment would best conduce to the happiness of the people and promise the largest measure of peace and good order in the province "during the continuance of the dispute between Great Britain and the colonies." The same advice was given to South Carolina, and that colony was also counselled to raise an army for its defence at the "continental expense."

The advice of Congress to the colonies arose from the exigencies of the cases presenting themselves. If the advice to South Carolina to organize an armed force with the assurance of the coöperation of all the colonies appears to be prophetic in the light of the constitutional guarantee of protection to every State, whatever may have been the history of the principle of the Constitution, that advice was simply a practical statement of mutual responsibility on the part of the colonies for their several welfare in a common cause. Likewise the advice to New Hampshire was not a pregnant bit of political wisdom, but a simple recommendation in the way of a war measure. The undisguised fact was that a state of revolution existed, and the Continental Congress had become responsible for the direction of the destinies of a revolutionary government. Indeed, Congress had now begun to shape matters toward a republic. It in nowise affects the fact that the patriots regarded the absolute severance of ties binding them to England as an ultimate and regrettable step to say that the course of history in America had been evidently tending toward independence for at least ten years. There has been an attempt in some directions to disparage the sincerity of the patriotic leaders and to regard the Declaration of Independence as the summation of a carefully prepared scheme whose real nature was gradually divulged. The documents of the period clearly denote the perception and apprehension of the trend of political affairs by the patriotic leaders, but they do not disclose



Room in Pennsylvania State House, commonly called Independence Hall, in which the Declaration was signed.

British troops into Charleston. On November 17th, Congress created a naval code, and on November 29th, appointed a committee of correspondence with foreign powers. The importance of this adjunct to the general government is indicated by the men appointed. They were Harrison, Franklin, Johnson, Dickinson, and Jay. On December 4th, Congress warned the colonies that it would be dangerous to the general welfare for any one of them to attempt individually to petition the king or Parliament. On the same day that this significant declaration was made it advised Virginia to resist the arbitrary rule of Lord Dunmore and to call a representative assembly for the formation of the local government.

The press of the country had not been timid in giving expression to the sentiments and aspirations of the period; now it boldly advocated independence. *The Essex Gazette*, November 23, 1775, contained the following: "We expect soon to break off all connection with Britain, and to form a Grand Republic of the American United Colonies, which will by the blessing of Heaven soon work out our salvation, and perpetuate the liberties, increase the wealth, the power, and the glory of this Western World." A soldier of the Continental Army expressed the sentiment of national aspiration in the following language of rhapsody: "When the throne of independence rises before the eyes of the admiring world, when our seas and our harbors are thronged with ships from the remotest corners of the earth, when our farmers are princes, and our merchants kings, what conscious pleasure must be ours! And what praise shall be given us who are engaged in all the danger and the heat of the day!" Not the least of the inspiring causes of the sentiment of nationality were the reports received from the scenes of strife. Many an account of a courageous deed, pathetic instance, or heroic sacrifice, was borne in letters from the battlefields to humble homes, and found their way into the press. The private correspondence of the day, that of persons inconspicuous as well as that of the men in-

direction of affairs, breathes the passionate hope of independence which had become the fixed purpose of the popular party. The sentiments of some of these letters are strikingly similar in the self-consciousness which they reveal to the utterances of the founders of New England. The latter constantly predicted a great commonwealth as the result of their sacrifices and labors; so with the founders of the new nation. Thus Joseph Hawley expressed himself in a letter to Samuel Adams November 12, 1775: "The eyes of all the continent are fastened on your body, to see whether you on this occasion act with firmness and integrity, and with the spirit and despatch which our situation calls for. It is time for your body to fix on periodical annual elections,—nay, to form into a parliament of two houses." The colonists well knew that Continental sympathy must be an asset for which they should make a strong bid.

The national movement had now become the expression of the American people's profoundest piety. A portentous era in the history of a people, when the springs of action and the streams of consequences cannot be easily related and the movements of the time are therefore mystifying, seldom fails to turn the minds of the people toward Providence as the director of their destinies and the guarantor of their security. This was the case in the revolutionary epoch of American history. The prospect of a long and severe war with the best equipped of European nations was well calculated to induce feelings of seriousness and even of foreboding. The colonists pursued independence not as a forlorn hope, for they recognized the natural advantages which were theirs, but failing to make good their claims upon the battlefield, they were prepared for the desperate alternative of retiring into the unknown wilderness depths to begin anew the effort to establish a government of freedom.

The British government had no less appreciation of the inevitableness of the struggle than the colonists. In a speech from the throne October 26, 1775, the king declared that the rebellion in the colonies was manifestly for

the purpose of establishing a colonial empire, and stated that, in order to put an end to the uprising, he had increased the naval establishment and the land forces and besides had entered into alliance with several foreign nations. The House of Lords in its address in reply lauded the disposition of his majesty to extend a full pardon to those of the "unhappy and deluded multitude" who might repent of their rashness in taking up arms, and characterized the colonial proceedings as the acts of ambitious and traitorous men who had led their fellow subjects to set up the standard of rebellion. This sentiment was reflected in the choice made of a new intermediary between the colonies and Great Britain. Lord George Germain succeeded Lord Dartmouth in the cabinet as the head of American affairs. He was well known for his violent antipathy to the colonists. His policy was summed up in the single word coercion.

It was painfully clear to the colonies that Great Britain, by this and similar appointments, meant them to understand that the policy of subjugation was fixed. There was now little pretence in patriotic circles of a desire to seek longer to preserve a tie of union which had passed from the point of being onerous to that of being odious. The advice which had been tendered New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia to form local governments was tantamount to revolution. It was this action more than any other which brought sharply to all minds the issue of choosing between king and colonies. The opponents of independence were not necessarily Tories. In many instances they were Loyalists, to whom the authority of the home government, although divested of real potentiality, was something yet to be desired and only to be relinquished when even the semblance of government was denied to the colonies. John Dickinson was one of those who were reluctant to sever the weakened tie of loyalty. He was supported in his position by the Quakers, who issued an address for peace under the title: *Address of the People Called Quakers.* Yet Dickinson himself saw, as did all the adherents of the Peace Party, that the

only alternatives left them were to "submit to wear their chains or wade through seas of blood to a dear-bought and at best a frequently convulsed and precarious independence." The Peace Party was strong in Pennsylvania and had a considerable following in Delaware and New Jersey. Maryland and the other colonies under proprietary governments included a large number of persons who were influenced by the feeling of self-interest to avow similar opinions.

Under the influence of conservative sentiment which is not an uncommon phenomenon at periods of impending crises, the Pennsylvania Assembly on November 9, 1775, instructed its delegates to Congress as follows: "We strictly enjoin you, that you, in behalf of this colony, dissent from and utterly reject any propositions, should such be made, that may cause or lead to a separation from our mother country, or a change of the form of this government." In the same vein were the instructions of the New Jersey Assembly to its delegates on the 28th of the same month. They were charged not only to withhold assent, but to positively reject "any propositions, if such should be made, that may separate this colony from the mother country, or change the form of the government thereof." On December 7th, the Maryland Convention assembled and made a "Declaration" to the effect that the people of that province "never did nor do entertain any views or desires of independency," and that union with the mother country they regarded as their highest felicity and would deplore severance from her as "a misfortune next to the greatest that can befall them." On December 14th, the New York Provincial Congress likewise abjured thoughts of independence other than as they might be forced upon the minds of the people by the "oppressive Acts" of the British government. The resolutions in full were as follows:

"*Resolved*, That it is the opinion of this Congress that none of the people of this colony have withdrawn their allegiance from his Majesty.

"*Resolved*, That the supposed present turbulent state of this colony arises not from the want of a proper attachment to our prince and the establishment of the illustrious House of Hanover, or from a desire to become independent of the British crown, or a spirit of opposition to that just and equal rule to which, by the British Constitution, and our ancient and established form, we are subject; but solely from the inroads made on both by the oppressive Acts of the British Parliament, devised for enslaving his Majesty's liege subjects in the American colonies, and the hostile attempts of the ministry to carry these Acts into execution." Delaware instructed its delegates to follow the policy of promoting conciliation. Congress thus found that its instructions to the Northern colonies of New Hampshire and Massachusetts and the Southern colonies of South Carolina and Virginia were more radical than the state of opinion in the Middle colonies could be brought to indorse. North Carolina next appeared in the conservative ranks; that province issued an address upon the subject of independence which was widely printed in the newspapers. It appeared in the *Pennsylvania Packet* December 4, 1775, and in part read as follows: "That it is our most earnest wish and prayer to be restored, with the other united colonies, to the state in which they were placed before the year 1763." The town of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on December 25th, issued instructions to its delegates in the Provincial Congress adverse to the recommendation of the Colonial Congress in the matter of forming a local government upon the ground that its enemies would be furnished with arguments "that we are aiming at independence, which we totally disavow."

It was but natural that the colonies should falter before a word which seemed to many persons to be fraught with evil omen. Independence as a principle of self direction was as dear to any of them as it was to Massachusetts, but few of them had advanced so far along the path of practical freedom as their Northern colleague. The whole

history of New England had prepared that section for the reception of the idea of independence not simply as an abstraction but as a fact. While the Middle and some of the Southern colonies were faltering in the path of a swift-moving destiny the papers of Boston were glowing with exhortations to them to stand by the stern facts of their fate as they were to be seen upon the New England battle-fields. One of these newspaper exordiums declared that "the concurring circumstances in divine Providence make it a present duty, for laying the foundations of well-being for many generations," that the colonies should declare themselves independent and so organize a "republic state." This article appeared in *The Essex Gazette*, January 1, 1776. A Virginia writer, a month later, recommended as timely the drafting of "what might be called the Constitution of the United English Colonies." Thus it will be seen that the year 1776, big with the fate of a new-born nation, found a divided sentiment upon the feasibility and desirability of declaring independence of the mother country. In New England opinion had crystallized in favor of it, while throughout the Middle and Southern colonies independence was still an individual aspiration. New Year's Day, 1776, was made prophetic by the action of Washington in unfurling the flag of thirteen stripes as the banner of the union.

The labors of the leaders at this uncertain period were attended with anxiety and apprehension. Samuel Adams was constantly in consultation with his colleagues and other persons prominent in the counsels of the patriotic party. In the list of those who faced with unflagging courage the ultimate fact of a declaration of independence were Samuel Adams, Joseph Hawley, John Adams, Elbridge Gerry, and James Warren, of Massachusetts. The forward man of New Hampshire was Mathew Thornton; Nathanael Greene and Samuel Ward were the representative spirits of Rhode Island. Benjamin Franklin, who since his return to America had allied himself with the radical element, and Benjamin Rush served to show that Pennsylvania might

be counted upon to yield its predilections for peace in the furtherance of the movements of the times. Thomas McKean, of Delaware, Samuel Chase, of Maryland, and Richard Henry Lee, George Wythe, Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington, of Virginia, were leading exponents of the doctrine of a separate destiny, to which Cornelius Harnett, of North Carolina, and Christopher Gadsden, of South Carolina, were as warmly attached.

We might well quote the closely considered and earnest words of Nathanael Greene, written to a member of Congress on January 4th, from his camp in the environs of Boston, as expressive of the best sentiment of the Independence party: "Permit me to recommend from the sincerity of my heart, ready at all times to bleed in my country's cause, a declaration of independence, and call upon the world, and the great God who governs it, to witness the necessity, propriety, and rectitude thereof. My worthy friend, the interests of mankind hang upon that truly worthy body of which you are a member. You stand the representatives not of America only, but of the whole world, the friends of liberty and the supporters of the rights of human nature. How will posterity, millions yet unborn, bless the memory of those brave patriots who are now hastening the consummation of truth, freedom, and religion!" More than exhortations from the North, the transfer of naval operations to Norfolk of which we shall have occasion to speak later in the account of the military movements of the period, served to rally to the cause of independence the doubting Southern colonies. If they were to be looked upon as tainted with the same rebellion as their Northern associates the directions of destiny became emphasized by the dictates of that duty which most strongly appeals to humanity—the duty of self-preservation.

The arrival in America in December, 1774, of Thomas Paine was one of those obscure events which involve much of moment. Paine had been bred in a Quaker family but had not imbibed reverence for religion. On the other hand

he was devoutly attached to republican ideas and was convinced that the inherent justice of the American cause made it a concern for all mankind. At the suggestion of Benjamin Rush, the Pennsylvania patriot and physician, Paine undertook a work which would embody his republican ideas. Under the title *Common Sense* the book was published January 9th; it was a pamphlet of forty-four pages and was issued as the utterance of an Englishman to the people of America. A few citations will serve to show how adapted were its sentiments to express the most profound feelings and earnest hopes of a large section of the people to whom it was addressed. "The sun never shined on a cause of greater worth. 'Tis not the affair of a city, or country, a province, or a kingdom, but of a continent,—of at least one-eighth part of the habitable globe. 'Tis not the concern of a day, a year, or an age: posterity are virtually involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected, even to the end of time, by the proceedings now. Now is the seed-time of continental union, faith, and honor. The least fracture now will be like a name engraved with the point of a pin on the tender rind of a young oak: the wound will enlarge with the tree, and posterity read it in full-grown characters."

These sentiments are reinforced by an arraignment of Great Britain in the matter of her lack of paternal care for the colonies: "Britain is the parent country, nay more. Then the more shame for her conduct. Europe, not England, is the parent country of America. This New World hath been the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from every part of Europe. The same tyranny which drove the first emigrants from home pursues their descendants still. We claim brotherhood with every European Christian, and triumph in the generosity of the sentiment." Paine's attitude toward the party of conciliation is expressed in as earnest a manner: "I challenge the warmest advocate for reconciliation to show a single advantage that this continent can reap by being connected with Great Britain. Everything that is right or reasonable pleads

for separation. The blood of the slain, the weeping voice of Nature cries, 'Tis time to part. Even the distance at which the Almighty hath placed England and America is a strong and natural proof that the authority of the one over the other was never the design of Heaven. Men of passive tempers look somewhat lightly over the offences of Britain, and, still hoping for the best, are apt to call out, 'Come, come! we shall be friends again for all this.' But examine the passions and feelings of mankind, bring the doctrine of reconciliation to the touchstone of nature, and then tell me whether you can hereafter love, honor, and faithfully serve the power that hath carried fire and sword into your land?" Paine looked upon the times as peculiarly fortuitous for the achievement of independence. He says: "It might be difficult, if not impossible, to form the continent into one government half a century hence. The vast variety of interests occasioned by an increase of trade and population would create a confusion. Colony would be against colony. Each being able would scorn the other's assistance; and while the proud and foolish gloried in their distinctions, the wise would lament that the union had not been formed before. Wherefore the present time is the true time to establish it. The present time, likewise, is that peculiar time which never happens to a nation but once in the time of forming itself into a government."

This polemic of Paine was the transmutation of the philosophy of a new social order into the terms of the language of a suffering people. Manhood was summoned to assert itself at the behest of suffering and indignity. What independence as a political principle could not of itself accomplish, independence enforced by an appeal to sentiment effected. Thousands were converted by Paine's rhetoric. The theory at which they had faltered became the principle which with ardor they avowed. The work of Paine became the textbook of the new era.

With the growth of the sentiment for independence there went a correlative growth of stubborn opposition to it. The

Tories, as the Loyalists were popularly styled, had now become a clearly defined party. The divisions between them, or rather the modifications of views which separated them into classes had now largely vanished. A Loyalist simply meant one who maintained allegiance to Great Britain in the face of the desire for a complete severance of political ties. Such persons regarded the army about Boston as a horde of armed rebels, deserving of no other consideration than that given to traitors. The patriots were not left without significant notice of the fate which might be theirs; the clause of the British statute relating to treason was printed and circulated in order to deter persons from following the fortunes of the independence party. It read as follows: "That the offender be drawn to the gallows, and not be carried or walk; that he be hanged by the neck, and then cut down alive; that his entrails be taken out and burned while he is yet alive; that his head be cut off; that his body be divided into four parts; that his head and quarters be at the king's disposal."

It was the clash of the parties in America which, more than the armies of Great Britain made ominous the future of the colonies. Washington expressed his concern lest the American cause should thereby be ruined, and John Adams was as gravely concerned when he said: "I feel unutterable anxiety;" and he writes: "God grant us wisdom and fortitude! Should the opposition be suppressed, should this country submit, what infamy, what ruin, God forbid! Death in any form is less terrible." The Tory writers warned the Separatists that in making war with the mother country they would be called upon to face the victorious veterans of a country feared by every nation in Europe. It was pointed out by them that by the calculation of the Separatists themselves they could not hope to have a revenue of more than £75,000 a year, while Britain in her last war expended £17,000,000 a year. Such representations had the effect of driving many timid persons into the loyalist ranks. Much was also made of the expressed

intention of the leaders of the revolutionary party to turn to France for aid. The manifest improbability that such a despotic government would render sincere aid to the American colonies in their aspirations for freedom was pointed out. The Loyalists could not conceive of justification for the colonies to turn for an ally to their late adversary whom they had fought in Canada. Even the astute leaders of the popular party themselves did not feel that France would render them disinterested aid. But they counted upon her desire to see Great Britain driven from the American continent as furnishing a sufficient motive for her to aid the rebellious colonies.

During the greater part of the winter of 1775 Congress was mainly engaged with military and financial transactions. In the spring of 1776 another attempt was made to bring Canada into concert with the colonies. A committee consisting of Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll, of Carrolton, was appointed to bear an invitation to the Canadian provinces to enter the union of the colonies. They were guaranteed civil and religious self-direction. The overture, however, proved resultless. On January 6th, Congress resolved that Loyalists ought to be disarmed and the more outspoken and active of them kept in confinement until they gave surety for their good conduct. On March 14th, all assemblies, conventions, and committees of safety were advised to disarm all persons who would not associate in defence of the United Colonies. Congress authorized the equipment of privateers, though Franklin took the position that such action ought to be preceded by a declaration of war, a step which the majority of the delegates were then unwilling to take. The justification offered for putting privateersmen into service was that Parliament had forbidden all trade and commerce with the people of the United Colonies, and had declared their property when found upon the high seas subject to seizure. On April 6th, resolutions were introduced into Congress to throw open the ports of the colonies to the nations of the world. In

the debates upon this measure it was pointed out that to open the ports to foreigners would be to make their trade so important as to secure for the colonies the assistance of foreign nations in the impending war. Congress even undertook to deal with foreign powers. In December, its Committee of Correspondence wrote to American agents in London and at The Hague asking them to ascertain the disposition of European courts toward the colonies. On March 16th, Congress issued a proclamation for a general fast, in order that the people might invoke Almighty God "to bless their civil rulers and representatives of the people in their several assemblies and conventions, to preserve and strengthen their union, and to direct them to the most efficacious measures for establishing the rights of the people on the most honorable and permanent basis." Just two months before, in June, a similar proclamation had been issued in the name of George III. The omission was full of significance. The demand was becoming urgent to have the Continental Congress vested with the full powers of a national legislature. When Franklin, in April, 1776, was asked when by general consent this would be, he replied: "Nothing seems wanting but that general consent. The novelty of the thing deters some; the doubt of success, others; the vain hope of reconciliation, many. Every day furnishes us with new causes of unceasing enmity and new reasons for wishing an internal separation; so that there is a rapid increase of the formerly small party who were for an independent government." The opinion of Samuel Adams at this time is well indicated by his vehement letter to James Warren dated April 16th. He said: "The salvation of the country depends on its being done speedily. I am anxious to have it done. Every day's delay tries my patience. . . . We are told that commissioners are coming to offer us terms such as we may with safety accept of. I am disgusted exceedingly when I hear it mentioned. Experience should teach us to pay no regard to it. The child Independence is now struggling for birth. I trust

in a short time it will be brought forth; and, in spite of Pharaoh, all America will hail the dignified stranger."

In a letter dated April 30th, Samuel Adams summed up the course of events which had brought the colonies to the point of declaring their independence of the mother country. His argument runs as follows: "The idea of independence spreads far and wide among the colonies. We cannot make events: our business is wisely to improve them. Mankind are governed more by their feelings than by reason. The Boston Port Bill suddenly wrought a union of the colonies which could not be brought about by the industry of years. Since the memorable 17th of June one event has brought another on, till America has furnished herself with more than seventy battalions for her defence. One battle would do more towards the declaration of independence than a long chain of conclusive arguments in a provincial convention or the Continental Congress."

We may now turn from the actions of the Continental Congress in its relations to the colonies to the development of the spirit of independence in the colonies themselves. In compliance with the resolve of Congress of June 9, 1775, Massachusetts, through its Provincial Congress, issued a call for the election of representatives. These met and chose counsellors who were to constitute a coördinate branch of the legislature. In New Hampshire the popular party also asserted the political dignity which they claimed under the resolve of Congress. A convention was summoned to meet at Exeter; it was to consist of delegates elected under the existing laws for the choice of representatives. This body met and framed a constitution which was adopted in the following terms: "In Congress at Exeter, Jan. 5, 1776, voted, that this Congress take up civil government in this colony in manner and form following." Then followed provisions for the executive, legislative, and judiciary departments of government. In South Carolina the population was heterogeneous in character and half of it was opposed to a declaration of independence. But in February, 1776,

the government was vested in a Provincial Congress. On February 10th, Christopher Gadsden urged the formation of an independent government. On February 11th, the Provincial Congress voted that the existing government was entirely "inadequate to the well-governing the good people of the colonies." This sentiment received sufficient endorsement to lead to the appointment of a committee to draft a constitution in line with the form of government recommended by the Continental Congress. On March 26th, this was adopted under the title of "a constitution or form of government agreed to and resolved upon by the representatives of South Carolina." These changes in colonial government brought forth vehement protest from the Tories. In the Middle colonies the agitation against the increasing control of the separate colonies by the Continental Congress was especially vigorous.

On May 6th, John Adams introduced a resolve recommending to all the colonies to form such governments as might best answer their needs and promote their happiness. A committee consisting of John Adams, Edward Rutledge, and Richard Henry Lee was appointed to prepare a preamble to accompany the resolve. When prepared it set forth the utter variance between the rights of the people according to all reason and conscience and the government as conducted by the crown. An earnest debate followed in which James Duane, of New York, made the principal argument for the opposition. He based his position upon the claim that the Congress had no right to pass such a resolve and that the disputes in the colonies concerning independence owed their origin to and were fomented by Congress. Samuel Adams replied that every peaceable measure had been employed and that petitions to the home government had been answered by the sending of armies and navies into the colonies. The resolution and preamble were passed and on May 15th were ordered to be printed. This act was one of revolution.

It now became important to have definite expressions from all the colonies upon the question of independence.

Consequently a number of representatives appealed to their various Assemblies to make declarations upon the subject. North Carolina took the initiative in declaring for independence. The action of the king in sending to the waters of that colony a military expedition in the winter of 1775 had much to do with forming a revolutionary sentiment. A committee was appointed by the Provincial Assembly which reported a resolution reciting the war being carried on by the king and Parliament against the colonies and recommending that the delegates in the general Congress from that colony should concur with their associates "in declaring independency and forming foreign alliances,—reserving to the colony the sole and exclusive right of forming a constitution and laws." This was adopted on April 12th. The action of this colony in declaring for independence had a stimulating effect upon others.

Rhode Island followed the action of North Carolina. On May 4th, its Assembly commissioned its delegates to Congress, Stephen Hopkins and William Ellery, to consult with their associates on "Promoting the strictest union and confederation" between the United colonies. In issuing to them this commission Governor Cooke advised them that although independence was not directly mentioned they would understand that they were empowered to vote for that measure. Massachusetts was the next to register its will for the declaration of independence. On May 1, 1776, both branches of the Assembly agreed to an Act which provided that after June 1st, all civil processes, customarily issued in the name of the king and bearing the date of his reign should be issued in the name of the government and people of Massachusetts and should be dated according to the usual chronology. A Test Act was also adopted requiring all persons "to defend by arms the United Colonies and every part thereof." On May 10th, the Assembly called upon the towns to convene in public meetings to declare whether in the event that the Continental Congress declared for independence they would solemnly engage to

support the measure with their lives and fortunes. During May and June many such meetings were held and votes to sustain the movement for independence were passed. The town of Pittsfield in taking favorable action expressed the general state of interest in the question. It declared that "the whole province are waiting for the important moment which they [Congress] in their great wisdom shall appoint for the declaration of independence and a free republic."

Virginia was in a state of great excitement. The royal governor, Dunmore, had sought refuge with the British fleet. The House of Burgesses after vainly summoning the governor to perform the duty finally declared itself dissolved. The delegates were reëlected in accordance with an ordinance of their own making. For the interim of its sessions the House of Burgesses had appointed a committee of safety to have executive powers, and also had organized a militia which was placed under the control of the committee. In April, 1776, public sentiment was crystallizing for independence. As in the case of North Carolina, the inspiration of the movement in this direction was the military operations which were planned by the royal authorities in the South. One after another of the County Committees instructed their delegates in the Congress to use their endeavors to throw off the British yoke. A convention was called and met on May 6th, at Williamsburg, to take action with regard to independence. In its membership were James Madison, a young man of twenty-five years of age, George Mason, Richard Bland, Edmund Pendleton, and Patrick Henry. Independence was advocated in the face of strenuous opposition. President Pendleton prepared a preamble and resolutions on the subject which were introduced into the convention and unanimously passed by a vote of one hundred and twelve—twenty members absenting themselves in order to avoid going on record. The resolutions adopted instructed the colony's delegates in the Congress "to propose to that respectable body to declare The

United Colonies free and independent States." This action of the Williamsburg convention evoked popular enthusiasm. At the capital itself bells were rung and salutes were fired. On June 12th, the convention adopted its famous Declaration of Rights in which all men were declared free and independent, government was asserted to be derived from the governed, and freedom of conscience was set forth as a fundamental right. The convention also formed a State Constitution and elected a governor and other officers to serve under it. A copy of the action of the convention was transmitted to the other colonial Assemblies.

On June 7th, Richard Henry Lee, speaking for the Virginia delegates, moved a resolution in general Congress on the subject of independence; this he enforced with a brilliant speech setting forth the resources of the colonies, their capacity for defence, and their right to form a government which might exercise the sovereign power of maintaining foreign relations. The resolution of Lee was as follows:

"That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be totally dissolved.

"That it is expedient forthwith to take the most effectual measures for forming foreign alliances.

"That a plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the respective colonies for their consideration and approbation."

John Adams seconded the motion of Lee. The next day the resolution was referred to a committee of the whole. No decision was reached on that day, Saturday, and the matter went over until the following Monday.

The resolution was debated a whole day, but the speeches are not extant. The particular question discussed in connection with the resolution was the proposition of Edmund Rutledge to postpone final consideration of independence for three weeks. In common with Livingston, Dickinson,

and others, Rutledge believed that there was not at that time sufficient unanimity of view to warrant immediate action. The result of the debate, as given by Thomas Jefferson in his memoir printed in 1830, was as follows: "It appearing in the course of these debates that the colonies of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina, were not yet matured for falling from the parent stem, but that they were fast advancing to that state, it was thought most prudent to wait awhile for them." It was agreed in committee of the whole to report to Congress a resolution postponing consideration of a resolution for independence. Such a resolution was passed by a vote of seven to five. It provided that in the meanwhile a committee should be appointed to prepare a declaration setting forth the reasons which influence Congress to take so radical a step. The committee chosen for this purpose consisted of Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, John Adams, of Massachusetts, Benjamin Franklin, of Pennsylvania, Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, and Robert R. Livingston, of New York. On June 12th, a committee, consisting of one representative from each colony, was elected to report a form of confederation. At the same time, to a committee of five was assigned the duty of preparing forms of treaties to be proposed to foreign powers.

The postponement by Congress of the vote on independence will afford us an opportunity of gathering expressions upon contemporary opinion as found in the letters and publications of the day. Everywhere the campaign of education was in full swing. Members of Congress absented themselves from the hall of legislation, to debate the tremendous issue with adversaries in their respective colonies. During the discussion in Congress of the Lee motion, John Adams is found writing under the date June 9, 1776, as follows: "Objects of the most stupendous magnitude, and measures in which the lives and fortunes of millions yet unborn are intimately connected, are now before us. We are in the midst of a revolution the most complete, unexpected, and

remarkable of any in the history of nations." When these words were penned, the state of the country was sufficient to fill the hearts of the Revolutionary leaders with feelings of the greatest alarm. Besides military operations by the British in the north and the south, the Loyalists in Delaware, New Jersey, and New York were organizing for armed resistance to the Revolutionary party. In addition to this, as indicated by Saint George Tucker, of Virginia, in an article in the *Connecticut Courant*, June 17, 1776, "armies, composed of Hessians, Hanoverians, Regulars, Tories, and Indians, were plundering and murdering, while the king was amusing a distressed people with the sound of commissioners crying peace when there was no peace." Throughout the colonies, religious assemblies, social gatherings, and domestic privacy were dominated by the one theme which overshadowed every other topic of discussion.

The internal disorders due to Tory machinations greatly complicated the situation in the Middle colonies. Not only did the Tories threaten internecine warfare, but they used every resource of argument to dampen the ardor of those who leaned toward independence. How could the colonies hope successfully to measure arms with the mother country? Were they not simply inviting for themselves rigors of governmental control compared with which the measures against which they complained were merciful? Broils were of constant occurrence in the colonies where the Tory element was strong. It was inevitable that in the excited state of public opinion there should be much occasion for anxiety in the minds of the Revolutionary leaders on account of the turbulence of mobs. Unfortunately, the undisciplined natures of many Americans of the lower type could not be restrained and sought satisfaction of their hatred toward everything British by resorting to acts of cruelty toward their adversaries. Even the very term Lynch law which still signifies in America a form of retributive justice without process of the courts, and outside of the pale of the law, is a bequest of the revolutionary

period. The term originated in the method of handling the Loyalists. Tarring and feathering was the popular form of punishment of those who made themselves obnoxious. It must be borne in mind, however, that in many of the colonies justice was disorganized, and there was little authority left to restrain the assumption by individuals of the prerogatives of the courts. In spite of the irregularity of Lynch law it was frequently dispensed with crude conformity to the procedure of the regular courts in the taking of testimony, and there is no doubt but that in some sections the methods of the "regulators" as they were called, elicited the sincere respect of the people. Thus an account of summary justice administered in New Jersey, and which ended in imposing the usual sentence of tarring and feathering concludes as follows: "The whole was conducted with that regularity and decorum that ought to be observed in all public punishments." The circumstances of violence attending the political disorders of the times was more than an expression of passionate feeling; it was the instinct of nationality asserting itself. In many cases the Loyalists gave verbal or written renunciations of their views, and apologies were often proffered for offences. And yet these violent measures had no sanction from the American authorities, but were perpetrated in despite of the advice of Congress to the people "to take care that no page in the annals of America be stained by the recital of any action which justice or Christianity might condemn." The high plane of authoritative action which was maintained amid the ferment of popular passions is the chief glory of the times. Throughout the political appeals of the period runs a strain of exalted feeling. An anonymous paper of May, 1776, reflects this. The writer expresses himself as follows: "May America rise triumphant, blossom as the rose, and swell with increasing splendor, like the growing beauties of the spring, bearing in her right hand the greater charter of Salvation, the Gospel of the Heavenly Jesus, and in the left the unfolding volumes of Peace, Liberty, and Truth."

Pennsylvania had now reached the point in its progress toward acceptation of the idea of independence where the revolutionists could demand of the Conservative element the recognition of the voice of the popular party. The common people were full of the idea of independence. Many considerations, besides the peaceful proclivities of the Quakers, served to complicate conditions in that colony. Political rivalries were strong, and the proprietary party was adverse to sacrificing the charter. On the other hand the Whigs met their opponents with the argument of nationality, urging the Loyalists to yield provincial narrowness for the furtherance of the common cause of the colonies.

The existence of the Continental Congress as an incipient national Assembly exerted a potent influence upon the Conservatives who were led to yield their position, bury their animosities toward their fellows, and to pledge the colony to abide by the decision of Congress. Such was the state of popular feeling when the recommendation of Congress embodied in the resolution of the 15th of May was received by the Assembly. On the 20th of that month a mass meeting was held, and the resolution of Congress was received with cheers. The instructions passed by the Assembly of November 9th were thereupon read and it was unanimously voted that they had a dangerous tendency to withdraw the province "from that happy union with the other colonies which we consider both our glory and protection." A protest was addressed to the Assembly in which the following expression of popular feeling appears: "We are fully convinced that our safety and happiness, next to the immediate providence of God, depends upon our complying with and supporting the said resolve of Congress, that thereby the union of the colonies may be preserved inviolate." The action of this popular gathering was profoundly felt throughout the colony and its effect was seen in the adoption by the Assembly, on June 8th, of instructions authorizing the delegates of the colony in the Continental Congress to concur in further compacts

between the United Colonies and in promoting the best interests of them all. It added the usual formula reserving to the people of Pennsylvania the right of regulating their internal government. One result of the Philadelphia meeting, held on May 20th, was the sending out under the date of May 21st, by a committee, a circular to the committees of the several counties calling an assemblage of delegates for the purpose of agreeing upon the mode of electing members to a Provincial Convention "for the express purpose of establishing a new government on the authority of the people only, according to the enclosed recommendation of the Honorable Continental Congress." This body met in Carpenters' Hall on June 18th, and elected Thomas McKean president. It issued a call on the 24th, for a convention to form the government. On the motion of Dr. Benjamin Rush, the same day, a resolution was adopted expressing concurrence in the acts of Congress and declaring the United Colonies free and independent States. The colony's representatives were instructed to take their position with the representatives of those colonies that had made like declaration.

In New Jersey the Revolutionists were opposed by the Loyalist governor William Franklin and a numerous party of Conservatives. Not only, as we have seen, had they sent instructions to the delegates from the colony in the Continental Congress to oppose independence, but the Assembly had also determined upon a separate petition to the king. Congress sent John Dickinson, John Jay, and George Wythe to procure a reversal of the position New Jersey had taken. The Assembly courteously received the commission and yielded to its arguments not to maintain a position which would keep the colony out of the union. The Assembly thereupon agreed to abide by the decisions of Congress. The governor sought to obstruct the popular will, but a new Provincial Congress met, on June 10th, at Burlington and voted condemnation of the executive as an enemy to the liberties of the country. It thereupon

proceeded, June 21st, to form a government for the direction of the internal affairs of the colony and instructed its delegates to unite with their fellows in a declaration of independence.

In Maryland the partisans of independence met with peculiar difficulties. The governor, Robert Eden, was generally respected. On April 28th, he wrote to his brother "be under no concern about me. I am well supported and not obnoxious to any, unless it be to some of our infernal independents who are in league with the Bostonians." Political power was vested in a convention which created a Council of Safety. This, however, was under the control of the proprietary party and, on May 21st, it renewed instructions against independence. This action not only greatly agitated the other colonies by creating an issue of the recommendation of the United Colonies but stirred the colony itself. Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, and Samuel Chase, who had returned from their mission to Canada, entered vigorously into the movement for independence. They encouraged the holding of mass meetings in the various counties in order to register the popular will. Anne Arundel County, through the medium of one of these meetings, affirmed that the province was bound to act in unison with the other colonies in all matters not affecting domestic policy and, therefore, the instructions against independence ought to be annulled. In unequivocal terms it declared its thorough conviction that "the true interest and substantial happiness of the United Colonies in general, and this in particular are inseparably interwoven and linked together, and essentially dependent on a close union and continental federation." This statement was expressed in a set of instructions of remarkable clearness and cogency which were addressed to the representatives in Congress. Charles County, Talbot, and Frederick followed the lead of Anne Arundel. On June 23, 1776, Governor Eden retired from the colony. So closed the proprietary government in Maryland. On June 21st, a convention assembled at Annapolis

and, on the 28th, recalled the former instructions against independence and commissioned the delegates in the usual terms, to support the proposition for independence.

On April 6, 1776, South Carolina passed a resolution to the effect that it would not "enter into any treaty or correspondence with that power [Great Britain] or with any persons under that authority, but through the medium of the Continental Congress." As early as March 23d it had given full instructions to its delegates to agree to any measure looking toward the general welfare.

New York was behind every other colony in loyalty to the common cause. The presence of a large Tory element whose influence was great prevented the idea of independence from becoming popular. In vain New York's representatives in Congress, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and Robert R. Livingston, appealed to the colonial Assembly for instruction on the subject. On June 11th they were advised that they were not instructed to vote on the question and would not be. This position was founded on the plea that the Provincial Congress having taken measures to obtain authority from the people to establish a regular government, "it would be imprudent to require the sentiments of the people relative to the question of independence, lest it should create division and have an unhappy influence on the other." By the end of June ten colonies had instructed their delegates to vote for independence, while the commissions of Georgia and South Carolina to theirs were broad enough to cover the subject. Only New York refused to enter into the common agreement.

By the popular verdict the question of independence had been settled. It now remained for Congress to draft a suitable declaration on the subject. This was done by a committee presided over by Thomas Jefferson. The paper that he prepared was submitted to the critical judgment of Franklin and Adams, who made a few alterations in its wording. It was then read at a meeting of the committee and without further alterations was adopted. On

June 28th it was reported to Congress and ordered to lie on the table. On the first day of July Congress assembled in Independence Hall. Its fifty-one members formed a group whose intelligence was of singularly high average. The Adamses, John Hancock, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson were a few of the illustrious men who gave prestige to what was to be the first council of a free people. One of the first matters of business was the reading of the resolution on independence which was just to hand from the Maryland Convention. Congress voted to resolve itself into a committee of the whole to take into consideration "the resolution respecting independency," and to refer "the draft of the declaration to this committee." Benjamin Harrison, of Virginia, was called upon to preside in committee. Richard Stockton, of New Jersey, one of the new delegates from New Jersey, called for a discussion of the question, and all eyes were turned upon John Adams. The eminent delegate from Massachusetts in describing the scene says: "This was the first time of my life when I seriously wished for the genius and eloquence of the celebrated orators of Athens and Rome, called in this unexpected and unprepared manner to exhibit all the arguments in favor of a measure, the most important in my judgment that had ever been discussed in civil or political society. I had no art or oratory to exhibit, and could produce nothing but simple reason and plain common sense. I felt myself oppressed by the weight of the subject; and I believe if Demosthenes or Cicero had ever been called to deliberate on so great a question, neither would have relied on his own talents without a supplication to Minerva and a sacrifice to Mercury or the god of eloquence." We cannot tarry to describe a circumstance of which indeed little record is left. We know that it was replied to by John Dickinson in an elaborate argument in favor of a further postponement of a declaration. The basis of his plea was the wisdom of awaiting the issue of the first military campaign. Foreign aid, he contended, would not be obtained by a declaration

of independence, but by successes of the Continental army in the field. Adams replied to Dickinson. James Wilson, William Paca, of Maryland, McKean, of Delaware, and Edward Rutledge all made speeches upon the subject. The meagre information at hand has not preserved their addresses nor has it perpetuated the participation of the other leaders in Congress who could not have remained silent upon the important theme. The question before the committee was embodied in the portion of the motion relating to independence introduced by Lee, of Virginia, on June 7th. The New York members upon stating their instructions were excused from voting. One of the Delaware delegates was absent, and of the two present, McKean and Read, the former voted in the affirmative and the latter in the negative. Thus the vote of that colony was lost. The vote of South Carolina as well as that of Pennsylvania was cast in the negative. The other nine colonies voted in the affirmative. Congress reconvened and Harrison reported the resolution agreed upon in the committee. Edward Rutledge, of South Carolina, requested that the vote be postponed until the next day in order that he might persuade his colleagues to change their attitude for the sake of unanimity, and such action was taken. Congress again went into committee of the whole on the draft of the declaration. On the next day the absent member from Delaware, Rodney, appeared and assured the vote of Delaware for independence. The Pennsylvania delegation also was brought into line by Franklin, Martin, and Wilson, who all along had been favorable to the resolution. The South Carolina delegates concluded to vote for the measure. Thereupon the resolution was adopted: "That these United Colonies are and of right ought to be free and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is and ought to be totally dissolved."

After the reading of the full text of the Declaration of Independence, Congress ordered it to be authenticated,

printed under the direction of the committee that reported it, and sent to the various committees and conventions of the States and also to the commanding officers of the Continental army; and to be publicly proclaimed in each of the United States. A committee was directed to prepare a device for a seal for the United States of America. On July 9th, the declaration was received by a newly called convention in New York and was referred to a committee, of which John Jay was chairman. This body pronounced favorable judgment upon it, and ordered it to be transmitted to the county committees. The convention pronounced its action to be that of: "The representatives of the State of New York." Thus the entire thirteen colonies were brought into the union. On July 19th, Congress ordered that the "declaration, passed on the 4th, be fairly engrossed on parchment, with the title and style of 'The unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America,' and that the same, when engrossed, be signed by every member of Congress." Richard Henry Lee and George Wythe were not in the Continental Congress when the Declaration was discussed and adopted. The full record of the participation in the momentous debate of Gerry, Franklin, and Samuel Adams has not been preserved. John Dickinson and John Adams were most prominent in the debates, so far as they have been preserved to us. To Jefferson belongs the high honor of having drafted the palladium of American liberties. Among those who rendered signal service in having the Declaration passed or were active in bringing about sentiment for it in their respective colonies were: Gadsden, of South Carolina; Nelson, of Virginia; Chase, of Maryland; McKean, of Delaware; Rush, of Pennsylvania; Sergeant, of New Jersey; Jay, of New York.

To celebrate the auspicious event a general holiday was observed in the colonies, and the Declaration was read amid scenes of wildest enthusiasm. The Liberty Bell in the State House at Philadelphia has become famous as the tocsin of a people's freedom; but, exultant as were its strains, no

more joyful music floated out from it to the throngs gathered in Independence Square than greeted the ears of the rejoicing crowds gathered at New York, Trenton, Baltimore, Williamsburg, and other chief cities of the newborn States. Military parades, salvos of artillery, the flaunting of the banner of the new union, proclaimed to the revolutionists in every city and town the glad news of the break with Great Britain. The celebrations in the colonies were not simply spontaneous rejoicings; in many cases they were planned to emphasize fitly and expressively the deep significance of the occasion. One after another of the colonial Assemblies registered their profound satisfaction with the terms of the Declaration.

Thus the colonies changed their official caption, and were henceforth to be known as the United States. The Declaration announced them, not as independent States, but as united States. Individual independence was not the dream of the leaders of the American movement, for well knew they the perils which follow in the wake of ultra-isolation. Independence was the present achievement, although that was subject to the hazard of war. Union denoted the capacity of the colonies for associate action. The principle which had struggled for supremacy from the time of the New England Confederation had now come to the seat of power, and was thereafter to be the moulding influence which should shape the destinies of the greatest republic in the world's history.

At the time that the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed the process of reconstruction had gone on in six of the colonies to the point of giving them forms of government consistent with the nature of statehood. The others rapidly took upon themselves the forms of local government set forth by the recommendation of May 15th. Upon the Declaration of Independence the former colonies easily adapted themselves to republican order. It became incumbent upon the national government to adopt a republican constitution. On June 11th, a committee was appointed

"to prepare and digest the form of a confederation to be entered into between these colonies." On July 12th, the articles, as drawn up by John Dickinson were reported. We need not dwell upon this document further than to note that the chief question which it proposed was that of representation. On July 29th, John Adams wrote as follows: "One great question is how we shall vote—whether each colony shall have one, or whether each shall have weight in proportion to its number or wealth, or imports or exports, or a compound ratio of all? Another is whether Congress shall have authority to limit the dimensions of each colony, to prevent those which claim by proclamation, or commission, to the South Sea, so as to be dangerous to the rest." Questions as to commerce, public lands, and taxation were also in the nature of problems. The Articles of Confederation submitted by the committee were not satisfactory to Congress. And not until sixteen months later could Congress come to an agreement upon the disputed points.

CHAPTER IX

THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

COMPARED with England the colonies were weak and insignificant as a naval or military power; their population in 1775 certainly did not exceed three millions, of whom about five hundred thousand were slaves. The colonial population was scattered along the coast, and so separated by obstacles to transportation and travel, that it could not exert its whole military strength. England, together with Ireland and Scotland, had a total population of nearly ten millions. The so-called "Industrial Revolution" had already begun in England. The manufactures and commerce of the country were extensive and profitable. Great Britain, moreover, possessed rich colonies in every quarter of the globe, and there seemed to be no limit to her resources or to her credit. Since the Seven Years' War, her mastery of the seas was practically undisputed, and this circumstance alone gave her an enormous advantage.

Under these circumstances it was unlikely that the war would terminate in favor of the colonies. From the beginning to the end of the war, the troops of the colonies were ill-armed, poorly clothed, and sparsely fed. The men readily became homesick; they pined for their farms and their firesides, and hundreds of them deserted. The need of an effective force both on land and sea continued throughout the prosecution of the war.

It is true that England's army in 1774 counted but seventeen thousand five hundred and forty-seven men, while

the naval force was sixteen thousand. But early in 1775 Parliament voted to increase the naval force by twenty-eight thousand, and the land forces by fifty-five thousand men. In addition to these forces the British government early in the war employed foreign mercenaries, and, however inexplicable it may appear, these mercenaries made excellent soldiers and sometimes saved British armies in critical moments. It is therefore evident that so far as numbers were concerned the British possessed a great advantage in the start and retained it practically till the close of the struggle.

The attitude of the British people toward the colonies was unfriendly. This attitude was largely due to a profound ignorance of the colonies and of the precise relation of the home government to them. This ignorance was by no means confined to the lower classes, and is fairly illustrated by the reception accorded to Captain Ryal by the prime minister, the Duke of Newcastle, when the former came to England with a despatch from Governor Shirley, of Massachusetts, concerning the danger of French invasion. After reading the dispatch the duke exclaimed: "Oh yes, yes,—to be sure. Annapolis must be defended, troops must be sent to Annapolis. Pray where is Annapolis? Cape Breton an island! Wonderful! Show it to me on the map. So it is, sure enough. My dear sir, you always bring us good news. I must go and tell the King that Cape Breton is an island." When the prime minister showed so little knowledge of the geography of the New World, it is not amazing that the common people, who imbibed their information from the official sources knew as little about America as they did of Hindostan. There were, to be sure, official sources from which information could be had by the advisers of the king, but these, however, were for the most part unreliable, and were accompanied almost invariably by private letters from the colonial governors in which the principal topic was the insubordination of the colonial Assemblies. Unofficial discussion of American

conditions were apt to reflect the prejudices of the writers and so were hardly more trustworthy. Samuel John saw fit to prepare a treatise entitled *Taxation no Tyranny*. John Wesley, thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the times, maintained that the Republican form of government was bad, and that only the rule of a king could insure public safety.

Not only in the matter of numbers but in the matter of discipline as well, a comparison of the British with the Continental army was altogether favorable to the former. The seasoned campaigners of European wars and the trained Hessian mercenaries outclassed the raw militia of the colonies at every point save that of strategy, in which the colonials were adepts, and in courage, a commodity of which the latter certainly had as much as their foes. The British were trained to fight in close formation in accordance with military rules, but the militia had learned the art of adapting their methods of war to the conditions of the country and to the meagreness of their armament. The failure of the British generals to see and to grasp their opportunities, their inaction when activity was demanded, and their incapacity to estimate a situation from the point of view of its real possibilities, together with a perverse tendency to underestimate the fighting qualities and generalship of the men and officers of the American armies, go far to explain, when coupled with the low state of mobility of British troops, the ultimate triumph of the Continental forces. It was not the British soldier but his superior who was at fault; the British commanders on the whole were inferior to the American. The successes of the British were almost invariably traceable to superior numbers and favoring conditions. The lack of training in the technique of war was more than made up in the American commanders by native ability. One of the most fortunate circumstances of the Revolutionary war was that, lacking experienced generals, the American army yet did not have to await the evolution of capable leaders through the costly experiences of defeat. The selection made of generals was

in most cases soon justified by their exploits. Washington, Greene, Arnold, Wayne and others, who achieved the victories of the American cause were not inferior in every element of military capacity to the best generals among the British. Indeed, the latter were frequently distinguished rather for their personal bravery than their efficiency as commanders.

There was a moral element in favor of the colonial cause which strengthened the courage of its leaders in the hours of their despair. This was found in the generally favorable attitude of the European powers. Although the sentiment which inspired their leaning toward a group of inconspicuous colonies engaged in a war of rebellion was in no case kindred to that which led the colonists to take up arms, nevertheless, the latter rejoiced in the fact that whether from feelings of fear or of jealousy, practically the whole of Europe wished to have them succeed. France was not only willing to aid the colonies by lending them moral support, but was forward as well—at first secretly—in giving their cause substantial furtherance. Spain was also well-disposed toward the colonies and permitted their ships to anchor in her harbors; the ingenious excuse being offered to England that the ships were not known to be American. When England turned to Russia that country refused her aid in subduing the colonies. From Hesse-Cassel only mercenaries could be recruited for the war in America.

Excepting for the sixteen thousand volunteers gathered about Boston from the country sides and hamlets of New England, the colonies, at the time of their commissioning Washington as commander-in-chief of the Continental forces, were wholly destitute of an army and were entirely lacking in ships. Arms and ammunition had to be purchased from foreign countries or captured from the enemy. One of the most difficult problems that confronted Washington when he assumed charge of the army was to bring it to a satisfactory point of discipline. The colonial soldiers all had a weakness for leadership, so that the curt

comment of a critic that the American soldiers were all generals was not without point. They chafed under discipline, were truculent and stubborn. Their commanders were faced by the seemingly hopeless problem of convincing their men that efficiency demanded implicit obedience to orders, and that to the officers and not to the rank and file belonged the duty of planning and directing battles. Some of the men had to be selected for commands and this was a fruitful source of jealousy in the ranks. Not only did others resent the placing over them of their fellows, but at times they flatly refused to receive orders from such sources. An imagined grievance was frequently enough to throw a whole company into open rebellion. Well might Washington exclaim: "Are these the men with whom I am to conquer America!"

The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts acted in accord with the Continental Congress in furthering the activities of the colonial troops, and in securing active measures for the prosecution of the war upon a broad basis.

The probable extent of the field of war from North to South was one thousand miles or more, but from East to West it was much less than one hundred miles. The Americans were able to use as places of retreat hills and inaccessible fastnesses. Rivers and bays divided the field of conflict and played a most important part in the plans of battles, and the determination of their issues. New England was separated from the rest of the country by the Hudson valley which was divided into two parts by the Mohawk. A campaign south of the Hudson was made peculiarly difficult by Delaware River, Chesapeake Bay, and the rivers of Virginia. The Carolinas were divided into distinct districts by marshes, regions of desolate land, rivers long and deep, which overflowed their beds in times of spring freshets. The territory thus described was covered for the most part by primeval forests, where lurked treacherous Indian enemies, and whose unknown depths could not be penetrated excepting by experienced scouts. There were few good

roads, and these were confined to the proximity of the larger centres of population. During the winter months there were long periods when they were impassable. The coast afforded abundant harbors and facilitated privateering.

The Americans possessed an almost incalculable advantage over the British in their intimate knowledge of the vast field of the war; they were thoroughly inured to climatic conditions and were adepts in fighting in the only method that might successfully be employed in forest engagements—the methods employed by the aborigines. The taste which the British at Concord and Lexington had received of their skill in this regard was the first of many such sorrowful experiences. On the other hand the configuration of the country, the diversity of mountain and glade, forest and river, the bewildering inlets of the coast with their numerous islands presented almost insuperable difficulties to the British. Thus both by land and water the nature of the country favored the cause of the colonists.

Connecticut, prior to the battle of Lexington had voted $1,000 for the equipping of an expedition directed toward the reduction of Fort Ticonderoga. The success of Ethan Allen in this undertaking and of Seth Warner in his expedition against Crown Point not only inspired the colonists, but, as we have seen, added quantities of needed stores and arms to the American army. The sending of General Washington to the front to assume control of the Continental forces was concurrent with these events. He had about him a staff of officers of high ability. Artemas Ward, Charles Lee, Philip Schuyler, and Israel Putnam bore commissions as brigadier-generals, and Horatio Gates bore the title of adjutant-general. These were the men who were called upon to lead the untrained militia against the splendid troops of the experienced Generals Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne, who, on May 25th, arrived at Boston with about ten thousand men and large and powerful batteries.

The arrival of such a formidable force of the enemy caused the gravest concern to the colonists. It was rumored,

and indeed there was every probability in the rumor, that the British would sally forth from Boston to burn the neighboring towns. To prevent this the Americans determined to fortify Bunker Hill; for, if the British should get out of the city and become intrenched upon Dorchester Heights to the south of Boston, the Continental position would be made untenable. It was necessary to keep the British within the city. So long as they were there, the advantage was with the Americans; but should the British secure the commanding positions about Boston, the town would be in their possession and it would be extremely difficult for the colonies to recover it. The two alternatives open to the Americans were to maintain the siege or to force the enemy from the town in such a manner as to prevent them from holding the surrounding country. Charlestown Neck and Bunker Hill were the strategic positions. Consequently an order was issued to fortify Bunker Hill in Charlestown. Three Massachusetts regiments, two hundred Connecticut recruits, and an artillery company with two field pieces were detached for the undertaking. Leaving a small force at Charlestown Neck the main body under Colonel Prescott advanced to Bunker Hill. Arriving at that point a discussion ensued as to its advantages for fortification over those of the near-by Breed's Hill. The discussion ended in a decision to immediately fortify Breed's Hill and later Bunker Hill. The expedition had proceeded in the early darkness of the evening of June 16th. The greatest caution in the work of construction was necessary as the ships of the enemy were in easy range, so close, in fact, that the voice of the watch could be heard, and the sombre hulls of five men-of-war were clearly in view and floating batteries were ready to rain a deadly fire upon the men who toiled with pick and shovel. Not an unnecessary sound was made during the long hours of the night, and when dawn came intrenchments six feet high along the side of the hill were disclosed. The captain of his Britannic majesty's ship *Lively* was astonished at the fortifications and gave orders to fire. The

reverberations of the guns wakened the people of Boston. Hastening to their housetops and other places of vantage they beheld the progress of one of the most momentous battles in the course of the Revolution. The attack of the *Lively* was supported by the other British ships and a terrific cannonade ensued. General Gage immediately called a council of war. This determined on the capture of Breed's Hill. Instead of making a detour to effect a landing at Charlestown Neck, the British, despising their opponents, determined to make a frontal attack. Orders to that effect were given. All this while the cannonade of the ships had been reinforced by the battery on Copp's Hill and the water batteries. In the face of this fire the Americans kept steadily at work completing their intrenchments, and when there was a slight show of faltering after a shot better directed than the others had done some execution in the trenches, Prescott himself mounted the works and marched to and fro with drawn sword, regardless of the fact that he was a mark for the British, and thus preserved the courage of his men, who had never before been under fire.

It was about three o'clock in the afternoon when the British troops, supported by a terrific bombardment from the ships in harbor, advanced in solid column against the fortifications. Confidently they approached the works of the Americans, construing the silence of the latter as timidity, until they were within a few hundred feet of the redoubt. The Americans had been keeping a close watch upon the movements of their foes, and as the latter advanced, the order was given to refrain from firing until the command was given. Thus it was the British, advancing over the open stretch of ground, panting from the heat and the weight of their knapsacks, heard the word "Fire!" at the moment of their supreme confidence, and recoiled before a volley that mowed down many of their number.

Fearing that his opponents might seek to turn his position on the left, Prescott had detached Colonel Knowlton with the Connecticut troops and artillery to oppose the

enemy's right. Consequently, when the British general, Pigot, was thrown back in disorder by the deadly execution of the fire from the redoubt, Knowlton held a strong position behind a stone wall, surmounted by rails, which he had hastily strengthened. Against this position General Howe advanced in person. A deadly fire was poured into the British columns, the marksmen of the Americans picking off the officers. Along the whole line of fortifications, from the rail fence to the redoubt, the British troops were soon in retreat. In a spirit of pure wantonness they also set fire to Charlestown. The ships renewed their bombardment and the artillery was placed in such a position that its fire would bear more directly upon the stone wall. The British columns advanced a second time and once more were met with a deadly fire. Now, however, they were prepared for it, and although staggered by the shock, they soon rallied and continued their advance. The Americans fired with such rapidity that it seemed as if a continuous stream of fire poured out from the redoubt. Bravely the British struggled to cross the open space in front of their enemy's position, but were forced to give up the attempt, and fled precipitously to the boats. The scene at the redoubt was being repeated at the stone wall, although there the British artillery supplemented the charge of the infantry with a hot fire. The officers of the staff of General Howe were picked off, and that gallant commander, himself a conspicuous target for bullets, seems to have been spared by the Americans as a mark of regard for the brother whom they had followed in the French War. Like the main column, the British assaulting the position of the Americans at the wall were forced backward and hurriedly made for their boats. The losses sustained on both side were severe, but although the field was strewn with their dead the British were not deterred from again attempting to take the American position. Prescott had sent for reinforcements early in the day, and John Stark with his New Hampshire company had courageously crossed Charlestown Neck under a severe

fire from the enemy, but the hazard of the attempt deterred other commanders from bringing troops to the support of the brave Prescott.

With ammunition almost exhausted and troops wearied from the frightful strain to which they had been subjected, Prescott realized the futility of holding his position in the face of repeated attacks by the re-formed and reinforced British lines. Nevertheless, he determined again to measure strength with the adversary; and, with a command to his men to make every shot tell, he awaited the advance of the British. Again the latter were permitted to approach within twenty yards of the American works before they were fired upon. The British line was broken, but still it advanced. With their powder now quite exhausted the Americans met their opponents with clubbed muskets and bayonets. The odds were too great, and Prescott ordered his men to retreat. It was in doing this that the Americans suffered their heaviest loss; among others who fell was Warren, one of the most cherished of the popular leaders. As the main body under Prescott retired, the troops at the stone wall checked somewhat with their fire the British advance. The little band of Americans crossed the Charlestown Neck in good order, and without being pursued. The immediate result of the battle was that the British secured possession of Breed's Hill, but were too weakened to take Dorchester Heights, and failed to break the close siege. The effect of the Battle of Bunker Hill was to inspire the American troops; for although a technical defeat, it was in reality a triumph. The price paid for the nominal victory was tremendous. The British lost one thousand and fifty-four men, somewhat over thirty per cent of their force engaged. The killed and wounded of the Americans was four hundred and eleven out of a total of about fifteen hundred men engaged. The effect of the battle upon the minds of the British was to enhance their respect for the courage and capacity of the Americans. General Gage said of the defenders of Breed's Hill that they fought like a trained

army. The general effect of the battle of Bunker Hill was to reveal to the American soldiers the vulnerability of their foe, and to deepen the conviction in the popular mind that the American cause was destined to triumph.

The one thing needed, a qualified leader was at hand; Washington had started, on June 21st, to assume charge of the army and after a pause in New York long enough to put Philip Schuyler in charge of military affairs at that point, he arrived at Watertown, Massachusetts, July 2d, where he met the Provincial Congress. The following day, at Cambridge, Washington formally took command of the American forces. The colonial army was in a deplorable state. It has been estimated that it consisted of seventy thousand men, but Washington never had more than fifteen thousand men fit for duty under his personal command. The investing force was composed wholly of New Englanders when he assumed charge and when at the close of the war he yielded his command the New England troops still formed a considerable proportion of the total forces. In spite of his frequent despondency in the initial stages of his leadership Washington believed from the first that he had under him the material from which to develop an army of high efficiency.

By the end of July, Washington had his troops in good form, but the army was almost destitute of gunpowder and if the enemy had made a sortie from the town there would have been only nine rounds of ammunition with which to oppose them. The line of works to be defended was extensive and the British force was well supplied with ammunition. Washington addressed himself to the situation and soon had collected from various towns sufficient gunpowder for immediate contingencies, and sent a vessel to the Bermudas for a further supply. Yet throughout the winter the supply continued to be critically low.

In addition to the investment of Boston, Washington had upon him the burden of directing the movements of a wide campaign. Little occurred during the summer of 1775

to cause anxiety to the commander-in-chief. During August some correspondence was exchanged with Gage in regard to the treatment of prisoners but the chief matter of apprehension continued to be the powder supply. It became so low, indeed, that Washington hardly dared to fire a salute, but he concealed this fact from his officers so that even the brigadier-generals under Washington did not understand the full seriousness of the situation.

The reports received in Great Britain regarding the conduct of the battle of Bunker Hill led to the displacement of General Gage from command and the appointment of Howe in his stead. Howe was a soldier of wide military experience and pronounced ability. It was thought that under his leadership the colonies would soon be brought back to subjection to Great Britain, and peace would be restored. Howe received the command of the British troops in America from his predecessor on October 10, 1775. The new commander resorted to the arts of diplomacy to bring about a cession of hostilities and to that end sought conference with Washington as a private citizen. This, and his attempts to obtain conference with other generals, was regarded as but an effort to secure advantages over his opponents in diplomatic ways. The Americans were determined neither to be cajoled nor to be led by specious promises into the renunciation of any of the advantages which they had gained in the initial engagement. The correspondence of the British general was not confined to the American generals, but embraced many prominent men in civil life, as well as English officials. After the British general had failed in his sedulous attempts to work discord among the Americans themselves, he addressed himself to the immediate duties of his official position. There had been significant indications that the British intended to conduct the war ruthlessly in the hope of soon breaking the spirits of the colonists. In the middle of October Falmouth, now Portland, Maine, was burnt by them. Captain Mowatt, under direction of his superior officer, entered the harbor

and perpetrated the outrage, openly declaring that it was but the first of a series of such acts which were to follow. Immediately upon receiving the news Washington dispatched Sullivan to Portsmouth to resist, so far as possible, any similar demonstration. The British ministry disowned the act of Mowatt and disavowed responsibility.

In the meanwhile, Howe was making plans to march against New York, and, after making conquest of that place and leaving a British force in control of the Hudson, thus cutting off New England from the rest of the country, he was to move through the South and West upon a campaign of subjection. There was nothing faulty in the plan of the British general but the difficulties in the way of its execution. The Tories in New York were a source of perturbation to Washington, and, had Howe been able to make his way from Boston to that point, he would have added many recruits to his army.

Washington also had been laying plans, and, unlike the British commander was able to execute them. He saw from the first that the most important point to be looked to was the Canada frontier. Invasion was to be expected from the north and a quick and decisive blow in that direction might give him possession of the country before the British should pour their troops into the valley of the St. Lawrence in numbers too great for him to hope to conquer.

The success of Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold at Ticonderoga and of Seth Warren at Crown Point had inspired the Americans with the hope that a strong expedition sent into the country could follow up these successes by the reduction of Montreal and Quebec, the latter one of the most strongly fortified places upon the American continent. Colonel Arnold, on June 13, 1775, wrote to Congress pressing this plan upon the attention of that body and offering, if given a force of two thousand men, to make conquest of the whole province. Arnold abounded in energy, and even before Congress had organized the Continental army

he was full of importunity for the Canada project. It was two months, however, before Arnold's proposition was considered by Congress. In the meantime, Sir Guy Carleton, the royal governor in Canada, was planning for the recovery of Ticonderoga and Crown Point. To this end he endeavored to induce the Canadians and the Indians to coöperate with the few regular troops under his command, but the proposition was declined. The governor thereupon proclaimed martial law in order to force the inhabitants to take up arms. Congress fearing a serious invasion of the northwestern country, prepared to meet it. Nevertheless at that juncture of affairs it hesitated to take a step which would change the character of the war from defensive to offensive. But it seemed the most favorable course, particularly as information had been received that the French inhabitants of the country were ripe for insurrection against the British.

Congress had committed the control of military affairs in the north to General Schuyler and General Montgomery. The former remained at Albany to effect an Indian treaty and the latter pushed on to Ticonderoga with a contingent of troops from New York and New England. General Schuyler joined Montgomery at Cape la Motte. From thence they moved on to Isle aux Noix. Schuyler issued an address to the inhabitants declaring the purpose of Congress to be to restore to them those rights to which every subject of the British empire, of whatever religious sentiments he may be, is entitled; and that in the execution of these trusts he had received the most positive orders to cherish every Canadian and every friend to the cause of liberty, and sacredly to guard their property. On September 10th, the Americans effected a landing at St. John's, about one hundred and fifteen miles north of Ticonderoga. They were about one thousand strong. Not caring to undertake the reduction of the strong fortifications, they retired to Isle aux Noix, twelve miles to the south, where they proposed to throw up intrenchments. The state of his health caused Schuyler to retire to Ticonderoga, leaving Montgomery in

Concurrently with Montgomery's expedition Benedict Arnold successfully conducted a body of troops into the provinces from Cambridge. He went to Maine and ascended the Kennebec with a thousand men, and descended by the Chaudière to the river St. Lawrence; this was on September 13, 1775; almost insuperable difficulties lay in the way of the "American Hannibal;" three hundred miles of unexplored and uninhabited country was in his path, the impetuous current of the river entailed strenuous labor, boats had often to be carried overland around rapids through pathless thickets; deep swamps had to be crossed, difficult mountains scaled, and well-nigh impassable ravines toilsomely threaded. Still the expedition pressed on, until after thirty-one days of desperate travel it came to human habitations; then its members sought to gain the good will of the country side, and as they went they circulated among the people a manifesto drawn up by General Washington for the purpose of securing the coöperation of the Canadians. A third of those who set out were obliged to turn back. Supplies became exhausted, dogs and even shoes and leather breeches were brought into requisition as food supplies. A hundred miles from any habitation their flour was reduced to four pints to a man.

On November 8th, Arnold reached Point Levi, opposite Quebec, where he hoped to meet Montgomery, who, however, was then at Montreal. So amazed were the inhabitants of Quebec at the sudden appearance of the gaunt body of men that had an immediate attack been made upon Quebec it is likely that from very surprise the garrison would have capitulated. But Arnold waited a few days before he crossed the St. Lawrence and then the critical moment of his opportunity had passed. Recovering from their surprise the garrison and the inhabitants united in putting the city into a state of complete preparation for attack. Arnold had no artillery and sought to do nothing more than to cut off food supplies from the town until the arrival of Montgomery. Although there was a large popular element

favorable to the Americans and these Canadians might have risen at the approach of Arnold had the promise of success been sufficiently strong, the country was held to its allegiance by the official and clerical classes, whose interests identified them with Great Britain.

On December 1st, Montgomery effected a junction with Arnold at Point aux Trembles and began the siege of Quebec after he had called upon the British governor to surrender. The Americans soon opened fire upon the citadel with a six gun battery, but it was too light to make a breach in the walls. The news of Montgomery's success at Montreal led the colonies to expect a brilliant triumph at Quebec. At this time the government of Great Britain was reduced to that single town; its reduction meant the addition of a vast province to the territory controlled by the Americans. The upper part of Quebec was surrounded with strong works and access was to be had from the lower city only by almost perpendicular ascents. The garrison of Quebec consisted of one thousand five hundred and twenty men, of whom eight hundred were militia, four hundred and fifty, British seamen, and the rest, marines and regulars. The total American force was eight hundred. Montgomery, at five o'clock of the morning of December 31st, advanced to the attack of the town. He passed the first barrier and was killed at the second. His death so discouraged his men that they abruptly ceased advancing and retired from the field. In the meanwhile Colonel Arnold with three hundred and fifty men had got into the city, but he was severely wounded and had to be carried from the field of battle. The loss of the Americans in killed and wounded was one hundred and three hundred of them were taken prisoners. Notwithstanding defeat, Arnold encamped near the town and maintained a siege which occasioned the garrison considerable annoyance and some distress. Upon the expedition to Canada was staked the pawn of Canadian coöperation. It was lost. Canadians as well as Americans lamented the loss of the splendid

Montgomery whose character and talents were held in general regard. Even in Parliament his name was mentioned with singular respect.

Not the least of the trials of Washington were the unreasonable demands made upon him by Congress. Very trying to his spirit were the petty annoyances and small exactions incident to the organization of an army and the pressing of siege operations without proper material. The importance of decisive action before Great Britain had time to pour an overwhelming force upon the American coast was keenly appreciated by him. He was impatient at the rate at which the siege of Boston dragged on. Early in September, he proposed to make an attack on Boston by boats and along Roxbury Neck. In neither proposition could he secure his support of his council of officers. Added to the difficulties of his task were the exhortations of Congress for him to make haste. The men gathered at Philadelphia had no idea of the difficulties with which the commanding general was earnestly grappling. They wanted him to secure Boston harbor, but he had no ships; they wondered why he did not set up batteries, and open fire on the town, but he had neither siege-guns nor powder. The impatience of Congress, and the unreasoning expectations of the provincial Congress of Massachusetts had to be met. In the midst of these difficulties the personnel of his army was constantly changing by the expiration of terms of enlistment, and the entrance into service of raw recruits.

The total number of troops in the American army in 1776, when Congress had brought the army to a point of adequacy by securing suitable quotas from the several States, was about seventy thousand; nine thousand of whom were in Canada under the command of Major-general Sullivan. Brigadier-generals Philip Schuyler and David Wooster had commands whose numbers are not certainly known. Considering the composition of the army, New York had twenty-three thousand troops in the field distributed among the commands of Washington, Major-general

Putnam, Brigadier-generals Heath and Greene; New Jersey and Pennsylvania contributed ten thousand men commanded by Brigadiers Whifflin, Deane, and Johnson. Virginia sent eight thousand, North Carolina four thousand, and South Carolina one thousand under the commands of Major-general Lee and Brigadier-generals Armstrong, Howe, Moore, and Lewis. Boston alone contributed two thousand troops under Major-general Ward and Brigadier-general Spencer. Of the remaining number of troops by far the greater part were from New England.

By March 1, 1776, Washington found himself in a position to push forward his plans for the reduction of the defences of Boston. At the close of February the guns captured at Ticonderoga and dragged overland on sledges were received. With this artillery and with a fair supply of powder, collected with great difficulty, he felt himself prepared for the undertaking. It was his plan to cross Charles River on the ice, but his officers not agreeing, he decided upon a land approach. As Boston was of little advantage to Howe as a town from which to operate he would have evacuated it long before had he not run short of provisions. Additional supplies had been sent from Great Britain to relieve Howe, but the ships which bore them encountered storms. Some were wrecked upon the coasts or foundered at sea; others fell into the hands of Americans. For although Washington was without ships, privateers patrolled the coast and attacked the enemy's commerce. The British felt the pressure of real want and pulled down houses to obtain supplies of fire wood, and foraged in the neighboring towns and villages to provide food for themselves.

This was the situation when on March 4, 1776, under cover of night, General Thomas moved from Roxbury with twenty-five hundred Continental troops, and took possession of Dorchester Heights. In the moonlight the men worked industriously and, without being discovered, threw up strong breastworks. All night long Washington rode up and down

the lines encouraging the men. When morning broke, and the British saw what the Americans had accomplished they began the movement of troops, which indicated unmistakably to the Americans that a battle was imminent. A gale came up which prevented the British from crossing the Bay; another day of storm and rain succeeded; by the third day the works were too strong to be successfully attacked. The guns from Ticonderoga began to pour a hail of iron into Boston. Parleys were opened and Howe made promise through the town's selectmen to evacuate if permitted to do so unmolested, and he threatened that if these terms were not granted he would burn the town. Washington assented but Howe delayed, whereupon the former advanced his works, which was sufficient sign to the beleaguered British general of the earnestness of his opponent's purpose, whereupon on the 17th of March, amid scenes of disorder and pillage, the British troops and a thousand Tories boarded the waiting fleet at one end of Boston as Washington entered the city at the other. The enemy's ships sailed down the harbor unmolested and that night blew up Castle William. The ships gathered at Nantasket Roads and remained in that vicinity for ten days causing Washington not a little uneasiness. He accordingly wrote to Josiah Quincy at Braintree to have all the roads and landings patrolled to prevent the British from sending spies into the country. By the 27th, almost all the ships had disappeared in the direction of Halifax. Ward was left with five regiments in charge of the town and Colonel Gridley whom Washington speaks of as "one of the greatest engineers of the age," was directed to fortify the sea approaches.

Boston was now in the hands of the Americans, and they retained it throughout the war. The importance of the evacuation of Boston lies in the fact that because of it the theatre of war was transferred elsewhere; except for a few raids and an attack on Newport, the war in New England was over. Henceforth she was able to devote all her

strength to the furtherance of the general cause without her resources being drawn upon by military operations upon her own soil. The achievement was one of prime importance and contributed much toward the ultimate success of the revolution. Washington concisely sums up the extraordinary result as follows: "To maintain a post within musket-shot of the enemy for six months together without powder, and at the same time to disband one army and recruit another within that distance of twenty-odd British regiments is more, probably, than was ever attempted." Not the least of the results of this brilliant success was the firm establishment in the confidence of the country of Washington as a leader whose military ability could be thoroughly relied upon.

Had the British taken a broad view of the war, and had they appreciated the scale upon which it was to be conducted they would surely have raised the siege and driven the undisciplined and poorly equipped troops of Washington before them. That they should have remained all winter in the town with only a body of soldiers raw in experience and inadequately supplied with arms to maintain the siege and then at the last to have taken their departure virtually without measuring arms with their adversary can only be explained upon the grounds of that military stupidity which so often characterized the conduct of the war by the British generals.

The concern of Washington was now centred in New York, to which point he believed the British fleet was on its way, particularly as he had received messages, which proved to be without foundation, asserting that the British fleet was massed at Newport to bombard that town. On April 4th, he left Cambridge to further secure the line of the Hudson, the strategic importance of which he fully realized. A few vessels of the British fleet hovered about Nantasket in order to warn off munition vessels sent out from Great Britain to Boston, but General Lincoln brought some guns to bear upon them and they sailed away. Thus

not a vestige of the British forces remained in the vicinity of Boston.

With the passing of the British from New England the scene of military operations is shifted to the southern colonies. When Lord Dunmore heard of Gage's proclamation placing Hancock and Adams under a ban and betook himself to a man-of-war he by no means was bent on leaving the patriotic party in peaceful control of Virginia. From his floating headquarters he directed the movements of a promiscuous body of adherents and instructed them to destroy the colonial stores at Suffolk. Meanwhile, he summoned the members of the House of Burgesses to meet him in conference upon the man-of-war. That body, however, promptly passed resolutions in which they declared that the message was a high breach of their rights and privileges and that they had good reason to fear that an attack upon the colonies was meditated. The character of the force that Dunmore had gathered showed the unscrupulousness of the man. They were largely disreputable fellows and among them was a considerable number of runaway slaves, for one of the acts of the governor after his departure had been to issue a proclamation of freedom for the slaves of the men whom he denominated rebels. By degrees he equipped and armed a number of vessels besides the one which he made his headquarters. They were not intended for service other than to make depredations and to intimidate the colonists. In this way, however, they caused a great deal of annoyance and loss. Persons obnoxious to Dunmore were seized and carried on board the ships, negro slaves were stolen from their owners, plantations were ravaged and houses burnt. For the protection of the colonists detachments of the provincial forces, newly raised by the Congress of the colony, were sent to protect the coasts. A number of petty conflicts resulted and, on November 7th, Dunmore fulminated a proclamation of rebellion against the colony.

In the latter part of November and December, the governor concentrated a force of several hundred soldiers, both

white and black, at Norfolk, whereupon a colonial force was sent to oppose him. Dunmore fortified a position not far from Norfolk at the Great Bridge and the provincials took up a position near the same place. After several days of inactivity the royalists commenced an attack. At the head of sixty British soldiers with fixed bayonets Captain Fordyce, on December 9, 1775, attacked the provincial intrenchments. He with several of his men fell under the fire of the defenders and those surviving of the attacking party were captured. The English prisoners were treated with consideration by their captors but the Tories were made to feel their resentment. The royal forces on the ensuing night retired from their position and shortly after Dunmore retreated with them to the ships, leaving the provincials in possession of Norfolk. As the ships were cut off from communication with the shore their supply of provisions soon ran out and upon the arrival of a British man-of-war, the *Liverpool*, messengers were sent ashore under a flag of truce to ask the provincials to supply the royal ships with provisions. Upon being refused the British determined upon the destruction of the town. This was carried into effect and Norfolk was reduced to ashes. The provincials, being determined that the British should not receive supplies, deprived them of every opportunity for so doing by destroying the houses and plantations near the water front and required the people to move with their cattle and provisions further inland. Nevertheless, Lord Dunmore, with his fleet, coasted along the Virginia shore for several months. The lack of armed vessels made it impracticable for the colonies to force him to withdraw. In the summer of 1776, Lord Dunmore, either because he feared the coming of the armed vessel which the Americans had by this time succeeded in equipping, or because of the sufferings entailed upon his followers by their cramped quarters and scant supplies, sent the ships of his fleet to Florida, the Bermudas, and the West Indies. The plan of the royal governor for the subduing of Virginia had rested largely

upon an expectation of an uprising among the negroes. But he found the Africans more indifferent to their condition than he had supposed them to be and, therefore, as far as they were concerned, his expectations were completely disappointed. The effect of Dunmore's activities was to spread the sentiment of union throughout the south and to cement the confederation of the colonies yet more strongly.

In North Carolina there existed a strong Loyalist party, the bulk of which was composed of Highlanders who had come to America since 1745. Governor Martin was active in raising a Royalist force from this element. He armed and fortified his residence at Newbern so that it did duty as a garrison and magazine, but so much resentment was engendered among the people by his conduct that he deemed it expedient to retire to a sloop-of-war in Cape Fear River. He had issued a commission as general to Donald Macdonald, a leader of the Highland settlers, and now sought to foment civil strife. He was successful to the extent of bringing about an engagement. Sixteen hundred Royalists attacked a thousand Revolutionists, who, under their leader, Colonel Richard Caswell, were posted, February 27, 1776, at the Moore's Creek Bridge. This the Highlanders attempted to cross, but were utterly defeated, and nine hundred of them, including Macdonald, were taken prisoners. This skirmish was all that was needed to swing the Royalist supporters in Carolina into line with the party of the Revolution.

As in North Carolina, so in the colony to the south of it, the herdsmen and farmers of the interior were inclined to the cause of the crown, while the people of the seaboard were ardent in their espousal of independence. Governor Campbell did all in his power to make head against the Revolutionary party. British agents were sent into the interior for that purpose, and they even sought to enlist the aid of the Indians. Their attempts in this direction completed the alienation of the colony from sympathy with the mother country. Indeed, the military policy of the royal

governors was the most effectual means of turning the colonies in the south from their adherence to Great Britain.

The failure of the royal governors to keep the colonies in subjection led the king to decide upon an active campaign in the south. In February, 1776, an expedition, consisting of a considerable fleet and transports bearing troops under command of Lord Cornwallis, sailed from Cork under Admiral Sir Peter Parker. But it was not until May that Clinton received instructions to assume command of the forces in the southern waters. Sir Henry Clinton had, under orders, proceeded to the south in January, 1776, prepared to take command of the British forces there when so directed. He had instructions that Parker's fleet was on its way and was at hand to receive it, when on May 3d the expedition entered Cape Fear River. Almost at once discord developed in the counsels of the British leaders. Clinton wanted to proceed to Chesapeake Bay, while Governor Campbell urged an attack upon Charleston. The opinion of the latter prevailed, and on June 1st, Lord Cornwallis landed with a force of troops and made a futile raid upon the North Carolina coast, after which the fleet departed southward. In March, General Charles Lee while in New York was ordered south. He was bitterly disappointed as he had coveted command in Canada for the reason that "he was the only general officer on the continent who could think and speak in French." By May he had arrived in Virginia and was busily at work in driving out the Tories and in seeking to find out the plans of Admiral Parker with regard to the future movements of the fleet. Lee established himself at Charleston, South Carolina, at the entrance of whose harbor, on Sullivan's Island, was a little fort with William Moultrie in charge. It was thought by Lee that Charleston would be the destination of Admiral Parker, whom he expected would make an effort to break up the considerable commerce of the port. The people of Charleston were on the alert and ready for the coming of their foe. The little fort at the mouth of the harbor was an

unsubstantial affair of palmetto logs and was unfinished on the land side. On June 4, 1776, the hostile fleet appeared, although as early as the first of the month news had been brought to Charleston that a fleet of forty or fifty sail were some twenty miles north of the bar at the entrance of the harbor. Continental troops had arrived from the north. First the Pennsylvanians under General Armstrong, then two North Carolina regiments and a regiment from Virginia. These were the men whom Lee was to command. That general had been given a position which his military attainments did not justify. He pronounced the fort on Sullivan's Island to be worthless and advised its abandonment. Moultrie made the quiet response that he felt himself able to hold the place. He was sustained by John Rutledge who had been chosen president of the colony, and went steadily to work strengthening his position. Failing to secure the retirement of Moultrie, Lee advised him to build a bridge from the island so as to secure the retreat of his men. But Moultrie paid no attention to Lee's counsel and continued the work of completing his fort. He had at his back the government of the colony and it supported him by well-arranged defences. Armstrong, who was cordial to Moultrie, was stationed at Hadrell's Point with fifteen hundred men, and Thompson, of Orangeburg, was sent with a thousand riflemen from the Carolinas to the island to support the garrison. Gadsden, with the first Carolina regiment, was stationed at the nearby Fort Johnson, while a force of about two thousand men occupied the town. The latter had been rapidly fortified and works were thrown up along the water front. The fortifications were complete and reflected a high degree of credit upon the South Carolinians for thoroughness and an intelligent appreciation of the needs of the situation.

To the dilatoriness of the British was due the ability of the Americans to secure such preparedness for attack. Although Parker's fleet had been sighted on the 1st of June and he had reached the harbor on the 4th, he did not begin

an attack until a month later. On June 9th, Clinton began to disembark his men on Long Island, acting on the erroneous information that there was a ford between that place and Sullivan's Island where the fort stood. The island on which Clinton landed was an unsheltered sand bar, without good drinking water, exposed to the fierce rays of the sun, and malarial. Clinton informed Admiral Parker that there was no ford between the two islands, but the latter did not appear to be concerned at the impossibility of Clinton's operating with him against the fort. Tory representations pictured South Carolina as being really loyal at heart and that the fort would quickly capitulate. Having received an important addition to his fleet by the arrival of the fifty-gun ship *Experiment*, he prepared to attack the fort on June 28th.

Moultrie was ready for the commencement of hostilities and had sent a body of riflemen to watch Clinton and prevent his crossing from Long Island. With less than five hundred men he prepared to defend the fort. On the morning of the 28th the bombardment of the fort was begun by the *Bristol* and the *Experiment*, which had anchored four hundred yards distant from the shore. The soft palmetto logs were admirably suited to receive the balls and neither broke nor splintered. Moultrie's powder supply was scant and had to be used sparingly; but the slow and careful fire from the guns of the fort almost invariably hit the mark. The *Bristol* was raked by it and three ships which came up to her relief ran aground. A dramatic incident of the defence of Moultrie was furnished by a shot from the enemy's gun that carried away the flag. Immediately, Sergeant Jasper sprang upon the parapet and amid shot and shell placed it on a halberd which he waved defiantly at the enemy. Throughout the day the heavy cannonade continued from the ships and it was steadily replied to by the Americans. In the meanwhile, Clinton was desperately seeking means to cross to Sullivan's Island, but was prevented by the American riflemen. He had no recourse but to remain inactive and watch the artillery duel between the

ships and the fort. At the close of the day, having suffered severely without having inflicted serious damage upon Moultrie, Admiral Parker retired to his former anchorage.

Summing up the results, the Colonials found the British ship *Actæon* aground, burned to the water's edge; the *Bristol* a wreck, and the *Experiment* in but little better condition. The loss of the British was two hundred and five killed and wounded, while the Americans lost but eleven men killed and twenty-six wounded. To Moultrie belongs the credit of the fiercely fought battle, but the South Carolinians under Rutledge made possible the victory by the admirable defenses which they prepared. The British general, Clinton, deserves censure for placing his fighting force upon a barren island where it was effectually prevented from taking part in the action; while Parker exercised as little judgment in failing to seek the capture or destruction of Charleston instead of pelting the fort at the entrance of the harbor with unavailing shots. Both Parker and Clinton misjudged their opponents and expected that the Americans would yield or retreat as soon as they came under severe fire. This mistaken view is not surprising when it is remembered that the Tory element of the colony regarded the Independence party as largely made up of a rabble devoid of the stamina necessary for sustained purpose. To the failure of Great Britain to maintain her position in Massachusetts was now added a signal defeat with wide-reaching effect in the South. It would be difficult to say which misadventure gave the severest blow to her prestige. Certainly the effect in both instances was to hasten the Declaration of Independence, the constitutional stages of whose evolution we have traced in previous chapters. Only in Canada had the American cause met with signal defeat. The hopes that had been staked upon the campaigns in that region centred about the considerable element sympathetic with the colonies; but an uprising had not resulted and the failure of the expedition to Canada had fixed the hold of Great Britain upon that portion of North America.

CHAPTER X

THE NORTHERN AND MIDDLE CAMPAIGNS

CONGRESS greatly elated at the news of the surrender of Montreal, and not yet having information of the disaster to the American army in its assault upon Quebec, believed that there was a fair opportunity of annexing Canada to the United Colonies. In furtherance of a plan of that sort Congress on January 8, 1776, determined that nine battalions should be kept in Canada. Upon receipt of information of the repulse and defeat of the Americans before Quebec Washington convened a council of war on January 19th, at which it was resolved that as no troops could be spared from Cambridge, the Colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, should be requested by Congress to raise three regiments and forward them to Canada. In addition to the nine battalions for service in Canada, Congress directed that four battalions should be raised in New York and employed for the defence of that colony, particularly to garrison Crown Point and various posts outlying from that fortress. A corps of artillery was also to be raised for this service, and a thousand Canadians were likewise to be enlisted. The new corps was placed under the command of Moses Hazen, a native of Massachusetts, who had long resided in Canada. On January 24th, Congress issued a letter to the Canadians intended to enlist their coöperation in the campaign just planned. They were urged to regard the forces sent into their province as liberators,

and to seize the opportunity thus offered to throw off allegiance to Great Britain, and to form a provincial Assembly after the pattern of those in the colonies. As an aid to the acquisition of Canada it was decided to supplement military operations by an active campaign of education, and printing and preaching were made allies of the troops. A press and printing outfit together with a clergyman were sent into Canada. It was at this time that Franklin, Chase, and Carroll,—the first two members of Congress and the latter a Roman Catholic held in high esteem in his native colony, Maryland,—were sent on their mission to enlist Canada in the general cause of the colonies. The inducement held out to the people of the province was the assurance of association with the other colonies on equal terms, and the enjoyment of the free exercise of their religion.

Congress eagerly awaited the approach of spring in order to put in operation its plan of campaign. On January 10th, Arthur St. Clair, who had been appointed colonel, received his recruiting orders. His regiment of Pennsylvania militia was raised and by April 11th had joined the American forces before Quebec. His march of hundreds of miles from Pennsylvania to Canada is but an instance of the resoluteness of the American soldiers. By May 1st, three thousand troops were massed about the city, but only nine hundred were fit for duty. A woman infected with smallpox, either sent from Quebec by design or else voluntarily undertaking to spread the contagion, had mingled with the American soldiers, and thus had propagated the scourge. To this unforeseen and discouraging circumstance was added the evident disinclination of the Canadians to alter their allegiance and the just as evident lessening of Congressional interest in the movements of the army in the north. We may say also that the conduct of the soldiers, and of many of the officers as well, of the army of invasion was little calculated to commend to the Canadians the alliance which the Americans hoped to bring about, for pillage and outrage were of frequent occurrence.

The American campaigns in Canada resulting in the reduction of Chamblay, St. Johns, and Montreal, and the isolation of Quebec had drawn to that region the attention of the British and had made them realize the necessity of employing unusual efforts to retain the "key of Canada." As spring approached several British regiments arrived in the province. On May 5, 1776, the van of the reinforcements made passage through the ice of St. Lawrence River and took position on both of its shores, half way between Quebec and Montreal. This new difficulty thoroughly dampened the ardor of the besieging force and led to a council of war at which retreat was decided upon. With a keen appreciation of his opportunity Governor Guy Carleton marched out at the head of a detachment of soldiers and marines to attack the Americans. But he found only evidence of a hasty retreat; the blockade of Quebec had been raised. The advance force of the British was followed by several British regiments, and also by troops from Brunswick. In a few weeks' time the total British force was not less than thirteen thousand men.

General Thomas who had held supreme command of the American army in Canada, died June 2, 1776, of smallpox, and his command devolved first upon General William Thompson, and afterward on General John Sullivan. But it soon became evident that the Americans could effect nothing by remaining longer in the country. In the hope of partially retrieving their loss of prestige in the eyes of the Canadians, General Thompson projected an attack on the British post at Three Rivers. On June 5th, he detached six hundred men under the command of Colonel St. Clair for the undertaking. News was received of a large addition to the British force at the objective point and General Sullivan arriving from New York and assuming command sent General Thompson with reinforcements to take personal direction of the whole force. The plan of campaign was as follows: One division under Colonel Wayne was to gain the eastern extremity of the town while

another under Colonel Maxwell was to enter from the northward, and two divisions under Colonels St. Clair and Irvine were to approach from the west. The expedition embarked at midnight and landed at Point du Lac before dawn. There were two approaches to Three Rivers, the roads, although widely separated, running almost parallel. Thompson planned to follow the river road, but upon learning that several hundred men were posted some miles away he determined to dislodge them. The intelligence proved to be false, but the troops had been carried too far from the proposed route to return. Taking a diagonal direction toward the road they had left they again advanced, but they soon found themselves halted by an extensive marsh, and when day broke they were still six miles from Three Rivers. General Thompson suspecting treachery on the part of his guides put them under arrest. Retracing his steps he again arrived at the river road. On reaching it, his force was fired upon by two armed vessels. The secret expedition was now at an end, and it was determined to make an open march and assault.

The attack from the river led Thompson to follow the inland road, which was more circuitous, but in which he was protected from the fire of the vessels. After severe hardships, the open country north of the town was reached, and Colonel Wayne immediately attacked the British forces. The onset was gallant, but the contest was too unequal and the Americans were forced to retreat. General Thompson, with a small force, left the main body of his troops to reinforce Wayne, but lost his way in the trackless woods. Colonel St. Clair, finding himself thus accidentally in command, hesitated as to his action. Every moment expecting the return of Thompson, he delayed giving orders for a general retreat; and he did not do so until the British, with the evident plan of cutting off the Americans, were discovered in force upon the river road. St. Clair thereupon ordered a retreat by way of the route that they had followed through the wilderness. The British hurriedly marched to

Point du Lac, in order to effect the capture of the boats of the Americans. But Major Wood, in whose care they had been left, got them safely away. When St. Clair arrived at the place of embarkation, he found the boats gone, and a large body of the enemy posted confronting him; another force was following close upon his rear. Only two courses were open—either to surrender, or else, by a sudden rush, to disperse the force and get beyond it. The last appeared to be practicable, as St. Clair had some knowledge of the country. The Americans had proceeded but a short distance, when St. Clair was incapacitated for further marching by an injury to his foot. Refusing the offer of his men to carry him, he remained where he was, in company with several officers who were worn out with fatigue. In a few days, they rejoined the forces at Sorel, where the greater part of the detachment had safely arrived. General Thompson, after wandering all night in the swamps and thickets, had been taken prisoner, and with him were captured Colonel Irvine and several other officers.

The British force, having been substantially reinforced, began the serious pursuit of the American army. Sir Guy Carleton planned to invest the Americans' fortified camp at Sorel. Before the advance division of the British troops made their appearance, the Americans had evacuated the place. During the retreat of the Americans, many were the reproaches cast at them by the Canadians who had responded to the overtures of Congress and had relied upon the faithful performance of the promises made them that they would never be abandoned "to the fury of their common enemies." General Sullivan conducted the retreat, and the American army reached Crown Point on July 1st.

With great reluctance, Congress saw the opportunity of annexing Canada pass away. The defeat of the Americans in Canada made it necessary for them to protect New York. This task was rendered more difficult owing to the existence there of a strong Loyalist party. The Declaration of Independence, while irrevocably committing the patriots to a

conclusive struggle, had added to the ranks of the British party. Instead of conducting a campaign of invasion, Congress had before it the problem of protecting the important Middle colony from invasion. The British had decided that the plan long contemplated of splitting the colonies in twain could now be carried out by occupying New York City and conquering the Hudson valley. General William Howe came down from Halifax, and was joined by his brother, Admiral Howe, with a powerful fleet from England. The army of Clinton and Cornwallis from the South joined them in New York harbor. Sir Guy Carleton was ordered to employ a Canadian army in the capture of Ticonderoga and to hold possession of the upper Hudson.

The importance of Ticonderoga and Crown Point as the keys to the control of the upper Hudson is manifest from their geographical situation. Located on the borders of Lake George and Lake Champlain, which form almost a continuous line of communication between the sources of the Hudson and those of St. Lawrence River, the power that held those strategic points would be in a position to cause vast inconvenience to an enemy. Some officers considered Crown Point, to which the retreating army had retired, to be the more important point of defence, but the majority opinion favored Ticonderoga. It was believed that superiority on Lake Champlain could be secured to the Americans by establishing a naval base at this point. Accordingly, late in August, General Gates was placed in command of twelve thousand men, and entrusted with the defence of Ticonderoga. A fleet had been hurriedly constructed at Skenesborough. This fleet was put under the command of General Arnold with instructions from Gates to proceed down Lake Champlain beyond Crown Point to Split Rock, but no further. It became necessary to the plans of the British to have on the lake a fleet superior to that of the Americans and by October they had such a fleet available for immediate service. On October 11th an engagement with the American flotilla occurred which ended

on the 13th in the practical destruction of all the American ships. The British were thus left in possession of Lake Champlain. The garrison at Crown Point retired to Ticonderoga. So ended the northern campaign of 1776; both on land and water it had been disastrous to the Americans.

The fate of the American cause now appeared to hang upon the issue of the campaign about to open in New York. Before beginning hostilities General Howe addressed a letter to "George Washington, Esq.," which the latter refused to receive because it denied him the title to which he had right, and he also treated a subsequent communication addressed to "George Washington, &c., &c., &c.," in the same way. The British endeavored by manifestoes to separate from the American cause those who had leanings toward Great Britain, while Congress was pursuing a similar policy in attempting to detach foreign mercenaries from the service of the king. A circular, dated August 14th, for that purpose was circulated among those troops.

Meanwhile, the British hesitated to undertake a land engagement. But hostilities could not long be deferred. The American army in and about New York numbered seventeen thousand two hundred and twenty-five men; they were mostly raw troops and were divided among a number of posts, some of which were far apart. The British force about New York at this time, the middle of July, was being constantly increased by arrivals from Halifax, the West Indies and Europe. During the three years of his command in America fifty thousand men were sent out to Howe, the successor of Gage. This was the force employed against an army which at only one time numbered as many as twenty thousand men in the field, and usually varied between four and ten thousand. In 1776, the British fleet numbered fifty-six war vessels and the next year it had increased to eighty-one. With such a navy Howe might readily have patrolled the whole sea coast from Boston to Charleston, but instead the admiral contented himself with maintaining a blockade of New York and deploying ships

for expeditions little more than predatory in the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays. In spite of the number of British warships, American privateers preyed upon the enemy's merchantmen almost with impunity. Egg Harbor, on the Jersey coast, was a favorite retreat for privateers. From thence by way of Mullica River goods taken were hauled by wagons to Philadelphia. The admiral's adherence to a policy of conciliation in part accounts for his lack of aggressiveness. Replying to a query as to why he did not employ loyalist privateers to attack American commerce he said: "Will you never have done oppressing these poor people? Will you never give them an opportunity of seeing their error?" It was only after futile attempts to negotiate peace that in August he and his brother undertook to capture New York.

The British felt confident of victory; the army of Howe would penetrate to the interior and, by a series of movements, get the main body of the American forces between them and the sea. Howe would then form a junction with the troops in Canada, which would march down and join him against the Americans. Before the end of the year, they hoped to have New York cut off from communication with the rest of the States, when its conquest would be complete. With the small number of troops at his command, it seemed impossible that Washington could successfully avert the calamity of having the British plans carried out in full. The British commanders resolved to direct their first movement against Long Island, in order that they might secure much-needed supplies. Twenty-six thousand men were available for a landing force. The fleet included fifty-two large war vessels, twenty-seven armed sloops and cutters, and four hundred transports. The British made a landing on Long Island, between Utrecht and Gravesend, with the intention of making an assault upon Brooklyn Heights. General Sullivan, with a strong force, was encamped within the works at Brooklyn. At each of the three approaches to Brooklyn Heights, one near the Narrows,

the second the Flatbush road, and the third Bedford road, eight hundred provincial troops were stationed. Colonel Miles, with a battalion of riflemen, was stationed near Jamaica. On the evening of August 26th, General de Heister, with a body of Hessians, took up a position at Flatbush. The next day, Howe sent a large portion of his forces by the different roads converging at Brooklyn Heights; and taking the rest of his force under his personal command, and associating with him Clinton and Cornwallis, he went by another road that took a wide circuit to the eastward and came upon the American flank just as the battle was joined between the Americans and the regulars and Hessians, who had come by the direct roads. The timing of the movement was excellent, and the Americans had no intimation of the plan.

The loss of Brooklyn Heights meant to the Americans the capitulation of New York. Had Washington retired from New York and permitted the British to occupy it, the prestige of the American army would have suffered almost irreparably; while, on the other hand, its occupation by the British might have afforded the Americans an opportunity to bottle them up. Whatever may have been the merits of the respective courses open to Washington, the fact is that he felt it incumbent upon him not to yield a pivotal position without an attempt to hold it. General Greene, the best of Washington's officers, was in command on Long Island, but, owing to illness, the leadership fell to Sullivan, an officer whom Washington spoke of as "active, spirited, and zealously attached to the cause," but lacking in "experience to move on a large scale." For this reason he superseded him by Putnam on August 24th. Sullivan, at the outposts, and Putnam, on the heights themselves, stood ready to meet the advance of the enemy. In the nature of the case, Sullivan had first to receive the shock of battle. Scarcely had the Hessians under De Heister opened fire from the front, when the American general found himself subjected to another galling fire from the rear. It was not

possible for the Continental troops to stand the dual attack. With their retreat cut off, surrender was their only recourse; thus nearly the whole force, including the commander, were made prisoners of war. The Delaware troops and Smallwood's famous Marylanders made a heroic stand in a four hours' battle against the regulars under Grant, and succeeded in escaping to the fortifications at Brooklyn Heights, after heavy losses. They were part of the command of the able leader of the New Jersey troops, Lord Stirling, which also included Colonel Miles's two battalions, Colonel Atlee's and Colonel Hatche's regiments.

The loss of the British and Hessians was about four hundred and fifty, while that of the Americans was considerably over a thousand. The latter lost as prisoners of war, General Sullivan and Lord Stirling, three colonels, four lieutenant-colonels, three majors, eighteen captains, forty-three lieutenants, and eleven ensigns. The severest blow to Washington was the heavy loss sustained by Smallwood's regiment, which was composed largely of young men from the best families of Maryland. Two hundred and fifty-nine of them were killed or made prisoners. Washington had witnessed the disaster from a distance, and with deep emotion exclaimed: "My God, what brave fellows I must lose this day!" Expecting an immediate assault upon Brooklyn Heights, Washington brought over to Long Island the greater part of his army. It was his wish and hope that General Howe would attempt to storm the works. So elated were the British troops with their success, that it was with great difficulty that their generals could restrain them from rushing upon the American lines. Clinton and Cornwallis urged General Howe to pursue the Americans into their intrenchments. It had been the intention of the British leaders to have the fleet coöperate in the battle of Long Island, but this was prevented by adverse winds. If Howe expected on the next day to have such coöperation in an attack upon Brooklyn Heights, he was disappointed because of the state of wind and weather. Had the fleet been able

to ascend East River, the Americans would have been completely hemmed in. Howe decided to spare his men and to take Brooklyn Heights by a siege. But this Washington skilfully eluded. His determination to retire from Long Island was carried out on the night of August 29th. Every manner of available craft upon the river was pressed into service, and had not a high wind subsided by eleven o'clock the undertaking could not have been accomplished by the means at hand. A heavy fog which rose about that time enabled the American force to withdraw without being detected by the enemy. The British advanced on the works a little after daylight, and were chagrined to find them deserted. General Sullivan was immediately released by Howe upon his parole, and instructed to inform Congress that while he could not treat with them in their professed capacity, he and his brother had full power to compromise the dispute between Great Britain and America upon terms advantageous to both and before a decisive blow was struck. To this message Congress replied, through General Sullivan, that it could not negotiate through any of its individual members, but, being desirous of establishing peace upon reasonable terms, it would send a committee to ascertain whether General Howe had power to treat with Congress and to hear what propositions he had to submit. The committee selected, Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge, met Lord Howe on Staten Island, and were received with great consideration. They reported to Congress that Howe did not appear to have other authority than to grant pardons and to declare any of the colonies submitting to be within the king's peace. After losing Brooklyn Heights, Washington could no longer hold New York, and fell back to the heights along Harlem River. In the retreat, Putnam, with a rearguard of four thousand men, narrowly escaped capture. Indeed, his safety was due to the clever strategy of a woman. Mrs. Murray, who had a fine country seat on Murray Hill, delayed the advance of the British by sending a pressing invitation to Howe to take dinner at

her house; and while he and his officers tarried, Putnam effected his retreat, although he was compelled to leave behind his heavy guns and much war material. The result of their defeat upon the spirits of Washington's men was one of the most serious results that followed the British successes on Long Island. Not having the steadiness of disciplined troops, the Continentals were quick to place an exaggerated value upon success and defeat. At the same time, they regarded their services as so much a matter of their own volition that it was hazardous to attempt to hold them to rigid discipline.

Not only in the ranks of the army, but in Congress and throughout the country, the reverses of Long Island and Brooklyn Heights cast a gloom. The great object of the British was now to flank Washington and cut off his retreat northward, but two strong forts upon the Hudson, Fort Washington on the upper end of Manhattan Island, and Fort Lee across the river on the Palisades, stood in their way. So, for nearly a month the armies lay at rest within sight of each other. After a skirmish at Harlem Plains, Washington, at the solicitation of General Charles Lee, moved out to White Plains to avoid being trapped. There he was confronted on October 28th by Howe, who took a small American outpost on Chatterton Hill. Howe might now have attacked Washington's main force to advantage, but did not, and in his memoirs assigns "political reasons and no other for declining to explain" why he failed to take advantage of his opportunity. Inference would suggest that he still hoped to compromise with the Americans. During the engagement at White Plains, the baggage of the American army was moved off in full view of the British. Howe withdrew his forces to Dobbs Ferry, and the Americans retired to North Castle. Leaving at North Castle seven thousand five hundred men under General Lee, Washington then crossed North River and took a position in the neighborhood of Fort Lee.

On November 12th, General Howe, availing himself of the absence of the main body of American troops, moved

upon Fort Washington, this was really only an open breast work with high ground in its rear and without a ditch or other outside defence of any consequence. The garrison decided to defend it, and the defence fell to three thousand Pennsylvanians and Marylanders. Colonel Magaw, who had been placed in command, made a valiant stand but was compelled to surrender, November 18, 1776, and the three thousand men fell into the hands of the British. Washington had urged General Greene to abandon the place, but had left the decision to that officer, who decided to garrison and hold it. In so doing he was following the instructions of Congress. Washington now determined to abandon Fort Lee on the west side of the Hudson, but this decision was arrived at after five thousand British soldiers had scaled the Palisades and were ready to make a dash upon the fort. The disheartenment of the patriotic army was complete. Throughout the country there was a widespread feeling that the American cause was lost. In the midst of these reverses Washington maintained his usual calm. His diminished and discouraged army now lay at Hackensack, and the men were leaving for home as fast as their brief terms of enlistment expired. Washington had now remaining to him only six thousand men, but the seventy-five hundred men with Lee at North Castle, New York, were under orders to cross the Hudson and join him at as early a date as might be possible. Lee hesitated and when Washington, pursued by Cornwallis, was fleeing toward Newark he sent frequent messengers to Lee to join him with all possible haste; that general made many excuses, but refused to move.

Thus Washington was forced to an inglorious retreat across New Jersey, with but a fragment of his army. Having abundant reason to believe that he would have to continue his flight yet further, Washington asked Colonel Reed: "Should we retreat to the back parts of Pennsylvania will the Pennsylvanians support us?" The colonel replied that if the lower counties should be subdued the

back counties would not hold out. Then said Washington: "We must then retire to Augusta County in Virginia. Numbers will repair to us for safety, and we will try a predatory war. If overpowered, we must cross the Alleghany Mountains." To increase the demoralization of the American army, Howe and his brother issued a proclamation commanding "all persons assembled in arms against his majesty's government to disband, and all general or provincial congresses to desist from their treasonable actings, and to relinquish their usurped power;" and declaring, "that every person who, within sixty days, should appear before the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, or Commander-in-Chief of any of his majesty's Colonies, or before the General or commanding officer of his majesty's forces, and claim the benefit of the proclamation, and testify his obedience to the laws, by subscribing a certain declaration, should obtain a full and free pardon of all treasons by him committed, and of all forfeitures and penalties for the same." Many persons in official positions or otherwise active in support of the new government made their peace by submission. Men of fortune generally did so; but there were notable exceptions. A further difficulty was that the term of enlistment of all the American soldiers expired in November or December, except two companies of artillery raised by the State of New York, which had enlisted for the war. This fact was due to the optimism of the Continental leaders, who at the beginning of hostilities believed that the war would not continue longer than twelve months.

But the troubles of the patriot commander-in-chief were not confined to the lack of material for his rank and file, or to those arising from the demoralizing influence of Howe's proclamation. There was the still more serious question of disloyalty on the part of some of the officers of the Continental army. The case of General Charles Lee is conspicuous and calls for more than passing notice. This officer was of English birth and the son of a British general. He took part in the French and Indian War in America; was

wounded at Ticonderoga, and was present at the capture of Montreal in 1760. On his return to Europe, he saw much military service and obtained considerable distinction, but his carping and caustic disposition and an inflated idea of his own superiority stood in the way of coveted promotion. In 1773, he returned to America, and, espousing the patriotic cause, offered his services to the colonial government, and secured from Congress the commission of second major-general in the Continental army. This subordinate position caused Lee great disappointment, but he lost no opportunity of thrusting his own consequence to the fore, and manifested a patronizing air toward Washington, from whom, as well as from Congress, he received marked honor. This was the man, of unprepossessing appearance, uncomely features, and ungainly movement, who, under the guise of a noble, patriotic spirit, hid the sordid purposes of an adventurer, and who, intrusted with important command, betrayed the cause he was pledged to maintain and the leader who had given him his confidence. Having failed to support his chief in the hour of peril, he wrote a series of exculpatory letters to State governors and members of Congress, in which he blamed Washington for the non-success of the army and insinuated that, had his own plans been carried out, the opposite result would have been obtained. Unhappily, too many persons could not realize the critical character of Washington's task, and the defamer's slanders were believed. During these dark hours, the patriots were obliged to listen to the exaltation of Lee to a hero's place. Time, however, was to work its revenge.

Washington retreated successively to Newark, to Brunswick, to Princeton and to Trenton. At that point he crossed the Delaware. Then Lee in a leisurely manner advanced to join his forces with those of his commander-in-chief. The alarm which was created by the successes of the British and the retreat of Washington, causing as it did almost the disorganization of the American army and destruction of confidence in the American cause, as well as the loss

of many influential persons like the Galloways, who accepted the conditions of submission offered by the British, was nevertheless not followed by the disasters which the terror of the people led them to apprehend, although three thousand Jersey farmers accepted Howe's proposals and swore allegiance to the British crown. The winter was so far advanced that the British gave up their intention of marching upon Philadelphia. After Washington had been forced to cross to the west bank of the Delaware, Congress, thoroughly alarmed, had retired to Baltimore on December 27th, after bestowing upon Washington, for six months, the "full power to order and direct all things relative to the department and to the operation of the war," thus rebuking the traitorous Lee. No wiser course during the conduct of the war was adopted by Congress than this act of signal confidence in the American commander. Although it indicated on the part of that body a realization of its inability to cope with the problems of the field and thrust upon Washington responsibilities which ought not, except in a desperate case, to be imposed upon a general, it was yet an act of keen discernment both of the situation and of the qualities of the man, and was the only feasible method of bolstering a tottering cause. Washington had literally to manufacture his army as he marched. Both men, munitions, and supplies had to be provided largely by his resourcefulness. At this time we find him writing with regard to his men: "They come we cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell where, consume your provisions, waste your stores, and leave you at last at a critical moment."

The campaign of the fall of 1776, had been a series of successes for British arms. On the east side of the Delaware their control of the country was complete and the people were not only expecting, but becoming reconciled to the idea of the reëstablishment of royal government. It must be remembered, however, that the Americans were acting with very little regard to system. The war at the first was purely defensive; the conditions since then had

changed, and it had become a war for sovereignty. Yet the direction of the struggle had not readily conformed to its new purpose. Washington fully realized this fact and was influenced by it in accepting military dictatorship. The people generally, however, were not able critically to gauge the condition of the country and to gather the reassurance which steadied the purpose of Washington. But as the difficulties thickened Congress awakened to the situation and sent out vigorous representations to the States to stir them to do their full duty. This address was prepared on December 10th, and on the following day Congress recommended the observance of a day of humiliation and prayer for the success of the American cause. In their extremity many persons thought it was time to turn to France for assistance. Some advocated that the American commissioners at the court of France should be authorized to confer upon that country the monopoly of trade which had formerly been enjoyed by Great Britain. But it was felt by Congress that to do this would be to weaken the arguments upon which the assertion of independence had been based. It was also proposed to offer to France a trade monopoly of certain enumerated articles, but to do this would have been to discriminate between the products of the several States. Another proposition was for an outright offensive and defensive alliance with France, in case that country would support American independence. This proposition was also distasteful to Congress, that body arguing that "though the friendship of small States might be purchased, that of France could not."

It was clear to the members of Congress that France, by espousing the cause of American independence would invite war with Great Britain, and if she did so it would not be because she expected to derive important advantages from an alliance with the United States, but in order to weaken a power of which she was jealous. Consequently it was felt that the only consideration which would induce France to lend her aid to the United States would be that country's

persistence in the stand it had taken, and the evidence thereby offered of its steadfast purpose under no conditions to return to its former allegiance. It was therefore determined by Congress to abide by the Declaration of Independence and to offer freedom of trade to every foreign nation, trusting to Providence for the successful issue of their cause. Copies of resolutions to this purport were sent to the principal courts of Europe, and suitable persons were appointed to solicit the friendship of European States. Copies of these resolutions were obtained in some way by the British and were published. This was satisfactory to the United States as it gave the widest circulation to the fact of their determination to maintain their independence at all costs. The adoption of such resolutions at the hour of their darkest despair would be indubitable testimony to their unshaken stand. Congress did not content itself with passing resolutions of this nature, but took active measures to supply adequate military forces for the prosecution of the war. To the official sent by Congress to the States, Pennsylvania responded with a fresh quota of fifteen hundred troops. When this contingent joined Washington his total force was between two and three thousand. Notwithstanding the smallness of his effective force the American general felt the importance of doing something that should in a way retrieve American prestige. To turn and face the victorious army was to take large risks, but so long as the Continental forces were fleeing before a victorious foe it was impossible for them to obtain recruits. Such was the situation at the end of December, 1776. If Washington was to effect anything with the troops under him he must act at once, as in a week or two the term of their enlistment would expire. Such were the considerations and such the conditions which led the commander-in-chief to form the bold resolution of recrossing the Delaware and attacking the enemy's forces at Trenton.

The British troops were garrisoned at the various New Jersey towns in the region of the Delaware, Burlington,

Bordentown, Trenton, and others. These forces were only awaiting the formation of ice strong enough to bear them in order to cross the river. Strong in their confidence that they had nothing to fear from the motley crew of half-fed and half-clothed men who made up Washington's army, the British became indifferent and careless as to the possibility of their surprise. Colonel Rahl, the commanding officer at Trenton, had under him twelve thousand Hessians. The total force which Washington might be called upon to meet numbered thirty thousand.

Washington determined to attack Rahl's command, and made arrangements with Putnam to join him from Philadelphia, and General James Ewing was to cross the Delaware near Trenton for the same purpose. Gates had departed from Bristol, where he should have remained to support Washington, in order to obtain from Congress support for himself. Brigadier-general John Cadwallader was also to proceed to the support of his superior. Putnam did not move, Ewing was deterred from attempting to cross the river by reason of bad weather, and Cadwallader decided that the river was running too fiercely to permit crossing. Nevertheless, Washington was firm in his purpose, and on the evening of Christmas day made arrangements to cross the Delaware with twenty-four hundred men, their bare feet leaving bloody impress upon the snow as they marched to the point of embarkation. Washington crossed at McKonkey's Ferry, but the ice in the river made the passage difficult. It was three o'clock in the morning of December 26th before the artillery had been transported. The troops were formed into two divisions under the command of General Sullivan and General Greene. Other officers whose troops were included in these commands were Brigadier-generals Lord Stirling, Hugh Mercer, and St. Clair. One of these divisions was ordered to proceed by the lower or river road, and the other by the upper road. Colonel Stark with his light troops was directed to advance near to the river and take possession of that part of the town which lay beyond the

bridge. The troops were ordered to march directly into Trenton and charge the enemy before they had time to form. Although they marched by different roads they arrived at the enemy's advanced post within a few minutes of each other. There they had a skirmish with Hessian troops which fell back keeping up at the same time a running fire. By this time the main body of the British were hard pressed by the Americans. The latter had captured half of the artillery of the enemy. The British finding themselves completely outgeneralled laid down their arms. The number which thus submitted comprised eight hundred and eighty-six men and twenty-three officers. Among the slain was Colonel Rahl. The detachment in Trenton had consisted of the regiments of Rahl, Losberg, and Knyphausen. As the British had a strong body of light infantry at Princeton, and another force superior to the American army near the Delaware, Washington considered it prudent to recross that river the same day. The well-aimed blow of the Americans had brought them a speedy victory, the battle lasting but half an hour. So unprepared were the Hessians for the attack that they had little chance to make successful resistance. The total American loss was two killed and six wounded. The news of the victory spread rapidly. To convince the people that the accounts were not exaggerated, the Hessian troops were marched through the streets of Philadelphia, and a Hessian flag was sent to Baltimore to be draped in the Hall of Congress.

The effect of the victory upon the spirits of the people was little short of magical, the depression which had rested upon the country was lifted; hope succeeded despair. The blow fell heavily upon the British. The loss of a thousand men at one stroke was a severe experience even for an army as strong as theirs. It completely disillusioned Howe with regard to the probable brevity of the war. There was in the mind of the British commander but one thought: "the defeat of Trenton must be made good." Washington was now in a better position to meet the enemy, having, at various

times, received fresh troops from Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and the men from New England having agreed to continue in the service after the expiration of their term of enlistment. Trenton was the goal of Cornwallis, who had been deputed by Howe to retake the place, and who set out against it on December 30th, with seven thousand men; but on December 28th, Washington had again crossed the Delaware to the Jersey shore and resumed possession of Trenton. The force under Lord Cornwallis embraced the troops which had been distributed among the Jersey towns and the army stationed at Brunswick. These had been hastily mobilized at Princeton, and on January 2, 1777, they advanced from that place, hoping by a vigorous onslaught with a superior force to repair the injury to their prestige by the late defeat. Washington was thus called upon to meet an army greatly outnumbering his own and with a river cutting off retreat in the rear. By four o'clock in the afternoon, the British advance attacked a body of Americans, who, with four field pieces, were posted a little to the northward of Trenton, and compelled them to retreat. After arriving at the bridge across the creek that runs through the town, the British found themselves checked by field pieces posted on the opposite bank and they retired out of range of the guns. The Americans on the opposite side of the creek cannonaded the enemy throughout the night and received their fire in return. Thus there were crowded into the little village of Trenton, and separated from each other only by the width of the creek, the two armies on which the success or failure of the American Revolution largely depended. The British were confident of their position and their prospects, but when the morning of January 3d broke, they found that during the night General Washington had abandoned the camp. This had been accomplished in silence. Washington, having left a few men to maintain the camp fires and otherwise disguise the fact of his retirement, quickly marched his whole force by a circuitous route over difficult roads to Princeton. This

action was taken because it would not savor of a retreat while it obviated the hazard of a battle in a bad position and was best calculated to protect Philadelphia. At Princeton, Cornwallis had left three regiments of foot and three companies of horse. Washington meant to strike the enemy at Princeton, although he had no positive information as to the number of troops there.

Washington reached Princeton early on the morning of January 3d, and his expedition would have been a complete surprise had not a small party of the British on their way to Trenton discerned it when yet two miles from Princeton, and sent back couriers to the main body of the troops with the news. Accordingly, these hurried forward and charged the American centre, which consisted of the Philadelphia militia. Washington pushed forward, placed himself between his men and the enemy, and by his presence and words encouraged the militia to withstand the British attack. A party of the British established themselves in the building of Princeton College, but the turn of the battle had been in favor of the Americans, and these, with their fellows, surrendered. In the course of the engagement the British lost sixty killed, as many wounded, and three hundred were made prisoners. The American loss was slight, although it included several officers, among them General Mercer, who died of bayonet wounds. He was a Scotchman by birth, but had warmly espoused the cause of his adopted country.

So completely were the British at Trenton deceived by the retreat of the Americans from that place that when morning broke preparations were actively made for a descent upon the evacuated camp. When they heard the report of the artillery at Princeton, even though the season was winter, they supposed that the sound was thunder. Washington had destroyed the bridges to prevent Cornwallis from making an expeditious pursuit. The British commander, having discovered that he had been outgeneralled, passively watched Washington's leisurely retreat. The

latter proceeded to Somerset Court House, where he stopped to rest his men, who had been fighting and marching for eighteen hours. It was too late for him to reach Brunswick, where Cornwallis had left his stores and had established magazines. Cornwallis gave up his plan of seeking immediately to crush the American army and withdrew his men to Amboy and Brunswick.

The battles of Trenton and Princeton were the decisive engagements of the Revolution: they were remarkable both from a military and political point of view. The generalship of Washington gave to them their noteworthy character, for, after a long and disastrous retreat, he turned upon an enemy outnumbering his force six to one and inflicted chastisement. In the dead of winter, with a dwindling army of shifting and untried militia, in little more than a week he had succeeded in turning the whole current of the war. Frederick of Prussia, when he reviewed the accounts of the Princeton and Trenton battles, pronounced that brief campaign the greatest of the century. Washington had now clearly refuted the aspersions of Lee, and there was hardly an American in whose mind lingered any doubt of the high military genius of the commander-in-chief of the Continental army.

The political effect of the campaign was seen in the increased confidence of the people of the country in the conduct of the war by Congress. In Europe, those whose eyes were fixed upon the American conflict now seriously doubted the ability of Great Britain to reduce the colonies to subjection. At home and abroad the American cause became vastly strengthened in public opinion. The control of the country between the Delaware and New York by the British had resulted in all manner of outrages. The property and the persons of the Americans were absolutely in the control of a horde of foreign mercenaries, who were not restrained by any of the instincts of honor which prevailed with patriotic troops. As a consequence the record of the Hessian rule was one of shocking brutality. The rejoicing of the people who were relieved of that dreadful incubus was beyond measure.

General Washington, after the battle of Princeton, retired to Morristown. The plight of the Americans was wretched. They were without shoes and sufficient clothing. The city of Philadelphia had twice supplied blankets and the whole countryside had been laid under requisition for these and other necessaries. Three months passed after the battles of Trenton and Princeton without important military movements by either force. Major-General Putnam had been given the post at Princeton and from that point covered the surrounding country. He had under him but a few hundred troops, while only eighteen miles away was the strong garrison of the British at Brunswick. Washington at Morristown also had a force inconsiderable as compared with that of the British, although his countrymen generally and the enemy believed otherwise. From their various stations the Americans repeatedly and successfully attacked foraging parties of the British and added greatly to their hardships during the winter. The experience of the Americans in the war thus far had, nevertheless, shown the folly of trusting the defence of the country to militia or to levies raised for a brief service, and Congress took measures for recruiting an army for the war. In recapitulating the campaigns of 1776 we may say: The British recovered in Canada all that they had lost in 1775 and had driven the Americans out of the province and destroyed their fleet upon Lake Champlain, but had not made an aggressive move across the border; their designs upon the Southern States had signally failed; they had gained possession of Rhode Island, but to little advantage, as the several thousand men stationed there were for three years lost to active service; they had succeeded in taking New York and the surrounding country and had gained possession of New Jersey, but the Americans had recovered the greater part of that section.

CHAPTER XI

THE NORTHERN AND MIDDLE CAMPAIGNS—(Continued)

In the spring of 1777 the American army was furnished with needed supplies of guns and ammunition. A vessel arrived from France at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, bearing eleven thousand stand of arms and one thousand barrels of gunpowder. A little later another consignment of ten thousand stand of arms was received. The British now sought to cripple the Americans by destroying their stores. On March 21st, Colonel Bird and Major-General Tryon, with five hundred men, landed at Peekskill about fifty miles from New York and surprised the few Americans on guard at that place and after firing the principal storehouses retired. The loss of provisions and supplies was considerable. On April 26th, Major-General Tryon, with a detachment of two thousand men, executed a similar move at Danbury, where they destroyed large quantities of supplies of all sorts. General Arnold, with five hundred men, sought to arrest their progress, but was unable to do so. The British, however, lost over three hundred men. Against these aggressive movements by the British may be set off the exploit of Colonel Return J. Meigs, an American officer, who with one hundred and seventy men crossed Long Island Sound at Sag Harbor, burned twelve British brigs and sloops, destroyed a large quantity of stores, and brought off ninety prisoners without sustaining the loss of a man. For this exploit Congress voted the gallant officer a sword. As the season advanced,

Washington's force of fifteen hundred men, which had been keeping throughout the winter the force of fifteen thousand British soldiers shut up at Brunswick, was considerably augmented. At the opening of the spring campaign of 1777 it amounted to seven thousand three hundred men. A small enough number, but nevertheless a force inspired by the late achievements of their commander. Toward the end of May Washington left his winter quarters at Morristown and took up a strong position at Middlebrook. A little later the British marched out of Brunswick as far as Somerset Court House. They found the whole countryside aroused; six months before, they had marched through that same district without being fired upon. Now, by a system of signals, notice of their movements was speedily transmitted from point to point and every move was harassed. They returned to Brunswick, and, in pure spite, apparently, left a trail of fire behind them. When again at Brunswick, the British ineffectually attempted to draw Washington into an engagement.

Howe then retired with his whole force to Amboy and was followed by a large detachment of the American army, General Washington himself advancing to give support to the Americans if needed. The course of the British general proved to be an attempt to draw Washington into the open field for an engagement, but finding the latter too astute to allow his hand to be forced, Howe left Amboy, and passed over to Staten Island. July had now arrived without the Americans discovering the British plan of campaign. Lack of knowledge of the enemy's plans greatly embarrassed Washington. This feeling was changed to apprehension when he received intelligence that Burgoyne was coming in great force to New York from Canada. Washington now conjectured that the plan of Howe was to move up North River and to effect a junction with Burgoyne near Albany. Washington, therefore, held his army ready to move either north or south as the movements of Howe might require. A letter which Washington intercepted furnished information

that the force of Howe, which had embarked at Sandy Hook was destined for New Hampshire. Washington, alert for deceptive moves, at once gave orders for his army to move southward, although he believed that the true interest of Howe pointed to a junction with Burgoyne. He feared that the move of Howe and his force might be to the south, and a ruse to draw the Americans farther from North River. Nevertheless, Howe must not be permitted, unchallenged, to sail in the direction of Philadelphia and make a landing at some point from which a march upon that city could be made. If it had been the British general's intention to ascend the Delaware, he had given it up, and instead followed a circuitous route by way of Chesapeake Bay. The only reason that can be assigned for his taking this course was the prospect, which he may have believed it held out to him, of receiving large Tory additions to his army from among the inhabitants of Maryland and Delaware. If this were his expectation he was disappointed. On August 25th, the British fleet appeared at the capes of Virginia, entered the bay and made a landing at Turkey Point. Washington was puzzled by Howe's movements and took a position which would enable him to proceed rapidly either to the relief of Philadelphia or to North River. When nearly three weeks had passed after the fleet left the Delaware, and no tidings came of it, Washington and his officers feared that it had proceeded to Charleston. Considering the fall of that city to be inevitable, for distance prevented the sending of a relieving expedition, Washington determined to keep Burgoyne busy; but before he could put into execution a plan to that effect the British fleet appeared in the Chesapeake. The American troops were thereupon put in motion to meet the British army. They marched through Philadelphia only eight thousand strong, but with an assumption of confidence which they hoped would partially offset the ill effect upon the people of the paucity of their numbers. This was the more necessary as at that time there were many persons in

Philadelphia who were under suspicion of actively sympathizing with the British.

Soon after General Howe had landed his troops at Elkton, in Maryland, he sent a declaration to the inhabitants stating that he had issued strict orders to the troops "for the preservation of regularity and good discipline, and that the most exemplary punishment should be inflicted upon those who should dare to plunder the property, or molest the persons of any of his Majesty's well-disposed subjects." This action appears to have been taken in view of the annoyances which the British troops had been made to suffer by the people of New Jersey in consequence of the outrages perpetrated by the troops when in control of the country. On September 3d, the royal army set out from the eastern head of the Chesapeake. They left tents and baggage behind trusting for supplies of that nature through forced accommodations from the people and captures from the enemy. The American army was then posted at Newport, but General Washington soon changed his position and occupied higher ground on the Brandywine Creek near Chad's Ford, where he determined to make a stand and risk an engagement, though he had only eleven thousand effective men and Howe had a fresh force of eighteen thousand men from New York. Washington disposed his forces so as to make the most of his position. With the main army, on September 11th, he held Chad's Ford while he committed the holding of the lower fords to the Pennsylvania militia on the left, and Sullivan in command of the right wing was ordered to guard the fords above the position of the main army. The failure of Sullivan to do this brought defeat to the American army. Howe and Cornwallis with strong columns marched northward and making a turn to the east effected a crossing at unguarded fords while their action was covered by a movement of Baron Knyphausen, the commander of the Hessians, who, with seven thousand men appeared at Chad's Ford and made a feint to force a passage. On learning

of the approach of Cornwallis, Washington determined to attack Knyphausen. His forces had begun to cross the stream to attack the British general when he received a confusing message from Sullivan, who asserted that he had information from an American officer on the other side of the river that Cornwallis was not approaching. The vigilance of the commander-in-chief being thus turned in another direction, Cornwallis actually engaged the American force before Washington realized that he had been ill informed. Washington hearing firing in the direction of Sullivan's post moved rapidly toward the right wing to give him support and, meeting fugitives, ordered Greene forward. This general with his division soon gave such support to the right wing that the latter was able to withdraw through a narrow defile at the end of which they maintained a stand until nightfall. In the meanwhile Knyphausen had crossed the ford and attacked the troops under Wayne, who were stationed there for its defence. The American general held the Hessians in check until there was no longer a doubt of the right wing having met defeat. He then retired in good order and joined the main army at Chester, to which point it had made its way under the cover of General Weeden's artillery. Had not Washington received false intelligence his admirably planned battle might have had a different issue. While Sullivan and Lord Stirling held Cornwallis in check he might readily have crossed the ford and engaged Knyphausen with assurance of success. It was a boldly planned design and that it was not executed was due to one of those slight circumstances which cannot be guarded against, but which have often had to do with determining important battles. The British lost nearly six hundred killed and wounded in the battle of Brandywine, but the loss of the Americans was double that number. They were called upon to lament the wounding of two general officers. One of them was the Marquis de Lafayette, a French nobleman of high rank, who, animated by devotion to the cause of liberty, had left

his native country in order to place his services at the disposal of the American Congress. He was but a youth of nineteen years of age when he expressed to the American commissioners in Paris his desire to join the American army. These estimated at its full worth the moral effect of the accession to their cause of a nobleman of the nation whose friendship they were especially anxious to have. However, before he departed from France, information was received in that country of the disasters which preceded the battle of Trenton. The commissioners thereupon felt that they ought to dissuade Lafayette from his project. But he was not to be deterred by stories of disaster. He purchased a vessel with which to cross to America, and, in 1777, arrived in the States and soon joined the Continental army. Congress, because of his illustrious connections voted him the rank of major-general. In espousing the cause of the United States, he, by reason of the laws of his country, hazarded a large fortune and risked capture and imprisonment on his way to America. The French court had strictly forbidden him from going to the seat of war, and had sent directions to the West Indies that if he should be found in that section he should be arrested and held in confinement. Such was the gallant Frenchman who, receiving a wound in the battle of Brandywine, still insisted on continuing in the field to encourage both by word and example the terrified troops.

Among the foreigners of distinction who shared in this engagement was Count Pulaski, a Polish nobleman who had come to America circled with a halo of romance due to his having carried off, a few years before, King Stanislaus from his capital when surrounded by a numerous bodyguard and in the face of a Russian army. Pulaski was a tower of strength in the field; no general evoked from his troops more heroism than did the noble Pole. Another foreign soldier who had done good work for his country and had sought service in America was Monsieur du Coudray, a French officer of high rank. While he was on his way from Philadelphia to join the American army at the Brandywine,

through a peculiar accident he was drowned in Schuylkill River. Mounted on a spirited mare he rode onto a flat-bottomed boat and was unable to check his steed, which became frightened and went over the farther end of the boat with her rider.

After the battle of Brandywine, Howe made a feint which led Washington to believe that his stores at Reading were in danger. While Washington was thus diverted, Howe turned and marched on Philadelphia, the bulk of the army remaining at Germantown. Cornwallis entered the city on September 25th with three thousand men and took possession. Congress fled to Lancaster. Howe bore his triumph graciously and did not molest the place or its inhabitants. He sent word to his brother in command of the fleet that the city was taken. The capture of the largest city in the United States, and that, too, the regular capital, and the dispersion of the National Assembly were feats whose importance were not to be underestimated. In order to diminish the effect in France of the British successes, Dr. Franklin gave the events an ingenious turn by observing "that instead of saying Sir William Howe had taken Philadelphia, it would be more proper to say Philadelphia had taken Sir William Howe." Although Philadelphia was in possession of the British, it was exposed to attack from American vessels in the river, and one of the first objects of the victors was to erect batteries to command the water front. However, before this could be done the American frigate *Delaware* anchored close to the shore, and, in company with some smaller vessels, commenced a heavy cannonade upon the unfinished batteries and the town. She, however, ran aground and was compelled to surrender; the other vessels thereupon retired.

Howe was so certain that there was little fighting strength left in his opponent that he was entirely unprepared to find that he had an enemy who seemingly did not know when he was beaten. General Washington, having been reinforced by twenty-five hundred men from Peekskill and

Virginia, and receiving information that General Howe had detached a considerable part of his force for the reduction of the forts on the Delaware, conceived the idea of attacking the main post of the British at Germantown. Thus it happened that on the morning of October 4th General Howe heard firing and upon riding out was amazed to find his light infantry in flight. His amazement soon passed into activity when he found the main body of troops engaged by the Americans. Washington's well-planned attack took the British unawares and was almost successful. The morning was extremely foggy, making it difficult for the British to discern the movements of their foe, but the weather was also disadvantageous to the Americans as well, for it forced them to use so much caution in their own movements that the British had time to recover from their first surprise and to mass their troops before the full weight of the attack was received. The Americans were driven back and pursued by the British for a number of miles. The loss of the royal army including wounded and prisoners, was five hundred. The loss of the Americans, including four hundred prisoners, was about one thousand. The attack had been well devised: the Pennsylvania and New Jersey militia were to make a flank movement in order to distract the enemy's attention, while Greene, with a large force, was to proceed up the Limekiln Road and strike the right wing of the British in an effort to force them back toward the river. Washington was to make the frontal attack, and when in action was to be supported by the reserves under Sullivan. The latter waited two hours for Greene to arrive before advancing. Everything pointed to an American victory when the American reserves were fired upon by some companies of English soldiers who were posted in the Chew House, a large stone building. The reserves under Sullivan were distracted by the fire, and in seeking to dislodge the British soldiers wasted valuable time, besides being checked in what might have been a victorious advance. Success might, nevertheless, have come to the Americans had Greene arrived half an hour

sooner. He struck the British at a point he had not expected, and had his line broken. Although he drove the enemy back at first, the latter received reinforcements and he was compelled to retreat. One of his divisions went astray in the fog and coming upon the Chew house opened fire, which caused Wayne to suppose that the enemy was in his rear and led him to draw off his men, thus uncovering Sullivan's flank. The sudden assault forced the latter also to retreat. Notwithstanding defeat, Washington's attack upon Germantown showed the recuperative powers of the American army, and for this reason, as well as for the mobility which was evidenced, won for it increased admiration at home and respect abroad.

Despite his victory, Howe found himself practically besieged, with his provisions running short. It was vitally important for him to open communication with the fleet by way of Delaware River. Accordingly, on October 19th, he withdrew from Germantown to Philadelphia and turned his attention to the destruction of the American defensive works upon the Delaware. These were considerable, as much industry had been expended to make Philadelphia secure on the water side. The principal works were Fort Mifflin, on Mud Island in the Schuylkill, and Fort Mercer, at Red Bank in New Jersey. Both these defences were in an unfinished state. As a supplement to the batteries there installed the Americans had blocked the channel and defended the obstructions by a number of small boats as well as a few larger vessels. Fort Mifflin was admirably situated to protect the city, lying as it did in the middle of the river about seven miles below Philadelphia. The narrowness of the river at that point made it impossible for large vessels to follow the channel without coming directly under the guns of the fort. Lord Howe used every means at his command to open the navigation of the Delaware. The British fleet succeeded in forcing the obstructions in the lower river and approached nearly to Fort Mifflin on October 21st. The next day there was a land attack upon Fort Mercer, conducted by Count Donop and twenty-five

hundred Hessians. General Greene with six hundred men valiantly defended the position. The fortifications of Red Bank were extensive and it was impossible for the small body of men to hold them all so that one-half was evacuated. This part was carried by the assailants, who magnified their unresisted conquest into a victory, indulging in loud hurrahs. The garrison, however, by its well-directed fire caused the enemy to retire. The British plan comprehended coöperation by the fleet, but John Hazlewood, superintendent of fire vessels, held the British ships in check, and drawing his small vessels toward the shore opened fire upon the flank of the Hessians. The latter having retired before the double fire to which they were subjected were again rallied by Donop, who led them in person. No body of troops, however, could stand before the fire which mowed down the ranks of the assaulting columns. The Hessians gave way, leaving many of their fellows upon the ground and others in the hands of the Americans. Among those who were captured was Donop, who was mortally wounded. In this engagement the Hessians lost over four hundred men while the American dead numbered but thirty-five. Two British vessels went aground and were set on fire or blown up by the Americans. The engagement was one of the best fought actions of the war.

Nevertheless, the British were not without resources and succeeded in opening the navigation of the Delaware in an unexpected way. This they did by diverting the current of the river into new channels, thus deepening the passage between the island and the Pennsylvania shore so as to admit of the passage of vessels of deep draft. The *Vigilant*, a large ship cut down so as to reduce its draft and mounted with a number of twenty-four pound guns, made its way to a position from which it could enfilade Fort Mifflin. At the same time batteries which Howe had erected on the Pennsylvania shore sent well-directed shots into the fort. For five days the three hundred men garrisoning the fort sustained the heavy cannonade, but when most of their officers

Americans by dividing the States appeared to be the very acme of military wisdom. With New England isolated and subdued, the British conceived that the pacification of the rest of the country would easily follow. The regular British troops and Hessian allies allotted to this service numbered over seven thousand. Their equipment included magnificent artillery served by picked men. The British supposed that the Canadians and the Loyalists of the adjacent States would largely reinforce the regulars; this led them to carry large additional supplies of arms and accoutrements. They had also enlisted the aid of Indians. The British justified their employment of the tribesmen on the specious ground that harsh measures were really merciful as they would lead to an earlier close of the war. The large force thus collected was put under the command of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, a British officer of ability and enterprise and one whose military reputation was of respectable order. As the northern campaign was the most serious effort of the British to conquer the Americans, the appointment of Burgoyne was a signal compliment to him. A word or two will serve to reveal his personality. He had been a member of Parliament and a capable debater, he had some literary gifts, was a playwright, and a gentleman of fashion and of leisure. He had shown bravery in the war in Portugal, although he had not become distinguished for military talent. The campaign was planned in connection with Lord Germain, whose contempt for American military ability was ingrained. The indispensable point in the plan, as worked out, was overlooked by Germain. It was absolutely essential to its success that Howe should join Burgoyne. Orders to this effect were prepared, but were lost sight of by Germain, and Howe did not receive them until August 16th.

On June 13th, at St. John's, Burgoyne took command of the British forces. These consisted of an army of eight thousand men, of whom four thousand one hundred and thirty-five were British, three thousand one hundred and sixteen Germans, five hundred and three Indians, and one

hundred and forty-eight Canadians. They were supplied with full military equipment. Burgoyne sent Colonel St. Leger with a thousand men to the West to reduce Fort Stanwix. When this was accomplished he was to rejoin the main army at Albany, to which point General Burgoyne was to advance by way of Lake Champlain. Burgoyne advanced with his army to Crown Point, here he held a council with the Six Nations, and secured several hundred Indian recruits. On June 30th, he issued the following military order: "The army embarks to-morrow to approach the enemy. The services required on this expedition are critical and conspicuous. During our progress occasions may occur, in which, nor difficulty, nor labor, nor life, are to be regarded. This army must not retreat." The British general sailed down Lake Champlain with the Indian canoes in the van and with colors flying and bands playing. At Ticonderoga there were twenty-five hundred regular American troops, poorly equipped, and nine hundred militia; a force entirely insufficient to maintain a proper line of works. The British opened a heavy fire upon the American position and on July 5th, St. Clair, who was in charge of the garrison, abandoned the fort as untenable. To have risked an action with such superior numbers of well-equipped troops would have been unwise, and yet St. Clair felt that in yielding Ticonderoga without striking a blow he was going counter to public sentiment, for his countrymen believed the fort to be well-nigh impregnable. Nevertheless, he was willing rather to face the odium of evacuation than to bear the responsibility of a disastrous defeat. He, therefore, sent the women and the wounded under the protection of Colonel Long and six hundred troops to Skenesborough. There they were attacked, and the American flotilla was destroyed. Colonel Purge Long, of the New Hampshire regiment, withdrew to Fort Anne and on July 6th, made a stand there, but was outnumbered and forced to retreat to Fort Edward where he was joined by Schuyler. In the meanwhile St. Clair was on his way to the same place, and

at the same time keeping up a vigorous rear engagement with the British. The American force concentrated at Fort Edward now numbered five thousand men, all of them inadequately provided for in the way of arms and provisions. Not daring to risk an engagement, Schuyler, after destroying the roads, burning the bridges, and stripping the country of everything that could be of service to the British fell slowly back to Fort Miller. Brigadier-General Arnold joined him with artillery and he awaited further reinforcements.

Burgoyne was overjoyed at his easy conquest and was unmindful of the predicament he was getting himself into by following the American troops into the wilderness. He had to cut new roads and build new bridges so that twenty four days were consumed in marching twenty-six miles. Arriving at Fort Edward on July 30th, he was obliged to wait until August 15th for his artillery from Lake George. This delay endangered the success of his campaign. Burgoyne's employment of the Indians and the depredations of those savage allies made the Americans burn with resentment. Even before he had traversed the distance between Skenesborough and Fort Edward, the Americans were pressing upon him. It was now the middle of August and before the close of the month a double disaster was experienced by the British in the battles of Oriskany and Bennington. While Burgoyne was forcing his way toward Albany, St. Leger was coöperating with him in the Mohawk country. Ascending the St. Lawrence he crossed Lake Ontario and commenced the siege of Fort Stanwix. At that place, General Nicholas Herkimer, an aged German, a resident of the country, and a veteran of the French War, had collected about eight hundred frontier riflemen for the support of the garrison under Colonel Leonard Gansevoort. St. Leger, to protect his rear from the advancing militia under Herkimer, detached a force of Tories and Indians to ambush them. Although taken at a disadvantage the warfare was of the kind which the Americans best understood. Taking their positions behind trees and rocks they engaged their

foes in a fierce combat. The British force was under the command of Sir John Johnson and the celebrated Mohawk chieftain Joseph Brant. In the history of war nothing more horrible has occurred than the carnage of this wilderness battle of Oriskany of August 6, 1777. The savage hand-to-hand fighting continued for five hours, the booming of artillery being responded to by the crash of thunder and the flash of the guns being lost in the glare of an electric storm. The spirit with which the men fought was kindred to the spirit of the elements. The terrible picture is completed by the view of Herkimer, whose horse had been shot from under him, propped upon his saddle against a tree, and fiercely encouraging his men in their struggle, while his own life's blood was welling from a mortal wound. St. Leger sent a message to Gansevoort, telling him of the defeat of Herkimer, and commanding him to surrender. As a reply to this demand Gansevoort displayed five captured British standards flying below the new American flag that he had made from strips of an overcoat and a petticoat. The besiegers thereupon renewed the attack, but Marinus Willett, second in command at Stanwix, made a sortie from the fort and with his aid the British were repulsed. At this time there were rumors of the approach of General Arnold for the rescue of the fort. By a clever ruse Arnold so frightened St. Leger and his allies that on August 22d, they raised the siege, abandoned their works, leaving behind artillery and camp equipment, and retired precipitately into Canada in utter defeat. The noble stand of Herkimer, the bravery of Gansevoort, and the resourcefulness of Arnold had triumphed. Arnold was able to rejoin Schuyler with the news that the valley of the Mohawk was saved.

While St. Leger was meeting defeat, General Burgoyne's own position was becoming precarious. His supplies were scanty and his men were suffering from hunger. When he learned that Fort Stanwix was being besieged he thought that an advance upon the main body of the Americans, which lay between him and Albany, would reduce them to

the necessity of fighting a losing battle or else of retreating into New England and leaving his path clear. The principal objection to Burgoyne's plan was the difficulty of obtaining provisions for his troops. Fort George was the nearest depot of supplies and every day's march toward Albany increased his distance from that point. The British general therefore sought to replenish his commissariat by foraging in the surrounding country. Being misinformed as to the sentiment of the people he believed that a force of five hundred whites with one hundred Indians and two field pieces would be sufficient for the expedition. The main objective point was to be Bennington, where it was believed the Americans had large stores of supplies. There was one quantity in the calculation of Burgoyne of which he knew nothing and inability to take account of which brought disaster to his expedition. This was the presence in the vicinity of Colonel John Stark, an intrepid militia leader in the battle of Bunker Hill, and one of the heroes of Trenton. He had retired to his Vermont home because of the failure of Congress to suitably recognize his services by promotion. Stark, learning of Burgoyne's expedition, again took the field to win a victory which was to overshadow his other exploits. His speech to his men is well known. "They are ours to-night, or Molly Stark is a widow."

On August 13th, Colonel Baum, in command of the British forces, finding his task more serious than he had expected, proceeded to intrench himself on a hill about four miles from Bennington. It was now clear to him that instead of leading a raid in the country of a conquered people he was to conduct a defence against the New Englanders who were turning out in force to meet him. Stark had fifteen hundred men from New Hampshire and Massachusetts. August 16th opened warm and fair and Stark determined to storm the position of the enemy, although his farmer recruits were without bayonets or side arms. The British troops were attacked on three sides. When Baum saw making toward

the rear of his intrenchments small parties of Americans without uniforms and in their shirt sleeves, devoid of bayonets or other equipment, he had no idea that they were an impromptu citizen soldiery. He looked upon them merely as straggling peasants flocking to the support of the king's troops. Thus Stark massed five hundred men in position behind the British forces. By a bit of strategy he got two hundred more to the right of the hill. Although his men were poorly equipped they were numerically twice as strong as the enemy. Giving the word to his fellows Stark pressed forward with them, and as they advanced they used their rifles with deadly effect. The Indians well understood the temper of their foes and deserted their allies early in the fray, but the British and the Hessians stolidly held their ground. The Americans swarmed upon them from all sides, making their assault in true backwoods fashion. For two hours the fight raged hotly, the fire being a continuous roar. At last Stark led his begrimed and powder-marked troops in a final charge. With a splendid dash they mounted the enemy's works and assailed the defenders with clubbed rifles, repulsing the bayonets of Baum's men. Baum himself fell mortally wounded and his soldiers surrendered. The victory was gained none too soon, for hardly had Baum's men surrendered when another detachment under Breymann appeared upon the scene. Called upon to meet another force after the exhaustion of a severe fight the Americans wavered, but Stark rallied them, and putting into service a hundred and fifty fresh men who had come upon the scene repulsed the Brunswickers and made them beat a hasty retreat under the cover of the gathering darkness. The battle of Bennington was a battle of blows. It followed no plan except that of stubborn fighting. The pluck of the New England farmer and the intrepid spirit of Stark were the determining factors. The American loss in the Bennington engagement was eighty-two killed and wounded, that of the British two hundred and seven; but the Americans also took seven hundred prisoners, one thousand stand

of arms, and all the artillery of the British. The blow was fatal to the campaign of Burgoyne. It would be difficult to exaggerate the enthusiasm which the Oriskany and Bennington victories inspired in the American army and throughout the country at large. Washington sent Morgan's splendid corps of Virginia riflemen north and volunteers came in increasing numbers from New York and New England. At this critical juncture Congress saw fit to supersede the resolute and steadfast Schuyler, giving the command of the northern army to Horatio Gates, "the son of the housekeeper of the second Duke of Leeds." The command was tendered Gates through the obsequiousness of Congress toward rank, the same trait which had led it to confer upon Charles Lee a position to which he was not entitled by his measure of ability.

On August 19th Gates took command of the enthusiastic army and after waiting three weeks marched to Bemis's Heights, on the west bank of Hudson River. Burgoyne was short of supplies and could collect nothing from the surrounding country. He had no present hope of reinforcement from the south to take the place of the men whom he and St. Leger had lost. After getting together a few stores and provisions and securing some artillery, on September 13th he crossed to the west bank of the Hudson. General Benjamin Lincoln on that date started on an enterprise against Ticonderoga and other posts in the rear of the royal army. He dispatched Colonel John Brown with five hundred men to the landing at Lake George; and this officer conducted his operations in that quarter so cautiously that he surprised all the posts between the north end of Lake George and the main fortress at Ticonderoga. Thus, on September 18th, Brown and his men were capturing those important outposts while Burgoyne was halting his troops two miles from the American army. The Americans had strongly intrenched Bemis's Heights, which had been fortified by the Polish patriot Kosciuszko. It was the purpose of Gates to act upon the defensive, but this did not suit the

temper of General Arnold, who begged and received permission to advance upon the enemy. Thus, on September 19th, was fought the first battle of Saratoga. The particular point where the engagement occurred was Freeman's farm. The attack began at midday and was fought fiercely for an hour and a half; after a pause it became more general and continued for three hours without intermission. Fortune alternately favored the Americans and the British. A number of American sharpshooters from lofty positions in the treetops deliberately picked off the British officers. The battle was fought with great obstinacy; repeatedly the British made bayonet charges, but without great success. Had Gates grasped his opportunity the British army would have met a crushing defeat, but it was five o'clock in the afternoon before he saw the advantage of sending a brigade of troops to the rear of the enemy, although Arnold had importuned him for reinforcements earlier in the engagement. The approaching darkness prevented a decisive stroke and the Americans drew off to their intrenchments leaving the enemy in possession of the field of battle. Had Gates taken prompter action the result would have been different, and had the American forces been directed by an efficient general and not left to regimental and brigade commanders Burgoyne's campaign would have ended then and there. The Americans had about three thousand men in the engagement and the British three thousand five hundred. The loss of the former was about three hundred and twenty-five, while according to their own accounts the loss of the latter was six hundred.

The conduct of Gates in refusing Arnold reinforcements can only be attributed to jealousy. In the account of the battle he sent to Congress, Gates took all the credit to himself and did not mention Arnold. Yet the latter was the popular hero. A personal quarrel between the two men growing out of their strained relations resulted in Arnold's being relieved of his command. He was only restrained from leaving the service by the importunity of his brother

officers. Burgoyne, finding himself in a trap, determined to cut himself out and was encouraged by hearing of the dishonoring of Arnold, which act thrust active command upon Gates, whom Burgoyne spoke of as "an old mid-wife." Accordingly, on October 7th, was fought the second battle of Saratoga. Burgoyne, with fifteen hundred picked men, attempted to turn the American left, but was driven back at every point by the New England regulars and Morgan's sharpshooters. Arnold was watching the conflict from a distance, and no longer able to remain a passive spectator, leaped upon his horse and was soon in the thick of the conflict. The enthusiasm which his presence evoked turned the tide of battle. The British were utterly defeated, and one of Burgoyne's foremost commanders, General Fraser, was mortally wounded. An incident of this battle well illustrates the character of Arnold. It occurred toward the close of the conflict. A wounded German soldier raised his pistol and fired a bullet that shattered the leg of Arnold who had been wounded in the same limb at Quebec. A rifleman rushed upon the soldier to run him through the body, but Arnold interposed in behalf of the wretch with the words: "For God's sake, don't hurt him! he's a fine fellow!" It has been fittingly said that this was the moment when Arnold should have died.

The British army was wearied almost to the last extremity. It had fought with unwavering bravery, but in spite of its endeavors, the Hudson was guarded at every point by the Americans, and they were fast closing in on the army of Burgoyne.

There seemed to be now but one alternative for the British army, and that was surrender. It was practically surrounded by the Americans, who kept up an incessant cannonade, its supplies were cut off, and it had no hope of rescue. Sir Henry Clinton was moving up the Hudson with a small army, but he could not succor Burgoyne although his army was fresh from its triumph in reducing the forts and fleet upon the Hudson and had supplies and

abundant provisions for itself and Howe. The patriots now numbered twenty thousand, and their ranks were rapidly being added to. Had Clinton succeeded in reaching Burgoyne, he would have shared the fate of the latter. On October 12th, Burgoyne asked of Gates terms of surrender; these were at first made unconditional, but upon Burgoyne's declaring that his men would die fighting before accepting such terms, others were offered. The British were permitted to stack their own arms, and were promised transportation to Great Britain on the condition that they would not again serve during the war. The total number of men who laid down their arms was five thousand seven hundred and ninety-nine. The American army came into possession of all the cannon, muskets, and munitions of war of their enemies. The entire British losses from the beginning of the campaign had exceeded ten thousand men. The surrender of Burgoyne on October 17, 1777, marked a turning point in the war. It greatly influenced European opinion in favor of the Americans. Frederick the Great of Prussia, who had watched with keen interest the contest across the water, became a warm admirer of Washington, and later sent to him a sword with the inscription: "From the oldest general in Europe to the greatest general on earth." At that time, Frederick was the most powerful personage in Europe. Although he had been greatly aided by England during the Seven Years' War, which meant so much for Prussian consolidation, he could not conceal his sympathy with the patriots. He demonstrated it by opening the port of Dantzig to American cruisers and by refusing to permit any more Hessians to traverse his dominions on their way to America.

But nowhere was the news of Burgoyne's surrender productive of such great interest as in Great Britain, where, at least by the royal party, it was felt to be a national calamity. In February, 1778, Lord North rose in the Commons and advocated yielding to America everything that it had claimed prior to the war. An Act to this effect, humiliating as it was to national pride, passed both houses

and was signed by the king in March. Commissioners were sent to Congress to treat with that body upon the basis of the Act; but they were received with scorn. America declined to consider any proposition for peace short of the recognition of the United States as a sovereign power.

The leaders in Congress realized that in order for the American cause fully to succeed it must have the recognition of Europe and obtain support from that quarter. Thus it was that the men of ability and strength in Congress either went abroad in advocacy of foreign support or else returned to their States in order to strengthen and direct local interests and support the cause of the Continental army. Although Congress suffered through the absence of these men, that was not of great moment as it was never an efficient executive body, and it was of greater importance to have the strong men of the country distributed at vital points than collected in the national legislature.

CHAPTER XII

FOREIGN INTERVENTION

SENSITIVENESS to foreign opinion was one of the constant characteristics of the revolutionary movement in America. In order properly to gauge the sentiment of foreign States and to take diplomatic advantage of any fortuitous circumstances in the progress of the war, Congress maintained agents abroad. These agents could not be accredited to the courts to which they were sent even after the Declaration of Independence until that declaration was acknowledged by those courts. The plan of having such agents in Europe was a usual one with some of the colonies, for example those of New England, especially Massachusetts, long before union between the colonies had been consummated. In this way the colonies were able to gauge the effect of their legislative or other local measures upon the minds of the king and Parliament, and through intermediaries or directly, as the case might warrant, the agents sought to mould British opinion and shape official action favorably to the colonies which they represented. Great Britain had never resented the presence and work of colonial agents in London as the wide separation of the colonies from the mother country and the consequent infrequency of communication made it of mutual advantage to have such representatives at hand.

It was, then, but in extension of a well-established policy for the United States to commission agents to the court of France when it became important to enlist as a powerful

ally the ancient enemy of Great Britain. The peculiar interest of France in anything that tended to weaken her neighbor across the channel, had made its officials watch with keener concern than that felt by other European governments the progress of events in America. In consequence the court of France was much better informed. The French were smarting under the loss of Canada, and were not slow to realize how much a succession of American victories might mean to them in revenge for their own defeats at the hands of Great Britain. The French minister of foreign affairs, Comte de Vergennes, was alert to seize the proper moment for striking a blow at his country's rival. He had, in August, 1775, sent secretly to America M. de Bonvouloir to report to him concerning the American situation. This agent, immediately after his arrival, sent word to the French minister that the Americans were determined to resist Great Britain, but that they were not yet prepared openly to seek foreign aid. Arthur Lee after his fruitless attempt, in connection with Penn, to interest the king in the last peace petition sent out from America became an agent at large of the colonies, and was able to report to them many expressions from important personages which encouraged them in their course toward independence.

At about the time that Bonvouloir departed on his secret mission, Beaumarchais, the dramatist, who was in England as the secret agent of Louis XVI., had an interview with Lee in which he received an accurate account of the state of affairs in America. Prior to his interview with Lee and other persons recently arrived from America, Beaumarchais feared that England might adopt the expedient of diverting the attention of the colonies from their grievances by enlisting them in a war with France. After these interviews he left London for Paris and presented to the king a secret memorial in advocacy of taking the part of the insurgents. "The Americans," said he, "are full of enthusiasm of liberty, and resolve to suffer everything rather than yield; such

a people must be invincible; all men of sense are convinced that the English colonies are lost for the mother country, and I share their opinion." On September 21st, the subject was discussed in the council of the king and Beaumarchais returned to England with a new commission. Vergennes, at this time regarded it as inconceivable that Great Britain should persist in her irritating policy toward the colonies and questioned the reports he received to that effect, whereupon the ambassador wrote from England: "You say what you think ought to be done but the king of England is the most obstinate prince alive, and his ministers, from fear of compromising their places, will never adopt the policy necessary in a great crisis."

A motion was introduced in Congress by Samuel Chase, of Maryland, at about the time that these views were being exchanged between the French diplomats, providing for the sending to France of envoys with conditional instructions. The motion did not prevail, but on November 29, 1775, Harrison, Franklin, Johnson, Dickinson, and Jay were appointed a secret "committee for the sole purpose of corresponding with friends in Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of the world." The resolution to this effect also authorized that funds be set aside "for the payment of such agents as they might send on this service." On December 12th, the committee of secret correspondence authorized Arthur Lee to ascertain the disposition of foreign powers. At the same time Dumas, a Swiss, resident at Holland and a personal friend of Franklin, received a similar commission. It was at this time that Bonvouloir arrived in Philadelphia. He met Franklin and other members of the secret committee who asked him if France would aid America, and for what considerations and whether or not it would be prudent to send a plenipotentiary to the French court. To the first question he replied that the aid of France would be upon just and equitable conditions, which he was prepared to receive and to present. To the second he made response that such action "would be precipitate and even

hazardous, for what passes in France is known in London; but if you will give me anything in charge, I may receive answers well suited to guide your conduct, although I can guarantee nothing except that your confidence will not be betrayed." Bonvouloir was made a medium of communication and reported to the French minister that "the Americans hesitated about a declaration of independence and an appeal to France."

The lack of necessary munitions of war to which reference has been made led to the appointment of Silas Deane as commercial commissioner and agent to France. On March 3, 1776, he was given his instructions to proceed to France in order to secure clothing and arms for twenty-five thousand men, one hundred field pieces, and quantities of ammunition. The French ministers were divided upon the question of tendering aid to America, and the question was debated for twelve months. Vergennes was clear in his opinion as to the judiciousness of so doing, and the king himself came gradually under his influence. The latter was also sustained by Sartine, the minister of the marine, and by Saint-Germaine, the new secretary of war. During the first days of March, 1776, Vergennes received the report of Bonvouloir, and upon its representations based a set of "considerations" for the notice of the king. They recounted the advantage to France and Spain of the war in progress in America, as it tended to exhaust the victor and the vanquished alike. However, the minister pointed out that the British ministry might be driven to conciliate the colonies, or else, being beaten on the continent of America, might seek indemnity at the expense of the colonial possessions of France and Spain. If the colonists attained independence they might, from the necessity of their situation and influenced by the spirit of conquest, carry their operations into Spanish America. After an elaboration of these possibilities and their effect upon France and Spain, Vergennes drew the conclusion that the war should continue for at least a year and that Great Britain should be kept

under the persuasion that France and Spain were neutral, in order that she may be thus encouraged to carry on an active and costly campaign in America. At the same time the courage and persistence of the Americans were to be kept up by secret favors and the holding out to them by France of vague hopes. The policy thus set forth comported with the extension of secret aid to America while it did not contemplate an early recognition of the colonies as a sovereign power. The chief opponent in the cabinet to the policy recommended by Vergennes was Turgot, then controller-general of finance. The king directed that the memorial of Vergennes be submitted to Turgot for his written opinion. After three weeks' deliberation the latter gave his report to the king. Briefly expressed it set forth that the independence of the American colonies was inevitable, but emphasized the undesirability of France or Spain doing anything that might provoke a war between them and Great Britain. Turgot based his objection to his country's becoming involved in war upon its financial stress as well as upon the broader consideration that such a war would be unfortunate. Nevertheless, his summary of the points of the dispute of the colonies with their mother country was a magnificent tribute to the former as well as an able arraignment of the principle of colonial subjection. Turgot had the genius to grasp the merits of the American claims, but his position as a minister of France would not permit him to advocate the support of them at the cost of war with a nation with which his country was at peace. The principle of self-administration had in France at this time many other able espousers. Voltaire advocated the doctrine that there could be no durable liberty or happiness for nations who were deprived of representative governments. Such sentiments found strong expression by Chastellux, in an important work which was then having wide circulation in Paris, and by Malesherbes, minister to Louis XVI. in the department of Paris.

The minister of marine implored the king to risk a war with Great Britain in behalf of the American colonies. He

said: "If the navy of France were at this moment able to act, France never had a fairer chance to avenge the unceasing insults of the English. I beseech your majesty to consider that England, by its most cherished interests, its national character, its form of government, and its position, is and always will be the true, the only, and the eternal enemy of France. Sire, with England no calculation is admissible but that of her interests and her caprices; that is, of the harm that she can do us. In 1755, at a time of perfect peace, the English attacked your ships, proving that they hold nothing sacred. We have every reason to fear that, whatever may be the issue of their war with the insurgents, they will take advantage of their armament to fall upon your colonies or ports. Your minister would be chargeable with guilt if he did not represent the necessity of adopting the most efficacious measures to parry the bad faith of your natural enemies." These various views well represent the divided state of opinion in France as to just what attitude that country ought to take toward the American cause. Early in May, 1776, the King of France reached a decision and informed the King of Spain of his intention of advancing, under cover of the name of a commercial house, to the Americans $200,000. The Spanish government, some weeks after the receipt of this information, secretly remitted to Paris a draft for an equal sum. Thus the French court, in connection with that of Spain, entered upon the policy advocated by Vergennes of encouraging the Americans in their resistance to Great Britain. Early in the summer Beaumarchais announced to Arthur Lee that he was authorized to promise aid to the amount of nearly $1,000,000. The tide of enthusiasm for America was on the rise, but its increase was at the sacrifice of some of the king's wisest counsellors. Thus he lost Malesherbes and Turgot. Both these men were ardent apostles of liberty; but neither of them agreed with the policy advocated by Vergennes toward the American colonies nor did they have a common plan.

While Arthur Lee and Silas Deane were receiving promises of secret aid from France and Spain, Congress, on June 11, 1776, appointed a committee to prepare a plan of a treaty with foreign powers. Great Britain had not been deluded by the French profession of a pacific attitude toward her, and she was entirely informed as to the predilections of that country for the colonies and the motives which prompted that preference. On September 17th, after many weeks of deliberation an elaborate plan of a treaty with France was adopted by Congress. As France had her secret motives for common action with the United States so the latter had concealed designs promotive of their own interests. Congress did not desire to make common cause with France, but to induce that country independently to engage Great Britain in war thus leaving the United States a free hand to conduct its own hostilities with an enemy distracted by two foes. The features of the treaty were as follows: The United States assured Spain freedom from molestation in her American possessions; they renounced in favor of France any and all conquests in the West Indies; they claimed the sole right, however, to annex British North America, the Bermudas, Cape Breton and Newfoundland. The King of France was to be permitted to retain his exclusive rights in the latter province as guaranteed by the treaty with England of 1763. Should the French become involved in war with Great Britain it was agreed that neither France nor the United States should make a definite treaty of peace without six months' notice to its ally. The men selected to bear this treaty to the French court were Dr. Franklin, Silas Deane, and Thomas Jefferson. The latter declined to serve and Arthur Lee, the London agent, was chosen in his stead. The commissioners were finally instructed that: "It will be proper for you to press for the immediate and explicit declaration of France in our favor, upon a suggestion that a reunion with Great Britain may be the consequence of a delay." In the nature of the case the instructions to the commission,

including the terms of the proposed treaty were to be kept secret.

On December 7th, Franklin, on the way to Paris, reached Nantes on the *Reprisal*, the first war vessel built by the United States, after a stormy passage which was varied by the excitement of being chased by two British cruisers. On arriving at Nantes he gave emphatic declaration to the intention of the Americans to hold out for independence to the end. His statements made a profound impression, due to the high regard in which he was held throughout Europe. Franklin reached Paris on December 21st. His fame as a philosopher had preceded him and his unfailing good humor, ease of manners, and simplicity of attire,—even his hair was unpowdered,—quickly gave him a warm place in the affection of the people of France. That people had already adopted the cause of America as its own, and everywhere the cry was that the cause of the revolutionist was the cause of mankind. On the morning of the 28th, the three American commissioners were received by Vergennes, who spoke freely to them of the attachment of the French people to the American cause. He desired that the intercourse between them be secret at all times, excepting that the Count de Aranda, the Spanish ambassador, whose country was in accord with France, might be admitted into full confidence. On December 29, 1776, and again six days later, Aranda received the American commissioners in consultation. The result of their first interviews with the diplomats of Spain and France was a promise given in behalf of both countries that American privateers and their prizes might find security in the ports of the two countries.

On January 5th, the commissioners preferred their first request for contributions. At that time they asked of Vergennes eight ships of the line, ammunition, brass fieldpieces, and twenty or thirty thousand muskets. The request comprehended Spain as well as France, being made upon the claim that: "The interests of the three nations are the same; the opportunity now presents itself of securing a commerce

which in time will be immense; delay may be attended with fatal consequences." The request was brought before the king at Versailles, and on the 13th of January, Conrad Alexander Gerard, one of the secretaries of Vergennes, met the commissioners by night at a private house and communicated to them the carefully prepared answer of the king. This was to the effect that the king at present could furnish neither ships nor convoys; time and events must be waited for. Continuing, the reply stated that the United Provinces, as the American States were styled in the communication, "may be assured that neither France nor Spain will make any overture that can in the least interfere with their essential interests. The commercial facilities afforded in the ports of France and Spain, and the tacit diversion of the two powers whose expensive armaments oblige England to divide her efforts, manifest the interest of the two crowns in the success of the Americans. The king will not incommode them in deriving resources from the commerce of his kingdom, confident that they will conform to the rules prescribed by the precise and rigorous meaning of existing treaties, of which the two monarchs are exact observers. Unable to enter into the details of their supplies, he will mark to them his benevolence and good will by destining for them secret succors which will extend their credit and their purchases." In pursuance of these promises $100,000 was paid to the bankers of the commissioners quarterly. The *Seine*, the *Amphitrite*, and the *Mercury* were loaded with munitions of war and other stores by Deane and Beaumarchais, and after many ostensible delays were permitted to go out to sea. The commissioners also received encouragement to contract with the farmers-general for fifty-six thousand hogsheads of tobacco; on which contract they received an advance of $200,000.

These proceedings did not escape the scrutiny of the British and the ministry of that country sent a firm but courteous remonstrance to France. At the same time the British admiral at the Leeward Islands was given orders to

station cruisers off the harbor of St. Eustatius with directions to their commanders to search all Dutch ships and to take in charge all that were found to have on board contraband of war and to bring them to some one of his majesty's ports. About this time the authorities at The Hague were called upon by the British ambassador to disavow an act of the governor of the Leeward Islands which was an act of virtual recognition of the American nation. His offence was the returning from the guns of the fort on the island the salute of an American brigantine. When taken to task for his action he made the reply: "I am far from betraying any partiality between Great Britain and her North American colonies." Their High Mightinesses were informed that nothing less than the recall of the governor would be considered a satisfactory reparation for his act. "Till this satisfaction is given," said the ambassador, "they must not expect that his majesty will suffer himself to be amused by simple assurances or that he will hesitate for an instant to take the measures that he shall think due to the interests and dignity of his crown." Such contemptuous language inflamed the resentment of Holland and had much to do with the attitude of the States of the Netherlands and of the Prince of Orange. Although the offending governor, the first foreign official to salute the American flag, was recalled, the paper of the British minister was returned to that official and a complaint of its menacing tone was entered by the Dutch minister in London. As an evidence of their resentment the United Provinces ordered a number of armed ships to be in readiness.

Louis XVI. personally was not favorable to assisting the Americans and "would break into a passion whenever he heard of help furnished to the Americans." Nevertheless the enthusiasm of the French nation could not be held in check by its sovereign. Ships were continually leaving the ports of France carrying those things most needed by the American army and American trading vessels had access to French ports and enjoyed their protection. Protests from

the English minister were heard and the form of heeding them was observed. Vergennes professed that the American ships were received only when in distress and were driven out from the ports without delay; he claimed that it was impossible to prevent such ships carrying contraband of war, as the Americans and their friends escaped his vigilance. Whereupon Great Britain claimed the right of search, and exercised it in spite of the protest of Vergennes that American property in French ships upon the high seas was inviolable; a declaration of war against France was simply delayed from motives of convenience. Spain was unprepared for war, yet France wanted to act in alliance with that power as it seemed destined to become the great ocean power of Europe.

On March 4, 1777, Arthur Lee made a visit at Burgos to Grimaldi, the Spanish prime minister. Grimaldi indulged in generalities with regard to the good relations subsisting between France and Spain and made some more or less general promises of aid, but the one thing that he did leave clear in the mind of Lee was his desire that Lee should return straight to Paris. Assurances were thereupon given to Great Britain that all attempts on the part of the agents of her rebellious colonies to secure Spanish assistance would be futile. Although Spain had strong reason to refuse aid to the American colonies, her own colonial interests in that country being threatened by American supremacy, nevertheless she was strongly drawn toward a French alliance. The aid and comfort which she gave was extended through France so that she might continue to furnish assurances to Great Britain of her neutrality. Florida Blanca, who had succeeded Grimaldi, advised Vergennes to let Great Britain and America continue their struggle until both parties were exhausted and ready to invite the interposition of France and Spain. In acting as mediators they would be able to take care of their respective interests. Vergennes did not fall in with this proposition and so in July, 1777, he fixed upon February, 1778, as a time when the two countries

must engage Great Britain in war or else ever after lament the loss of a great opportunity.

The attitude of the other nations of Europe toward the United States needs statement. Italy saw in the earnest efforts of the American States to achieve national unity a prophecy and an inspiration. Although Italy was made up of small States, the spirit of nationality was strong in the Italian people and they indulged the hope of becoming united. Great Britain had repeatedly importuned Russia to enter into an alliance with it, but that empire had declined such overtures, and had advised instead the concession of independence to the United States. French subsidies had bound Gustavus III. to France, but Sweden had a predilection for the United States independent of European relations; this grew out of the fact that Delaware had been largely settled by Swedes, and the additional consideration that, being a maritime people themselves, the Swedes naturally sided with the colonies in their dispute with Great Britain concerning matters of trade. The German peoples were well disposed toward the Americans, and the great philosopher Kant was an avowed friend and defender of their country in its contest with Great Britain. Frederick of Prussia was not only friendly to America, but was also a warm admirer of Washington. He watched the course of the war with the keen interest of a professional soldier, at the same time that he followed its progress with the concern of a well-wisher. The courage and capacity of the American soldier made a strong appeal to his military instinct, and had much to do with his interest in the ambitious nation. Upon one occasion he expressed his opinion that the perfect government was a well-administered monarchy, but added the qualification "kingdoms are subjected to the caprice of a single man whose successors will have no common character. A good-for-nothing prince succeeds an ambitious one; then follows a devotee; then a warrior; then a scholar; then, it may be, a voluptuary; and the genius of a nation, diverted by the variety of objects,

assumes no fixed character. But republics fulfil more promptly the designs of their institution, and hold out better; for good kings die, but wise laws are immortal. There is unity in the end which republics propose, and in the means which they employ; and they therefore almost never miss their aim." In November, 1776, he expressed the opinion that the colonies would rather fall under the ruins of their own settlements than pass again under the yoke of the mother country. In October of the same year, when ill and expected to die, his thoughts turned toward America, and he recorded them as follows: "During my illness, in which I have passed many moments doing nothing, these are the ideas that have occupied my mind: it seems to me very hard to proclaim as rebels free subjects who only defend their privileges against the despotism of a ministry." This comment was brought out by the proclamation of George III. denouncing the American insurgents as traitors. "If I had a voice in the British cabinet," he added, "I should take advantage of the good disposition of the colonies to reconcile myself with him."

On February 14, 1777, the American commissioners at Paris placed in the hands of Frederick a copy of the Declaration of Independence and Articles of Federation, at the same time expressing the wish that the United States might obtain his friendship and that commercial relations might be established between the two countries. He could only reply to these overtures that he would respect the rights of neutrals to the fullest extent, but that, being without a navy and armed ships to protect trade, direct commerce between the countries could only be established under the flag of the Netherlands, and that England no longer respected that flag. "Under more favorable circumstances," said he, "our linens of Silesia, our woollens and other manufactures, might find a new market." While Frederick postponed negotiations, he at the same time gave repeated charges to his minister to do nothing and to say nothing that could wound the sensibilities of the American people. Frederick's

sense of duty toward Prussia prevented him from giving to the United States the practicable evidences of his regard for them. It was just at this time, when the efforts of Franklin to enlist the active interest of Frederick were unavailing, that Arthur Lee, contrary to the advice of Franklin and unmindful of a clear hint from the Prussian minister Schulenburg, went from Vienna to Berlin. At the former place he had been regarded as an unwelcome visitor, and the Austrian minister Kaunitz had to exercise constant tact to prevent Lee from being accorded a degree of social recognition which would have been misconstrued, and yet at the same time not to subject the American agent to such treatment as would have wounded the American people. In Berlin he received every courtesy but Frederick refused to see him. He secured substantial returns for his visit, however, in the promise of the king that he would use his influence to prevent new treaties by Great Britain for German troops. Great Britain was earnestly desirous of an alliance with Frederick, but the latter replied to the approaches of the ministry "no man is further removed than myself from having connection with England." On the other hand France was anxious in the event of war with Great Britain to have the assurance of the good will of Frederick and his aid in stopping Great Britain's traffic in German soldiers. Frederick was quite ready to meet the overture of France, and at the end of July, 1777, gave the assurance desired in his own handwriting. In August and September following he repeated his declaration in language of which the following is a fair expression: "I have no connection whatever with England, nor do I grudge to France any advantages she may gain by a war between England and her colonies." "Her first interest requires the enfeeblement of Great Britain and the way to this is to make it lose its colonies in America. The present opportunity is more favorable than ever before existed, and more favorable than is likely to recur in three centuries."

Added to the pressure brought to bear upon the French policy by the repeated assurances by Frederick of his good

will and his counsel for war was the attitude of Marie Antoinette. She placed in the hands of her husband a memoir drawn up by Counts de Maillebois and d'Estaing strongly censuring the ministers for their timid policy. The king was told that his reign would be judged by his action in the presence of the opportunity he now had to punish the pride and arrogance of the rival of France. Yet as late as November 23, 1777, only Sartine and Vergennes advocated war. The surrender of Burgoyne's army thrilled Paris and the wave of sentiment overbore the adverse counsels of Maurepas, chief minister of Louis XVI. At this time Frederick renewed his assurances of good will and declared that "the chances are one hundred to one that the colonies will sustain their independence." He struck at the very heart of the problem which faced Great Britain at this time when he declared: "The ministry may get funds, but where will they get twenty thousand men? I see no gate at which they can knock for auxiliaries." At this time Frederick extended to the United States the refuge of the port of Dantzic for their ships. He also positively forbade mercenary troops of the principalities of Anspach and Hesse from passing through Prussia. This open testimony of his good will had a profound effect throughout Europe. From this time every facility was afforded the United States to ship arms from Prussia and before the year 1777 closed the American commissioners were assured that Frederick would not be the last of the sovereigns of Europe to recognize the independence of the United States. In January, 1778, an official communication was sent from the Prussian court to one of the American commissioners in Paris as follows: "The king desires that your generous efforts may be crowned with complete success. He will not hesitate to recognize your independence when France, which is more directly interested in the event of this contest, shall have given the example."

The recognition of American independence by France was not long delayed. Turgot declared that Washington's

feat in bringing a raw army to the point of winning from experienced generals like Howe and Burgoyne such signal victories as those which had during the year crowned the arms of the Americans left no doubt as to the issue of the contest. As Spain, on account of her possessions in America, was interested with France in any treaty which the latter country might make, that government was consulted upon the matter of a treaty with the United States. On December 17, 1777, five days after an interview thereon with Vergennes, Gerard, one of the secretaries of the latter, informed the commissioners that the king in council had determined not only to acknowledge the United States, but to sustain them as well. In case Great Britain declared war with France—the certain outcome—France stipulated, not that the United States should not make a separate treaty of peace with Great Britain, but that they should absolutely maintain independence. To this announcement the American commissioners made reply: "We perceive and admire the king's magnanimity and wisdom. He will find us faithful and firm allies. We wish with his majesty that the amity between the two nations may last forever." For the present, however, Spain adhered to its policy to avoid a rupture with England. Emperor Joseph, of Austria, upon hearing of the action of France, declared: "The women and the enthusiasms of the moment putting the ministers in fear of losing their places determine them to make war on the English; and they could commit no greater folly." On February 6, 1778, a treaty of amity and commerce looking toward an eventual alliance was concluded between the King of France and the United States, largely upon the lines of the treaty proposed by the American Congress.

Great Britain persisted in the war with the United States. The bitterness of feeling which had been engendered is illustrated by a passage between Hillsborough and the Duke of Richmond on the 11th of February. The former asked: "In what manner he meant that England should crouch to the vipers and rebels in America? By giving up the sacred

right of taxation? or by yielding to her absurd pretensions about her charters? or by declaring the thirteen provinces independent?" Richmond answered: "I never liked the Declaratory Act; I voted for it with regret to obtain the repeal of the Stamp Act; I wish we could have done without it; I looked upon it as a piece of waste paper that no minister would ever have the madness to revive; I will, with pleasure, be the first to repeal it or to give it up." On the same day in the House, George Grenville made a savage attack upon the administration and indicated Lord Chatham as the person who should treat with America. While the British government was facing its quandary, Franklin was paying his respects to the octogenarian Voltaire, the philosophical savant of France. According to the latter's account of the interview, when Franklin bade his grandson request the benediction of Voltaire, the latter gave it in the words: "God and Liberty!"

On February 17th, Lord North announced to the House of Commons conciliatory proposals. They were embraced in two bills, one of which yielded the claim of Great Britain to the right of imposing taxes within the colonies of North America, and the other authorized commissioners to be sent to the United States. North proposed his bills in a speech of two hours in which he advocated that the commissioners should have plenary powers. A copy of Lord North's bills was received by Franklin, who replied: "If peace by treaty with America, upon equal terms, is really desired, your commissioners need not go there for it. If wise and honest men, such as Sir George Saville, the bishop of St. Asaph, and yourself, were to come over here immediately with powers to treat, you might not only obtain peace with America, but prevent a war with France." The conciliatory bills were passed by almost unanimous consent. The king of France made formal declaration to Great Britain of its treaty with the United States. The rescript which was left with the British secretary of state by the French ambassador on March 13th, announced that "the United States of North

America are in full possession of independence, which they had declared on the fourth of July, 1776; that, to consolidate the connection between the two nations, their respective plenipotentiaries had signed a treaty of friendship and commerce, but without any exclusive advantages in favor of the French nation. The king is determined to protect the lawful commerce of his subjects, and for that purpose has taken measures in concert with the United States of North America." The last clause of the rescript served notice upon Great Britain that her practice of overhauling French ships upon the high seas would not be tolerated. The announcement by the French government of its alliance with the United States was tantamount to a declaration of war. The proposition of Lord North, at this juncture, that he should give place to Lord Chatham, found little favor with the king, who declared that under no circumstances would he bear the ignominy of turning to the opposition for assistance.

On March 20th, the American commissioners were received by the king of France in his palace at Versailles amid circumstances of great pomp. Franklin was the most prominent figure in the notable group. His fame had spread over Europe, and at this reception he was the target of all eyes. The king assured the commissioners of his wish that his friendship might be extended to the American Congress. After the ceremony, the commissioners paid a visit to the wife of Lafayette, and dined with the secretary of foreign affairs. The king was borne upon the current of republican enthusiasm; all the while he was out of sympathy with the Americans and only concerned in administering to Great Britain the chastisement which his pride dictated. But the pique of the king, hardly disguised, did not affect Franklin. The official conduct of Franklin, and his intercourse with persons of the highest rank, were influenced by the most delicate propriety and self-respect. His charm of manners, grace, and simplicity won him good will in all directions. Whether at a sitting of Parliament, at the

opera, or upon the public thoroughfares he was accorded deferential and enthusiastic acclaims. John Adams was giving but a just estimate of the fame abroad of the eminent American when he observed that "Not Leibnitz, not Frederick nor Voltaire, had a more universal reputation; and his character was more beloved and esteemed than that of them all."

Chatham, to whom Great Britain looked as the only British statesman who had a right to invite America to resume her old connection, came into the House of Lords, April 7, 1778, decrepit from years and infirmities. But instead of being prepared, as the king thought he would be, to declare for American independence, he rose in his place and said he thanked God that, with more than one foot in the grave, he was permitted to stand up once more in the cause of his country. Amid an awed silence, the tremulous voice of the feeble statesman sounded throughout the chamber. But his words were the golden links of a disconnected chain. Sublime were some of the things that he said, but his eloquence lacked coherence. The keynote of his speech was the words: "If peace cannot be preserved with honor, why is not war declared without hesitation?" The Duke of Richmond, in a respectful response, deprecated engaging in war with France and Spain when the latter would have America as an ally. Chatham rose to reply, but his emotion overcame his strength; he swooned, and in ten days he was dead. On April 22, 1778, the American States observed a day of humiliation and prayer for the perpetuation of the Union; and upon that day Congress resolved to hold no conference or treaty with commissioners of Great Britain unless preliminary to such conference the latter should withdraw its armies and fleets or in positive and express terms acknowledge the independence of the United States. On the 29th of the same month, Voltaire and Franklin, before the French Academy, symbolized with a kiss the adoption of American independence by philosophic France as the independence of the human intellect. Indeed, this

was the underlying fact of the French alliance. Intellectual freedom was restive under the restraints imposed upon it, and everywhere throughout Europe was seeking to have expression. The republican principles of the Americans and the avowal of them in terms of human freedom profoundly affected the feeling of Europe. Franklin, as a doctrinaire in the person of an American patriot, seemed to prefigure a new era and to impersonate a new epoch. The intellectual activity in France broke through the crust of mediævalism, but not so in Spain. Not only was the hand of the Bourbon too strongly fixed upon that people, but the spirit of that dynasty was the spirit of Spain.

The Marquis de Lafayette, whose letters to France had much to do with influencing that country to adopt a favorable disposition toward the United States, was one of the first persons in America to receive news of the treaty of his government with the American Congress. In a transport of joy, he embraced Washington, exclaiming: "The king my master has acknowledged your independence, and entered into an alliance for its establishment." Throughout America the feeling of jubilation was intense, and the French alliance the one theme of public thought. Everywhere the event was celebrated by the usual demonstrations, and the air resounded with a cry: "Long live the King of France!" Thus did the young republic salute the aristocratic head of an ancient monarchy. With the assurance of French aid, popular opinion in America fancied that the port of peace was in sight. The new States had all the effervescence of the youthful period of national life. Occasions of joy and sorrow alike evoked responses of exaggerated sentiment from the people. Congress, however, sought to hold the popular rejoicing within the bounds of reason by issuing an address to the effect that the people "must yet expect a severe conflict; though foreign alliances secured their independence, they would not secure their country from devastation."

We have seen that on February 17th two bills were introduced into the House of Commons whose intent was

to conciliate America. When passed they were hurried to America, where, on April 21st, they were conveyed under a flag to Congress, which was assembled at Yorktown. At that time Congress was uninformed of the treaty which the American commissioners had concluded with France. Indeed for more than a year Congress had not received a line from the agents. One attempt of the latter to communicate with America had been frustrated by British agents abstracting the letters and supplying their place with blank paper. Upon the receipt of the bills a committee of Congress was appointed to take them under consideration. The following day they made a report which was unanimously adopted. It recommended absolute rejection. The vigorous and firm language of Congress in stamping with its disapproval the overtures of Great Britain was a remarkable testimony to the earnest spirit of independence which influenced its action. Congress, relying upon the good sense of its constituents to support it in its action, determined to make the proposals public and ordered that they should be printed. To the British overtures and a record of its action upon them, Congress appended some general remarks to the effect that they believed the bills were intended to create division in America; and that as the British were prepared to recede from unjustifiable claims, so must they inevitably come to the point of yielding independence. In view of the fact that the thirteen colonies had united in the Declaration of Independence, the committee made the following observation: "Wherefore any man or body of men, who should presume to make any separate or partial convention or agreement with commissioners under the crown of Great Britain, . . . ought to be considered and treated as open and avowed enemies of these United States." The committee also recommended that the several States should be called upon to use their most earnest efforts to have their quotas of Continental troops in the field as soon as possible.

On June 9th, the British commissioners, George Johnstone, Governor of West Florida, Lord Carlisle, and

Mr. Eden, attempted to open negotiations with Congress, but were refused the opportunity. They then forwarded a communication through the usual channels to President Henry Laurens and the other members of Congress, in which they sent a copy of their commission and offered to concur in any satisfactory and just arrangement toward the following objects: "To consent to a cessation of hostilities, both by sea and land; to restore free intercourse; to revive mutual affection, and to renew the common benefits of naturalization through the several parts of this empire; to extend every freedom to trade that our respective interests can require; to agree that no military forces shall be kept up in the different States of North America without the consent of the General Congress or particular Assemblies; to concur in measures calculated to discharge the debts of America, and to raise the credit and the value of the paper circulation; to perpetuate our union by reciprocal deputation of an agent or agents from the different States, who shall have the privilege of a seat and voice in the Parliament of Great Britain, or if sent from Britain in that case to have a seat and voice in the Assemblies of the different States to which they may be deputed respectively, in order to attend to the several interests of those by whom they are deputed." The answer to the bills of conciliation having already been given and the action of France by this time being known, President Laurens, by order of Congress, replied to the commissioners that nothing but an earnest desire to spare further effusion of blood had induced Congress to have their communication read, so derogatory to the honor of an independent nation did that body regard it. The course of Parliament and their communication were alike declared to be based upon the intolerable idea of dependence. President Laurens took the occasion to assert that, nevertheless, Congress was inclined to peace and would consider propositions looking to that end based upon the fundamental facts of the recognition of American independence. Notwithstanding this emphatic declaration, the commissioners supplemented their

letter of June 10th by another on July 11th. To this last communication Congress directed that no reply be made. Governor Johnstone thereupon sought to influence individual members of Congress through private correspondence. This action was followed by an appeal to the country at large. But Congress declared that persons distributing these manifestoes were not entitled to the protection of the flag. Yet that the people might not feel that anything was being reserved from them, Congress ordered the manifestoes and proclamations to be printed in the newspapers. As the commissioners had threatened that the country would be laid waste on October 30th, Congress issued a proclamation declaring that should their enemies attempt to make good their threat or continue their present barbarous conduct of the war it would take exemplary vengeance of a kind which would deter the British army from a repetition of such actions. Parliament was now fully aware of the futility of attempting to divert the American States from their purpose by negotiations or by threats.

On April 10, 1778, Gerard, bearing his credentials as minister to the Congress of the United States, sailed from Toulon with a French fleet. On September 14th, Benjamin Franklin was appointed by Congress minister to the Court of France. On Sunday, August 6th, Gerard, having arrived in America, was received by Congress, which body listened to the protestations of affection which he bore from the King of France, and in return piously acknowledged "the hand of a gracious Providence in raising them up so powerful a friend."

Although the close ties subsisting between Spain and France identified in a large degree the policies of the two countries, Spain, by reason of her North American holdings, had independent reasons for dreading the supremacy of the United States in North America. Early in 1778, she sent Juan de Miralez to Philadelphia. He was not accredited to Congress, but was received by that body with unsuspecting confidence as the representative of a prospective ally,

when in truth he came as a spy and an intriguer. The independent action of France toward America had created in Spain a feeling of jealousy, and a question of the good faith of its ally. Florida Blanca, in April, 1778, declared to the French ambassador at the Court of Spain his displeasure at the policy of France toward the United States, declaring: "The announcement of your treaty with them is worthy of Don Quixote." Spain was influenced by two sentiments, first to prevent the independence of the United States, second to act as mediator in fixing the terms of peace between them and Great Britain. Blanca proposed to the British minister to compose their differences by demarcating spheres of influence in North America. The British to have the basin of the St. Lawrence with the territory northwest of the Ohio, and to bound the United States by the Alleghanies. Lord Weymouth responded that negotiations of any sort could not be entered into so long as France supported the colonies in rebellion; but as both Great Britain and Spain were interested in preserving their colonial dependencies, he proposed alliance between the two nations. This proposition was disregarded because it ran counter to so much that Spain believed to be essential in her policy.

Albeit Spain was ill-prepared for war she gave out hints to France that she would be ready to attack Great Britain by October. Notwithstanding that France had taken sides with America, she was as indisposed as Spain to raise the United States to the position of arbiter of the destinies of the continent of North America. Said Vergennes: "On our side, there will be no difficulty in guaranteeing to England Canada and all other American possessions which may remain to her at the peace. The king has recognized the thirteen provinces as free and independent States; for them we ask independence, but without comprehending other English possessions. We are very far from desiring that the nascent republic should remain the exclusive mistress of all that immense continent." The French minister at Philadelphia constantly urged the members of Congress to

limit the bounds of their ambition to the territory of the thirteen colonies. Gouverneur Morris advocated the passage of a law fixing the limits of American dominion. John Jay, then president of Congress said: "Our empire is already too great to be well governed; and its Constitution is inconsistent with the passion for conquest." Jay was a warm advocate of a triple alliance between France, the United States and Spain. In order to induce Spain to come into such an alliance, Vergennes in October, 1778, named as the only provisions France would exact in the conditions of peace: first, continuance in whole or abrogation in entirety of the Treaty of Utrecht; secondly, freedom to restore the harbor of Dunkirk; and thirdly, the coast of Newfoundland from Cape Bonavista to Cape St. John, with exclusive fishery from the first point to Point Riche. From this time Florida Blanca was in earnest in desiring to join France in the war. However, the demands of his government as compensation for such an alliance were enormous. France was to undertake the invasion of Great Britain alone and Spain was to be assured the cession of Gibraltar. All the while the court of France pretended indifference to affairs in the American colonies and persisted in offering mediation to Great Britain. When the Spanish minister had secured from Vergennes every concession which he could possibly expect a convention was drawn up, and on April 12th the treaty was signed. France bound herself to undertake the invasion of Great Britain or Ireland; if Great Britain were driven from Newfoundland, its fisheries were to be shared solely with Spain. The two courts bound themselves not to grant peace to England until Gibraltar was restored to Spain; besides which, effort was to be made to recover for that country Minorca, Pensacola, Mobile, the Bay of Honduras, and the Coast of Campeachy. By the conclusion of this treaty Great Britain gained a new enemy and the United States a doubtful friend. The attempt of Spain to limit the United States to the Atlantic coast was already sure of defeat.

CHAPTER XIII

MIDDLE STATE SUPREMACY AND BORDER STATE STRIFE

VALLEY FORGE, the place selected by Washington for winter quarters after the defeats of Brandywine and Germantown, had the merits of being central and readily defended. From the military point of view the choice was in every way admirable, although there were many who criticised Washington's selection. The winter at Valley Forge was an era of suffering which has given to the American commander-in-chief and his patient forces a distinction hardly less enviable than that achieved by the victories of Newport and Trenton. The army first employed itself in making the place habitable. Huts were erected in regular lines, and the men performed the arduous labor upon rations which were barely sufficient to sustain life. Meat was seldom obtainable, and the usual form of bread was made by mixing flour and water and baking the paste into cakes. As blankets and other coverings were extremely scarce, and as many of the soldiers were entirely without shoes, suffering from the cold was intense; and at night the troopers huddled about camp fires to keep from freezing. It was the 1st of January, 1778, before the army was housed, and by that time the privations they had endured had rendered three thousand men unfit for duty. The situation of the army was only improved to the extent of shelter. The devastation of the country by the contending armies had swept it bare of everything that might have added to the well-being

of the soldiers. Not even straw for pallets could be obtained, and the cold earth had to serve for a sleeping place. Frequently the horror of actual famine had to be faced. The horses succumbed in great numbers, which increased the difficulties of transportation and laid upon the men themselves much of the labor of hauling firewood. So the days passed in an unvaried round of cold, nakedness, hunger, and toil. The men were more than once on the point of mutiny and general desertion, for now and again their hardships reached the limit of endurance. However, whether because of the force of example of their superiors, who bore the same hardships which they themselves experienced, or because of their desperate patriotism, the rank and file, despite their tortures, remained faithful to their commander and their country.

The heroic sufferings of the army at Valley Forge are in striking contrast to the captious fault finding of Congress during that celebrated winter. John and John Quincy Adams, Richard Henry Lee, and other men prominent in Congress brought Washington under criticism, and unfavorably contrasted him with General Gates and the latter's conduct of the northern campaign. Every measure which Washington took at Valley Forge was carped at. Thus, Mr. Clark, of New Jersey, came to the remarkable conclusion that the action of Washington in taking strong measures to secure food for his starving men and his insistence that the people of the Middle States who had been influenced by the British amnesty should take the oath of allegiance to the United States were invasions of popular rights. Others of that body, which Gouverneur Morris said had depreciated as much as the currency, proposed to supersede Washington by Gates, who was hailed as the conqueror of Burgoyne. That general was entirely pliable and complacently fell in with, if he did not directly instigate, the schemes of Washington's enemies. The mischief went further, for the army became inoculated with a virus of distrust of its commander-in-chief. Congress had a peculiar

fondness for foreign soldiers, and was continually issuing commissions to hungry adventurers whose desire to take part in the war was not related to its cause, but was inspired simply by the desire of profit. The evil had its source in the American commissioner, Silas Deane, and when Washington opposed the policy he made new enemies. Congress could not be brought to see that a Steuben, a De Kalb, a Lafayette, a Kosciuszko, and a Pulaski were the rare exceptions. Had the practice of loading the army with foreign officers been allowed to proceed unchecked, it would have been fatal to organization and discipline. The foreign aspirants for American military honors were under the lead of an Irish adventurer named Conway, whose pique was due to his inability to secure at once a major-general's commission. Washington had dismissed his claims by the terse comment that "Conway's merit and importance existed more in his own imagination than in reality." Conway, bent upon revenge and the office he desired, covertly attacked Washington. He addressed a letter to Gates, in which the commander-in-chief was spoken of in terms of great disrespect. The letter came to the knowledge of Washington, who addressed a curt note of remonstrance to Conway; whereupon the latter sought to apologize. However, Conway's friends were strong in Congress; and that body enlarged the Board of War, placing Gates at the head of it, and including in its membership Thomas Mifflin, a virulent opponent of Washington. The Board appointed Conway inspector-general, with the rank of major-general, and Gates exerted his influence to hamper Washington by refusing him men and supplies and subjecting him to various petty annoyances and slights. In this way, the so-called "Conway Cabal" sought to drive Washington from his position. He did not preserve a passive relation to his persecutors, but relentlessly pursued Gates with the Conway letter and kept that general in an uncomfortable frame of mind throughout the winter. When Conway visited his camp, Washington received him with studied coldness. The

plotters failed at every point in their schemes against the commander-in-chief, but they succeeded in withholding from him the supplies which would have relieved the sufferings of his starving men. Washington felt keenly the fact that because of the spleen of the Conway faction against himself, his men were forced to suffer. As spring approached and active operations became necessary, the cabal went to pieces: Mifflin was put under Washington's orders, Gates was ordered to his command in the north, and Conway resigned from the Board. The latter closed his career in America by a duel, in which he was severely wounded. Upon recovering, he wrote to Washington a contrite note and left the country.

While Washington's men were suffering from the privation and exposure of Valley Forge the British army was quartered in Philadelphia. Warmly housed and amply supplied with the necessaries and even the luxuries of life, they passed those winter months, so replete with agony for the American army, in pleasant idleness. At this time Washington stood absolutely alone, save for the officers of his immediate command. In March Greene was made quartermaster-general and the long delayed supplies were forwarded to the camp. Though reinforcements had been denied and few preparations for the spring compaign could be made, the hardships of Valley Forge and the stern disciplinary measures which it necessitated had welded the army into material from which might readily be fashioned a fighting force of great power. The turn of fortune now brought to Washington the man above all others fitted to assist him in this fashioning. Baron Steuben, who had as an officer performed distinguished service in the Seven Years' War and who represented the best type of soldier of the school of Frederick, a commander of unsurpassed brilliancy, came to Valley Forge and from his efforts arose a well-organized and conquering army.

Early in May, 1778, the news of the French alliance was celebrated in the camp with salvos of artillery and musketry.

The army, now full of spirit and disciplined and strengthened by new levies, was ready for the field. The British still tarried in Philadelphia and it became evident that Howe had achieved little by the capture of that city. The British ministry was displeased that the only result of Howe's campaign was the obtaining of comfortable winter quarters for the troops and decided to recall him and to bestow the command upon Clinton. The British in Philadelphia, however, gave Howe an ovation and hailed him as a great military genius. Washington sent Lafayette to observe the enemy at Barren Hill and through a well-planned manœuvre by Howe the French general barely escaped capture. However, the glory of such a feat was not to grace the retirement of the British general, and Lafayette and his force escaped. Howe departed from America and gave place to the inefficient Clinton.

After a long delay, which was influenced to some extent by the arrival of the peace commissioners on June 18th, Clinton left Philadelphia meaning to go to New York. Washington decided to contest his passage across New Jersey. The American force numbered thirteen thousand while that of the British was seventeen thousand. General Charles Lee, who, at the time of Washington's retreat through New Jersey, had been captured by a British scouting party, had been exchanged and was again in the American camp. He still entertained his opinion that the British were invincible. He was pertinacious in thrusting upon Washington his opinion that the British meant to hold Pennsylvania and would speedily march on to New York. Washington, though the most generous of men, had now come to estimate Lee at his real value, and paid little attention to his vagaries. Breaking camp he moved rapidly after the British. Although opposed by a number of his officers, Washington, having the support of effective men like Greene, Wayne, and Lafayette, persisted in his plans, and detaching Wayne with his force to effect a junction with Brigadier-General William Maxwell and the New Jersey

militia and engage the enemy, he prepared to bring up the main army. Charles Lee was given command of the advance division, although he had previously refused it. Had he persisted in declining the post, which by rank belonged to him, Lafayette would have received it.

The New Jersey militia harried Clinton's army, which was suffering from heat and thirst on its northward march. Clinton arrived at Crosswicks before the Americans could destroy the bridge. In order to escape Washington's forces which were pressing upon his flank, he sent forward his baggage train and deflecting his army toward Freehold made for the Neversink Hills and the coast. On the 26th of June he encamped at Monmouth Court House with his left still at Freehold. The American army was but eight miles distant, with the advance division under Lee three miles further on. Washington sent orders to Lee to attack the British the next day upon their resuming the line of march. But that general made no plans to carry out his commander's orders so that the next morning it was the New Jersey militia under Dickinson and not Lee who first opened fire upon the British rearguard under Knyphausen. The Hessian leader turned upon the militia, which retired, thus bringing Lee into the engagement. That general immediately began to fall back and divided his force with the purpose of cutting off isolated parties of the enemy. The men were ready and eager to fight, but Lee did not give them a chance for a general engagement; his orders were confusing, and the men losing heart began to retreat, which encouraged Clinton to reinforce Knyphausen. Washington heard that the militia were engaged and he ordered Lee to bring on a general engagement and informed him that he would move to his support. He pressed forward with the main army, his men throwing aside their knapsacks in order to advance more quickly. But before they could join in the engagement word was received of Lee's retreat. It was inconceivable to Washington that Lee should retire immediately upon the advance of the foe when he had knowledge

that the main army was coming to his support. Filled with amazement and anger, Washington put spurs to his horse and galloped to the front. Meeting Lee's advanced stragglers and then the full division in precipitate retreat his worst fears were realized. At last, meeting Lee he rode straight at him and with fierce oaths demanded the meaning of his cowardice. Lee quailed before Washington's outburst of wrath and stammered a lame excuse. There was no adequate answer that could be returned to Washington's question, none that could in any measure exculpate the recreant general and he was ordered to the rear. A court-martial found him guilty of insubordination and suspended him for a year, but he never resumed military duties, for he was dismissed from the service by Congress. His treason was conclusively shown when Howe's papers were published in 1857, and Lee sank out of history into private life with strong suspicions of treason clinging to him.

Washington took command of the broken division and rallied its men who gladly responded to his able generalship. With the division reformed and the main army in action, the British were repulsed. Washington routed the enemy and drove them from the field of battle. Under cover of night Clinton continued his retreat and arrived at New York. The timorousness, if not the treachery of Lee, almost lost the day for the Americans; had Lafayette been in command of the advance division the victory of Monmouth would have been glorious. As it was, it was complete enough to strengthen the confidence of the army and of the people of the country in the ultimate success of their cause. The British were now driven from the Middle States, and were in possession of only New York, which was covered by the guns of their fleet, and Newport. Frustrated by their defeats at Trenton and Princeton in their purpose to reach Philadelphia from the north, they had succeeded in reaching it from the south only to find their conquest of the city worthless and an absolute source of weakness, as they were without a line of communication with New York,

which was necessary if they were to hold the country and check any movement of the Americans by land.

After the battle of Monmouth, the army was inactive for some months, but on July 8th the arrival of a French fleet, consisting of twelve ships of the line and three frigates, under D'Estaing, marked a new development in the war. D'Estaing hoped to surprise Howe's fleet in the Delaware, but he arrived too late to do so. Howe, whose ships were all in bad condition, had escaped, fortunately avoiding an encounter with D'Estaing's superior strength. Not finding the enemy in Delaware Bay, D'Estaing proceeded to Sandy Hook. He next entertained the idea of conquering Newfoundland, which, so far as the interests of the United States were concerned, would have been a profitless undertaking; but, yielding to the wishes of Washington he consented to go to Newport and coöperate with the army in an attack upon the British who held the place with six thousand men. The French fleet arrived off Newport on August 8th. Had D'Estaing remained off Sandy Hook a few days longer he would have had a sure opportunity of taking some of the British fleet, for the squadron under Admiral Byron, who had been sent out to relieve Admiral Howe, met with bad weather and within eight days after the departure of the French fleet four of the vessels put in singly at Sandy Hook.

The enthusiasm caused by the arrival of the French fleet brought several thousand recruits to the Americans. Hence, Sullivan, who had been detailed by Washington to coöperate with D'Estaing, had a large force at his command. The French fleet remained outside of the port for ten days, and then running in past the batteries forced the British to destroy their harbor defence ships. Howe appeared outside with his squadron and D'Estaing put out to sea to engage him. A strong gale arose which prevented an engagement, and the ships of both admirals were damaged. Howe was forced to return to New York to make repairs to his fleet, and D'Estaing returned to Newport and

announced that it would be necessary for him to go to Boston to refit. Before his departure Generals Greene and Lafayette, who had been sent by Washington to the aid of Sullivan, went aboard his flagship and urged him not to go to Boston, but he informed them that his instructions required him to repair to that place in case his fleet met with injury. Upon the report of Greene and Lafayette, a council of war was held and a protest was drawn up to the French admiral in which it was declared that to take his fleet to Boston at this time was derogatory to the honor of France, contrary to the intention of his monarch, and destructive to the welfare of the United States, as well as being contrary to the spirit of the alliance between the two countries. Had D'Estaing conformed to the plan of Washington and coöperated with Sullivan in the reduction of Newport, and not have been turned aside by the appearance of Howe's fleet, that town would almost assuredly have been taken. The storm which had brought disaster to the French fleet had also worked great damage to the forces of Sullivan by ruining a large part of their ammunition and wrecking their camp. The failure of the plan of attack upon Newport discouraged the militia, who returned to their homes in large numbers. Moreover, the British force, which now outnumbered the six thousand men of Sullivan was soon to be reinforced by four thousand men under Clinton. Under these circumstances, Sullivan was constrained to retreat to the mainland. The retreat was effected in a cautious manner on August 30th, under cover of night. Lafayette, who had ridden from Boston, a distance of nearly seventy miles, in seven hours, in order to participate in an engagement, was greatly chagrined, and returned to Boston. In making their retreat the American forces were attacked by the British, whereupon Greene, turning upon his pursuers, drove them back to their works. In their abortive attempt to take Newport, the Americans lost two hundred and eleven, and the British two hundred and sixty men. However, this skirmish by Greene availed nothing more than to display

American spirit. Clinton having arrived too late employed himself in making depredations upon the farms of Martha's Vineyard and the shipping at New Bedford.

The Newport affair was similar to all the other engagements of that summer, excepting only that in this case the French fleet was present. One of the most disastrous of the events of the summer was the surprise and massacre of an American force of light dragoons under Lieutenant-Colonel George Baylor. While employed in watching and intercepting British foraging parties, they were surprised by a party of the enemy under General Grey, at Tappan, New York, who surrounded them while they were asleep and applied the bayonet, in spite of pleas for quarter. Of the one hundred and four men in Baylor's force, the wounded and prisoners numbered sixty-seven. In September, Captain Ferguson led a British force against Little Egg Harbor where were collected a number of privateers and prizes. Many of these were destroyed, although some made their escape. Before returning to New York Ferguson surprised and put to death a party of fifty Americans. These several expeditions gave a setback to the American privateers and furnished the British with considerable supplies. Clinton instigated a raid by Indians into Cherry Valley in November, during which the tribesmen burned houses and killed and scalped some thirty persons. The approach of winter found the British in possession of New York and Newport, while Washington had his men disposed so as to form a line of defence from Long Island Sound to West Point, and thence south to the Delaware. His headquarters were at Middlebrook. Thus, excepting for the actual ground they occupied, the British were entirely dispossessed of the Middle and New England States, although they had been campaigning in them for three years. This achievement, so largely due to Washington, had been accomplished in the face of an impotent Congress. The actual direction of affairs did not come from the general government but from the commanding general.

As we have already seen, Spain, because of her territorial interests in North America, hesitated long before contracting an alliance with France which might turn out for the benefit of the American States. But even while the Spanish minister wrangled with Vergennes, the musket and the axe of the backwoodsman was marking out the course of the western expansion. The British policy with regard to the aborigines greatly influenced the character of the war in the west. That policy was a wide one and embraced a design to unite all the Indian tribes against the Americans so as to harry the western borders and prevent American expansion. The British had a large degree of success in uniting the Indian tribes of the northwest and west. The British lieutenant in the northwest was Henry Hamilton, who resided at Detroit, and to him was intrusted the conduct of Indian warfare. In 1776 he had effected the necessary Indian alliances, and for two years a ferocious border warfare was conducted. The scalps brought in by the savage allies were bought and paid for in Detroit with British coin. The contest with the Indians fell to the frontiersman. Hamilton in carrying out his orders to check the tide of western immigration directed his efforts principally against the borders of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The American outposts to the south of Ohio River, from which were to spring the State of Kentucky, were largely at the mercy of the Indian allies of the British. The horrors inflicted by the savages on the settlements of Kentucky gave to that country the descriptive name of the "dark and bloody ground." The warfare was hand to hand, and was carried on according to the methods practised by the savage and the frontiersman. The story of that phase of the Revolutionary War is a record of personal heroism in which the names of women share the honors with those of men. The battlefields of Kentucky evolved such notable pioneer leaders as Boone, Logan, and Kenton.

Among the western leaders whose names are cherished for their success in preserving for the new nation the vast

territory of the west, none holds a higher place than that of the young Virginian, George Rogers Clark. On January 2, 1778, he began the formation of a party of adventurous spirits, and when he had gathered them he made an expedition into the Illinois Country. On July 4, 1778, he captured Kaskaskia; Vincennes was captured and recaptured; Cahokia yielded to the Americans.

The effect of Clark's expedition was to break the hold of the British upon the western country and to destroy the confederacy of the Indian tribes. By the courage of this resourceful frontiersman, an immense territory, larger than many of the States of Europe, was wrested from the control of the British. The attempt to limit the advance of the American vanguard across the continent was frustrated, and when the Treaty of Paris was signed it gave the United States a territory bounded on the north by the Great Lakes and on the west by Mississippi River.

To understand the influence of the British over the Indians, it is necessary to state that since the Peace of Paris, in 1763, transactions with the savages had been carried on mostly through superintendents appointed by the British king. Thus the Indians came to look upon the king as their natural protector, and listened readily to the insinuation of the British agents that if the colonies succeeded in throwing off their allegiance to Great Britain they would next turn upon the Indians and extirpate them. At the same time, the Americans used every means to persuade the Indians that the quarrel did not belong to them and that they should take sides with neither party. On January 26, 1776, Congress resolved to expend £40,000 in the distribution of presents of goods and trinkets among the Indians, but this resolution was not put into effect. South Carolina was one of the first States to experience the bad effects of the British influence over the Indians. The Cherokees and the Creeks occupied lands near the western boundaries of Carolina and Georgia. For several years before the outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain, intercourse with

these tribes had been conducted by John Stuart, an officer of the crown. Upon the rupture of relations between the colonies and the mother country, Stuart prepared a plan to land an armed force in Florida, which was to proceed to the western frontier of the Southern States and make a junction with the Tories and the Indians to raid the settlements of the Americans. At the same time, it was intended that a fleet should land an army on the seacoast. The capture of Moses Kirkland, one of the principal agents for the execution of the plan, furnished General Gates with full information with regard to it. Although the Americans were enabled to frustrate Stuart's scheme, nevertheless the Cherokees began to carry out their part of it and committed several massacres at the time the British fleet was attacking Fort Moultrie. The defeat of the British and their retirement from the South gave the people of that section a free hand to punish the Indians, although their design was not so much retaliation as it was intimidation and the prevention of future coöperation between the Indians and the British. Accordingly Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia acted together in the summer of 1776 in sending a large punitive force over the Alleghany Mountains to traverse the Indian settlements, burning the towns and destroying the fields of corn. About five hundred Cherokees were forced to take refuge in Florida, under the protection of the British government. They sued for peace, and concluded a treaty with South Carolina by which they ceded considerable territory to that colony. Little further difficulty was experienced with the Cherokees for several years. This was not the case, however, with the Indians in the immediate vicinity of British posts. There the British agents gave presents and incited to deeds of rapine and pillage.

One of the most prominent of the Indian leaders, Joseph Brant, a Mohawk and the chief of the confederacy of the Six Nations, on March 14, 1776, gave Germain, the British secretary of state, assurance of aid against the colonies of New England. It was the purpose of Germain to employ

the Indians along the whole of the frontier and in accordance with his engagements with the British, Joseph Brant in the summer of 1777 aroused the natives to the work of slaughter, but he induced the tribes to demand that they should operate under leaders of their own choosing, his purpose being to allow them to gratify their cruelty unrestrained. It was upon these allies that Germain depended for the destruction of communications between Albany and Lake George. During the Burgoyne campaign, Gates sought to counteract the authority of the British over the powerful tribes of the Six Nations, and in May, 1777, thus addressed a council of the warriors: "The United States are now one people; suffer not any evil spirit to lead you into war. Brothers of the Mohawks, you will be no more a people from the time you quit your ancient habitations; if there is any wretch so bad as to think of prevailing upon you to leave the sweet stream so beloved by your forefathers, he is your bitterest enemy. Before many moons pass away, the pride of England will be laid low; then how happy will it make you to reflect that you have preserved the neutrality so earnestly recommended to you from the beginning of the war! Brothers of the Six Nations, the Americans well know your great fame and powers as warriors; the only reason why they did not ask your help against the cruelty of the king was, that they thought it ungenerous to desire you to suffer in a quarrel in which you had no concern. Brothers, treasure all I have said in your hearts; for the day will come when you will hold my memory in veneration for the good advice contained in this speech." It was impossible, however, to break the hold of the British upon the Indian chiefs and the horrors of Indian warfare became the most dreadful chapter of the war.

On July 1, 1778, the Indians instigated by Tory allies swooped down upon a flourishing settlement in the valley of the Wyoming on the eastern branch of the Susquehanna. The region had been colonized by Connecticut. In the winter of 1776 the people had supplied Washington with

two companies of infantry, although their exposed situation made it important to have the men at home for the protection of their families. Knowing of the alliance of the British with the Six Nations they had built a line of ten forts as places of refuge. The Senecas, one of the fiercest of the tribes of the Indian confederacy, nourished their resentment at the loss of many of their number in the battle of Oriskany. Their chief was strengthened in his attachment to Great Britain on hearing of the Franco-American alliance because of his implacable hatred for the French people. The Tories in this remote settlement were under little control by the Americans, though twenty-seven of them had been arrested and sent to Hartford, Connecticut, and afterward released. Burning with resentment they made common cause with the Indians in planning the attack upon the Wyoming settlement. Their combined force was between five and seven hundred men. This body was commanded by Colonel John Butler. On the last day of June they hid in the forests about Wyoming. The next day they began their attack. The two upper forts capitulated, but some of their garrison had retired to the principal fort of Kingston. Colonel Butler demanded the surrender of that stronghold. In the meantime the members of the one regular company, and other men of Wyoming, in numbers hardly more than three hundred, took counsel and decided that they had no recourse but to give battle to their enemies. On July 3d, they advanced under the lead of Colonel Zebulon Butler who had retired from the Continental service. The invaders pretended to retreat, but instead crouched upon the ground in the wood. As the villagers drew near to where the Indians and Tories were in ambush they fired at a few of the enemy who showed themselves for the purpose of drawing on the defenders. Then the whole body of Senecas and the Tories joined in the attack. The Indians gave no quarter, and in less than a half-hour two hundred and twenty-five scalps dangled at their belts. The Tories saved the lives of but five of the captives. The

murderers lost but two whites killed and eight Indians wounded. The next day the remaining forts, which were filled chiefly with women and children, surrendered. These were permitted to pass through the hills to the eastern settlements. The Senecas continued their depredations throughout the surrounding country, and the British leader boasted that his party had burnt a thousand houses. Germain extolled his prowess and determined on sending out similar parties to the older settlements.

Bent on avenging the massacres by the Indians, Congress on February 25, 1779, gave Washington directions to afford protection to the frontier settlements, and to proceed against the Senecas. Accordingly, three thousand men were sent by way of the Susquehanna to the Wyoming Valley, while another thousand troops composed of New York men were directed to operate from Mohawk River. The command of this expedition was given to Sullivan, who received orders to carry as little baggage as was necessary and to give the expedition his very best efforts. However, Sullivan wasted valuable time, and the Indians continued their outrages. Aided by the British, Fort Schuyler was surprised and twenty-nine men were captured. The whole west bank of the Susquehanna was ravaged by the savages, and the British leader, MacDonell, reported that they were "glutted with plunder, prisoners, and scalps." Thirty miles of country was laid waste. Brant and his men consumed with fire all the settlements of Minisink with the exception of one fort. Being pursued, they turned upon their pursuers and added forty more scalps to their bloody trophies. In the meanwhile, their depredations had met with some retaliation at the hands of Colonel Van Schaick and Colonel Marinus Willett, who made a swift march into the country of the Onondagas and destroyed their settlements without the loss of a man.

It was July, 1779, before Sullivan was prepared to move from Wyoming. He arrived at Tioga and the presence of such a strong force spread terror among the Indians. On August 22d, Sullivan was joined by the New York men

under General James Clinton and began the march into the Indian country. In their straits, the Indian chiefs sent an urgent message to the governor of Canada for aid. Sullivan, in the battle of Newtown, destroyed eighteen villages and their fields of corn, and returned to New Jersey. Colonel Broadhead with a small party from Fort Pitt broke up the Seneca towns on the upper branch of the Alleghany. Convinced of the inability of Great Britain to protect them, the Six Nations were forced to a position of neutrality.

Another British expedition of the summer of 1779 was that of the Tory ex-governor of New York, Tryon, who led a pillaging expedition against Connecticut on July 5th. He divided his men into two parties, and at two o'clock in the morning they simultaneously approached New Haven from the east and the west side. Houses were plundered, and the vessels in the harbor, the public stores, and the warehouses were destroyed by fire. Tryon's forces continued their pillage throughout the day, but the next morning retired before the Connecticut militia. Similar scenes were enacted at East Haven, but the British were driven to their ships. On July 7th, the expedition landed at Fairfield where the men were let loose to plunder, and every building was stripped. That evening houses were set on fire, and the next day the conflagration was made general. On the 11th, the campaign of fire and pillage was extended to Norwalk. New London was the next place selected for burning, but Tryon was called back to New York.

Excepting for the suffering they brought to the people, these plundering expeditions caused Washington little apprehension as they were without military importance. He became more concerned when Sir Henry Clinton took possession of Stony Point and Verplanck's Point, driving off the Americans and obtaining control of King's Ferry, which was an important line of communication between New York and New Jersey. Clinton landed five hundred men at Stony Point and set about strengthening the works there. Washington determined to stop this work. A British post in

the north would endanger the American stronghold at West Point, which controlled the river. Washington accordingly decided to take Stony Point, and casting about for a good leader his choice fell upon Brigadier-general Wayne. He was an irrepressible fighter and years before had received from the Indians the name "Black Snake." But later, when they had suffered a severe drubbing at his hands, they named him "Tornado." The men under him called him "Mad Anthony," because of his reckless daring. Tradition has it that when Washington asked Wayne whether he would storm Stony Point that general expressed his confidence in his superior officer by replying: "I will storm Hell if you plan it." Washington planned and Wayne stormed, although he had a difficult task in doing it, for by this time, July 15th, Stony Point had been strongly fortified and the approach to it was far from easy.

Making his way with his troops from Sandy Beach on July 15th, Wayne proceeded through the mountains by hard marching until at eight o'clock in the evening they found themselves at the rear of the fort and within a mile and a half of the works. Here they rested, for Wayne proposed to make the attack at midnight. He divided his forces into two columns with a storming party at the extremity of each wing. These parties marched with unloaded muskets, trusting to their bayonets. Wayne held Harry Lee's light horse for the reserve and three hundred men under General Muhlenburg were to cover the attack. When all arrangements were made, according to Washington's directions, a slip of white paper bearing the words "The fort is ours," was given to each man to fix in his cap; this was the watchword of the Americans in their attack. The columns moved rapidly forward; Major Murfree and his North Carolina troops were delayed by a marsh, upon emerging from which they met an outpost and were fired upon. The alarm was now given, but Murfree and his men and the other columns rushed to the attack. Wayne led the right wing. A musket ball grazed his head and stunned him and

his men picked him up and bore him forward with them. The well-directed attack was irresistible. The men stormed the works and poured over into the fort. The sharp attack was quickly successful. The Americans lost ninety-eight men killed and wounded and the British ninety-four, the rest of the garrison being taken prisoners. Guns and munitions of war to the value of $160,000 were taken. The victors withdrew and Clinton again occupied the fort, but abandoned it in the autumn.

Another exploit of this summer was the attack of Major Harry Lee and his light horse on one of the strongest of the enemy's posts. This was Paulus Hook, on the site of Jersey City. At that time it was merely a ferry landing. Between the Hook and the mainland there was a morass which might be crossed only by a narrow way which was passable by coaches. The place was vital, as it commanded the road to the South and had great elements of military strength. The British had seen the utility of fortifying it and had done so strongly on both the land and the water sides, the latter being by batteries and having the further protection of men-of-war. The task of capturing this stronghold was assigned by Washington to Lee upon the earnest solicitation of the latter. Lee reconnoitred the surrounding country and on August 18th he himself started. He became separated from the Virginia contingent and found himself at the Hook at midnight with only one hundred and fifty men. He knew that the ordinary strength of the garrison was not less than two hundred men. Giving the word to his men at three o'clock in the morning they plunged into the water and struggled across the morass. The garrison heard their approach and opened fire, but the Americans were upon them and were soon in possession of one of the block houses. A dozen of the British were killed and one hundred and fifty-nine taken captive. Lee retired with this body of prisoners, outnumbering his own men. The capture of Paulus Hook accomplished nothing of military advantage, but it showed the British the character of the men whom they had to fight.

CHAPTER XIV

THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGNS

AFTER nearly three years' freedom from the horrors of war, the South was again called upon to bear a heroic part in determining the result of the great conflict. Sir Henry Clinton, being relieved of anxiety with regard to the safety of New York by reason of the departure of the fleet of D'Estaing, determined on a new campaign in the South. The plan for the Southern campaign of 1778 was carefully prepared by Germain. It comprehended the following points: Detachments from the army at New York were to be sent to reduce Georgia and South Carolina, and, after that had been accomplished, the militia of these States was to be drafted into the British service and used to hold them for the king; the uplands, from which Tory sentiment had so long expressed itself with enough strength to retard and almost prevent the inclusion of these colonies into the Union, were to be separated from the plantation or low-lying region. The former, if found recalcitrant, were to be held to their forced allegiance by the aid of the Indian allies of the British, while the latter was to be threatened by a scourge almost as detestable,—an uprising of the blacks; the city of Charleston was to be taken in due time. It was thought that upon the arrival of even a small force of British at Cape Fear "large numbers of the inhabitants would doubtless flock to the standard of the king" and the royal government would be speedily reëstablished in North Carolina. Thus three important States would be again brought

under British control. But, with their usual inertness, the British permitted the summer to pass without serious offensive operations. With the coming of autumn Brigadier-general Prevost opened the campaign by sending from East Florida into Georgia two expeditions of British regulars and Tory refugees. The one proceeded as far as Sunbury, where it was stopped, and the other as far as Ogeechee. These expeditions, particularly the latter, committed many of those acts of cruelty and devastation which were a regular feature of British punitive and coercive expeditions. In December operations upon a large scale were commenced. In that month Lieutenant-colonel Campbell appeared off Tybee with a body of three thousand troops from New York. Robert Howe, who is not to be confused with the British general of that name, was the American commander in the southern district. Although he had a force greatly inferior to that of Campbell, owing to an unsuccessful expedition against Florida, he decided to defend Savannah; but he was not prepared to cope with a rear attack at the same time, when on December 9th a renegade negro led a party of the British through a swamp to the rear of the American force. The simultaneous attack of the forces in his front and rear caused Howe to make a precipitous retreat. Campbell thereupon gave clear evidence as to the lines upon which the Southern campaign was to be conducted, for he offered to the inhabitants of the country protection upon the single condition that they should take arms in support of a royal government which he proposed to establish. Although a number of civilians accepted these terms, many left their homes and departed to other sections of the State. The prisoners were crowded on board ships which were veritable pest houses, and many of them died of infection. The people of South Carolina were dissatisfied with Howe, and their delegates voiced the sentiments of their constituents when they requested his removal and procured the appointment of General Benjamin Lincoln in his stead. Lincoln had joined Washington's camp as major-general of militia in 1776. His

record was an honorable one, but he had seen little service and that which he had seen was devoid of military importance. In 1777, when reconnoitring in the rear of Burgoyne's army, he received a wound that incapacitated him for a year and was to render him lame for the rest of his life. On September 25, 1778, when not yet fully recovered from his wound, he was made commander-in-chief of the Southern Department.

It was early in January, 1779, that Prevost again appeared in Georgia and captured Sunbury. In the same month Augusta submitted to Campbell. Lincoln with about eleven hundred men took his position at Perrysburg. The British plan of campaign does not appear to have been fixed, for in January we find two hundred men detached to Beaufort, a movement which Moultrie, on February 3d, successfully met, driving back the intruders to their ships with great loss. North Carolina did not have men available to reinforce Lincoln, as the North Carolina regiments were with Washington. Nevertheless, the legislature promptly raised a force of two thousand men, for whom they had no arms, to serve for five months. The scanty stores of South Carolina were drawn upon and almost exhausted to arm this contingent, which was placed under the command of Colonel Ashe. At the end of January, 1779, they joined Lincoln. South Carolina furnished supplies and raised a regiment of light dragoons,—the latter by offering a bounty of $500 to persons enlisting for sixteen months. The British now extended their operations into South Carolina, parties being sent out to coerce or persuade the people to revolt against the Federal government. One of these parties was pursued by Colonel Pickens with a force of three hundred citizens of one of the small towns, and, on February 14th, was completely routed. The prisoners were given a civil trial, seventy of them were convicted of treason and rebellion against the commonwealth, and five of these were executed.

The American army, in discipline, numbers, and equipment, was greatly inferior to the British, but Lincoln detached General Ashe with a force of fifteen hundred militia

to recapture Augusta. The expedition proved disastrous. The militia was completely routed when Prevost fell upon it unawares at Brier Creek on March 3d. By wading the swamps and swimming the Savannah, four hundred and fifty of the force regained the camp, but the rest were killed or captured, or deserted the service. General Prevost considered this victory sufficiently important to warrant him in proclaiming a form of civil government for Georgia. Being reinforced with militia from South Carolina, Lincoln committed the post at Perrysburg to Moultrie, who in February had distinguished himself by gallantly repulsing the attack of Colonel Garstner and a superior force upon Beaufort, South Carolina, with a thousand men, and led his troops against Savannah, proceeding by way of Augusta. Prevost had open to him the alternatives of facing Lincoln or of making a descent upon Moultrie. As the latter course carried with it the prospect of considerable booty, it was chosen by the British leader. He attacked Moultrie's position with three thousand men and a band of Indian allies. For a week Moultrie's tactics checked the British advance; then the American commander retreated to Charleston. Good use was made of the time gained by Moultrie, and, when Prevost approached Charleston, he found it strongly fortified by well-planned defences. On May 9th and 10th Rutledge had arrived with a strong body of militia, and there also appeared a detachment of three hundred men from Lincoln's army. On May 11th, the British began the attack, but, as they were crossing Ashley River, a corps of Americans under Count Casimir Pulaski, whom Washington had placed in command at Charleston, was being ferried over Cooper River. It was impossible for the British to interfere with the movement of American troops across Cooper River, as the forces in Charleston had effectually blockaded the entrance to the river by sinking eleven vessels in the channel. For several days repeated and desperate assaults were made by the British, but Pulaski repulsed these, and, aided by reinforcements, he took the

offensive and drove Prevost from the State. The latter's invasion of South Carolina proved to be nothing but a raid through the richest sections of the State.

On December 26, 1779, General Henry Clinton left New York. He left General Knyphausen in command. Clinton led southward a large force of British and Hessians with artillery and cavalry. The force was under the convoy of Vice-admiral Arbuthnot. The fleet met with various misadventures, and did not arrive at Tybee, Georgia, until January 21, 1780. In a few days the transports set sail from Savannah and on February 11th, the troops were landed thirty miles from Charleston, taking possession of various points in the vicinity of that city. Upon learning of the sailing of Clinton, the American forces at Charleston began to fortify strongly the water approaches to the town, and, finding his task more difficult than he had thought it would be and having suffered losses from tempestuous weather, the British commander at once ordered reinforcements and additional stores from New York. At the same time he directed Prevost to coöperate with him from Savannah. The land and water forces having made a juncture on March 29th, they proceeded to erect counter fortifications to those of the Americans. Several islands in the harbor served the British well for this purpose, and a land force crossed Ashley River and broke ground at a point but eleven hundred yards from the American works. Thus defences and counter defences were in progress during the last days of March. Commodore Whipple at first strove to prevent Admiral Arbuthnot from crossing the bar at the entrance of the harbor, but, finding himself unable to do this, he fell back to Fort Moultrie and afterward to Charleston, and his boats, crews, and guns were landed to aid in reinforcing the batteries. On April 19th, Admiral Arbuthnot entered the harbor, passing Fort Moultrie under a heavy fire from Colonel Pinckney, who commanded on Sullivan's Island. The town was now threatened by batteries much stronger than the Americans possessed. The British were

active in the country about Charleston. They surprised and routed a post at Monk's Corner. The hope of securing recruits and reinforcements for the garrison was given up. On April 20th, Cornwallis with three thousand men arrived from New York, and on the 21st a council of the citizens decided that, as retreat was impracticable, and they could not hope to hold the town, "offers of capitulation should be made to General Clinton, which might admit of the army's withdrawing, and afford security to the persons and property of the inhabitants." These offers were proposed, but were rejected by the British commander, who declined to treat with civilians. In the meanwhile, the British continued their investment of the town until they commanded all the approaches to it by land and water. As the British admiral was inside the line of Sullivan's Island on May 6th, Colonel Pinckney and his one hundred and fifty men withdrew to Charleston, and the fort was occupied by the British. On the same day a small body of American cavalry which had escaped Colonel Banastre Tarleton in his surprise of Monk's Corner on April 14th were again surprised by that officer and the whole force killed, captured, or dispersed. At this time Clinton again opened correspondence with General Lincoln looking to the surrender of the town. But upon Lincoln's demurring to the conditions, Clinton renewed the attack. A heavy fire was kept up by both the British and the Americans, and the town took fire in several places from the bursting of shells. The British approached closely to the American works and prepared to make a general attack both by land and water. There were but three thousand men to hold the town against an attacking force of nine thousand, supported by a fleet. The attack was sustained until May 11th, when, recognizing the futility of prolonging the contest, and in compliance with a petition addressed to him by many citizens, Lincoln announced to Clinton his acceptance of the latter's stringent terms of surrender. On May 12th, the capitulation was signed and Major Leslie took possession

of the town. The losses on both sides during the siege had been inconsiderable. The garrison was required to march out of the town and to deposit their arms in front of the works, but they were spared the humiliation of passing under the British colors. The Continental troops were allowed to retain their baggage and had the prospect as prisoners of war of being exchanged. The inhabitants of the town were placed on parole. Including these, the British made five thousand prisoners of war, half of this number being of the garrison. General Lincoln was permitted to send a vessel bearing dispatches to Philadelphia. The British booty was of the value of £300,000, besides a considerable amount of munitions of war. Lincoln was severely censured for his attempt to defend Charleston, but the Southern States had been unwilling to yield to the enemy the only considerable coast town which they possessed and Lincoln believed that he would receive sufficient reinforcements to hold the place. Congress and the legislatures of North and South Carolina had made assurances to Lincoln that his force would be raised to at least ten thousand men, and under these conditions, he did not feel justified in evacuating the town. Upon taking Charleston, Clinton issued a manifesto to the people, calling upon them to give their allegiance to the British, and to aid in bringing about order and good government. The British next attempted to force the submission of the State. Garrison posts were established throughout the country.

Excepting the fall of Fort Washington on Hudson River, the reduction of Charleston by the British was the severest loss sustained by the Americans during the war. The conditions in the humiliated States were terrible; the Loyalists entered into the fruits of the British victory without let or hindrance. For months after the fall of Charleston, bloody encounters between the Loyalists and the Patriots were of daily occurrence; the States were in a condition of anarchy. The name of Tarleton became a terror to the countryside, and no one was safe from murder and robbery. The rapine

and pillage of the British and their supporters were, to an extent, offset by roving bands of their opponents, who subjected the Loyalists to atrocious retaliatory acts.

Sir Henry Clinton embarked for New York in June, taking with him the main army and leaving Cornwallis in command of five thousand men—a force which he deemed quite sufficient to hold the newly conquered States in subjection. The season of the year was not favorable for continuing active operations; and this fact, in connection with the unsettled state of the country, necessitating as it did constant military vigilance, influenced Cornwallis to remain inactive during the summer. Word was sent to the Loyalists of North Carolina to attend to their harvest and to make ready provisions to supply the British when in the late fall they invaded the State. Lord Rawdon was assigned the duty of policing the frontier and of the regulation of commercial and civil matters; the people, finding no other course open to them, quite generally submitted to the British and their exactions. They were either subjects of the British king or prisoners upon parole. The British came to believe that the conquest of North Carolina was also complete, because the people of that State gave little indication of a spirit of resistance. Following a plan of conciliation, Sir Henry Clinton decided to adopt the experiment of giving to the inhabitants a share in the civil government. As confiscation of property and even death was held out as the penalty of opposing British control, and as the British army was in possession of the States of the South, and the nearest army that could by any possibility aid them was four hundred miles to the north, the British considered the time opportune for making such an experiment. Relieved of the fear of American armies, the British believed that the people would be found favorable to British rule. The strong inducement to submission with many was, of course, the respite from the horrors of war which it obtained and the enjoyment of domestic security and public order. A proclamation had been issued by Clinton before his departure,

which set forth "that it was proper for all persons to take an active part in settling and securing his majesty's government." And that all the inhabitants "should, from and after June 20, be freed from their parole, and restored to all the rights and duties belonging to citizens and inhabitants." It was added that those persons who were subjects of this proclamation and withheld their allegiance to his majesty's government should be regarded and treated as rebels. Thus there was forced upon the people the alternative of coöperating with the British in reëstablishing the government of the king or else of departing from the country as refugees. For the men it implied military service. The proclamation had a different effect from that intended, for, when the men of North Carolina had to face the question of whom they would serve, the greater number of them declared that if fight they must they would be found on the side of America, along with their friends and countrymen. Large numbers of them construed this proclamation as a release from their parole, and armed themselves.

In the meanwhile, Governor Rutledge, of South Carolina, was earnestly endeavoring to enlist the aid of Congress and the States of North Carolina and Virginia in raising a force to withstand British arms in Georgia and South Carolina. Congress ordered a strong detachment of the main army to move southward, and North Carolina raised a considerable body of militia to take the field. A great many Revolutionists were also forced into North Carolina by the advance of the British in the upper regions of South Carolina. Among these was Colonel Sumter. A party of exiles from South Carolina selected him to be their leader and, returning to his own State with this little force, he became a thorn in the side of the victors. Already provoked at the lack of response to Clinton's proclamation and the many expedients resorted to for its evasion, the British were incensed at this challenge of their authority. In May, on Catawba River, Colonel Sumter's corps attacked and routed a detachment of the British, giving thus to the Americans the

first victory they had had since Clinton's force landed in the South at the beginning of the year. This exploit created enthusiasm among the disheartened South Carolinians and many from the northwestern frontiers of the State hastened to join Sumter's force, so that in a few days he found himself at the head of six hundred men whom he employed in a spirited attack upon the British at Rocky Mount on July 3, but, as the enemy were intrenched and Sumter had no artillery with which to drive them out of their works, he was obliged to retreat. But that his men might not be wearied by inactivity, Sumter attacked another detachment of the British and a large body of Tories at Hanging Rock on August 6th. The Prince of Wales's regiment was almost destroyed, only nine men remaining of its two hundred and seventy-eight. At the same time the Loyalists under Colonel Bryan were dispersed. The discouragements attending the loss of Charleston having abated to some extent, the Revolutionists again took up arms and, forming into independent bodies, effectively carried on operations similar to those in which Sumter was engaged. Such enterprises did much to revive the hopes of the people of the South and, when it was learned that the Maryland and Delaware troops had been detached from Washington's headquarters to operate in South Carolina, there was great rejoicing. After delays due to the difficulty of providing these troops with clothes and equipment, they embarked on April 16th at the head of Elk River and, landing at Petersburg, proceeded by land to South Carolina. The force was at first under command of the brilliant leader, Major-general Baron de Kalb, the most unpopular of the notable group of foreign officers who achieved distinction in the Continental service. But De Kalb was superseded by General Gates, who had been appointed to take the place of General Lincoln as commander-in-chief of the Southern Department. The troops were in wretched condition, but General Gates on taking command immediately ordered an advance and, disregarding advice which urged him to take such a route as would carry

the army through a fruitful country on his way to Camden, where Lord Rawdon had established his headquarters, as the place was the key to the northern part of South Carolina, he deliberately chose the shortest road to the British encampment, although in following it he led his forces through a barren country and caused them to suffer from scarcity of provisions. Thus the whole army was frequently reduced to a diet of green corn and peaches, which caused loud murmurings of discontent.

On reaching the frontier of South Carolina, Gates issued a proclamation offering amnesty to those citizens who had been coerced into submitting to the authority of the British, provided that they gave themselves heartily to the work of driving out the Loyalists. Gates's force now numbered four thousand men, but of regulars there were hardly one thousand. On hearing of the approach of Gates, Cornwallis hastened to Camden from Charleston, arriving there on August 14, 1780, the same day that Gates reached the place. Cornwallis was in command of seventeen hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry, but his troops were veterans and, notwithstanding his numerical disparity, he decided to risk an engagement. Accordingly, on August 15th, he moved from Camden with his whole force, for the purpose of giving battle to the Americans in their camp at Clermont. Gates did not know of the proximity of the British when he gave an order to march at ten o'clock on the evening of the 14th, with Colonel Arman's cavalry leading the advance, Colonel Porterfield's light infantry on the right and Major Armstrong's on the left. The advance forces of the armies met before Gates seemed aware of the presence of his foe. When he met Cornwallis, he did not realize the extent of the force opposing him, and ordered Stevens to charge with his several hundred raw troops, which had been recruited and brought to the field but the day before. Cornwallis met this move of Gates with his right wing under Webster, and the Virginians fled in a panic without firing a gun. The North Carolina forces

were next called upon to bear the brunt of the attack from the well-seasoned British troops, but they were not long in following the example of the Virginians, though that portion under General Gulpry remained long enough to fire one volley at the advancing British. The thoroughly panic-stricken militia dispersed in every direction and took to the woods, while Gates, unmindful of the Continental troops which he left upon the field, retired in quick order to Charlotte. Thus the Maryland and Delaware line under De Kalb had to meet the whole British army. Webster swung around to the flank of the first Maryland brigade and attacked it both in the front and flank. Being sustained by the reserve, the brigade stubbornly held its ground until, being outflanked by vastly superior numbers, it was forced to retire. Twice it rallied, but finally it was forced to retreat. The second Maryland brigade and the Delaware men under De Kalb continued the action longer, and greater courage was never shown by men upon the field of battle than that displayed by the gallant line of Maryland and Delaware, whose exploits grace so many of the battle records of the Revolution. Too earnestly employed to realize the full disaster which had come to the militia, De Kalb actually ordered a charge and drove the British back. The valor of the men of Maryland and the men of Delaware, under their superb leader, was, however, evidenced at a terrible cost. Eight hundred of them were left upon the field, and De Kalb himself, suffering from eleven wounds, perished, a prisoner in the hands of the British. The action of the heroic Continental troops placed a wreath of glory upon what would otherwise have been one of the most shameful battles of the Revolution. The loss to Cornwallis in the victory of Camden was four hundred men.

Gates, Caswell, of the North Carolina militia, and the other leaders had retired post haste to Charlotte after the overwhelming of the militia, and the next day Gates fled, riding two hundred miles in less than four days, to Hillsborough, where the North Carolina legislature was in

session. In addition to men, the Americans lost all their artillery and the greater part of their baggage. The dispersed corps, separated from their commanders, could not be again assembled. As an evidence of its appreciation of the splendid exploits of the gallant leader of the troops of Maryland and Delaware, Congress passed a resolution to erect at Annapolis a monument in memory of De Kalb. The defeat of Gates was followed by the dispersion of the forces of Sumter. That leader had taken a post between Camden and Charleston. He had captured one of Cornwallis's supply trains and secured a number of British prisoners and stores. On hearing of the defeat of Gates, he retreated with his prisoners to the Wraxall line, but was surprised by Tarleton at Fishing Creek on August 18th, and lost his artillery and a number of his men.

On August 17th and 18th fugitives from Gates's army to the number of about one hundred and fifty men were at Charlotte, but, as the town was without ammunition, stores or fortifications, they continued their retreat to Salisbury. The people were in a ferment, as they expected that the British would follow up their victory by a pursuit of the remnant of the army and the devastation of the country, but the British general was content with his laurels, and, as the season was unpropitious and the health of his men bad, he concluded to rest upon his conquest. The South was now once more without an army. The gallant body of Continental troops, which had been sent south to form the nucleus of an army, had been sacrificed by the incapacity of its general, the rising enthusiasm of the people had been crushed and their ready response to the needs of the Continental service had gone for naught. Lord Cornwallis regarded the country as conquered territory and issued an order "that all the inhabitants of the province who had submitted, and who had taken part in this revolt, should be punished with the greatest rigor—that they should be imprisoned, and their whole property taken from them or destroyed." He also ordered "that every militia man who

had borne arms with the British and afterward joined the American army should be put to death." On August 27th the British placed the patriot, Christopher Gadsden,—whose unselfish love for his country had long been an inspiration to his countrymen,—and most of the civil and military officers and others who declined to return to their allegiance as British subjects, upon a vessel in the harbor and sent them to St. Augustine. On September 16th Lord Cornwallis issued a proclamation for the confiscation of all possessions of the friends of independence.

The disaster to the American army filled the whole country with gloom, but the spirit of arrogance displayed by the British was the occasion of their final disaster. Sumter won recognition for his military services by receiving from Governor Rutledge the rank of brigadier-general. He at once set out on a new movement in South Carolina for the overthrow of the British. The field of operation was the mountain district. Williams made Ninety-Six a centre of opposition to the British rule. Marion pursued a similar course in the lowlands. The latter had about seventy men in command, and, although this number was reduced at one time to but twenty-five, nevertheless, with this inconsiderable force, he caused the British much annoyance. For several months he and his men were obliged to sleep in the open air and traverse deep swamps in keeping out of the reach of the British. The efforts of these partisans revived the spirit of independence and soon the people of South Carolina were again ripe to aid any movement that promised success.

The same spirit of opposition to the British was shown in Georgia, where Colonel Clarke entertained designs against the British post at Augusta. The people to the west of the Alleghany Mountains, those in the districts that were to become the States of Tennessee and Kentucky, evidenced their devotion to the cause of independence by raising companies of intrepid frontiersmen. These under such leaders as Campbell, Cleveland, McDowell, Sevier, and Shelby,

united to the number of sixteen or seventeen hundred men under Williams for the purpose of attacking Major Ferguson, who had made himself particularly obnoxious to the patriots. He, with eleven hundred and twenty-five men, established himself in a strong position on King's Mountain near the boundary of the Carolinas. Forming into two divisions, the Americans, on October 7th, moved to the attack. The British received them warmly, but, after a severe conflict in which both leaders were killed, the British were overwhelmed and no less than four hundred and fifty-six were killed and six hundred taken prisoners. The American loss did not exceed one hundred. As soon as the battle was over the frontiersmen dispersed to their homes. The conflict at King's Mountain was of great importance in that it showed the unexpected resources of the Americans and greatly aroused the disheartened Revolutionists.

Leaving a small force at Camden, Lord Cornwallis moved his main army toward Salisbury, but the defeat of Major Ferguson led him to go forward to Hillsborough. These retreats of Cornwallis had the effect of further encouraging the Americans to resume hostilities. Sumter and Marion continued throughout the fall of 1780 their irregular warfare against the British, causing them much annoyance and severe losses, but the effect of their activity was chiefly beneficial in stimulating the militia. Of these, Gates collected a force of about fifteen hundred and established headquarters at Charlotte. His incapacity and cowardice were generally known, and in December, 1780, he was superseded by Greene, who was Washington's choice for the command.

Gates's disaster was not to stand alone. Hardly had its significance been grasped when the shock of Arnold's treachery was experienced. After Arnold was wounded at Quebec, Congress repaired its tardy recognition of his services by giving him a commission which recognized his rightful seniority, and, as he was physically unfit for active service, he was assigned to the command of Philadelphia after its evacuation by the British. In the new atmosphere

qualities of his character came to view that had been overshadowed, if not quite hidden, by his splendid courage and genuine military talents as a leader in the field. He there exhibited sordid and immoral traits. He married Miss Peggy Shippen, the daughter of a Tory judge, and was thus brought into intimate relations with Loyalists. He spent his money lavishly and wasted his fortune in gambling and dissipation. His downward career was marked by a quarrel with Joseph Reed, president of the supreme executive council of Pennsylvania. In connection with this, charges against Arnold were laid before Congress, but he was acquitted. Further accusations were made and he was given a trial by a court martial and acquitted, but Washington was ordered to reprimand him. In performing his duty, Washington rather turned blame to praise, for he regarded Arnold as a persecuted man. The occasions of Arnold's irritation were not different from those experienced by other generals. It was not these, but his conviction that the Revolution was a failure that led the unfortunate man to be recreant to the trust imposed in him by his commanding general and by Congress and to besmirch with treason his brilliant record, —a course of action which many persons now believe Arnold to have taken in the hope that he might be instrumental in bringing about a more honorable peace than could be won by force of arms. Washington, after administering his rebuke to Arnold, offered him, on July 30, 1780, the command of the left wing of his army, but this Arnold did not accept, upon the ground of physical disability. At that very time he was in communication under an assumed name with Major André of Clinton's staff. His purpose would be better served by the command of West Point, which was, from a strategical point of view, the most important place in America. He therefore solicited and received the command of this powerful fortress which dominated the gateway of the Hudson. If the British had obtained possession of it, with their control of the South, there is reason to believe that the Revolution could not have survived the blow.

Arnold's communications with André had been under the guise of correspondence relative to commercial transactions and, after assuming command of West Point, he attempted to communicate in the same manner, but was checked by Washington, who decided that such matters related to the civil and not to military authority. Nevertheless, Arnold found means to consummate his plan and, upon the night of September 21st, managed that Major-general André should be landed from the sloop-of-war *Vulture* which lay in the river below West Point, by Joshua Smith, who had as oarsmen two ignorant watermen who did not suspect the identity of the young man whose overcoat hid the brilliant uniform of a British officer. André had orders not to go within the American lines nor to change his uniform and to accept no papers. After landing at Long Cove, he rode to Smith's house near Stony Point, thereby disobeying his instructions not to pass within the American lines. The plan for the surrender of West Point was there perfected with his fellow conspirator. The plan was a simple one. Clinton was to come up the river with part of the British fleet on September 25th and surprise West Point, which Arnold was to surrender to him. Washington was then to be lured to attempt the recovery of the post and, in so doing, was to be betrayed and captured. For these services Arnold was to be made a brigadier-general in the British army and to receive a sum of money. André now attempted to return to the *Vulture*, but she had been discovered by the shore batteries and they opened fire upon her, and because of this Smith refused to make the venture in his small boat. It was then decided that André should return to New York by land,—a very perilous undertaking. But Arnold provided him with passes and, carrying with him papers and plans of the fort, which his instructions had forbidden him to receive, he started upon his way. He proceeded far on his way unchallenged, but upon nearing Tarrytown, three men sprang out from a thicket and confronted him. One of them, John Paulding, was in the uniform of a Hessian

soldier and, thinking him to be such, André disclosed his identity as a British officer, only to discover that he and his companions were Americans. In vain he produced his pass and just as vainly did he attempt to bribe his captors. They searched him and found the fatal papers and realized that they had captured a spy. They conducted their prisoner to North Castle and delivered him to Colonel Jameson. The latter, unsuspicious of Arnold, sent André to him with an explanatory letter and sent to Washington the papers found upon the British spy. Fortunately, Jameson recalled his instructions with regard to André and he was brought back before the escort reached West Point. The letter, however, was carried on to Arnold and was the means of saving the traitor's life.

Washington, who had been to Connecticut for conference with Rochambeau, returned earlier than was expected and was at Fishkill eating supper and conversing with the same Smith who had convoyed André from the *Vulture* the day before he found out the treachery of the man. He sent to Arnold, stating that he and his staff would be at breakfast with him in the morning, but at that time he sent Alexander Hamilton and others of his staff, while he remained behind to examine some redoubts. It was a pleasant party that was gathered around Arnold's table in the Beverly Robinson house on the morning of September 25th, when a note was brought in and handed to the host which caused a pallor to spread over his countenance and destroyed the brightness of his humor. The note was Jameson's letter. It told him that his plot was discovered. Excusing himself, he rose from the table and was followed by his wife. Retiring to their bedchamber, Arnold broke the news to her that he was a ruined man, with flight as his only means of safety. The ambitious wife, whose counsels had much to do with her husband's folly, fell in a swoon to the floor. Placing her upon the bed, Arnold summoned a servant to care for her, kissed their sleeping baby, and was soon galloping down the river road. In a short while he was aboard the *Vulture* and

soon gained the protection of the British at New York. It is difficult to conceive, much less to portray, the feelings of Washington when, a few hours later, with tears rolling down his cheeks, he sorrowfully turned to a group of officers and said: "Arnold is a traitor and has fled to the British! Whom can we trust now?" Recovering from his emotion, the sternness of his just nature, to which treachery could make no appeal, asserted itself, and he quickly sent men in pursuit of his faithless general.

André was tried by a court martial, over which General Greene presided, and was condemned as a spy. In the face of death, he never lost his gallant bearing, and went calmly to the scaffold. The justice of his sentence is not questioned, even by the British, and his sad death was deplored on both sides of the Atlantic. Smith, the ally of the conspirators, evaded justice, and many years later wrote an account of the transaction from his own point of view.

Arnold received the promised commission and $25,000. He felt that he owed his new masters a service for the compensation he had received, and sought to draw soldiers and officers of the Continental army over to the British. To this end, five days after the execution of André, he issued *An Address to the Inhabitants of America.* In this he endeavored to justify his course upon the ground that, when he had engaged in the war, he conceived the rights of his country to be in danger, and that duty and honor called him to her defence. He alleged that redress of grievances had been his only aim and object, but that he had acquiesced in the Declaration of Independence, although he thought it precipitate. He contended, however, that the reasons that were then offered to justify that measure no longer existed, as Great Britain, with the open arms of a parent, now offered to embrace the colonists as children, and to grant their wishes in the redress of their grievances. He also declared that, upon the refusal of Congress to accept the British overtures, and especially after it had entered into the French alliance, his sympathies had been alienated from the American cause and

his conception of the justice and policy of the war had become wholly changed. He did not seek to excuse holding his command after his opinions had become altered, but admitted that he simply awaited an opportunity to surrender it to Great Britain. In a subsequent address to the officers and soldiers of the Continental army, he held forth inducements to them to follow his example. Rank in the British army was promised to American officers who would do so, and monetary awards were held out to the men. So far from his attempt to seduce his fellow soldiers from their service to their country being successful, the contrary was the result, for, after the defection of Arnold, desertions from the American army almost wholly ceased. Nevertheless, the condition of the soldiers was such as to warrant widespread dissatisfaction. Although they could not be enticed into the British service, their grievances at last produced two serious outcomes. Congress had not the money to pay the troops, and the Continental currency had greatly depreciated in value. The soldiers were without pay, were poorly fed and wretchedly clothed. The first outbreak occurred in the Pennsylvania line. The soldiers from that State were noted for their discipline and their courage, as well as for their ardent attachment to the cause of independence. They were mostly of Irish birth and had the fighting qualities of their race. A few months before their own dissatisfaction had broken into revolt they had helped to quell a sporadic mutiny among the Connecticut troops. They were enlisted for a term of three years, or during the war, and, as the former period had expired, they claimed release from the service; but their officers insisted that the option was not theirs, but rested with their superiors, or rather with the State. On the night of January 1, 1781, led by noncommissioned officers, the privates mutinied, and the disaffection extended throughout the Pennsylvania line, becoming so general as to pass beyond control. Upon a prearranged signal, the whole body of soldiers, with the exception of three regiments, demanded redress of grievances, and in

attempting to control them, a captain and several others were injured. General Wayne, with his usual ready address, presented his pistols at them and threatened to fire. Whereupon a number of the men held their bayonets to his breast and replied: "We love and respect you, but, if you fire, you are a dead man. We are not going to the enemy; on the contrary, if they were now to come, you should see us fight under your orders with as much alacrity as ever; but we will be no longer amused; we are determined on obtaining what is our just due."

Thirteen hundred of the men marched in a body from Morristown with their arms and several field pieces to Princeton. General Wayne, to prevent them from plundering the country, forwarded to them provisions, so that they did not commit excesses upon the way. They declared that their only purpose was to make Congress provide for their necessities. A committee of Congress was appointed to confer with the insurgents, but they refused any terms short of redress of their grievances. The British general, Clinton, also sought to attach the men to himself by substantial offers, but the revolting soldiers were not responsive to treasonable overtures, so that Clinton's messengers were promptly seized and delivered to General Wayne. Pennsylvania thereupon next sought to bring the men to terms. President Reed and General Potter were appointed by the Pennsylvania Assembly for this purpose. They met the men at Princeton and agreed to dismiss all whose terms of enlistment were completed. The British spies sent to them from Clinton were tried and executed and, as a reward for their loyalty in delivering up the men, President Reed proffered the mutinous soldiers a purse of one hundred guineas. This was refused by the men upon the ground that they had only done their duty as loyal Americans. Nevertheless, the conference was prolific of good, and measures were taken for the redress of the men's grievances. This action, accompanied by the proclamation of a general amnesty, brought the insurrection to an end January 17th. Washington in

a circular letter to the four Eastern States set forth the just complaints of the army and the difficulty of keeping the men in the service under conditions of severe privation. As a result Massachusetts led the other States in making satisfactory payments to her soldiers. A small revolt broke out in the same month, January, among the New Jersey troops, but it did not involve many of the men nor was it conducted with dignity and self-restraint. It ended unhappily for the mutineers, for two of the ringleaders were shot and others were severely punished. These mutinies had the effect of deepening the feeling of responsibility on the part of the various States toward the soldiers of their quotas. Accordingly, sporadic measures of relief were adopted, but these were only partial mitigations. As an illustration of the actual condition of the army, we may cite General Clinton's statement to General Washington, Albany, April 16, 1781, as follows: "There is now (independent of Fort Schuyler) three days' provisions in the whole department for the troops in case of an alarm, nor is there any prospect of procuring any. The recruits of the new levies I cannot receive, because I have nothing to give them. The Canadian families I have been obliged to deprive of their scanty pittance, contrary to every principle of humanity. The quartermaster's department is totally useless, the public armory has been shut up for nearly three weeks, and a total suspension of every military operation has ensued." It was shortly after this that Washington found it necessary to appropriate for the quartermaster's department $9,000 which Massachusetts had sent for the payment of her troops. This expedient was adopted only after every ounce of the reserve stores at West Point had been consumed and requisitions upon the people of the surrounding country had been pressed to the last point of endurance.

CHAPTER XV

NAVAL OPERATIONS

PARTIALLY as a matter of inheritance from their British antecedents and partially as the result of environment, the people of the American colonies had shown a strong liking for the sea. Up to the outbreak of the Revolutionary War the maritime instincts of the colonists had found expression in commerce. This had been of a nature to bring the isolated settlements along the Atlantic seaboard of North America to the attention of the West Indies and the various countries of Europe and even to carry intelligence of them to oriental ports and to establish relations which were destined to play no small part in the future history of America. When the exigencies of war called for the recruiting of men and vessels for naval service there were to hand experienced seamen and vessels that were able sorely to harass the commerce of Great Britain.

A considerable part of the war of the Revolution was fought upon the high seas and many serious blows were administered to the British in the naval engagements; it may be said that the losses inflicted upon the British shipping by the American navy were the most unvarying sustained by that power. The captures made by the Americans were altogether out of proportion to those effected by the British. The former could well afford to have the enemy take a dozen schooners laden with fish and masts in compensation for the capture of an East Indiaman. The hazards of commerce during the Revolutionary War are

well shown by the high rates of insurance which prevailed. These advanced rates were made long before the alliance with France and Spain brought the fleets of those powerful countries into hostility with the British navy. The personal bravery of the American seamen was the basis of American naval efficiency. The naval leaders and privateersmen of the period were not only courageous and capable, but they possessed a thorough knowledge of the North American coast, and also of many retreats in the West Indies as well as places where it was impossible for the ships of the British fleet with their deep draft to enter.

Not only were the Americans good sailors, but they had well learned the art of shipbuilding. In colonial days New England not only built ships for domestic needs, but acquired such distinction in the art that the products of her shipyards found a wide market abroad. From the very first the New England men conceived their destiny to be linked to the seas and in the first years of their history we find John Winthrop exploring the coast in *The Blessing of the Bay*, the first of the subsequent fleet of American ships. The British with their characteristic insistence upon the superiority of their own craftsmen required three quarters of a century to be persuaded that in the remote colonies could be found superior shipwrights and also better timber than was used at home. Ship timber from the colonies, however, gradually superseded that from Norway which had been the main dependence of the British shipyards, and in trade regulations which from time to time were adopted by the British government for Massachusetts, reservations were made of the right of the crown to timber especially suited for masts for the royal navy.

The vast forests of primeval pines throughout New Hampshire and Maine led to the constant requisition of the king upon the timbers of that region. The different nature of the holdings in the other colonies also accounted for the fact that in their forests was not found the king's mark which set off the tree that bore it for the use of the royal shipyards.

As early as the year 1700 Lord Bellomont urged the king to retire from the open market for ship timber and to depend wholly upon New England for his supply of spars. It was then clearly pointed out by him that Portugal and France had fully awakened to the superiority of the American spars and that the royal interests demanded a monopoly of this article of commerce. It is an interesting fact that when the Revolutionary War brought the United States and her allies into conflict with Great Britain the ships of all four nations carried American spars. The number of ships whose home ports were the harbors of New England is shown by the despatches of Bellomont in 1700 and 1701. These stated that more ships built in New England sailed from the port of Boston than belonged to all Scotland and Ireland. As early as 1690 the American shipbuilders produced their first contributions to the royal navy. The names of these ships were the *Admiral Breble* and the *Falkland.* In 1743, there is a record of three other ships for the royal navy which were built upon the model of ships of the line and were equipped with the armament of such vessels. They were the *America*, the *Boston*, and the *Essex.* Although the New England shipyards were foremost, those of New York and of other points along the middle and southern seaboard were efficient; the Chesapeake model became noted the world over and furnished the lines upon which many sailing craft and yachts are being built at the present day.

In 1774 the naval force of Great Britain numbered but sixteen thousand men, but when it was seen by Parliament that war with the colonies was inevitable, the naval arm was increased by twenty-eight thousand. The numerical superiority of Great Britain over the United States in ships, guns, and men was great at the outbreak of the Revolution. But at the close of the war the naval force of the United States, including privateersmen, about equalled that of Great Britain. On March 23, 1776, Congress took decisive measures looking to a more energetic attack upon

British shipping. It issued letters of marque and reprisal, and from that time all public and private cruisers of the colonies were authorized to capture any British vessel, armed or unarmed, sailing under the British flag. Some idea of the extent of privateering may be gathered from a statement of the number that sailed from a single port—Salem. This town had a fleet of twenty-six cruisers carrying a force of two thousand six hundred and forty men; besides ten brigs with eight hundred and seventy men and eight schooners with a complement of two hundred and seventy-five men. During the Revolution the privateers and the Continental cruisers together captured about eight hundred vessels with about twelve thousand prisoners. Among these were many of the finest soldiers of the British army.

As the privateers were owned by individuals and sailed under government licence, it was necessary that rules should be established governing their conduct and the division of prize money arising from their captures. Washington drew up a code of such rules. This received the sanction of the Continental Congress. Every encouragement was given to citizens to embark in the adventurous business of privateering. As a type of this class of sea-fighters may be instanced John Manly, of Marblehead. Washington gave him the commission of captain, and quickly shipping a crew he set sail. Three British vessels were taken at the entrance of Boston harbor, one of them being laden with guns, mortars, and intrenchment tools, the very things that the Continental army stood most in need of. This capture greatly encouraged the American force besieging Boston. In his gallant schooner *Lee*, Manly cruised along the New England coast making many captures, and when Congress formed the Continental navy he received a commission as captain. The gallant Manly after obtaining his commission made such captures as that of the man-of-war *Fox* with the frigate *Hancock* of thirty-two guns, and himself suffered capture by the British ship *Rainbow* and remained a prisoner until the end of the war.

Before the end of 1775 Congress had ordered to be built five ships of thirty-two guns, five of twenty-eight, and three of twenty-four. This was the beginning of the navy of the United States. Almost without exception the ships of this little fleet suffered disaster, being either captured or burned to avoid that fate. These ships were the *Washington*, *Raleigh*, *Hancock*, *Randolph*, *Warren*, *Virginia*, *Trumbull*, *Effingham*, *Congress*, *Providence*, *Boston*, *Delaware*, and *Montgomery*. It was a delegate from Rhode Island whose motion led to the formation of an American navy, and it was Abraham Whipple, a native of Rhode Island, who fired the first gun in the naval service of the colonies. He became recognized as the commodore of the little fleet of American cruisers. The initial difficulties in the formation of the American navy were serious. Congress lacked funds with which to build and equip ships, and although there was splendid material from which to draw for crews, their pay and maintenance furnished a serious problem. Nevertheless, during the year 1776 the American fleet, in spite of its small size, captured three hundred and forty-two British vessels. Of this number forty-four were recaptured and eighteen were released, but the remainder were brought into port. In the year 1777, Great Britain suffered the loss of no less than four hundred and sixty-seven vessels, and this despite the fact that during that year the American coast was patrolled by seventy powerful cruisers. The British captured the brig *Cabot*, which was one of the finest of the American cruisers, and when Howe took Philadelphia the Americans burned the *Andrea Doria*, the *Wasp*, and the *Hornet*. The *Montgomery* and *Congress* were burned in Hudson River to avoid capture, the *Delaware* was taken by the enemy in Delaware Bay, and the *Hancock* was captured off Halifax, while the *Randolph* was destroyed by an accidental explosion. The American losses of 1777 were continued during the next year, when the *Washington* and the *Effingham* were burned by the British and the *Virginia* was captured. Such was the fate of the first American fleet,

but the ships that composed it did valiant service prior to their destruction.

The government experienced difficulty in securing men for the regular navy, because of the superior attractions of privateering. The roving life in the irregular service, and the attractions of prize money more than rivalled any inducements that the government could offer to secure enlisted men. The same difficulty was experienced by the maritime States, the larger of which had one or more vessels in commission from the beginning of the war. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina also had, throughout the war, a small naval force. The division of the maritime force into the regular navy, the State navy, and privateers did not work disadvantage to the American cause, as the object of the several classes was a common one, and it was not difficult to unite them in naval enterprises. The pay of men in the regular service was at the beginning of the war fixed as follows: "Commander-in-chief, $125 a month. Officers of a ship of twenty guns and upward: captain, $60; lieutenant, $30; master, $30; surgeon, $25; chaplain, $20; midshipman, $12; gunner, $15; seaman, $8. Officers of a ship of ten to twenty guns: captain, $48; lieutenant, $24; master, $24; surgeon, $21.66; midshipman, $12; gunner, $13; seaman, $8. The pay of the following was the same in any class of cruisers: armorer, $15; sailmaker, $12; yoeman, $9; quartermaster, $9; quarter gunner, $8; coxswain, $9; cook, $12. Commanders were allowed $4 and $5 a week for rations; and lieutenants, captains of marines, surgeons and chaplains, $4 when on shore. Prize money coming to the officers and seamen of the Continental navy was divided into shares as follows: captains, 6; first lieutenant, 5; second lieutenant, 4; surgeon, 4; master, 3; steward, 2; mate, 1½; gunner, 1½; boatswain, 1½; gunner's mate, 1½; sergeant, 1½; privates, 1." The committee which had in charge naval matters was styled the Marine Committee and consisted of Silas Deane, John

Langdon, Christopher Gadsden, Stephen Hopkins, Joseph Hewes, Richard Henry Lee, and John Adams. It is interesting to note that these seven men, representing as many colonies, all became distinguished in the later history of the Revolutionary period. Deane held the office of a foreign ambassador; Gadsden became the distinguished leader of the patriots in South Carolina, Langdon was made governor of New Hampshire; Hopkins, Hewes, Lee, and Adams were among the signers of the Declaration of Independence, and the last became the second president of the United States. On December 22, 1775, Congress appointed Esek Hopkins, of Rhode Island, commander-in-chief of the navy, although he was then nearly sixty years of age; and Dudley Santonstall, Abraham Whipple, Nicholas Biddle, and John B. Hopkins, captains. In addition to these, several lieutenants were appointed, among them John Paul Jones. Hopkins and his associates fitted out a squadron of eight small vessels of which the *Alfred*, of twenty-four guns, was the flagship. With this force, in February, 1776, a descent was made upon New Providence, in the Bahamas, for the purpose of securing a stock of gunpowder, and although they failed in this they took a hundred cannon and quantities of other stores. This expedition was undertaken without instructions from Congress, as the only official destination of the fleet was the Virginia coast region where it was to operate against Governor Dunmore. On its way it was joined by the *Lexington* commanded by Captain Barry, of Baltimore, and by the *Hornet* and the *Wasp*, which had been fitted out at Baltimore, under the direction of the Marine Committee. After having despoiled New Providence, Hopkins sailed for New England with his spoils. Arriving off the coast of Long Island, he captured two small British vessels, and on April 6, 1776, with a part of his squadron engaged the British ship of war *Glasgow* of twenty guns. The attack failed, but the audacity of it pleased the country until it was learned that Hopkins had five yessels in the action. Though his total force was inferior to the *Glasgow*, a reaction in

public feeling set in. In January, 1777, Hopkins was court martialed on the charge of incompetency, but was honorably acquitted. His official vindication failed to establish him in the public estimation, and he does not again appear in the records of the Revolutionary navy. Thus the country at the outset of the war lost the services of one who was described as "a most experienced and venerable sea captain, and of whose competency there appears to be little question." To first-lieutenant John Paul Jones, of the *Alfred*, belongs the honor of having hoisted the first flag upon an American man-of-war. This was a yellow silk flag with the device of a pine tree and a rattlesnake, with the motto: "Don't tread on me." At the same time the "grand union flag" was displayed. It consisted of thirteen stripes with the British union jack in the field. Hopkins was the only naval officer to bear the rank of commander-in-chief of the navy. It was intended that this rank should correspond with that held by Washington in the army, but after its lapse it was not revived until the title was bestowed upon the president of the United States.

In the middle of April, 1777, Captain Barry, while cruising off the Capes of Virginia, sighted the *Edward*, an armed tender of the *Liverpool*. After a spirited action of an hour's duration the *Edward* surrendered, having sustained serious injuries and lost severely in killed and wounded. This engagement is important from the fact of its being the first British vessel of war that was captured by a regular cruiser of the American navy. Barry was made the hero of the hour.

The first naval battle of importance was won by the people of New Bedford on May 5, 1775. The *Falcon*, a British vessel, entered Buzzard's Bay and seized a small American vessel and sailed off with her. Thereupon the New Bedford men quickly manned a ship and put out after the British vessel; an engagement took place off Martha's Vineyard in which the Americans made a prize of the British ship and took fifteen prisoners. On Sunday, June 11th, of the same year, the people of Machias, Maine, attacked the

crew of the *Margaretta*,—which was convoying two sloops to be freighted with supplies for the army at Boston,—while on land. The captain and his men fought their way to the ship and dropped down the harbor, but the next day Jeremiah O'Brien, with forty men, manned one of the captured sloops and pursued the vessel, twenty other men of the town following in another craft. The *Margaretta* was overhauled, and after a sharp engagement was captured, her captain and six of her crew being killed and five taken prisoners. For his exploit O'Brien was given a commission by Congress. On September 22d, Washington ordered an American naval force to proceed against the British and cut off their supply ships. On October 16th, Washington appointed two captains in the regiment of Marblehead, Broughton and Selman, to the command of the *Franklin* and the *Lynch*, and ordered them to the St. Lawrence to intercept two British transports. In this they were not successful, but they secured ten prizes and some prisoners, although the latter were subsequently released. As the adventurous captains had taken a fort on the island of St. John and made the governor and one of the judges prisoners, on their return to Massachusetts they were severely reprimanded for exceeding their instructions and the prisoners and prizes were released, for at this time Congress was seeking to secure the good will of Canada and the other northern provinces. On May 10, 1776, Paul Jones was given command of the *Providence*, superseding Eben Hazard, whose conduct in the engagement with the *Glasgow* had been brought in question. During the summer Jones scoured the sea, cruising as far south as Bermuda and eastward as far as Canso. The result of his summer's enterprise was sixteen prizes and a rapid rise in popular favor. While Jones was cruising in the east, Captains Whipple and Biddle, with the *Columbus* and the *Andrea Doria*, were making successful cruises up the coast of New England as far as Nova Scotia. Biddle made so many prizes that when the *Columbus* arrived in the Delaware she was manned by only five of her original crew, the rest

having been distributed among the captured vessels. As a reward for his present services he received command of the frigate *Randolph*. On October 10, 1776, Congress fixed the ranks of captains in the navy. James Nicholson was made first, Manly second, McNiel third, Saltonstall fourth, Lambert Wickes eleventh, John B. Hopkins fourteenth, and Paul Jones eighteenth on a list of twenty-four. Although Jones was not pleased that his rank was so low, he attained a position in the popular esteem higher than that of any of his fellow captains.

Paul Jones, now in command of the *Alfred*, sailed for Nova Scotia in November, 1776, accompanied by the *Providence*. When but a few days out he captured a British transport laden with a large quantity of supplies for Burgoyne's army in Canada. Closely pursued by two British armed ships he returned to Boston. At this time only two of the ships ordered by Congress had been completed so that Congress was obliged to purchase merchant vessels and convert them into men-of-war. The *Alfred*, carrying twenty-four guns, was the largest of this class.

One of the most active of the privateers was the *Defense*, a Connecticut vessel of fourteen guns. She took prize after prize. On June 17, 1776, she left Plymouth under the command of Seth Harding, and hearing cannonading to the north set sail in that direction. Coming up with four American schooners she was told that they had had a running fight with two large British transports which took refuge in Nantasket Roads. The American schooners consisted of the Massachusetts State cruiser *Lee*, of eight guns, and three privateers. Harding immediately arranged a plan of attack in conjunction with the commanders of the other vessels. Running into the Roads at night he took position between the transports and commanded them to strike their flags. The reply was a broadside poured into the *Defense*. The Americans responded and after a smart engagement the enemy surrendered. The prizes bore about two hundred soldiers who were made prisoners together with Lieutenant

Campbell, their commander. On the following morning another transport was overhauled and one hundred more added to the list of prisoners. This exploit will serve to illustrate a number of similar performances on the part of the privateers and State ships. While these vessels were engaged in actively aiding the cause of the Revolution the seaport towns were occupied in fortifying their harbors. A feature of the water defences in most cases was floating batteries.

Although mention of the engagement on Lake Champlain has been made in the course of the narrative of the military events of the Revolution, the circumstances of the destruction of the American squadron belongs properly to naval history. The fight for the command of the only waterway between the American colonies and Canada occurred on October 11, 1776. The American squadron, under the command of General Benedict Arnold, consisted of the twelve-gun schooner *Royal Savage*, the ten-gun sloop *Enterprise*, the eight-gun schooner *Revenge*, the eight-gun galley *Trumbull*, the eight-gun galley *Congress*, the eight-gun galley *Washington*, the six-gun galley *Lee*, the five-gun gondola *Spitfire*, the five-gun gondola *Connecticut*, the three-gun gondola *New Haven*, the three-gun gondola *Providence*, the three-gun gondola *Boston*, the three-gun gondola *Philadelphia*, the three-gun gondola *Jersey*, and the three-gun gondola *New York*. These fifteen vessels were manned by men who for the most part had been drafted from the troops at Ticonderoga. Arnold was not encouraged with the outlook, for writing before the battle he said: "They are a miserable set; indeed, the men on board the fleet in general are not equal to half their number of good men." Again he wrote: "We have a wretched, motley crew in the fleet. The marines are the refuse of every regiment, and the seamen, few of them were ever wet with salt water." The officers of the fleet were from the army and the vessels themselves had not been built with the expectation of their serving in a heavy engagement. Needless to say, the British

squadron, under the command of Captain Pringle, was much better manned and equipped. Three of his vessels, the *Inflexible*, *Maria*, and *Carleton*, English built, had been taken to pieces and transported to Lake Champlain, where they were reconstructed. The other ships had been built under the supervision of an experienced naval officer by competent men. The *Inflexible*, of more than three hundred tons burden and manned by the picked men of the royal navy, was itself competent to destroy the whole American flotilla. The rest of the British ships were the fourteen-gun schooner *Maria*, the twelve-gun schooner *Carleton*, and the fourteen-gun radeau *Thunderer*, the seven-gun gondola *Loyal Convert*, besides twenty gunboats and other craft bearing a full equipment of guns. Including officers, these ships bore a force of six hundred and ninety-seven men from the regular navy. Coöperating with them was a detachment of the regular troops and seven hundred Indian allies. Early on the morning of October 11th, Arnold became aware of the presence of the enemy's fleet. He moored his vessels in a little bay on the west side of Valcour Island so that they might be as little as possible exposed to the fire of the British fleet. The latter sailed past Valcour Island and it was not until they got to the south of it that they discovered the Americans. They were then out of range but by eleven o'clock their gunboats and the *Carleton* had gotten near enough to open fire. The *Royal Savage* and the galleys had run ahead of the American line and bore the brunt of the attack. The *Royal Savage* was disabled and ran aground on Valcour Island where, during the night, she was burned by the enemy. The course of the battle may be followed by quotations from Arnold's official report. In this he says: "At half past twelve the engagement became general and very warm." After describing the closer approach of a part of the enemy's ships, under the propulsion of oars, he adds: "They continued a very hot fire with round and grapeshot until five o'clock, when they thought proper to retire to about six or seven hundred yards' distance and continued

the fire till dark." While engaged with the British fleet the American flotilla was annoyed by the Indians firing from the shore. The part of the savages in the battle is described by Lieutenant Murray Hadden as follows: "These savages under Major Carleton, moved with the fleet in their canoes, which were very regularly ranged. On the day of the battle, the rebels having no land force, the savages took post on the mainland and on Valcour Island. Thus being upon both flanks they were able to annoy them in the working of their guns. This had the effect of now and then obliging the rebels to turn a gun that way, which danger the savages avoided by getting behind trees."

At about five o'clock in the evening Captain Pringle finding it impossible to bring his larger ships into action gave the signal for their recall and anchored his fleet just out of gunshot. Arnold distinguished himself in this first day's battle by his acts of personal courage. He commanded the *Congress*, and toward the end of the engagement aimed many of her guns. His ship received seven shots. The *Washington*, the *Congress*, the *Trumbull*, and the *Philadelphia* were also greatly damaged. The Americans had lost about sixty and the British about forty, and being aware of the futility of renewing the battle on the morrow, General Arnold decided to slip by the enemy under cover of night. At seven o'clock the retreat was commenced. Not until daylight did the enemy learn of the escape of the Americans. They then began a hot pursuit, but it was not until noon of October 13th, that they overhauled Arnold's vessels at Split Rock. By this time the American vessels had become much scattered. The *Congress* and the *Washington* sought to engage the British fleet so as to permit the escape of the other vessels. The *Washington* was forced to surrender while the *Congress* made off closely pursued by the *Maria*, the *Inflexible*, and the *Carleton*. Arnold ran the *Congress* and four gondolas into Panton Bay, where after removing the small arms he destroyed them and escaped with his men to Crown Point. The *Enterprise*, the *Revenge*, the

Trumbull, and one gondola reached places of safety, while the captain of the *Lee* blew that vessel up at a point above Split Rock. The only ships that fell into the hands of the British were the *Washington* and the gondola *Jersey*. The total American loss for the whole battle was about eighty. The different calibre of the guns upon the several American ships caused delay in serving them.

The voyage of the *Reprisal* to France when it conveyed Dr. Franklin to that country was the first instance of a national cruiser appearing in European waters. To Lambert Wickes, the eleventh in the list of captains was given the honor of commanding the *Reprisal* upon this eventful cruise. She sailed in the autumn of 1776. Taking two prizes during her passage, the *Reprisal* reached Nantes in safety with her distinguished passenger, and refitted at this port. The appearance of the *Reprisal* and her prizes awakened the greatest enthusiasm in France. War had not yet been declared with Great Britain by France and the act of Wickes in bringing into a French port his British prizes was an act of flagrant violation of the neutrality laws of France. The king had expressly waived the right to harbor privateers of other powers excepting in instances of actual distress. Wickes could not reconcile in his mind the theory of neutrality as applied to French waters with the practice of the French government in covertly sending supplies to America. Consequently he slipped out of the harbor of Nantes and sailed toward the Bay of Biscay, and captured two vessels, one of which was the king's packet, plying between Falmouth and Lisbon. This conduct on the part of the American captain was too dangerous to the tenuous relations between France and Great Britain to be countenanced by France, and the French minister, Vergennes, took account of it. That the action of the French authorities was emphatic is shown by the plaint of the American captain, who writing under the date August 12th, said: "This will inform you of my present unhappy situation. The judges of the Admiralty have received orders of the

6th inst., from the Minister at Paris, ordering them not to suffer me to take any cannon, powder, or other military stores on board, or to depart from this port on any consideration whatever, without further orders from Paris. In consequence of these orders, they came on board on Saturday to take all my cannon out and to unhang my rudder. I have prevented this for the present by refusing to let them take rudder or cannon without producing an order from the minister for so doing. As I told them, my orders corresponded with theirs in regard to continuing in port, but I had no order to deliver anything belonging to the ship to them, which I would not do without orders, and if the ministers insisted on it, made no doubt but you would give your orders accordingly, which would be readily complied with on my part when such orders were received. My powder is stopped, and they have been contented with taking my written parole not to depart until I receive their permission." Nevertheless, before his "powder was stopped," the American captain had disposed of a number of prizes to French merchants, and the proceeds went to swell the fund for the maintenance of the American commissioners in Europe. At last it became necessary to order Wickes out of the country, and he set sail only to meet with fatality off Newfoundland, where his ship was lost and but one man was saved. Although the open contumacy of Wickes could not be upheld, Franklin himself had carried to France a number of blank commissions for army and navy officers, which bore the initials of John Hancock, President of Congress. These were filled out as occasion required and under their authority commanders of cruisers sailed from French ports. One of the embarrassments to which this procedure subjected the French government was caused by Captain Gustavus Conyngham who sailed from Dunkirk in the brig *Surprise* early in May, 1777. In a few days he had taken a British brig and the packet ship *Prince of Orange*, and returned with them to Dunkirk. The British ambassador made strong remonstrances, and Conyngham and his crew

were imprisoned, but were soon released and were not long in fitting out another cruiser. This they named the *Revenge*.

The exploits of Conyngham made him a worthy fellow of Jones and Wickes. He carried one of the commissions brought over by Franklin and was later saved by it from being hanged as a pirate. On July 18th, he set sail in the *Revenge*, an out-and-out privateersman, notwithstanding that its commander bore a naval commission. The cruise was an extraordinarily successful one, several ships were taken, and the British merchant marine thrown into a state of great alarm, for the daring captain threatened the British coast and had the hardihood to put into an English port to refit his vessel. Thence he made his way to Spain, all the while continuing his depredations upon British shipping. The terror which he inspired caused insurance rates on cargoes to rise twenty-five per cent. So reluctant were British merchants to ship goods in home bottoms that at one time as many as forty French vessels were loading in the Thames. The *Revenge* was alert to capture the transports engaged in conveying the Hessian mercenaries across the Atlantic, but did not find any. Most of the prizes of the *Revenge* were disposed of to the advantage of the United States government and the private parties interested in the ship. Another of the captains of the type we have been considering was Captain Johnston, who in the spring of 1777 took the *Lexington* across to Europe, arriving there in April. He was with Wickes in the cruise described and later made another venture. He engaged the *Alert*, an English cutter whose force was somewhat less than that of his own. After a long action the *Lexington's* ammunition became exhausted and Johnston was forced to surrender. He and his crew were carried to Portsmouth and imprisoned at Forton where the British had nearly one thousand American seamen in prison. Most of these were exchanged in the winter of 1779–1780. The daring and success of the expeditions of the captains of the American cruisers and privateers led the British government to issue letters

of marque and reprisal, their issuance being followed in 1778 by the fitting out of a large number of British privateers. The Americans had little commerce to tempt British privateers, but the latter were intent upon recapturing as many as possible of the British ships which their enemies had taken. These British privateers, however, played but an inconsiderable part in the naval warfare between the countries.

The famous cruises of Captain John Paul Jones off the coast of Great Britain were the most important of the operations of the American sea captains. Jones was a native of Scotland who at an early age had come to America and engaged in commercial undertakings until the breaking out of the war. We have already noticed his relations to the regular service. He had desired Congress to give him a ship of the class he cared to command, but as his wish could not be granted he crossed the Atlantic in the hopes of there finding a better vessel than could be obtained at home. In this he was disappointed. He thereupon returned and fitted out the *Ranger*. He left Portsmouth, New Hampshire, November 1st, and reached Nantes December 2d. Being in an unseaworthy condition it was April, 1778, before the *Ranger* was ready for a cruise. In that month Jones made a bold descent on the coasts of Scotland and England and captured the British ship *Drake*. He carried his depredations inland, making a landing on the Scotch coast and carrying off the family plate from the mansion of the Earl of Selkirk. This, however, Jones caused to be returned to the Countess of Selkirk. This exploit did much to advance in France the fame of the American, and led to his receiving command of the *Indian*, which was a fine vessel just ready for launching. The French were fertile in devising expeditions for the adventurous American. One of these was a plan for him to lead a naval expedition in conjunction with a land force under Lafayette for a descent upon the British coast. The alliance between France and the United States had taken place on February 6, 1778,

and the French government planned larger enterprises than this. D'Estaing was sent to the American coast and Lafayette and Jones were informed that their services were not needed. Jones thereupon went to Paris and urged his claims for employment with the result that an Indiaman was placed at his disposal. He transformed this into a two-decked frigate, giving it, in compliment to Franklin, the name *Bonhomme Richard*, that being the French translation of Poor Richard. This vessel was armed and equipped in haste and had associated with it the *Alliance*, under Captain Landais, and the *Pallas*, besides two smaller vessels. The latter were privateers. The seamen were of all nationalities, but Jones and his officers were all Americans holding American commissions.

The expedition left the harbor of L'Orient on August 14, 1779, and already Captain Landais had shown symptoms of a mutinous spirit. The vessels encountered severe storms, but took several prizes. Their cruise along the coast of Scotland filled the inhabitants with dismay. Jones's former visit was remembered, and householders hastened to bury their plate to prevent it from falling into the hands of the dreaded sea rover. The squadron passed around the north of Scotland and came down on the east side into the North Sea. Discovering that several of the enemy's ships were lying in the Frith of Forth, off Leith, he decided to attempt a descent on that town. Making his way into the Frith to within gunshot reach of the port, he had his boats launched and manned and had given all but his final instructions to his first lieutenant, Dale, who was to take command of the landing enterprise upon Leith, when a terrific squall struck the ships. Jones was unable to withstand the heavy gale that followed, and his vessels were driven out into the North Sea. The commanders of the French ships that formed part of Jones's little squadron were not in harmony with him, and hampered his plans. At this juncture, two of the Frenchmen carried their insubordination to the point of sailing off with their vessels. Jones continued his

cruise southward and caused widespread terror along the coast, the people burying money and valuables in anticipation of his dreaded landing. Off Whitby the *Bonhomme Richard* fell in with the deserting Frenchmen and the reunited squadron entered the Humber and captured and destroyed several of the enemy's ships. Again sailing southward, on September 23, 1779, Jones sighted a fleet of forty merchantmen beyond Flamborough Head. This was the Baltic fleet, convoyed by the frigates *Serapis* and *Countess of Scarborough*. At this time Jones's squadron consisted of the *Bonhomme Richard*, the *Alliance*, and the *Pallas*. The British ships were under the command of Captain Richard Pearson. The latter signalled to his convoy to take care of themselves, and at once engaged the American squadron. The latter were quite as ready for the engagement. The *Pallas* took the *Countess of Scarborough*, although the details of the action are not clear. It was a little past seven o'clock in the evening when the *Bonhomme Richard* came within musket range of the *Serapis*, and one of the most desperate sea fights on record began. The battle was a long and close one. The two vessels carried about the same number of guns, but those of the *Bonhomme Richard* proved to be defective; so that upon the first fire of her lower deck guns, two of them burst, and the other men refused to fight their batteries. Thus throughout the rest of the engagement the *Serapis* played its lower deck guns upon the *Bonhomme Richard* without reply from the similar guns of the American vessel. The wind brought the ships so near to each other that the muzzles of their guns touched. Jones took advantage of the situation and lashed the *Serapis* to the *Bonhomme Richard*. For an hour and a half the fighting was fierce. Jones's motley crew displayed unsuspected courage. When there came a slackening in the fire of the *Bonhomme Richard*, Pearson called to know if she had struck her colors. To this query came the ready response of Jones: "I have not yet begun to fight!" Serving a gun with his own hands, he kept his eyes upon the conflict at every point

and inspired his men to keep up the contest. He succeeded in placing several of his guns so that they raked the enemy's decks fore and aft. At the same time, hand grenades were showered upon the *Serapis*. The heavy guns of the British ships were literally tearing the *Bonhomme Richard* to pieces, and she had but three nine-pounders with which to reply. But the deadly volleys of musketry from her tops and the grenades from her deck did frightful execution upon the British ship. This remarkable action raged throughout several hours of the night. It was literally a duel between the two ships, for the *Alliance* gave no direct assistance, and the men upon the *Bonhomme Richard* declared that the few scattering shots which were delivered from that vessel were aimed at their own ship. At thirty minutes past nine, the crisis of the battle was reached. At that time, one of the grenades dropped through a hatchway of the *Serapis* and exploded a powder chest. This demoralized the crew, and Pearson surrendered; but so close was the contest, that when the cry was raised: "She has struck!" the first officer on the *Serapis* supposed that it was raised by his own men and indicated the surrender of the American ship.

At the end of the struggle the *Bonhomme Richard* was a complete wreck and Jones had her sick and wounded transferred to the *Serapis;* she sank the next day in Bridlington Bay. With the remainder of his squadron and his prizes Jones sailed to Holland, where he arrived, October 3d, at Texel. This exploit, under the very eyes of the people of Scarborough, attracted the attention of all Europe. Jones received an ovation from the French people, and the French government offered him flattering proposals to enter its service. The French captain, Landais, escaped a court martial for his conduct in the combat only because of his evident insanity. He had an unpleasant reputation before engaging under Jones, having been dismissed from the French service on account of his temper. His exhibitions of petulance and jealousy had caused his relations with his superior officer to become very unpleasant, and it was suspected at the time

that the shots from the *Alliance* which caused fatality upon the *Bonhomme Richard* were fired with the hope of killing Jones, in order that Landais might assume charge of the squadron and win the engagement.

The years 1777 to 1779 were not marked solely by naval exploits in foreign seas, for many battles were fought in home waters. One of the foremost of these was won by the navy of Massachusetts. Among the cruisers fitted out by the State was the fourteen-gun ship *Hazard* under Captain Williams. Late in May, 1779, she sailed from Boston and had a sharp encounter with the *Active*, of eighteen guns, a British cruiser supposed to have been a private ship of the king. The battle lasted nearly an hour and the British ship was badly cut up, and sustained a loss of thirty-three killed and wounded as against a total loss on the *Hazard* of but eight men. As a reward for his gallantry on this occasion Williams was given charge of the State cruiser *Protector*. On July 9, 1780, this ship had a severe struggle with a British privateer, *Admiral Duff*, the two ships being of nearly equal force. After a fight of an hour the *Admiral Duff* was set on fire and blown up. Edward Preble was engaged in this affair, he being a midshipman on the *Protector*. Soon after, he joined the sloop-of-war *Winthrop* as lieutenant, and distinguished himself by his daring seizure of a British brig in the waters of the Penobscot. Early in 1779, the *Alliance* made ready to bear General Lafayette to France on an important mission. The command was given to Landais, whose subsequent misbehavior we have already noticed. It was difficult to secure a crew, as even at that time the French captain was in disfavor with American sailors. As the business was urgent, a crew was made up by accepting the services of some British seamen held as prisoners of war. These men planned to mutiny, but, being betrayed by an Irish sailor, they were put in irons, and the ship safely reached her destination. Refitted and with a new crew, she became, as we have seen, a part of the squadron of Paul Jones. In the summer

of 1779, Whipple, one of the old captains, having charge of the *Providence*, came across a large convoy of British merchantmen bound for Great Britain from the West Indies. Whipple disguised his vessel and boldly entered the fleet as one of their number. On ten successive nights he boarded and captured a vessel from the convoy, and eight of the prizes were brought safely to Boston. Their cargoes were sold for more than a million dollars, thus making the bold venture of Whipple the most successful enterprise of the war from a pecuniary point of view.

Emboldened by the successes of several of her cruisers, Massachusetts fitted out an important expedition in which the land and naval forces united. The latter were commanded by Commodore Saltonstall. It consisted of several sloops-of-war, seven armed brigs, and twenty-four transports carrying about nine hundred land troops. The expedition had as its object the reduction of the British posts at Penobscot, but almost from the start it met with misfortune. The land commander Lovell considered it impossible for the men at his disposal to storm the fortifications of Penobscot and a siege was determined upon. The supplies of the British running short the garrison was on the point of surrender when Sir George Collier appeared with five British vessels. Not daring to give battle Saltonstall ran his own ship, the *Warren*, upon the shore and burned her; most of the other ships found a like fate, the remainder being captured by the British. The land forces and the rest of the naval contingent made their way back to Boston overland. The American regular navy was now reduced to a small number of vessels, and four of these were taken by the British when Charleston surrendered. Congress had little enthusiasm for replacing its lost vessels by new ones for the double reason of lack of funds, and because the French alliance now gave it the use of a much more powerful navy than it could hope to create. The list of vessels in the service of the United States in March, 1780, were the *America*, of seventy-four guns, under Captain John Barry, at Portsmouth,

New Hampshire; the *Confederacy*, of thirty-six guns, under Seth Harding, refitting at Martinique; the *Alliance*, of thirty-six guns, under John Paul Jones, in France; the *Bourron*, of thirty-six guns, under Thomas Read, on the stocks in Connecticut; the *Trumbull*, of twenty-eight guns, under James Nicholson, ready for sea in Connecticut; the *Deane*, of twenty-eight guns, under Samuel Nicholson, on a cruise; the *Providence*, of twenty-eight guns, under Abraham Whipple; the *Boston*, of twenty-eight guns, under Samuel Tucker; the *Queen of France*, of twenty guns, under Irath Bourne; the *Ranger*, of eighteen guns, under Simeon Sampson, within the bar at Charleston, South Carolina, to defend that harbor; and the *Saratoga* of eighteen guns, under J. Young, on the stocks at Philadelphia. Of the original navy of the United States only six remained after the fall of Charleston.

It is credibly estimated that during the conduct of the Revolution no less than seventy thousand men fought the British upon the sea, a conservative estimate which does not satisfy the figures given by some computers. This number was greater than that of the men enrolled in the United States army at any one time. The fleet of Massachusetts was the largest of the State navies. An incomplete list of the vessels which bore commissions gives the names of two hundred and seventy-six. The fleets of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Philadelphia were also large, as was that of Baltimore. In the Atlantic Ocean the Americans seemed to have outnumbered the British. It is difficult to draw the line between State cruisers and privateers, as frequently a vessel which came under the one designation one year was found in the other service the next. Some of the largest of the privateers carried one hundred and fifty men. A large force was necessary not only for fighting the ship but for prize crews. Thus a privateer captain who had reduced his force by detailing prize crews often found himself without sufficient men to fight his own ship and himself suffered capture. From such sources as are available for estimates it would appear from some statements that Massachusetts

alone sent out sixty thousand men to fight upon the seas, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Connecticut twenty thousand more; with the Delaware fleet, the privateers commissioned in France and the fleet of the Chesapeake and more southern waters to be added, data for which is lacking. As opposed to the national and State navies and the privateer fleet, the number of the vessels in the British navy during the early years of the contest seems surprisingly small. After Great Britain became engaged with America, France, and Spain, the number of her men in naval service reached eighty-seven thousand, but a considerable part of this number was in the East Indies and on remote stations. Almon's *Remembrancer* states the number of men engaged against the colonies at sea in 1776 as twenty-six thousand. Were the records for the American navy for this period of its service complete the part played by it in the Revolution would be seen to have had very much more importance than is commonly attributed to it.

CHAPTER XVI

THE TERMINATION OF THE WAR

BEFORE pursuing the progress of the campaign in the South as it was conducted by General Greene, it will be necessary to advert briefly to the course of events in Europe as they affected the fortunes of the American States. On May 5, 1781, soon after Spain had declared war upon Great Britain, the Spanish governor of Louisiana sent expeditions against the British settlements in West Florida and in a few months had conquered that province. But the two strongholds of Great Britain extraneous to the territory of North America whose possession Spain regarded as of prime importance to her were not so successfully attacked. These were Gibraltar and Jamaica. It will be remembered that France had engaged to assist Spain in recovering Gibraltar from the English. Spain had conducted a blockade of Gibraltar upon the land side since the summer of 1779 and followed this up with its investment by water. On February 8, 1780 when the garrison had been reduced to severe straits Great Britain sent out a strong naval force under Sir George Rodney. He met the Spanish squadron on July 18th, near Cape St. Vincent and destroyed a number of its ships, taking others and forcing the Spanish admiral to strike his flag. The garrison at Gibraltar was forthwith relieved and Rodney set sail for the West Indies. Subsequent efforts of Spain to reduce the fortress were as unsuccessful. The narration of these, however, does not bear upon

American history. In these actions France and Spain were allies, and the operations constituted one part of the undertakings of the former country against Great Britain. The other side of her hostile operations was her coöperation with the Americans. In 1780, in the early part of the year, the combined fleets of Spain and France assembled in the West Indies. By concerted action they hoped speedily to take Jamaica and to destroy British influence in the Caribbean Sea. The outbreak of disease among the troops upon the crowded transports went far toward defeating the plans of the allies. Although Great Britain had maintained her hold upon Gibraltar and Jamaica, the armed neutrality of the northern European powers and the outbreak of hostilities with the Netherlands were sources of considerable embarrassment to her. Great Britain's supremacy of the sea and her assertion of naval power by repeated acts of arrogance made every maritime power of Europe her enemy.

On February 26, 1780, Catharine II., Empress of Russia, took the initiative in establishing a system of maritime laws in contravention of the claims and practices of Great Britain. The ships of Russia like those of the other nations had been repeatedly stopped on the high seas and searched by the British on the pretence that they were carrying on a commerce inconsistent with neutrality. Russia transmitted to the courts of London, Versailles, and Madrid a declaration which stated in direct terms that she had given convincing proof of her strict regard for the rights of neutrality and the liberty of commerce in general. That she had hoped that her impartial conduct would have preserved to her subjects the enjoyment of those advantages which belonged to neutral nations. That as her subjects had been repeatedly molested in their navigation by the privateers of the belligerent powers she found it necessary to remove those vexations to her commerce. But before taking active steps she felt it incumbent upon her to communicate to the world the principles which she had adopted, and which were as follows: That neutral ships should enjoy a free navigation,

even from port to port, and on the coast of belligerent powers. That all effects belonging to the belligerent powers should be looked on as free if on board neutral ships unless such ships were in or seeking to enter or leave places actually blocked up or besieged, and unless they carried to or for the belligerents contraband articles. The latter were defined to be warlike stores and ammunition. The declaration closed by affirming that the empress was firmly resolved to maintain these principles and to that end had given orders to fit out a considerable part of her naval force.

Great Britain returned a civil response to this announcement and France a cordial one. The kings of Sweden and Denmark gave their formal endorsement to the principles set forth by Russia. The Queen of Portugal was the only interested sovereign who refrained from doing so. Thus Great Britain's claim to the sovereignty of the sea was denied. The commerce of the Netherlands with the United States had been a constant source of irritation to Great Britain and, added to the action of the governor of St. Eustatius, completed her resentment against the United Provinces. The event which led to a formal declaration of war was the capture of Henry Laurens. He had been sent out from the United States to solicit a loan from the Netherlands and to seek to negotiate a treaty. On his way thither the ship which bore him was overtaken by a British frigate, whereupon he threw his papers overboard, but the British recovered them and learned their contents. Among them was the draft of a treaty which had been drawn up in a conference between William Lee and John de Neusville, a merchant of Amsterdam. Although it lacked the endorsement either of Congress or of the States General of the Netherlands, Great Britain became incensed and its representative, Sir Joseph Yorke, on December 20th, was ordered to withdraw from The Hague. Without a single ally Great Britain found herself at war with France, Spain, Holland, and the United States. On February 3, 1781, Sir George Rodney and General Vaughan, with a large fleet

and army, attacked St. Eustatius and forced its governor to capitulate. Great stores of ammunition fell into the hands of the British. Their conduct was unmerciful. They made havoc of private property, even destroying the books and correspondence of merchants; many of the inhabitants were transported to St. Christopher. While Great Britain was wreaking her vengeance upon this island possession of the Netherlands, France was devising naval operations which were to complete the destruction of British power in the United States.

In the spring of 1780, the troops promised by the King of France for the aid of the United States, set sail. Court favor secured for the American service a number of the French nobility who felt that no higher honor could be bestowed upon them than the opportunity to serve under General Washington. The whole French people were enthusiastic over the expedition. Setting sail on May 1, 1780, the troops arrived at Rhode Island on the 10th of the following July. M. de Ternay was in charge of the squadron which consisted of seven ships of the line, five frigates and several smaller armed vessels. The fleet of transports which the squadron convoyed bore six thousand men including a battalion of artillery, all of whom were under the command of Count de Rochambeau. Upon their landing the French force was put in possession of the forts and batteries of Rhode Island and these they soon brought to a point of high efficiency. Shortly after their arrival the General Assembly of Rhode Island presented the Count de Rochambeau an address which abounded in expressions laudatory of his sovereign and nation, and of greeting for himself. Rochambeau replied that the force under him was but the vanguard of a larger force to follow and that in accordance with the instructions of his sovereign the French troops "were under the strictest discipline and acting under the orders of General Washington, and would live with the Americans as brethren." As an expression of friendship and affection for their allies, General Washington

in public orders recommended the American officers to wear cockades. A British fleet under Admiral Graves blockaded the French fleet in the harbor of Newport, and Clinton embarking at New York with eight thousand of his victorious troops, returned from Charleston, declared his intention to coöperate with the navy in an attack upon the French in Rhode Island, but he evidently realized the importance of not weakening New York by depleting it of troops and returned to that place before Washington could carry out the bold plan which he had at once conceived of making an attack upon New York in the absence of the British general. Both the Americans and the French hoped that another fleet under Count de Guichen, which had been operating in the West Indies, would come north and coöperate in an attack upon New York. Their hopes, however, were dashed by the departure of Count de Guichen for France. Thus the French army was kept shut up in Rhode Island for a year unable to render effectual aid to the Americans.

Deferring, through necessity, their plan of taking New York, the American leaders now turned their attention to a renewal of the campaign in the South. Mortified at the defeats in that section, and yet inspired by the examples of bravery which had now and again accompanied those defeats, Congress now determined to do what it had come to learn was the most rational thing it could do for the promotion of the efficiency of the army—it decided to send South a general qualified for the business in hand. The nomination for this important trust was left to General Washington and he named General Greene, assigning as the reason for his choice, "that he is an officer in whose abilities and integrity, from a long and intimate experience, I have the most entire confidence." After its defeat and dispersion the army rendezvoused at Hillsborough from which place they advanced toward the close of 1780 to Charlotte. It was here that Gates transferred the command to Greene. The country was up in arms against the British invaders.

The performances of Sumter and Marion had thrilled the south with a new hope and had inspired the backwoodsmen generally with a determination to harry their British foes out of the South. Yet Congress could not repeat its aid to the section by commissioning another army for its service. One army captured at Charleston, and another destroyed at Camden, had almost exhausted the resources that Congress could devote to the South. Yet Washington was hopeful, for although Greene led but three hundred and fifty men from the regular line, nevertheless that general was a host in himself and the achievements of the irregular troops of the section gave to Washington full proof that there was in them the making of an army such as he had employed in gaining control of the Middle States. Congress could furnish Greene with only fifteen hundred stand of arms, and he had to rely upon his own efforts to secure provisions, money, clothing, medicine, and all other things needed by his troops. Pennsylvania aided him by a gift of wagons, and Greene persuaded Congress to assign him "light horse Harry Lee," with his cavalry regiment or rather with a cavalry regiment when Lee should have raised such. Everywhere Greene solicited aid without being particular as to what form it took. He made requests to Delaware and Maryland and backed his solicitations with letters from Washington and Congress. These States had lost men at the Battle of Camden, and felt exalted by the display of heroism made in the memorable stand of their troops, so that, as far as their means would permit, they came to the aid of Greene for the equipping of a new army for the South. Passing on to Richmond, Greene made his plea to Governor Jefferson and the legislature, but matters were in too confused a state to admit of Virginia's giving him aid. A force of the enemy had landed in the southeast, and Virginia was concerned for its own protection. Greene detailed Steuben to take charge of military affairs in Virginia, and continued southward. He was drawing near enough to the scene of his future activities to receive

reports, and these indicated a condition little short of chaos. On December 2d, he arrived at Charlotte and found awaiting him a complaint from Cornwallis about the hanging of prisoners by the Americans after the Battle of King's Mountain. To this he responded with a declaration that he was not going to conduct hostilities after that fashion and appended to his reply, as a sufficient rejoinder to Cornwallis's complaint, a list of fifty prisoners who had been executed by British commanders. Greene had more serious matters to engage his attention than complaints concerning the treatment of prisoners made in former battles; his work was the organization of an army. The order of genius required for such organization was different from that necessary for the conduct of a campaign. Washington possessed both executive and military ability and he judged truly when he attributed to Greene the organizing and fighting qualities sufficient to cope with the difficulties of the situation. One of the most pleasing traits of the new commander-in-chief of the southern department was his magnanimity. In his letters and conversation he sought to vindicate the reputation of Gates and affirmed that his predecessor had not been remiss in any part of his military duty, and that he had richly deserved the success which he could not gain.

Greene found himself in command of an army of twenty-three hundred men who had been collected by Gates since his defeat. It goes without saying that these men were in no sense prepared for a long campaign; in clothing and equipment they were near the last point of deficiency. Discipline was at a low ebb and the men were accustomed to return to their homes when in the mood to do so. Greene met this situation promptly in a way that left no doubt as to his views upon the subject of army discipline; he classed such conduct as desertion and shot the first offender. While employed in bringing his troops to a point of efficiency he made a careful examination of the country and prepared maps of it. A brilliant corps of men held commands under

Greene. When he arrived at Charlotte he found there the dashing Colonel John Eager Howard and the resolute Colonel Otho Williams, of Maryland, and Colonels William Washington and Daniel Morgan, of Virginia, both splendid soldiers and the latter the most capable of all Greene's subordinates. The others represented the aristocracy of the colonies, but in this fact was no depreciation of their merits, for soldiers such as they were a standing rebuttal to the Tory sneers at the plebeian character of the men in the Continental service and in Congress. Morgan represented that virile element whose contributions to American character have been the inspiration and glory of American progress. He was the son of a Welsh immigrant and was born in New Jersey. Following the tide of westward immigration he found himself upon the frontier and living under conditions which were possible only to men of hardihood, courage, and vigor. First a wagoner, later a soldier in the Braddock expedition, he became inured to the privations of military service, and he suffered the infliction of an indignity which the barbarous military code of the time permitted; he was severely flogged for striking a companion. Nevertheless he continued in the service and had numerous exciting adventures with the Indians. Marrying and settling down in Virginia, the finer qualities of the man were exhibited and he became a leader among his neighbors. When the Revolution broke out he raised a company of riflemen and these he led in almost every action from Boston to Monmouth. He played a conspicuous part in the Burgoyne campaign, and at the surrender of Saratoga the British commander paid him the fine tribute of declaring that his was "the finest regiment in the world." Congress with its fatuous predilection for persons of note or social status had not grasped the worth of Morgan or had signally failed in appropriately rewarding it with suitable distinctions. Disgusted at seeing foreigners and unworthy favorites given the promotions withheld from him he retired to his home in Virginia.

The American defeat at Camden stirred Morgan's fighting blood, dissipated the clouds of resentment from his mind and sent him post haste to Hillsborough to offer his services to the defeated general. Such exemplary spirit won from Congress the delayed commission and Morgan was made a brigadier-general. Greene confirmed Morgan in his separate command and assigned him to Ninety-Six. Here in the western extremity of South Carolina the British for thirteen months had been filling the country with resentment over their constant series of predatory expeditions. When Morgan made his appearance the plans of Cornwallis for the invasion of North Carolina were far advanced, but that general could not afford to leave in his rear such a notable force of fighters as Morgan's men. To hold them in check he detached Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton with eleven hundred soldiers. That vigorous officer was supplied with two field pieces and with infantry and cavalry which were superior to those of Morgan in the ratio respectively of five to four and three to one. Such were the forces and the men engaged in the Battle of Cowpens on January 17, 1781. Tarleton had moved rapidly against Morgan, and on January 16th the latter reached the Cowpens, which was a place midway between Spartanburg and the Cherokee ford of Broad River, where cattle were rounded up and branded. Morgan had been too well trained in military matters to be guilty of foolhardiness and was unwilling to risk an engagement with Tarleton under conditions so disadvantageous. The scouts whom he had sent out had brought back information which fully advised him of the probable design of the British to crush him, for he ascertained that he was between two armies. Yet he could not continue indefinitely to retreat; so that, although, as he wrote his chief, his position was one of gravity, he determined to risk an engagement at Cowpens. As, on the evening before the battle, he passed among the men gathered about their camp fires, he strengthened their confidence by assuring them that "the old wagoner would crack his whip over Tarleton."

The next morning he formed his troops in battle array. He gave the Maryland troops the centre position, and placed the Virginia riflemen on each flank. In front of the main line he placed the militia under Pickens, and in the rear he stationed Colonel Washington and the cavalry. Pickens's men were under orders, when too hard pressed, to retire and take position on the right of the second line. Colonel Washington's cavalry formed in an open wood, which was not secured on either side, front or rear.

The British formed with the infantry and fusileers for the main line. But the order to make this formation had not been fully executed when the impetuous Tarleton led the men in a rush upon Pickens. The assault was expected by its leader to sweep the Americans out of his path. With shouts the British came on, firing volleys from their muskets. The wild onslaught of Tarleton had more than once carried terror to the hearts of his enemy, and caused them to flee in terror. But he miscalculated when he threw his troops, wearied with their pursuit of the American forces, upon Pickens's militia supported by the Maryland line and Washington's cavalry. Above all he lost sight of Morgan. Following his orders, Pickens delivered several well aimed and destructive volleys and then fell back in an orderly manner to the right and left wings of Howard and his Marylanders. Tarleton was now open to a heavy and well-directed fire from the steady Continental troops. The British faltered under the hail of lead, and Tarleton called up his reserves, who flung themselves upon Howard's line. Seeing that his front was being turned Howard ordered his right company to "right face." Misconstruing the order, the whole line turned and began to retreat. At this point the genius of Morgan came into play. Keeping Pickens and his militia, which had reformed, employed in assailing the British right wing, he ordered Colonel Washington to charge the enemy, which that officer did, breaking through the British right wing and getting in the rear of the column. He sent word to Morgan to give the British in pursuit of Howard's

retreating line the benefit of a volley, while he charged them from the rear. By this time Howard had rallied the Continental troops and at the word of command they faced about and poured into the British line a deadly volley which they followed up with a bayonet charge. This unexpected move on the part of troops whom the British thought to be a panic-stricken mob filled them with astonishment and threw them into confusion. At the same time, Washington charged them from the rear. Panic spread throughout the British ranks, and the rout of the army was complete. Finding themselves surrounded they threw down their arms and asked for quarter. The only body of infantry which escaped capture was that which formed the guard for the baggage, and upon hearing of Tarleton's defeat, the officer in charge of that detachment hastily joined Cornwallis. Six hundred and eleven of Tarleton's men were captured. Over one hundred men and ten officers were killed. Tarleton himself by acts of personal valor and hard riding only barely made his escape. All the field equipment fell into the hands of the Americans. The loss of the latter was but twelve killed and sixty wounded. In commemoration of Morgan's notable victory Congress accorded him a gold medal, and in appreciation of the gallantry of Washington and Howard these officers were voted silver medals.

The effect of Tarleton's defeat was damaging to British prestige. It more than wiped out all that his previous successes in skirmishes had gained. The stimulus afforded to the American troops, and especially to the militia, by the victory was a great aid to the army in the South.

Lord Cornwallis still adhered to his plan to move into North Carolina, but he saw the necessity of leaving a large force in South Carolina. For this purpose he garrisoned Camden with a large body of troops under the command of Lord Rawdon. Thus there were large British forces at Charleston and Camden. Greene had heard with the greatest satisfaction of the splendid exploit of Morgan, but at the same time he was profoundly concerned at having the

enemy between that general's command and his own. He sent out in all directions to gather together the militia, and made arrangements to have the prisoners transported to the north, and then, accompanied only by an orderly sergeant, he joined Morgan. In the meanwhile, Morgan had crossed Broad River on the night of his victory. He was pursued by Cornwallis, who actually resorted to the expedient of destroying his baggage in his desperate effort to come up with the daring general. When Cornwallis reached the Catawba he learned that the Americans had crossed that stream two days before, and were far on their way to join Greene. When Greene learned that Cornwallis had destroyed his baggage he realized that the British general had added to defeat upon the field the severe difficulties arising from deficiency of stores, and exultantly exclaimed: "He is ours." Greene hoped to prevent Cornwallis from crossing the Catawba, and to force him back to the Santee. But the sudden fall of the waters defeated his plans in this regard, and made it necessary for him to order Morgan to continue the retreat to the Yadkin. Greene gave himself to the work of getting together the scattered militia. Some eight hundred of these were stationed at MacGowans Ford. Nevertheless, the British, with great bravery, succeeded in crossing, though only at a point where it was five hundred yards wide and three feet deep, and under a sustained fire of the militia, and dispersed the latter, whose retreat was hastened the next morning by Tarleton. With the passage of the Catawba effected, the Yadkin became the point for American concentration. Morgan's foresight had provided for the exigency by having boats ready at the Yadkin to convey Morgan's army to the opposite shore. Well was it for Morgan and his men that these transports were in readiness. The water was running swiftly, and difficulties were encountered in breasting the current; so that the British got close to the American rear, and a sharp skirmish occurred between it and the British van. Yet the whole army was landed with the loss of but a few wagons. Cornwallis, being

without boats, could resort only to a fruitless cannonade. The exploit of Morgan and his dramatic escape from the British army greatly impressed the country, and made the Americans feel that they had received another evidence of the favor of heaven for their cause. On February 7th, at Guilford Court House, the American army was reunited. However, its numbers were so greatly inferior to those of the force under Cornwallis that Greene dared not risk an engagement. Calling a council of war, he was advised by that body to retire beyond the Dan until he might be reinforced. Cornwallis foresaw this movement of the Americans, and planned to get between them and Virginia, so as to cut off Greene's retreat, and be in a position to capture any reinforcements and supplies that might be sent to him. For this purpose, Cornwallis patrolled the upper country where the rivers were fordable, believing that the Americans could not affect a crossing of the river in the deep waters below, but in the event of their making the attempt to do so, notwithstanding the depth of the water, he believed that he could overtake and engage them before they could get across.

Although Benedict Arnold was now ravaging Virginia, General Greene did not hesitate to seek refuge within its borders. He was determined at all odds to save his army from falling into the hands of the British, and thus adding another defeat to those of Charleston and Camden. He sought in every direction for reinforcements. Sumter went to South Carolina to raise troops. Marion was ordered to cross the Santee and Pickens was detached to harass the rear of the enemy. The heavy baggage was sent to a place of safety, and on February 10th, Greene started on a seventy mile march to the Fords of the Dan with the British following hard after him. The season of the year and the condition of the country made rapid marching impossible. The hardships of the men were great, yet they bore them with courage. In order to retard the enemy's pursuit, Greene detached Colonel Williams with several hundred men to

impede Cornwallis by repeated skirmishes with the British flank. In the meanwhile the American army struggled on, leaving their path marked by blood stains from the bare feet of the soldiers. The ordeal was too severe for the North Carolina militia, most of whom wearied and deserted after three days' wading of swamps and travelling over hard country. Meantime, the picked command of Williams challenged every foot of the onward march of the British. Not only so, but he succeeded in deluding the British commander and diverting him from the line of march followed by the main army. Having effected his purpose, Williams, on February 13th, succeeded in withdrawing his men under cover of night, but he was quickly pursued by Cornwallis, who, having discovered the trick that had been played him, also made a forced night march. Receiving word the next day that the American army had crossed the Dan, Williams and his men hurried forward and made the crossing themselves. As in the case of the Yadkin, so in the case of the Dan, Greene had fully provided for the emergency of crossing the river in haste. He had not only provided boats but had sent Kosciuszko to ford the river and to throw up earthworks on the other side in order to be in a position to successfully challenge the British in an attempt to follow them.

Cornwallis, seeing the impracticability of crossing the Dan, withdrew his army to Hillsborough. He made the most of the situation by claiming to have driven the Americans into Virginia. The result of Greene's campaign in North Carolina, aside from the immediate value of the victory at the Cowpens, was to arouse again the friends of independence enthusiastically to resist Cornwallis. At this time the British general wrote: "I am amongst timid friends and adjoining to inveterate rebels." Greene employed Lee and Pickens on similar work to that being done by Williams, to wit, the harassing of the enemy, especially by interfering with communications and capturing Loyalist recruits. Tarleton was again upon his plundering expeditions and in pursuing him Lee came upon three hundred Tories on their

way to join Cornwallis. Although he endeavored to pass unperceived by the Tories in order to attack Tarleton he was forced into an engagement. The Loyalist recruits were beaten. Those who were not left upon the field scattered in all directions. The experience of this company did much to dampen the new ardor for the king which had sprung up among the Loyalists upon the departure of Greene from the country. Cornwallis, deprived of reinforcements and with his communications cut off, felt it necessary to bring his foe to a battle as speedily as possible. After having sent over the Dan his light troops, on February 21st, Greene recrossed the river with the main army and the Virginia militia in order to support Pickens, Lee, and Williams in their skirmishes with the British. The successful forays of the Americans and the return of the main body of troops upset the plans of Cornwallis. Had the American army remained out of North Carolina a fortnight longer, he believed that the tide of popular approval would have been with him. Now, those who would have curried British favor were too terrified to do so. By changing his camp every night Greene kept Cornwallis confused as to his location. He continued this manœuvre for three weeks; all the while he and his army were hard pressed to obtain food enough for bare subsistence. Greene himself was reduced to the necessity of asking the common soldiers to share their bread with him. Cornwallis, wearied of the attempt to force Greene to join battle with him, went into camp at Bell's Mills, in order to rest his men. Greene likewise was glad to afford his men a respite from their marches.

On March 14, 1781, Greene, having in the meanwhile been reinforced by two brigades from North Carolina, one from Virginia, and four hundred regular troops, determined to risk an engagement with Cornwallis. That general was ready and anxious for the contest. At this time the American army consisted of forty-two hundred men, of whom about half were militia. Of the entire force but two hundred were cavalry. Though feeling far from confident

of the outcome of the battle, Greene believed that at least he could do the enemy damage enough to make them retire to Wilmington. Therefore, on March 15th, he prepared for the contest by drawing up his men in three lines. The first was composed of the North Carolina militia, the second, of the Virginia militia and the Continental troops under the immediate command of General Isaac Huger, who was in charge of the main army at the time when Greene left it to join Morgan, and Colonel Williams made up the third line. Of the second line the Virginians, although militia, had been under fire before. Of the Maryland and Virginia regulars only one regiment, the First Maryland, were veterans. On the right flank was posted Colonel Washington with his dragoons and a part of the light infantry. Lee and his light cavalry, with the rest of the infantry, and Campbell with his riflemen, were on the left. About one o'clock in the afternoon, after a brisk cannonade, the British advanced in three columns—the Hessians on the right, the guards in the centre, and Lieutenant Webster's brigade on the left. With a shout the British rushed upon the front line of the Americans; and the untried North Carolina militia, while the enemy was yet a hundred and forty yards distant, broke ranks and fled; "none of them having fired more than twice, very few more than once, and near one-half not at all." Lee's command became separated from the main army and did not rejoin it until the next day. The British, without pausing, advanced upon the second line; and the Virginia militia stood their ground, keeping up their fire until ordered to retreat. It was known to them that General Stevens, their commander, had taken the extraordinary precaution for preventing a panic of posting forty riflemen in the rear of his brigade with orders to shoot any man who left his post. So the second line held its ground until ordered to retreat and then the British were near enough for a bayonet charge. The British army was now faced by the third line, which was in direct command of Greene. The Continental troops maintained the conflict with great courage for an hour

and a half, bearing an attack on the right from Colonel Webster with the British left wing. The latter was driven back and Webster was mortally wounded. While Greene's force was under fire, the second battalion of the Guards under Lieutenant-colonel Stewart broke through the Second Maryland regiment and, turning the American left flank, got in the rear of the Virginia brigade. Seeing the Second Maryland fleeing before the British, Colonel Washington charged the latter with his dragoons and was ably supported by Gunby and Howard, the First Maryland regiment making a spirited bayonet charge. The British gave way in disorder, and Cornwallis, who had his horse shot from under him, ordered the artillery to open fire, although in doing this the solid shot ploughed through his own ranks. It had the desired effect and the American pursuit was checked, thus affording the British time to reform their lines. The first battalion of the Guards, which had suffered severely, advanced against the Americans, but were received with a front and flank fire which threw them into disorder. They were supported, however, by Du Puy's Hessian regiment and renewed the attack, making it impossible for the Americans to hold their ground. Greene had two Virginia regiments of Continentals in reserve, but hesitated to contest the issue further; and, not knowing the extent of the British loss, decided to use the reserve regiments in covering the retreat of his army. The retreat was continued for three miles, when the army paused. Greene fainted from exhaustion, and suffered greatly in his health as a result of the strain he had been under. The battle of Guilford Court House cost the British dearly. They had lost six hundred and thirty-three killed and wounded, besides Colonel Webster, Colonel Stewart, and three captains. After a battle and particularly a defeat, the desertion from the American army was large. The Guilford Court House battle resulted in the disappearing of over one thousand Americans, they having gone home, as Greene expressed it, "to kiss their sweethearts and wives"; the informal leavetaking was greatest

among the North Carolina militia, which had lost only nine men in battle. The actual number of the Americans killed and wounded was but one hundred and sixty-three. Among the American slain were Major Anderson, of the Maryland line, and General Huger. Greene was not ill pleased with the result of the battle, as it had badly crippled Cornwallis; while that general professed great satisfaction at its result and issued a proclamation announcing a victory. When his despatches reached England, Charles Fox said that "another such victory would destroy the British army." Cornwallis betook himself from the scene of the late conflict as quickly as possible, leaving his own and the American wounded upon the field. His objective point was Wilmington, where Major Craig had been stationed to keep up communication with the British army in the north, in which efforts he had been unsuccessful. The rush of the British for Wilmington was dictated by the dire necessities of the men, who were deprived of opportunity to secure stores and provisions by the spirit of the people. When Greene heard of the movement of Cornwallis he pursued him with hurried marches but did not overtake him. The British managed to cross Deep River before Greene desisted from the chase. There they made a halt.

There were but two courses open to Greene, one was to pursue a policy looking towards the isolation of Cornwallis by cutting off his communications with the north, the other was to march to the south and place himself between Cornwallis's main army and its southern division and begin a systematic attack upon the southern posts. The latter course would tend to draw Cornwallis into the two lower States. It was also important that Greene should move quickly, whichever plan he adopted. He fixed upon the second, and on April 6th he began his march to the south. Had Greene departed from the south, the people of that section would have looked upon themselves as conquered by the British. When he returned to South Carolina the

people looked upon Cornwallis as in retreat. So long as his army was operating in the Southern States, independent commands like those of Sumter and Marion were able to keep up their aggressive efforts. Indeed, Greene was strongly urged by General Sumter to continue his operations in that section. Before setting out on his march southward Greene detached General Pickens to cut off supplies from the British garrisons at Ninety-six and Augusta. On April 6th he ordered Lieutenant-colonel Lee to join Marion and assail the communications of Lord Rawdon, who was then at Camden, with Charleston, where was stationed the second division of the southern department of British troops. The main army in the meanwhile proceeded from their camp at Deep River to Camden. The British had established a chain of posts from the capital to the extreme districts of the State. These now became objects of American attack. One of them, Fort Watson, between Camden and Charleston, was on April 23, 1781, invested by General Marion and Lieutenant-colonel Lee and the garrison capitulated. On April 25th, General Greene took a position a mile out from Camden in the hope of thereby luring the garrison to come out and give battle. Lord Rawdon accepted the challenge and an engagement ensued between Greene's force of fourteen hundred men and Rawdon's of one thousand, with the advantage of equipment and morale in favor of the British. In spite of the suddenness of Rawdon's attack the battle of Hobkirk's Hill was favorable to the Americans until two companies prematurely retreated. Seeing that the course of the battle was against him Greene determined to rob the British of the substantial fruits of victory and ordered a general retreat, which was executed in an orderly way, saving the artillery from falling into the hands of the British. The American loss in killed, wounded, and missing was two hundred and seventy-one, that of the British two hundred and fifty-eight. Although depressed in spirits by the result, Greene withdrew his men to Rugely Mills where he paused to recruit his army and once more threatened

Camden. On May 7th, Lord Rawdon received a reinforcement of between four and five hundred men whom Lee and Marion had failed to intercept. He sought again to engage Greene in action, but failing in this, on May 10th, he evacuated Camden, which was now cut off by the fall of Fort Watson, and retired south of the Santee. On May 11th, the post at Orangeburg capitulated to the Americans, followed on the next day by the surrender of Fort Motte.

The interior of the State was now entirely open to the operations of the American army; Greene had lost a battle, but had won a campaign. Neilson's Ferry was evacuated on May 14th, and on the 15th Lee took Fort Granby. North Carolina was free and South Carolina nearly so. Georgia still remained in the hands of the enemy and toward it Lee directed his march. He joined Pickens in the siege of Augusta on May 21st. This town was strongly defended by Fort Cornwallis and Fort Grierson. Pickens attacked the former and Lee besieged the latter. Fort Grierson first fell and the garrison retired to Fort Cornwallis, although most of them were killed or captured in the attempt. The American force was now concentrated upon the larger and more formidable fort. The Americans drew their lines closer and closer about the fortification and made breaks in it by the one cannon that they possessed. The garrison, when reduced to extremities, surrendered, and thus Augusta and its defenders passed into the hands of the Americans. The Americans under Greene were, in the meantime, operating against Ninety-six, which was now the strongest post held by the British in the South. Its garrison consisted of Lieutenant-colonel Cruger and five hundred men. The siege began on May 25th. The outlying works had been successfully taken when intelligence was received of the approach of Lord Rawdon with a relief force of two thousand men. These had arrived in Charleston from Ireland after the siege had begun and were marched to Ninety-six the seventh day after their landing. Accordingly on June 18th, General Greene decided no longer to delay the

assault; he had hoped to reduce the place by siege. Although the assault was conducted with great courage, it was unsuccessful. The British army was now close at hand and Greene was obliged to withdraw. The British force arrived at Ninety-six on June 21st, and then undertook the pursuit of Greene. The latter eluded his pursuers and persisted in his determination to capture Ninety-six. If he could not force his antagonists to evacuate the fort he would entice them to do so. This he succeeded in doing, and Rawdon, evacuating Ninety-six, divided his army into two columns and marched to Charleston. He was forced to do this by Greene's refusal to fight and his own inability to hold the ground, cut off from communications.

After the retreat of Rawdon, Greene retired to the hills of the Santee leaving Lee, Sumter, and others to follow the retreating troops and to harry them by skirmishes. This they effectually did, continuing their irregular operations to the picket lines at Charleston, where they destroyed the enemy's ships in Cooper River. The country lately occupied by the British now became a scene of civil war, as the patriots were fiercely incensed against the Loyalists and the latter were equally embittered. The action of the British in executing Colonel Hayne, a prisoner of war, filled the Americans with wrath and led them to make reprisals. Houses were burnt, fields were ravaged, and a state of terror instituted. Thus the Loyalist sympathizers of South Carolina and Georgia reaped a bitter harvest from their confidence placed in British promises of protection.

Lord Rawdon, broken in health, took ship for England, only to fall into the hands of the French. His command devolved upon Lieutenant-colonel Stewart who, with twenty-three hundred men, established his camp at the junction of the Congaree and the Wateree. Greene was intent upon forcing the British to Charleston, and crossing the rivers where the British had their camp, he took his position on the south side of the Congaree, determined to act upon the offensive. This led the British, in the middle of August,

to retire to Eutaw Springs, forty miles nearer to Charleston. Greene also marched to Eutaw Springs. On September 7th he was within easy striking distance of the British and was joined by Marion, whose men were flushed with a recent victory gained in a contest with three hundred Hessians and British of whom they had captured or killed over one hundred. Stewart was not aware of the approach of the Americans until they were close upon him and he had barely time to prepare for his defence. He sent out his cavalry on the morning of September 8th, and it was cut to pieces. Greene had drawn up his men in two lines and they marched unflinchingly to the attack. His first line was composed of militia and the second of Continental troops. The North Carolinians forming the first line delivered seventeen rounds before they gave way and permitted the Virginians and the Maryland men to take their places. These forces were under Colonel Williams and Lieutenant-colonel Campbell. Although subjected to a heavy cannonade and the fire of the flower of the British musketry they rushed on in good order bearing down the enemy before them. Twice the British lines repelled the assault before Greene set these Continentals the final task of the bayonet. They broke entirely through the British centre while Lee employed the enemy's flank. In that onslaught Campbell received a mortal wound. Having fallen, he anxiously inquired which side had given way, and upon being assured that the British were in flight in all directions, he exclaimed: "I die contented!" The victors, flushed with success, scattered in all directions seeking plunder. The British reformed their lines and only the coolness of Greene and the steadiness of his best troops saved the Americans from disaster. The right wing of the British had repulsed the American attack with great slaughter and some of the soldiers had taken possession of a brick house from which they delivered a merciless fire. Greene saw that under these conditions his forces, now scattered, would soon become disconcerted and panic-stricken. With great difficulty he reformed his lines,

but the full result of victory was lost through the bad discipline of his troops. Nevertheless, he had delivered a fatal blow to his enemy, had taken five hundred prisoners, and had forced the British to retreat to Charleston. Their total loss, including men taken prisoners, was about one thousand, while that of the Americans was four hundred and eight. Congress honored Greene for his conduct of this battle with a gold medal and a British standard and passed a vote of thanks to the different corps and their commanders.

The battle of Eutaw Springs may be regarded as closing the war in South Carolina and as the termination of an eventful campaign. At its commencement the British had control of the State, at its close they were virtually shut up in Charleston. The people of South Carolina were now free to harvest their crops and to attend to their business affairs that had so long been neglected. They were also free to reorganize their shattered government and to place it among the States of the Union.

As has already been said, Lord Cornwallis, after the battle of Guilford Court House, had retired to North Carolina. His plan was to form a junction with the British forces in Virginia. There was strong pressure brought to bear upon him to return to South Carolina so that he might offset Greene's expedition thither. But he felt that if Lord Rawdon should be unable to stand his ground and if Greene should gain control of the State, his own conquest of Virginia would make it possible for him to take South Carolina without serious trouble. By the end of April, 1781, Cornwallis was on his way from Wilmington to Virginia. Taking the shortest road to Halifax he arrived there before the Americans could remove certain supplies stored there, and these he captured. There was little opposition made to the progress of the British army. By May 20th it had reached Petersburg, which had been fixed upon as the place of rendezvous for all the royal forces in the State.

We will now briefly review the course of military events in Virginia prior to the coming of Cornwallis. On

January 5, 1781, Arnold, now a brigadier-general in the royal army, appeared in Virginia waters, and made a landing fifteen miles below Richmond. He had with him a force of sixteen hundred men, besides a number of armed vessels, with which he committed extensive depredations upon the unprotected coasts. At Richmond large quantities of tobacco, salt, rum, sail-cloth, and other merchandise was destroyed by the invaders, and like depredations were repeated elsewhere. In the latter part of 1780, Major-general Leslie with two thousand men had been detached from New York to the Chesapeake. But he had subsequently been ordered to Charleston to coöperate with Cornwallis. Thus Arnold was left to be the scourge of Virginia. On January 20, 1781, he marched into Portsmouth and began to fortify the place. Washington had watched the movements of Arnold with concern, and fearing that he was establishing a permanent post, rather than a base for predatory expeditions he sent Lafayette into the State with twelve hundred infantry, and urged the French in Rhode Island to aid in his attempt to capture Arnold and his party. The French commanders had been awaiting a suitable opportunity to participate in the war, and gladly accepted the invitation presented. They therefore undertook to cut off the retreat of Arnold's party. On March 8, 1781, the French fleet with fifteen hundred men sailed from Rhode Island for Virginia. The death of De Ternay had, since December, 1780, devolved the command of the fleet upon D'Estouches. On February 9th, prior to the sailing of the fleet, he despatched an advance squadron with orders to destroy the British ships in the Chesapeake. By March 25th, the French ships had destroyed ten vessels and captured the *Romulus* of forty-four guns. Arbuthnot sailed from Gardiner's Bay in pursuit of D'Estouches, and engaged him on March 16th. The British had the advantage of heavier armament than the French although the French ships were better manned. The substantial fruits of victory rested with the British, and the French fleet returned to Rhode Island

without fully accomplishing its object. On March 25th, the day before the French fleet returned to Newport, a convoy from New York, bearing Major-general Phillips and two thousand men arrived in the Chesapeake. This officer had been appointed to the command of the royal forces in Virginia, and he at once proceeded to make a junction with Arnold. They swept the whole country before them, defeating the militia companies with ease. On April 22d, the main body of the British who had been at Williamsburg proceeded to Checkapowing. A detachment, however, had been sent to Yorktown. The main army continued its march to Petersburg, where it was opposed by Baron Steuben who made a gallant but ineffectual resistance. At this place the British destroyed quantities of tobacco and some shipping. Osborne, Manchester, and Warwick, and other towns were successfully ravaged. On May 10th, the army returned to Petersburg after having destroyed an enormous amount of property. At this time Phillips's career was closed by death.

Lord Cornwallis had hardly completed a junction with the royal troops in Virginia when he received Rawdon's report of the advantage he had gained over General Greene and at about the same time there came information of the sailing of three Irish regiments for Charleston; he therefore felt that the Southern campaign was largely confined to Virginia, and that North and South Carolina were subdued. The massing of such considerable forces as were now centred at Petersburg, made Virginia the principal theatre of military operations in America. Congress was awake to the seriousness of the situation, and prepared to meet it. On the failure of the French fleet successfully to coöperate with Lafayette, that general had marched to the head of Elk River, where he received orders to return to Virginia and oppose the British. He immediately proceeded to Richmond and arrived there a day before the British reached Manchester on the opposite side of James River. The British force was vastly superior to that of Lafayette which

consisted of about one thousand regulars and about two thousand militia. By pledging his own credit Lafayette had obtained in Baltimore shoes and clothes for his troops, so that, though insufficiently provided for, they were not in a destitute condition. The arrival of Lafayette in time to save Richmond was a commendable feat, but he could not give battle to the enemy with the force at his command. On the death of the British general Phillips, on May 13th, Arnold attempted to open correspondence with Lafayette, but the proud Frenchman scorned to have anything to do with a renegade. Cornwallis had as little liking for treachery as Lafayette and was not long in sending Arnold back to New York where his unsavory career was rounded out by further plundering expeditions and burning raids into Connecticut; these reached a climax in the capture of New London and the murder of Colonel Ledyard and seventy-three of his soldiers, who had surrendered as prisoners of war.

Cornwallis at the head of a splendidly equipped army of seven thousand seasoned troopers set himself to cut off Lafayette, who was attempting to make a junction with General Wayne, who had been ordered into Virginia by Washington. But the tactics so successfully employed by Greene were not unknown to Lafayette, and he experienced no great difficulty in deluding the British general and joining Wayne at a point on the Rapidan. The size of his force and the weakness of the American army enabled Cornwallis to detach large bodies of men for distant expeditions. Thus one was sent to Charlotte with the view of capturing the governor and the members of the State Assembly. This force was under Tarleton and it succeeded in dispersing the Assembly and capturing the governor and seven assemblymen besides destroying large quantities of stores. The other, under Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, was sent to Point of Fork to seize the American stores, but the greater part of these were gotten away in safety before the arrival of the British. The latter had become so imbued with

the plundering instinct that they appeared more anxious to destroy stores than to capture armies. By marching to meet Wayne, Lafayette had permitted the British to get between him and Albemarle where were stored the greater part of the American provisions and ammunition. By a dexterous manœuvre on June 18th, Lafayette reversed this situation and Cornwallis fell back to Richmond, Lafayette following him and making such a show of force as to give the British general the impression that the American army was larger than it was. This led Cornwallis to retire to Williamsburg on June 26. At this time Cornwallis received a message from Clinton, stating that he feared a combined attack by the French and Americans upon New York and requiring him to detach to that point a body of troops if he were not then engaged upon an important enterprise. Lord Cornwallis considered it expedient to comply with Clinton's request, but after doing so felt that he would no longer be in sufficient force to hold Williamsburg and fell back to Portsmouth. In doing this it was necessary to cross James River. He advanced to Green Spring where the impulsive Wayne was stationed with eight hundred light troops to harass the rear of the British. He had received information from a countryman that the main body of the British had crossed the James and when, on July 6th, he fell in with the enemy he was amazed to find himself facing the whole army. With his usual dash, however, Wayne charged the British line and Cornwallis, evidently suspecting that he had fallen into an ambuscade, declined to pursue the adventurous general in the hasty retreat that followed the audacious attack. But a more important influencing motive was the appearance of Lafayette. The action was brief and sharp. The American loss was one hundred and eighteen while that of the British was seventy-five. Lafayette had not been adverse to this brush with the British but was thankful to be able to draw off his forces intact, and to avoid a general engagement he withdrew to Malvern. Cornwallis continued his retreat to the coast, sending Tarleton into

Bedford County with the usual results of fire, sword, and pillage. Cornwallis withdrew to Portsmouth and thence, on August 1st, he proceeded to Yorktown, at which place, by the 9th, he had concentrated all his forces. He employed his men in building strong defences and preparing for active operations. Before the sailing of the troops which Cornwallis had detached for service at New York he received an express from Clinton, setting forth his wishes that Old Point Comfort should be made a station for battle ships and authorizing Cornwallis to retain under his command his entire force if he should need them for this service. Impressed with the necessity of controlling the Chesapeake, Cornwallis availed himself of the permission of Clinton to retain his whole army and pushed forward his work of fortifying his positions. He realized fully the strategic value of Yorktown and Gloucester. The British naval officers were at this time expecting the arrival of the West Indies fleet upon which event operations in Virginia were to be resumed with vigor.

Washington felt that the time was drawing near when a decisive and successful action must be fought if the Revolution was to be successful. A fatal blow at the army of Clinton or of Cornwallis could be delivered only by bringing an overwhelming force to bear at the point of conflict. This he hoped to accomplish with the aid of his French allies, but the command of the sea was essential to success. At this time Washington was casting about for the best means to make available and effective the French alliance. He entertained at the close of 1780 the idea of making common cause with the Spaniards for the seizure of Florida and thence proceeding against Georgia and coöperating with Greene. This broad plan, however, was not favored by Rochambeau and it was given up. The embarrassments which Congress was suffering from a depleted treasury and a depreciated currency made it imperative that success should be early achieved or else the Revolution must fail. Robert Morris was in charge of the finances of the country and

proved a tower of strength to the tottering cause of the Revolution. Just at this critical juncture, in May, 1781, De Barras, who succeeded De Ternay, who had died the year before in Boston, appeared at Newport with a French squadron and six hundred additional men for Rochambeau. But he brought with him the glad news of the sailing of De Grasse's powerful fleet from the West Indies for northern waters. It was uncertain, however, whether the latter's instructions would lend the strength of his fleet to Washington's plan. These were the factors at hand for Washington in the settlement of what he conceived to be the determining problem of the war. To bring them together and to unite their efforts in one crushing blow upon the British was the plan which promised success to the American cause. On May 21st, the plan was formulated in conference with Rochambeau at Wethersfield, Connecticut. It was decided that if De Grasse would coöperate, the total French forces and those of Washington should move against New York. At the same time the feasibility of proceeding to Virginia against Cornwallis was considered.

On June 8th, the French army formed a junction with the forces of Washington and on the 2d of July a combined attack was made upon the upper works of Manhattan Island, but without tangible results. Washington followed this up by a military demonstration calculated to impress Clinton with the seriousness of his own situation, and so to deter him from sending additional troops into Virginia. The movement had the desired result. Tingling with the anticipation of momentous happenings, Washington was anxious to strike the decisive blow either at New York or Yorktown. The course of action was largely controlled by De Grasse and that officer declined to go to New York. Thus the more important enterprise had to be set aside for one against Cornwallis. Congress had been apprised by Washington of the possibility of concentrating the Continental forces in Virginia. When it became known that De Grasse was headed toward the Chesapeake, Washington

prepared to move his armies southward. To the New England governors he sent almost passionate appeals for additional troops and Robert Morris responded to similar appeals for money up to the limit of his ability. Yet, despite the vital importance of the situation, the funds were miserably inadequate, the Northern States apathetic, and the general government impotent. Thus the burden of the great undertaking fell upon the commanding general in the field. The situation of Washington was further embarrassed by the pique displayed by De Barras toward De Grasse, his junior in rank, but having control of the larger fleet. As De Barras had an independent command, he determined not to coöperate with his fellow naval officer. Washington and Rochambeau saw the seriousness of this defection, and by a tactfully worded letter succeeded in inducing De Barras to yield his personal feelings for the general good. Accordingly, that admiral sailed from Newport, with a siege train. By a system of movements designed to deceive Clinton, Washington managed to conceal from that general his plan of operation against Cornwallis. Leaving General W. Heath in command of troops to check the British in New York, on August 19th, Washington with Rochambeau and the allied armies started for the south. Still intent upon deluding Clinton as to their real destination they made an attack on Staten Island, and thus managed to get the whole army across the Hudson into New Jersey without opposition. On September 8th, the allied armies were at the head of Elk River, awaiting the arrival of the fleet. The British were caught unprepared for the naval movements of the allies; and Admiral Rodney, instead of pursuing De Grasse with his whole squadron, detailed only fourteen ships under Hood to effect a juncture with Admiral Graves at New York. It was not until the latter's arrival at that place that the British ascertained that the destination of De Grasse was not New York. Clinton was now convinced that Virginia was the danger point, and sent Graves with his ships to the south with instructions to attempt to intercept De Barras.

In this Graves failed, but he kept on to the Chesapeake, and gave battle to De Grasse, who was at that time landing troops under St. Simon for the aid of Lafayette. The action although indecisive was favorable to the French, the British sailing back to New York. Thus the control of the Chesapeake fell into the hands of the allies, and one of the chief points of the campaign as planned by Washington had been gained. While Graves and De Grasse were manœuvring at the mouth of the Chesapeake, De Barras passed within the capes. At the time that these naval operations were taking place, the French and American forces were marching through the Middle States on their way to Yorktown.

Washington had advanced as far as Chester before he learned of the arrival of De Grasse. In its march to Yorktown the army passed through a fruitful country and the inhabitants readily met their needs. On September 14th, Washington and Rochambeau reached Williamsburg and in company with Generals Chastellux, Du Portail, and Knox visited Count de Grasse on his ship and agreed upon a plan of operations. The combined forces proceeded to Yorktown; the French fleet proceeding by way of York River, took a position to cut off Cornwallis's retreat or succor by way of water. Washington, during the march from Williamsburg to Yorktown, issued a general order as follows: "If the enemy should be tempted to meet the army on its march the general particularly enjoins the troops to place their principal reliance on the bayonet, that they may prove the vanity of the boast which the British make of their peculiar prowess in deciding battles with that weapon."

Arriving at Yorktown on September 28th, the Americans found Cornwallis in an intrenched camp outside the town. On the 29th, Washington assumed a position on the right which led Cornwallis to retire to the town within the inner lines of his defences. The following day the allies took possession of the abandoned works. At Gloucester, on the side of the neck of land, Cornwallis was shut in by the

Virginia militia under Weeden and the cavalry under Duc de Lauzun. Tarleton made a sortie, and Lauzun learning of the fact sought him out. The British officer was quite as anxious to meet the Frenchman, and upon their forces coming in touch Tarleton made at once for the duke. A lancer, however, rode against Tarleton throwing him to the ground, and the French advancing against the British in a brisk charge scattered them in all directions and Tarleton made his escape. On October 7th and 8th, heavy cannonading by the French and Americans forced the British back from their last outlying post. The fire continued more heavily on the 9th and 10th and at the same time the French fleet destroyed some of the British ships. On the 11th, Cornwallis sent word to Clinton that his situation was desperate and that the enemy was closing upon him. The duels of the batteries and the siege guns continued until, on the 14th, Washington deemed it feasible to assault the two advanced redoubts of the British left. Lafayette was assigned to the one closest to the river while several of the French regiments were detailed to look after the other. Alexander Hamilton led the main attack of the Americans with Laurens commanding the flank. The Continental troops depended entirely upon the bayonet. With a rush that surmounted all obstacles they reached the redoubt. They lost forty-two killed and wounded, while the British suffered a loss of but eight. Deeming surrender the better part of valor the British yielded the position as soon as the Americans began pouring over the parapet. The task of the French was more difficult, the redoubt assigned to them for capture being more earnestly defended and by a larger force. Nevertheless, after a half-hour's hard fighting they won the position.

Washington at once included the captured positions in the American lines and the British realized that the end was near. By this time the batteries of the besiegers comprised a hundred guns, and Cornwallis, realizing that his position was hopeless, sought to escape to Gloucester by

water. The attempt was futile; the transports were scattered by a violent storm and the men who had been successfully landed on the opposite shore were the next day brought back. Then Cornwallis sought terms of surrender from Washington, and on the 18th articles of capitulation were signed. Between eight and nine thousand men with full equipment, stores, and standards fell into the hands of the Americans. The French took four ships, thirty transports and fifteen galleys, besides smaller craft, and with them between eight and nine hundred officers and seamen. The allies had lost seventy-five killed and about two hundred wounded, while the loss of the British was one hundred killed, three hundred and twenty-six wounded, and seventy missing. The victory was complete and decisive. On the 24th, Sir Henry Clinton arrived off the capes with a fleet and reinforcements, but upon learning of the surrender of Cornwallis returned to New York. The formal act of surrender of the posts of Yorktown and Gloucester occurred at one o'clock on October 19th. At four o'clock in the afternoon General O'Hara tendered General Lincoln the sword of Cornwallis, at the same time offering apologies to Washington in his chief's behalf for his non-appearance upon the plea of illness. The British troops thereupon marched between the French and American lines and piled their arms, and as prisoners of war awaited dispersion to the several States. The troops of the allies in the siege of Yorktown consisted of seven thousand of the French, fifty-five hundred of the American troops, with four thousand of the militia. The fighting was over, but a state of official hostility was to exist for six months, and the evacuation of Savannah, Charleston, New York, and other points held by the British followed upon the conclusion of articles of peace.

CHAPTER XVII

CONDITIONS OF PEACE

THE sympathetic attitude of the countries of Europe toward the young republic has been noted. During the latter part of the war for independence Europe was in a state of armed neutrality, and, as we have seen, two of the most powerful nations of that country became allies of the United States in time to aid effectively in bringing to a successful issue the American struggle for independence. As the conflict drew toward a close, countries which had hesitated to acknowledge the independence of the United States hastened to do so. In May, 1782, the King of Sweden expressed through Franklin his earnest desire to enter into a treaty with the United States. The ambassador of Gustavus at Paris remarked to the American philosopher that he hoped that it would be remembered "that Sweden was the first power in Europe, which, without being solicited, offered its friendship to the United States." Five months prior to the signing of the treaty between Great Britain and the United States the treaty between Sweden and the United States was concluded. Each party was put on the footing of "the most favored nation." Liberty of commerce was made to include all forms of merchandise and the number of contraband articles was carefully limited. In case of a maritime war mutual assistance was to be rendered by the ships of each nation. Upon the conclusion of this treaty Frederick of Prussia sent instructions to his

minister in France to make overtures to Franklin, and these were cordially met. After it became apparent that a treaty of peace was to be concluded between the two warring nations the Prussian king permitted it to be intimated to Franklin that he was favorable to the conclusion of a treaty. On February 22, 1783, Denmark expressed her desire to effect a treaty with the United States, but a question of indemnity growing out of alleged violations of neutrality by Denmark interfered with the negotiations.

We have already seen that Spain, with great hesitancy and with no sympathy for the American cause, had been brought into alliance with the United States because of her close relations with France and a feeling that the identity of interests of the two countries dictated a parallel policy toward the young republic in its contest with Great Britain. Although Spain was displeased at the extent of territory conceded to the United States in the Anglo-American treaty, nevertheless Florida Blanca, in the presence of the ambassador of France, gave to Lafayette his pledge to observe the boundary laid down in that instrument and authorized Lafayette to present his declaration to Congress; and Spain made an effort, though a faint-hearted one, to live in harmony with her new neighbor. In the summer of 1783 Portugal made tentative offers to treat with Franklin, but did not pursue the subject to a conclusion. Russia entered into no specific agreement with the United States, as at that time she was engrossed with affairs in the East; but the two countries had rendered each other valuable service which established a permanent friendship. Catharine had flatly refused to aid George III. with troops and had declined to ally her country with Great Britain. While the United States was giving full employment to the maritime powers, Russia availed herself of the opportunity of incorporating the plains of Kuban and Crimea.

The questions of territory and fisheries, next to the actual recognition of independence of the United States, were the main subjects of the treaty of Versailles. The

alliance between France and Spain bound the former country to do and to seek to do certain things advantageous to Spain. The alliance of France with the United States reserved to the former certain claims, and it will now be necessary to review these, as they became points at issue. On June 19, 1779, Elbridge Gerry moved, in Congress, resolutions to the effect that the United States possessed common right with Great Britain to the fisheries on the banks of Newfoundland. Persons in Congress who cherished the friendship of France opposed the resolutions, but by the votes of the New England States and Pennsylvania the common right of the Americans to fish on the Grand Bank was affirmed and the guarantee of France was asked. Vergennes, however, brought such pressure to bear upon members of Congress favorably disposed toward France that enough votes were secured to defeat the plan to incorporate in the treaty of peace a right to the fisheries. In the matter of boundaries, Spain entertained the hope that by the support of France the country east of Mississippi River might be preserved to Great Britain by the terms of the treaty of peace between that country and the United States. Such a proposition, however, did not find favor with Congress and France and Spain were forced to content themselves with opposing the acquisition of Canada and Nova Scotia by the United States. In this they met little opposition. France was anxious to close the war with Great Britain and sought to induce Congress to agree to a truce with that country and to be satisfied with a tacit acknowledgment of the independence of the United States. But Congress determined to accept nothing short of an explicit recognition of independence, and this before a treaty of peace was formulated. The minister to be chosen to negotiate such a peace, by unanimous vote was directed to require "Great Britain to treat with the United States as sovereign, free, and independent." Although the United States desired to secure Nova Scotia, everything pertaining to the northeast boundary was to be left open by the negotiator for adjustment

"by commissioners after the peace." Although common right to the fisheries was declared to be of the utmost importance, it was not to be made an ultimatum, "except in the instructions for the treaty of commerce with England." At the same time the American minister to France was directed to enter into a guarantee with that power establishing the rights of that country in the fisheries as existing prior to the war. On September 17th, Congress offered to guarantee the possession of Florida to the King of Spain, provided that monarch should agree that "the United States should enjoy the free navigation of the Mississippi into and from the sea." On the 26th of September, Congress selected John Jay as envoy to Spain and John Adams to negotiate the treaty of peace and also an eventual treaty of commerce with Great Britain.

On August 14, 1779, Congress unanimously adopted an ultimatum setting forth the claim of the United States to the widest boundaries that had belonged to them during their dependence. It declared, however, that the matter of "equal common rights with Canada and Nova Scotia to the fisheries" should not stand in the way of peace, but that the right to the fisheries was not thereby to be considered as surrendered, but as an essential feature of any treaty of commerce with Great Britain. In February, 1780, John Adams arrived in Paris, and, pursuant to his determination not to take any steps in his character of negotiator without first consulting the French king, he asked the opinion of Vergennes as to whether it was opportune to acquaint the British ministry of his willingness to treat and to publish the nature of his mission, or for the present to keep silent. The latter advised him to delay in informing Great Britain of the extent of his powers, particularly those with regard to a treaty of commerce. Adams, contrary to his own feeling in the matter, followed the advice of Vergennes. But it was just as well that he did so, as the time for treating of peace had not yet come in Great Britain. In January, 1781, the King of France expressed his desire to bring

the war to a close. Personally, he would at that time have been willing to compromise with Great Britain on the basis of a truce for a period of at least twenty years, during which, in compensation for the evacuation of New York, South Carolina and Georgia might remain in the possession of Great Britain; France could not make such a proposition, as she had guaranteed the independence of the thirteen States. The Austrian minister, Kaunitz, thereupon undertook to have Austria accepted as a mediator. John Adams was willing to go to Vienna, but required that he should be received by the mediating power as the plenipotentiary of an independent State. On the other hand, Great Britain would not consent to negotiations involving France until that country should give up its alliance with America. Thus the efforts of Kaunitz were fruitless. He consoled the Austrian emperor for his ill success by declaring: "As for us, there is more to gain than to lose by the continuation of the war, which becomes useful to us by the mutual exhaustion of those who carry it on and by the commercial advantages which accrue to us so long as it lasts."

In 1781, France and America were uniting in preparations for a great campaign, which was expected to hasten materially the successful conclusion of the war. France took advantage of the dependence of the United States upon her to endeavor to secure control of the negotiations for peace. Anne César de la Luzerne, who had been appointed minister to the United States to succeed Gérard, sought to have Congress formulate its instructions to its peace commissioner in a way that would leave negotiations on the part of both France and the United States in the hands of his royal master. He sought to frighten the United States into compliance with the wishes of France by warning them that his country might become involved in war on the continent of Europe, and thus the United States would lose her powerful assistance. The instructions of the United States to their commissioner, if the advice of Luzerne had been accepted, would have insisted on no points but independence

and the validity of the treaties of Louis XVI. To have agreed to this would have left open important matters, and would have made it certain that the western country would remain in the hands of Great Britain. The amendments were voted upon on June 11, 1781, and were carried by a bare majority. A proposition to have someone associated with Adams was voted down; but the vote was reconsidered, and John Jay, Benjamin Franklin, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson were chosen as his colleagues in the commission. The original instructions to Adams covered the matter of boundaries, but left open that of the fisheries. Now, however, neither was made the subject of an ultimatum. But Madison on June 29th, fourteen days after the passage of the amendments, made a motion that no treaty of commerce should be concurred in with Great Britain unless it contained a definite and satisfactory clause concerning boundaries and fisheries. The motion was lost by a vote of six to five. Adams showed no discomfiture at the enlargement of the commission, but welcomed its new members, saying: "The measure is better calculated to give satisfaction to the people of America in all parts, as the commissioners are chosen from the most considerable places in that country."

Great Britain was becoming thoroughly wearied of the war. The national debt had been doubled; land valuations had fallen and the foreign markets for British manufactures had become contracted. In 1775 Great Britain employed seven thousand vessels in her commerce; before the end of 1782 nearly one-third that number had been captured by American privateers. The credit of the nation was impaired and the country had lost grace with every great power in Europe. A great change had come over the public mind and a ministry pledged to a continuance of the war found it impossible to secure a working majority in Parliament. Accordingly, on February 22, 1782, Henry Conway introduced into Parliament a motion against continuing the American war. This measure found the support of such men as Fox, William Pitt, Barré, Wilberforce,

Burke, and Cavendish, and was lost by the narrow margin of one vote. Five days later, Conway moved an address to the king upon the same subject, which was carried. On the 28th of the same month, Edmund Burke wrote to Franklin: "I congratulate you as the friend of America; I trust not as the enemy of England; I am sure as the friend of mankind; the resolution of the House of Commons, carried in a very full house, was, I think, the opinion of the whole. I trust it will lead to a speedy peace between the two branches of the English nation." The reply of the king being in equivocal terms, on March 4th Conway proposed a second address to the effect that the House would consider as enemies to the king and the country all who should further attempt the prosecution of a war on the continent of America for the purpose of restoring the former subjection of the colonies. This address, after considerable discussion, was adopted. On the following day similar unanimity prevailed in the sanctioning of the bringing in of a bill to enable the king to make a peace or a truce with America. The bill for that purpose was accordingly introduced by the ministers, but two months and a half elapsed before it was, in an amended form, adopted. In the debate of the 4th of March, Fox denounced Lord North and his associates in the ministry as "men void of honor and honesty," but he later modified his statement to exclude Lord Thurlow. On the 20th, the members of the House were present in large numbers and the crowd of spectators, was unprecedented. At the same time that a member who was about to move a vote of want of confidence in the ministers arose, Lord North also claimed the recognition of the chair. The Speaker was assailed with shouts from the members of the two parties in the House, claiming recognition for their respective champions. He hesitated, and then recognized Lord North, who, with visible emotion, announced that his administration was at an end.

Lord Shelburne received the portfolio of secretary of state in the new ministry. Shelburne appointed Richard

Oswald, of Scotland, diplomatic agent to treat with the American commissioners. The king acquiesced in his minister's attempt "to sound Mr. Franklin." Oswald had spent many years in America and understood the feeling in that country. Shelburne, in answer to a letter addressed to him by Franklin, whom he esteemed as a personal friend, wrote under the date April 6, 1782, as follows: "I have been favored with your letter, and am much obliged by your remembrance. I find myself returned nearly to the same situation which you remember me to have occupied nineteen years ago; and I should be very glad to talk to you as I did then, and afterward in 1767, upon the means of promoting the happiness of mankind, a subject much more agreeable to my nature than the best concerted plans for spreading misery and devastation. I have had a high opinion of the compass of your mind, and of your foresight. I have often been beholden to both, and shall be glad to be so again, as far as compatible with your situation. Your letter, discovering the same disposition, has made me send to you Mr. Oswald. I have had a longer acquaintance with him than even with you. I believe him an honorable man, and, after consulting some of our common friends, I have thought him the fittest for the purpose. He is a pacific man, and conversant with those negotiations which are most interesting to mankind. This has made me prefer him to any of our speculative friends, or to any person of higher rank. He is fully apprised of my mind, and you may give full credit to anything he assures you of. At the same time, if any other channel occurs to you, I am ready to embrace it. I wish to retain the same simplicity and good faith which subsisted between us in transactions of less importance."

Such were the credentials that Oswald bore to Paris, and the sentiments of Shelburne argued well for his mission. John Adams was at The Hague seeking to negotiate a loan of money to the United States, and as he had little faith in the sincerity of Shelburne, Franklin was left to manage

the negotiations alone. The attitude of France toward the conditions of peace remained complicated by reason of the prejudices and fears of Spain. Oswald was introduced by Franklin to Vergennes, although the British agent desired to avoid European affairs. Oswald stated to Vergennes his wish that America and France should each treat directly with the British plenipotentiaries; the negotiations, however, to be carried on at the same time, and concluded by treaties simultaneously signed. John Adams, in Amsterdam, was kept informed as to movements looking toward peace but was convinced that no true peace could be secured which left Nova Scotia and Canada in the hands of the British. Franklin, however, was more hopeful with regard to the negotiations in progress. From Paris he wrote an urgent letter to Jay to come on to that city, saying: "I wish you here as soon as possible; you would be of infinite service. Spain has taken four years to consider whether she would treat with us or not. Give her forty, and let us in the meantime mind our own business." Thus he excluded Spain altogether from the American negotiations. On August 23d, Oswald, who had returned to London, was directed by the Cabinet to meet Franklin again and acquaint him with its readiness to treat at Paris for a general peace based upon the recognition of American independence, but otherwise conforming to the treaties of 1763. Five days later, Oswald received from Shelburne the verbal instruction: "if America is independent, she must be so of the whole world, with no ostensible, tacit, or secret connection with France." Canada could not be ceded. "All debts due to British subjects were to be secured, and the loyalists to be restored to a full enjoyment of their rights and privileges." British communication with the European belligerents was conducted through the British Foreign Office, of which Fox was chief. The latter's disposition toward negotiations did not argue well for their successful conclusion. He appointed for the weighty matter of diplomatic negotiations with Vergennes, Thomas Grenville,

a young partisan of Fox, of excellent mind, but devoid of experience in public business. Upon his introduction by Franklin to the French minister, Grenville made the unhappy observation that the war had been provoked by the encouragement which France had given to the Americans to revolt. To this charge Vergennes made the warm rejoinder that France had not made America independent, but had found her possessed of freedom, and that at any rate independence was not the sole cause of the war.

News of the successful operations of the fleet of De Grasse in the West Indies, in 1781, did much to further the negotiations for peace. The capture of St. Eustatius and its restoration to the United Provinces, with the other successes of her fleet, gave to France naval ascendency in the West Indies; but an engagement between the fleet of De Grasse and that of Rodney on April 12, 1782, resulted in the defeat of the former and restored to the British the supremacy of the sea which they had temporarily lost. This fact made Great Britain more complacent toward peace. She felt that with her sovereignty of the sea unquestioned she might treat with France upon a footing of dignity. The credentials of Grenville were, however, declared by the French minister to be insufficient as they did not empower him to negotiate with America and with Spain; or France's partner in the war, the Netherlands.

Grenville then approached Franklin and disclosed to him his instructions, but the American diplomat would not make known to one who was not authorized to negotiate with him, the conditions of peace determined upon by his government. The ambitious young diplomat was forced to confess to Franklin that he lacked official status as regarded the American commissioners. After the passage of the Act of Parliament enabling the king to treat with America, of which notice has been made, Oswald was empowered to negotiate a peace with the United States, although he did not receive his commission to do so, as

Fox asserted his fear that the negotiations with France might thereby be thwarted. Fox next endeavored to have negotiations with America brought under the British Foreign Office by having America recognized as an independent power antecedent to a treaty. In this he failed. Shortly after, the Rockingham ministry went out of office. As regards America its principal achievement was its compelling the king to negotiate with the United States for a treaty of peace. Shelburne headed the new ministry. Fox was offered the portfolio of secretary of state, but as he was out of sympathy with Lord Shelburne he refused the position. The sincerity of Shelburne was doubted because of his allegiance to the throne, and he was severely attacked by Burke who called heaven and earth to witness that "the ministry of Lord Shelburne would be fifty times worse than that of Lord North." He classed him with Machiavelli and Borgia. On July 9, 1782, Shelburne wrote to Oswald: "I hope to receive early assurances from you that my confidence in the sincerity and good faith of Dr. Franklin has not been misplaced, and that he will concur with you in endeavoring to effectuate the great work in which our hearts and wishes are so equally interested. We have adopted his idea of the method to come to a general pacification by treating separately with each party. I beg him to believe that I can have no idea or design of acting towards him and his associates but in the most open, liberal, and honorable manner."

On July 10th, Franklin had an interview with Oswald and disclosed to him the essential conditions of peace which America had to offer. These were: the independence of the thirteen States; the withdrawal of all British troops; the integrity of each State as it was before the Quebec Act of 1774; the settlement of the boundaries between the American colonies and Canada; freedom of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland and elsewhere. He made it clear that nothing could be done for the Loyalists as the confiscation of their property had been made under the laws of the

several States, over which Congress had no control, and he proceeded to demonstrate to Oswald that the action of the British toward the patriots in the matter of property had made their attachment of British estates and possessions just acts of retaliation. Franklin also recommended, though he did not insist upon, reciprocity in ships and trade. Vergennes was aware of the independent negotiations of the American commissioner, but was not informed as to their nature. Jay had arrived in Paris on June 23d, but a severe illness kept him from participating in the negotiations, and made it necessary for Franklin to continue them alone. Laurens having little faith in Oswald's mission, was at The Hague where he had joined Adams, and was assisting the latter in his endeavors to obtain a loan for the United States. Oswald's commission permitted him to treat with "the representatives of the colonies" unitedly or with any one of them separately. Shelburne desired that Oswald should not only effect the restoration of peace, but also a complete reconciliation with America. An advance copy of his commission reached Oswald on August 6th. It was in accordance with the Enabling Act of Parliament. Having shown it to Franklin at Passy, he proceeded to Paris again and there met Jay. The latter was less responsive than Franklin, and made the British commissioner feel that the United States would studiously observe their duty of gratitude toward France in the terms of peace. He also pointed out that independence should not have been included in treaty conditions, but should have been proclaimed by the king as an *a priori* fact. Jay objected to the use of the term colonies. He finally expressed his willingness to have the matter of independence find its place in a separate preliminary covenant to "be ratified or declared as absolutely and irrevocably acknowledged and unconditioned by the event of other or subsequent articles." Franklin was anxious to complete negotiations before the overthrow of Shelburne's ministry, which he saw would not long continue. Nevertheless, he could not prevent delay.

The friendship of France for the United States had its limits. Vergennes sided with Spain in that country's endeavor to confine the republic to the territory east of the Alleghanies. France did not desire to see the United States become a formidable power, and Vergennes sought to curb their aspirations by offering proof to the British minister of more southerly limits for Canada than the boundary assigned to that possession of the British by the United States. France likewise urged Great Britain not to grant the claim of the United States to the lands to the west of the Alleghanies. The contention of Jay, with regard to independence, received the consideration of the British Cabinet, and on September 1, 1782, the secretary for the colonies, Thomas Townshend, directed Oswald to assure the American commissioners, in evidence of the good faith of the British government that his majesty was willing, without waiting for action in the "other branches of the negotiations," to recommend to his Parliament the passage of an act enabling him to declare absolutely the independence of the thirteen colonies. This would entail the delay incident to waiting for the next meeting of Parliament, but Jay was obdurate, for he did not realize the danger to his country involved in his position. While in America Jay had been enthusiastic for the triple alliance between France, Spain, and the United States, and had been conservative in the matter of territory, and was opposed to making the right to fish on the Grand Bank a condition of peace. In 1778, largely through French influence, he had been elected president of Congress. But, his relations with the diplomats of France and Spain, in his capacity of peace commissioner, had disillusioned him as to the real designs entertained by those countries. Jay was not so conversant with the European situation as Franklin, nor did he possess the latter's diplomatic ability. Thus, in the early part of September, 1782, he is found in his individual capacity making to Lord Shelburne, through an inferior agent in the British pay, the offer of mutual

control of the navigation of the Lakes and Mississippi River.

In the latter part of September another commission was issued to Oswald, empowering him to treat with "the commissioners of the thirteen United States of America," but the matter of independence was still reserved for the first article of the treaty of peace. Jay was a skilful lawyer, and was intrusted with the work of drawing up the American articles. The thirteen United States, with every part of their territory, were acknowledged to be free and independent; their boundaries were to be determined according to the unanimous instructions of Congress, which had reserved the line between Nova Scotia and New England for adjustment by commissioners after peace had been established; the fisheries were to be freely exercised of right by the Americans where they had exercised them while united with Great Britain. Jay, on his own authority, added an article conceding to Great Britain the unasked navigation of the Mississippi. He pleaded for Great Britain as if he were her agent, insisting, in reparation for her losses, that she should recover West Florida and "engross the whole of the supplies from Canada to the mouth of the Mississippi, and particularly should embrace the whole of the fur trade."

The draft of the treaty was sent to the British ministry, and Franklin and Jay agreed that upon its approval they would sign it immediately. During these negotiations, they had maintained a policy of reserve toward the French minister. Congress, however, was looking to France for the loan of $4,000,000, and on October 4, 1782, it passed a resolution to the effect that it would not consider propositions for peace except in confidence and in concert with its ally. On the 14th of October, Vergennes wrote to the French envoy in America: "If we are so happy as to make peace, the king must then cease to subsidize the American army, which will be as useless as it has been habitually inactive. We are astonished at the demands which continue

to be made upon us, while the Americans obstinately refuse the payment of the taxes. It seems to us much more natural for them to raise upon themselves, rather than upon the subjects of the king, the funds which their defence exacts."

The first draft of the treaty, when it reached Great Britain, brought upon Oswald the censure of the Cabinet for his too liberal concessions. The ministry was particularly out of sympathy with the article providing for reciprocity of navigation and commerce and for that which declared the inability of the commissioners to guarantee the restoration to the Loyalists of their possessions. On October 26th, John Adams joined his fellow commissioners. Franklin had persistently avoided acknowledgment of the right of British merchants to collect debts in the United States because of the depredations upon debtor merchants made by the British army, and he warned Adams to be on his guard in this matter.

The year after the curtailment of his exclusive authority over negotiations had been one of bitterness and unhappiness to Adams, for, despite his contrary statements, he had felt chagrin at the appointment of his associates. Flushed with his success in securing from the United Provinces recognition of the independence of the United States, and feeling resentment at Franklin's prominence in the negotiations with Great Britain, he and Jay on November 4th determined not to be overruled by Franklin. The British demanded amnesty for refugees and also indemnification for them, but Franklin persuaded Adams and Jay to unite with him in a letter to Oswald, expressing their belief that it would be impossible to enlarge upon the amnesty already conceded in the article as agreed upon.

The crux of the negotiations was the status of the Loyalists; here again prevailed the happy influence of Benjamin Vaughan, an unofficial mediator between the British government and the American commissioners, to whom was largely due the success of the peace negotiations. On November 29, 1782, Oswald, Strachey, under secretary of state,

and Fitzherbert, British minister to Paris, met Adams, Franklin, Jay, and Laurens at the apartments of Jay. The American commissioners agreed that there should be no more prosecution of the Loyalists or confiscations of their property; that all pending actions should be discontinued; and that Congress should recommend to the several States, and their legislatures, amnesty for refugees and the restoration of their confiscated property. With this the British commissioners were satisfied. The discussion over the fisheries resulted in the granting to the United States of rights equal to those of Great Britain to take fish off the coasts of Newfoundland and on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all British dominions in America.

On the 30th of November the existence of slavery in the United States was recognized officially by the commissioners for the first time during the negotiations. At the demand of Laurens a clause was inserted in the engrossed copies of the treaty prohibiting the British in their evacuations to carry away "any negroes or other property of the inhabitants." In a separate clause a line of north boundary between West Florida and the United States was stated in the event of that province being in the possession of Great Britain at the conclusion of the war. In courtesy to France the treaty was not to be made definite until terms of peace had been reached between Great Britain and that country. This being the last reservation, the treaty received the signatures of the commissioners of both countries and was duly sealed.

On February 13, 1783, the king opened Parliament by a speech from the throne, in which he announced the signing of the provisional articles of peace with the United States. Great Britain experienced sad satisfaction at the close of the long struggle, and in the United States the news was received with the greatest enthusiasm; the joy, however, of the leaders having in it a dash of concern by reason of the debts which Congress was not in a position to meet. Upon official information from Franklin and Adams,

Congress, on April 11, 1783, proclaimed the cessation of hostilities. In announcing the auspicious event to the army, Washington gave especial praise to the men who had enlisted for the war, and closed as follows: "Happy, thrice happy, shall they be pronounced hereafter who have contributed anything in erecting this stupendous fabric of freedom and empire, who have assisted in protecting the rights of human nature, and establishing an asylum for the poor and oppressed of all nations and religions." The proclamation of Congress announcing the end of the war was published to the army on April 19th, exactly eight years after the first shot was fired at Concord. On September 3, 1783, the final treaty of peace was signed and on November 25th the British army evacuated New York.

The treaty was a complete document; it was not a compromise but a compact. It gave to the United States the opportunity upon which to base a firm and perpetual union. Yet while the conditions for the growth of a nation were present in the treaty, at the time it was made the United States formed the loosest of confederacies. Although peace was undertaken to be concluded by the States as a nation, they were really a congeries of separate and selfish sovereignties. Their government was in the nature of the case: a revolutionary one, and such is seldom sufficient for the needs of times of peace.

The condition of the army at the close of the war was deplorable. Congress was hopelessly in arrears with its pay. In the fall of 1782 the troops were wintered near Newburgh, and in the leisure of the camp had time to think about their grievances. At the close of the year the officers sent a committee to present their complaints to Congress. It consisted of Major-general Macdougall and Colonels Ogden and Brooks. They stated that the patience of the soldiers had reached its limit and that no other class of citizens had borne such losses for the common good with such little proportion of gain. They closed their plea for the soldiers with the words: "They therefore entreat that Congress, to

convince the army and the world that the independence of America shall not be placed on the ruin of any particular class of her citizens, will point out a mode for immediate redress." The complaint was met by the response that Congress was without funds. Nevertheless, it was a source of irritation to the soldiers that Congress did not adjourn before its members had received compensation for their services. But before adjourning, on February 5th, Congress ordered the Superintendent of Finance to use his discretion with regard to a present payment to the army, and that official, on February 5th, issued a warrant, out of which the officers received one month's pay in notes and private soldiers one month's pay in weekly instalments of half a dollar.

In considering briefly the value of the foreign aid tendered to the United States, we may say that aside from its moral effect it was not of great moment in practical service until the last campaign. Although prior to that, both at Newport and at Savannah, the French made an honest effort to assist the Americans, the result was failure. But, in the final blow to the British at Yorktown, the coöperation of France cannot be too highly valued. But for the operations of her fleet, Cornwallis would have escaped by way of the sea, and but for the French land forces he would have broken through the American lines. There was a domestic factor that negatively contributed to the success of the Revolution; it was the slight effectiveness of the support of the American Tories. This was a source of keen disappointment to Great Britain. That country's mistake in this regard was an important factor in determining the result of the strife. Able commanders in the British service, like Cornwallis and Rawdon, were offset by men like Burgoyne and Clinton. On the American side was a group of able generals. The greatest of them was Washington, and next to him stood Nathanael Greene, the man who never won a battle, but always won the campaign. Lafayette was endeared to the nation by the nobility of his nature

and his heroic service, but he never displayed military genius. Among the commanders who won their laurels by single acts were Ethan Allen in the capture of Ticonderoga, Stark at Bennington, and Wayne at Stony Point. The names of Schuyler, Daniel Morgan, Clark, and Sullivan are no less illustrious, while for steady valor bodies of troops like Morgan's riflemen and the Maryland line have become synonyms of high efficiency in the rank and file.

When the British army under Sir Guy Carleton, who had succeeded Clinton, evacuated New York on November 25, 1783, the American army marched in and took possession of the city it had failed to capture during the course of the war. Nine days after that event Washington, surrounded by his officers at Fraunce's tavern, pronounced an affectionate farewell. Raising to his lips with a trembling hand a glass of clear water he drank their healths with the following sentiment: "With a heart full of love and gratitude I now take leave of you, and most devoutly wish your later days may be as prosperous and happy as your former ones have been glorious and honorable." Proceeding to New York he deposited a memorandum of his expenses during the war, which were about $64,000, and then proceeded to Annapolis where Congress was in session. At noon, on December 23d, amidst scenes of deep emotion, Washington returned to Congress through its president, General Mifflin, his commission as commander-in-chief of the army. In doing so he employed words which greatly impressed that body with his signal devotion to the land whose freedom he had so largely aided in achieving. Commending his country to the care of Almighty God, he bade an affectionate farewell to Congress and took leave of public life, retiring to Mount Vernon. But not before Congress had made a fitting response, not only to the words of Washington, but to his great deeds. The speech was framed by the hand that drafted the Declaration of Independence, and was delivered by General Mifflin, whose countenance was pale from the excess of his emotion. After a profound

and eloquent expression of the debt which the country owed to its great leader the address closed with the following words: "We join you in commending the interests of our dearest country to the protection of Almighty God, beseeching him to dispose the hearts and minds of its citizens to improve the opportunity afforded them of becoming a happy and respectable nation."

As the time drew near for the officers who had endured the hardship of the camp to pass from military service to civil life, they recalled the classic example of Cincinnatus, who left his plow to lead the cause of his country, and organized a society bearing the name of the great Roman, to perpetuate "the spirit of brotherly kindness and to be of mutual aid to one another and to their families in time of need." They pledged their "unalterable determination to promote and cherish union between the States. On June 2d, a general order was published containing a resolve of Congress that the men engaged for the war and a proper proportion of officers should receive immediate furloughs. On the reverse of the document granting this leave of absence was to be their discharge, which was to take effect upon the ratification of the definite treaty of peace. The veterans of many battlefields retired to their homes bearing with them their arms as testimonials of their service, but without receiving the arrearages of their pay with which to equip anew their farms, which in many instances had been ruined by the ravages of war.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FINANCES OF THE WAR

THE cost of the Revolutionary War, like that of any great conflict, is not reducible to exact figures. The burning of towns, the ravaging of the country, the horrors of Indian attack, and the no less horrible conduct of the bands of Tories; the calling out of militiamen leaving their families destitute and distressed, the miseries of the hospitals, and the unspeakable distresses of the British prison ships, all entered into the sum total of that cost of the war which cannot find expression in monetary terms. The pecuniary cost of the war did not fall far short of $170,000,000—an amount which, according to the abilities of the people, amounted to many times as much as it would to-day. Two-thirds of this sum had been expended by Congress and the rest by the individual States. Four methods had been adopted for raising funds for the needs of the civil and military arms of the government: the indirect method of taxing the people through a depreciated currency, by indirect taxes, by borrowing cash, and by incurring debt for supplies. Congress being without means of enforcing its will was not in a position, upon the breaking out of the war, to impose taxes upon the people. The suggestion of anything of the sort was of itself a delicate matter as the principal grievance of the colonies then in rebellion had been the subject of taxation. It was, therefore, impolitic to resort to that method of filling a war chest.

Under these conditions, Congress felt that its only recourse was the emission of bills of credit, representing specie, which were to be ultimately redeemed. The various colonies were familiar with this system of finance, and Massachusetts had resorted very largely to it to meet the pecuniary needs arising out of the French and Indian War. It had been found by the colonies to be advantageous. Accordingly, after Congress in June, 1775, passed a resolution to raise an army it voted to emit bills of credit to the amount of $2,000,000, and this sum was increased by another million on July 25th. The confederated colonies were pledged to the redemption of these bills and the several colonies were directed to provide ways for meeting their proportion of the common obligation in four annual payments, the first of which was to be made on or before the last of November, 1779. It was confidently expected that before that date the contest would have been brought to a close. On November 29, 1775, bills of credit were issued for a further sum of $3,000,000, under conditions of redemption similar to those adopted in June, although, in this latter instance, the first payment was to be made on or before the last day of November, 1783. Many of those in Congress believed that even by June, 1776, the period whose needs were provided for by this new issue, the war would have been brought to a close by conciliation, if not by conquest. This financial policy of Congress was shaped by the belief in a probable reconciliation with the mother country. However, early in 1776, Congress received word that Great Britain had hired foreign mercenaries, and reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that provision would have to be made for a long and costly war. Therefore on February 17, 1776, it ordered the issuance of an additional $4,000,000 of bills of credit. On May 9th, and July 22d following, $10,000,000 more were issued; the total sum emitted to August, 1776, aggregating $20,000,000. This amount circulated for several months without depreciation. As long as this condition of affairs lasted, Congress found

itself possessed of a cheap and easy method of meeting its obligations, while the British ministry was casting about to find some new source of revenue which was not obnoxious to the people. But the Aladdin system of finance had its limit. Public confidence began to change to incredulity. Still, eighteen months passed before the unpleasant side of the financial plan had to be met.

Congress accommodated itself to the popular protests against the paper currency, and, taking warning from its depreciation, resolved to secure $5,000,000 by means of lotteries. This also was a financial recourse not unfamiliar to the colonies. In New England, town improvements were frequently provided for by lotteries. If the system answered a good purpose in the individual colonies, Congress saw no reason why it should not be resorted to for the needs of the general government. On October 3, 1776, a resolution was passed to provide the sum mentioned by means of a lottery. So long as the zeal of the people was not too heavily burdened, the patriotic spirit led to the acceptance of the paper currency at its face value. This was largely the case throughout the campaigns of 1776 and 1777. But Congress, realizing that when the reaction against the paper set in its depreciation would be rapid, on November 22, 1777, recommended to the several States to raise by taxes the sum of $5,000,000 for the military needs of 1778. Some of the States failed to raise their quota of the proposed tax. Congress, to meet the deficiency, resorted again to bills of credit, but these declined in value with their increase. Congress became anxious not only to stop the increase of bills of credit, but also to provide a fund for reducing the amount of those already in circulation, and on January 1, 1779, called upon the States to pay into the Continental treasury their respective quotas of $15,000,000 for that year and $6,000,000 annually thereafter as a fund for the redemption of the bills of credit first issued and the loans; 1779 was the year when the redemption of the first issue was to begin; but so far from

the war being at an end, the conflict was still being fought with determination. On May 21, 1780, the States were called upon to furnish their respective quotas of $45,000,000 more. In the meanwhile, such were the fluctuations in values that it was impossible to make sure calculations as to the amount necessary for a year's service. At the time a requisition for funds was made, the sum asked for might be adequate, only to be found insufficient when the time came to purchase the needed supplies. The depreciation was not uniform in the several States, but was general by the middle of 1777, and from that time progressively increased till the close of the war. At first, the depreciation was in the ratio of two or three paper dollars for one of silver or gold; in 1778, it dropped to five or six for one; in 1779, to twenty-seven or twenty-eight for one; in 1780, during the first quarter of the year, to fifty or sixty for one. After that date, Continental currency no longer had general circulation, but where it still found acceptance it depreciated to one hundred and fifty for one. It was still received in some parts of the country until the middle of 1781, by which time it stood at several hundred for one.

The public clamor against the depreciated currency led Congress to resolve in October, 1779, that further issues of bills of credit should not exceed a sum which, with the amount then in circulation, would be equal to two hundred millions of dollars. Congress further determined that only such portion of that amount should be issued as was absolutely necessary to meet the public demands until adequate supplies for the army should be furnished by the States. On September 13, 1779, a circular letter had been sent out to the several States exhorting them to furnish the supplies which were indispensable. In this letter, Congress denied with indignation the insinuation that had been made by Loyalists and others that the United States would tarnish their honor by repudiating their obligation as expressed in the bills of credit and stated the practicability of redeeming them in gold or silver. This strong declaration

bolstered the declining confidence of the people in the paper currency, and many were led to accept it to their ruin.

From the failure of the several States to comply with the request of Congress for supplies, another burden of paper issue had soon to be imposed upon the people. This last emission brought the amount up to the two hundred million limit. In addition to this vast amount of paper circulated by Congress, the several States, in order to meet the needs of their militia and to make such responses to the plea of Congress for the Continental troops as they felt able to do, had themselves made large issues of paper money. The low rate at which the latest paper issue of Congress circulated made it wholly inadequate for the pressing needs of the army. It was at this juncture that Washington was reduced to the necessity of making forced requisitions upon the inhabitants of New York and New Jersey to supply the needs of his troops. Failing to secure from the States sufficient supplies of money, Congress sought to have them contribute in kind. They were therefore called upon in 1780, to furnish specified quantities of beef, pork, flour, and other provisions. The new form of requisition was called "Specific Supplies." The new experiment was found to be so difficult of execution, so inconvenient, and so expensive that it was quickly abandoned. Congress again turned to the manufacture of money and fixed upon a new sort of paper issue which was to differ from the former in being guaranteed by the several States. The old money was to be recalled in payment of taxes, and burned. One dollar of the new currency was to be issued for every twenty of the old. It was planned thus to have the two hundred million of the old currency cancelled, and only ten million of the new to take its place. Four-tenths of this was to be subject to the order of Congress, and the other six-tenths to that of the several States. These new bills were to bear interest at the rate of five per cent, and, with the interest, were to be redeemable in specie within six years, or, if the holder so elected, annually in bills of exchange on the American

commissioners in Europe at four shillings and sixpence for each dollar.

It was expected as a result of these measures that the old paper issues would be cancelled and the currency reduced to a fixed standard. It was also expected that the States would be supplied with the means of purchasing the specific supplies required of them, and that Congress would have a satisfactory currency with which to purchase war supplies. However, the financial plan was not permitted to have the test which inevitably would have disappointed the expectations reposed in it, for the several States were not responsive. Only partial compliance was to be had from them, and the new paper answered little purpose. The scheme was ingenious, but unsound, it presented too many points of weakness for the States to become interested in it.

The depreciation and subsequent repudiation of the paper currency of whose worth Congress had unfortunately persuaded the people for a long time, using such sophistries as the indignant declaration that it was "the only kind of money that could not take wings and fly away," imposed a loss upon the country to the amount of possibly seventy millions of specie dollars. This tax fell heaviest upon the ignorant and the helpless. In private business it gave rise to innumerable frauds which the laws of the States promoted; after the paper had fallen to a fortieth or fiftieth of its nominal value they still declared it good for its face value.

Many persons who were unfavorable to the Revolution declined to receive the bills of credit even before their depreciation, and Congress recommended the States to pass laws making the paper money legal tender at its nominal value in discharge of bona fide debts; although the debtor had contracted to pay them in silver or in gold. They further recommended legislation prescribing that "whosoever should ask or receive more, in their bills of credit for gold or silver, or any species of money whatsoever, than the nominal sum thereof in Spanish dollars, or more in the said bills for any commodities whatsoever, than the same would

be purchased from the same person in gold and silver, or offer to sell any commodities for gold or silver and refuse to sell the same for said bills, shall be deemed an enemy to the liberties of the United States, and forfeit the property so sold or offered for sale."

As we have already observed, the flood of fiat money issued by Congress was joined in the channels of circulation by thirteen streams of State currency of like character. Some States, such as Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, honorably redeemed their credit by funding their bills at their nominal value. In other States, particularly in those of the South, they were partially redeemed by the issue of land warrants. The remainder of the State issues met the fate of the Continental currency—practical repudiation. In some instances a pretence of redemption was gone through with, as in the case of Virginia, where the bills of credit not covered by land warrants were redeemed at the rate of a thousand dollars in paper to one of silver or gold. Toward the close of the war direct taxation had to be resorted to and the conclusion of peace found the States bearing an additional heavy burden of this sort.

The moral effect upon the country of a dishonest currency was bad, and Congress, having contracted the debt habit, depended upon borrowing as a chief source of federal resources after the issue of paper money was stopped. Thus by 1784 a federal debt of $44,000,000 had been contracted, of which sum $10,000,000 was due in Europe, principally to France. At the close of the war the arrears of interest on the foreign loan were remitted and the reimbursement of the principal was promised in instalments beginning three years after the conclusion of peace.

The administration of finance by Congress was as unfixed as its methods. Originally, finance, like the matters of war, marine, and foreign affairs, was under the direction of a committee. In June, 1781, Congress placed all the departments of government under single heads, excepting that of finance, which had been already so treated by the appointment

of Robert Morris as superintendent in the preceding month. Morris entered upon his duties on May 24th. On the 22d, Congress, realizing the futility of efforts to support the fiat money by compulsory acts, recommended to the States the repeal of any laws which still might be enforced making any sort of bills of credit legal tender. Morris in assuming the new office did so upon the express condition that the financial transactions of the government were to be in specie. He was an Englishman by birth, a merchant with a comprehensive business grasp, of a speculative temperament, and indefatigable in the pursuit of gain. He expressed himself prior to the Declaration of Independence to the effect that he had "no doubt that with union the colonies could at their pleasure choose between reconciliation and total independence." His faith in the future of his country was fixed and he from the first stood ready to afford it the aid of his great abilities. He entered Congress, where he served in important capacities, notably in company with Dickinson, Franklin, John Adams, and Harrison on July 12, 1776, to prepare plans of treaties with foreign powers. His faithfulness to the cause of the patriots was evidenced by his personal efforts in securing for Washington $50,000 for his needs during the winter of 1776 and 1777. On New Year's Day, 1777, he went from house to house in Philadelphia arousing people from their beds to borrow money for the commander-in-chief. With the money he secured he sent to Washington the cheering message: "Whatever I can do shall be done for the good of the service; if further occasional supplies of money are necessary, you may depend upon my exertions either in a public or private capacity."

Such was the man who was called upon to steer the government through the sea of financial perils. At that time the paper currency was at its lowest ebb of value. Washington had sent out his circular letter to New England for specific supplies, and Morris turned to Pennsylvania to effect an arrangement with that State for substantial aid

toward provisioning the army. He made a contract with Pennsylvania in June, 1781, by which he agreed to furnish all the "specifics" required of that State, amounting in value to more than $1,000,000, on the credit of certain taxes which the Pennsylvania Assembly had imposed.

In the march of the American army southward in August, 1781, the troops gave such alarming signs of discontent that Morris sought some way to allay their dissatisfaction. No other financial recourse being open, Rochambeau advanced him $20,000 from the French military chest on his promise to repay the sum not later than the first of the following October. At this critical moment, Laurens returned from France, landing at Boston on August 25th, and bearing with him large supplies of clothing, arms, and ammunition, and $500,000 in cash. Thus Washington was enabled to keep his forces in the field and to supply the needs of Greene in his southern operations.

A plan for a national bank which Morris had entertained for some time received the approbation of Congress, and that body, on December 31, 1781, passed an ordinance incorporating the Bank of North America. It had at first a capital of $400,000, which was afterward increased to $2,000,000. Its notes were made legal tender for all federal dues, and were made payable at the bank in specie on demand. This was the first American money convertible into coin at the will of its holders. The bank was located in Philadelphia, and became the prototype of all the later banking institutions of the country. On January 7, 1782, the bank commenced business. Although established in the public confidence at home, the new institution was not held in regard abroad, and it was thus enabled to buy up its notes possessed by foreign holders at a discount of ten to fifteen per cent. As the power of Congress to create a corporation was questioned, the Pennsylvania Assembly in April, 1783, granted to Morris's bank a charter for ten years with a monopoly of banking privileges. This charter was repealed in 1785 by a party opposed to the bank,

which was then in power in the State. When in January, 1783, the army presented to Congress its grievances, Morris attempted to coerce that body into an adjustment of the complaints of the soldiers by a threat to resign. He alleged that the members of Congress hesitated to take necessary measures for fear of offending their States, and he therefore undertook to drive them to decisive action. He was not interested solely in adjusting the claims of the soldiers, but to force Congress and the States to harmonize their financial methods and to bring about an efficient financial system. Accordingly on January 24th, the day upon which the report of the congressional committee appointed to confer with the delegates of the army was made, he sent in his resignation of office, for reasons stated as follows: "The funding the public debts on solid revenues, I fear, will never be made. If before the end of May effectual measures to make permanent provision for the public debts of every kind are not taken, Congress will be pleased to appoint some other man to be the superintendent of their finances: I will never be the minister of injustice." Congress feared that if the contents of Morris's letter should become public, it would have a bad effect; the enemy would be encouraged, domestic credit disturbed, foreign confidence shaken, and the army perhaps provoked to mutiny. It was, therefore, decided to place the communication under the injunction of secrecy. Morris was firm in his adherence to the interests of the army, and in February addressed a private letter to Greene, of which the following is an extract:

"The main army will not easily forego their expectations. Their murmurs, though not loud, are deep. If the army, in common with all other public creditors, insists on the grant of general, permanent funds for liquidating all the public debts, there can be little doubt that such revenues will be obtained, and will afford to every order of public creditors a solid security. With the due exception of miracles, there is no probability that the States will ever make such grant unless the army be united and determined in

the pursuit of it, and unless they be firmly supported by the other creditors. That this may happen must be the entire wish of every intelligently just man and of every real friend to our glorious revolution."

The motive actuating Morris in urging the army to bring pressure upon Congress was to secure for that body more power, by forcing the States to agree to greater centralization of administration. He was an advocate of larger powers for the general government, and felt that if the States could be brought to feel the absolute necessity of reposing in Congress powers adequate for the proper administration of government this result would be brought about. Before the close of February, Morris extorted from Congress the removal of the condition of secrecy with regard to his letter of resignation, and at once sent it to Washington, as well as to the press, and thus the army became informed of its contents. On November 1, 1784, Morris retired from his office as superintendent of the finances of the United States. His bank, although remunerative to its stockholders, had done little toward adjusting the finances of the country. Before retiring, Morris made known to the representative of France in America the inability of the United States to pay the interest for that year on the country's debt to France or the interest on the Dutch loan, which France had guaranteed. This confession of default greatly impaired the esteem in which the United States were held in Paris.

Such, in brief, was the financial side of the Revolutionary War. Unfortunate as it was that Congress should have involved itself in the tangled meshes of dishonored credit, the need of securing money for the exigencies of the contest was imperative. The nature of the conflict made it a long struggle; although if Congress could have found the means with which to equip suitably and pay its troops, there is no reason to believe that it could not have placed in the field a force outnumbering that of the adversary. The lack of funds made it necessary to conduct the campaigns in a

manner to wear out the enemy. Thus the American armies depended largely upon tactics of evacuation and retreat. This was the very sort of war most trying to unseasoned troops, and for that reason a permanent army was necessary. To secure this it was needful that sufficient money should be raised to at least support the men upon the field, even though their patriotism stood the test of defaulted pay.

Great Britain confidently counted upon the financial embarrassments of Congress to bring the contest to a speedy close. Every ordinary source of revenue was closed to Congress and it had, perforce, to depend upon an extraordinary source. Therefore, paper of no intrinsic value was issued on a par with the gold and silver which the country lacked for its redemption. The credit of the several colonies had been excellent and this fact begot confidence of the people in the paper issues of Congress. They had been accustomed to see the bills of credit of the several colonies honestly redeemed. The enthusiasm of the people for the war made it a matter of patriotism to support the government in its financial policy. It therefore was regarded as a point of honor to accept the paper issue at its face value. Repeated emissions of the bills, however, placed such a quantity of them in circulation that their depreciation in value could not be prevented. In addition to the inherent defects of the Continental currency there were those due to the artifice of the enemy. The British are said to have counterfeited the Continental money and circulated the forged notes throughout the United States.

The policy of Congress toward the public agents increased the burden of obligation, for these were allowed commissions on the amount of their purchases which became an inducement to them to pay the highest price for everything instead of seeking to obtain stores and provisions at the lowest figure. Popular prejudice for a long time would not permit Congress to supply the armies by contract as was done by the British. With the reverses to the American forces, confidence in Congress declined and enthusiasm

abated. In an attempt to support its tottering credit Congress recommended the States to pass laws regulating the price of labor and commodities and for confiscating and selling the estates of Tories. The money thus raised was to be invested in loan office certificates, a form of warrant for public lands.

The laws passed by the States for the regulation of the prices of labor and commodities were found to be impracticable. The patriotic few observed them, others disregarded them and would either not part with their commodities or else demanded and received their own prices.

The confiscation and sale of the property of the Tories did not add much to the public treasury. The sales were made for credit for the most part and successive depreciations of the currency very much reduced the original purchase price. When the law was passed making the paper money payable in gold and silver, the two forms of currency were of equal value and fraud was not intended, but the depreciation of paper made its redemption at par with gold and silver a source of incalculable loss. It worked hardship in all directions. The fruits of industry vanished, and patrimonies lost their value. Innumerable were the instances of suffering from the evils of the fiat currency. Up to 1780, the people cherished the delusion and Congress believed that the full redemption of the notes in circulation was still a possibility. In no other way did the new republic so clearly display its ignorance of the methods of conducting government wisely and honestly as it did in the errors it committed in regard to finance.

There was one class of persons to whom the wildcat currency was rather a blessing than otherwise,—those who worked for a daily wage. It made a convenient medium of ready pay for the services of such persons; and as they needed to expend their money as soon as received, they always got its full value. Active and industrious persons found ample scope for their activities, labor was high, and by conforming the price of their services to the state

of depreciation of the money in which they were paid they were enabled rapidly to build up a competence. Everything that was saleable found a ready market; a few cattle could be sold for enough to buy a comfortable house, while a good horse had the value of an improved plantation. Persons who were burdened with debt found themselves able to discharge their obligations by the returns from the products of their farms. To the poor man and the debtor the epoch of the bills of credit was a veritable golden age, although others were impoverished by it. The tendency to resort to specious and novel monetary expedients developed at this time became ingrained in the national life, and perverted ideas and love of justice, the evil effects of which can be seen throughout the subsequent financial history of the country. The loss of property and fortune through the bills of credit was a passing evil, but the wave of dishonesty which then swept over the country reached its full tide only long years after.

CHAPTER XIX

DISINTEGRATION OF THE UNION

THE close of the war did not end, but only changed the character of the labors of Congress. The country had been wasted and impoverished by the war, which had carried its devastation into every State—with the exception of New Hampshire. During the progress of the strife, the States were called upon to organize their respective local governments. By the Declaration of Independence, the sovereignty over the thirteen States had passed from the crown to the people dwelling in them. As President Monroe later expressed it: "It passed directly to the people of each colony, and not to the people of all the colonies in the aggregate: To thirteen distinct communities, and not to one." Yet the States which thus assumed sovereignty were not in segregation, but in union. That the union was as much a fact as local autonomy was shown, not only by the powers which Congress was permitted to exercise, but also by the summary treatment accorded to any persons who refused to acquiesce in the decisions of Congress. The war had both begun and ended under the direction of Congress. To quote from President Monroe again: "In every stage of the conflict, from its commencement until March, 1781, the powers of Congress were undefined, but of vast extent. . . . Never was a movement so spontaneous, so patriotic, so efficient. The nation exerted its whole faculties in support of its rights and of its independence." The people had

acquiesced in the exercise by Congress of its powers, and had not murmured even when it delegated dictatorial powers to Washington. The government of the period was purely revolutionary. With the close of hostilities it became necessary that it should be established in law. When this was attempted, the diversity of views of the representatives of the various sections and classes of political opinion clashed. The discussions centred about the degree of authority which should be vested in the general government.

The various colonies in forming governments adapted to their new dignity of statehood were influenced by local customs and laws, so that the methods which they followed differed in the several States. The New Jersey Provincial Congress took early action upon the communication of the General Congress to the various colonies recommending them to form local governments. Upon the petition of several townships, a committee of the Provincial Congress reported a constitution on June 24, 1776. This was adopted, under the caption "Constitution of New Jersey," on July 2d. This constitution thus established two days prior to the Declaration of Independence continued as the instrument of government for the State for sixty-eight years. On September 20, 1776, the Delaware Assembly, through a constitutional convention, adopted the constitution which was to continue in force for sixteen years. In Maryland, on July 3, 1776, an assemblage exercising powers of government called a constitutional convention "for the express purpose of forming a new government by the authority of the people only, and enacting and ordering all things for the preservation, safety, and general weal of the colony." This convention met on November 3d, and agreed upon a Declaration of Rights. On the 8th, it adopted a constitution which for seventy years proved satisfactory.

In Pennsylvania, on July 12th, a convention with power to frame a constitution met in Philadelphia. It elected Franklin as president and assumed the functions of government. On September 28th, the convention signed a

constitution, declared it to be in force, and ordered it to be laid before the Charter Assembly, which body promptly denounced the convention and its work. The following year a committee of Congress was appointed to act in conjunction with the high officers of the State in view of the threatened invasion of the British. They were clothed with full authority, which the commanders of the Continental forces were ordered to recognize. The constitution adopted by the convention and found unsatisfactory by the popular party, which was in the ascendency, was amended in 1790 to cover objections. On July 24, 1776, the North Carolina Provincial Congress vested political power in a Council of Safety, which pledged itself to execute the resolutions of the Provincial Congress as well as of the Continental. On August 9, 1776, this Council recommended the people of the State to elect suitable persons to serve as delegates to a convention, having in view the fact that the persons chosen would have the work of framing a constitution for the State, "that this, as it is the corner-stone of all law, so it ought to be fixed and permanent; and that as it is well or ill ordered it must tend in the first degree to promote the happiness or the misery of the State." The delegates elected convened at Halifax, where, on the 18th of August, they adopted a Bill of Rights and Constitution which remained in force for sixty-nine years. In Georgia the president of the Provincial Council, by virtue of the supreme authority of that body, issued a proclamation for a convention to meet at Savannah in October, 1776. The people were enjoined to adopt such government as would "conciliate the affections of the United States; for under their shadow they would find safety and preserve to themselves their invaluable rights," though "they should be purchased with garments rolled in blood." This convention met and adopted a State constitution on February 5, 1777. Under this constitution, which lasted but eight years, the delegates to Congress were permitted to sit in the Assembly. John Jay drafted a constitution for New York which was adopted by a convention

which exercised the powers of government. The date of the adoption of the constitution was April 20, 1777. This instrument was the best of the State constitutions thus far adopted, and continued forty-five years without amendment.

Of the States that had formed local governments prior to the Declaration of Independence, a word may be said in addition to what has been related in a former chapter. South Carolina amended its instrument of government in 1778 "to accommodate it to that great event." That of Virginia lasted until 1829, while that of Rhode Island continued in force for many years. New Hampshire revised its government in 1784, and Massachusetts adopted in 1780 a constitution which was not amended until 1820. It was the best of the State instruments. These constitutions all provided for three departments of government: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial, which were made independent. In most of the States the executive was restrained by a council. The legislatures of Pennsylvania and Georgia consisted of one body, while the bicameral system was introduced into the others, pursuant to the colonial custom. The constitutions were not to be altered excepting by the methods specifically pointed out in them. They were thus modes of action rather than acts of legislation; they prescribed the degrees and bounds of the power which the State officials, periodically chosen, might possess. The sphere of activity of these officials was strictly internal, and in no case was power conferred upon any of them to deal with foreign nations. The State governments went into effect with men at the head of them who had the confidence of the people. John Adams heralded the equipment of the States with constitutions and complements of officers as "Thirteen governments thus founded on the natural authority of the people alone, without a pretense of miracle or mystery, which are destined to spread over the northern part of that whole quarter of the globe, are a great point gained in favor of the rights of mankind. The experiment is made, and has completely succeeded."

In all the States, either by their constitution or by legislative enactments, the English common law, as well as those English statutes which had customarily been observed in the respective colonies, were made the basis of State jurisprudence. In South Carolina the colonial statutes were enumerated and reënacted in particular, but in all the other States the colonial statutes were continued in force until repealed or altered. With the exception of Georgia, the States established or continued some tribunal vested with authority to review the decisions of the lower courts. In Georgia the County Courts had final jurisdiction, the juries being expressly declared by the constitution to be judges of the law as well as of fact. A chief justice, however, appointed for the State presided in all these courts. In New York the State Senate was clothed with the judicial function of the British House of Lords, being, with the assistance of the chancellor and the judges, a Supreme Court of Error. In New Jersey the colonial custom was preserved of having the governor and council constitute a Court of Appeals. In Virginia a variation was made by having that court composed of the admiralty and chancery judges and the judges of the general courts. The judge of the court whose opinion was under review was, of course, excluded in that particular case from the Court of Appeals. In Maryland and South Carolina the presiding judges of the District Courts formed a Court of Appeals. Their jurisdiction, however, did not embrace chancery cases. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, as well as those of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, exercised substantially the same powers as had inhered in the superior courts of colonial times.

Chancery jurisdiction had been introduced into all the crown colonies excepting New Hampshire, and was retained by them when they became States. In New Jersey and South Carolina, the governor retained his colonial office of chancellor, while in New York and Maryland a separate officer was appointed with that title. North Carolina and

Georgia intrusted the administration of law and equity to the same tribunals. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held partial chancery power. With the exception of Connecticut, the New England States retained their dislike to chancery practice and relied for many years on common law remedies; the Assembly of Connecticut exercised chancery powers in important cases, and invested the judicial courts with such powers in minor cases. The familiar system of committing to the County Courts the adjudication of lesser civil cases and to the Courts of Sessions, composed of the justices of peace of each county, the trial of petty crimes was continued throughout the States, as was also the old system of separate tribunals for the probate of wills. The administration of estates and the guardianship of minors were given over to special courts—a practice derived from the ecclesiastical courts of Great Britain. In some States the power of granting divorces was conferred upon the courts, but for the most part it was retained by the legislatures.

In the new legal forms, The State, The Commonwealth, The People, were titles substituted for the king, the disposition of the States being to conform to English technicalities. In 1784, Connecticut made it obligatory upon the judges to give in writing the reasons for their decisions. Kirby's reports, published in 1789, included the Connecticut cases from 1785 to 1788, and was the first of American law reports. The method of appointing judges differed in the various States: in Connecticut and Rhode Island it was done by the Assemblies, and the judges served for one year; in New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania the same method was followed, but the term was seven years; in Georgia the chief justice was so appointed, but the county judges were elected annually by the people. In Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland, the power of judiciary appointment rested in the governor and council, in the other States with the legislature, but in all the term of appointment was during good behavior. In Virginia the

justices of the peace during colonial times had been given wide powers, which were retained when the State government was organized and the additional power conferred of nominating candidates to fill vacancies occurring in their own body. Besides the criminal jurisdiction of the justices of the peace, these officers appear in all the States to have had cognizance, in the first instance, of the smallest class of civil cases.

The constitution of Georgia and the second constitution of New Hampshire provided for the election of delegates to the Continental Congress by the people; in the other States they were appointed by the legislatures. The right of suffrage was given in New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and South Carolina to all resident freemen who were taxpayers, with the exception that in Pennsylvania the eldest sons of freeholders, who were twenty-one years of age, could vote without payment of taxes. In the other States a pecuniary qualification was imposed, except that in North Carolina resident freemen, who were also taxpayers, could vote for members of the lower house. Virginia's colonial practice remained in force; the possession of a freehold of fifty acres, or a town lot, was requisite for the exercise of the suffrage. North Carolina also had a freehold qualification, but it was limited to voters for senators. In New York the condition of a freehold worth $250 was attached to the suffrage in the vote for governor or senators, and for members of the Assembly a freehold worth $50, or which yielded an annual rent of $10. The Rhode Island provision, carried over from the colonial period, restricted the right of voting to freeholders possessing a clear landed property of the value of $134, and to their eldest sons. In all other States property, real or personal, from $33 to $200 constituted the voting qualification.

It is interesting to note the statements of these several constitutions upon the matter of religion. The constitution of Massachusetts guaranteed the freedom of religious opinion and the equality of all sects, but the legislature

expressly authorized and by implication required the people to support the ministers. The legislature also revived the old colonial laws against blasphemy. Similar laws were in force in Connecticut and in New Hampshire. By the favor of the legislature, Congregationalism in Massachusetts enjoyed the prerogatives of an established church which was supported by taxes that persons of other religious persuasions could not escape, except by becoming contributors to some other church which they regularly attended. Once chosen, the ministers held their places for life and had a legal claim for their stipulated salaries unless dismissed from their churches for causes considered sufficient by a council which was mutually chosen from among the ministers and the members of the neighboring churches.

The Church of England, to which the majority of the Loyalists belonged, lost by the Revolution the official establishment which it held in the southern colonies, as well as the official countenance and privileges which were accorded it in New York and New Jersey. But it retained its properties, lands, and endowments. The second constitution of South Carolina made "Christian Protestant Religion" the established religion of that State. All persons professing faith in God and a future state were tolerated, while if in addition they held Christianity to be the one inspired religion they might form churches of their own, which would be entitled to be admitted as part of the establishment. The constitution of Maryland authorized the Assembly of that State to levy a "general and equal tax" for the support of the Christian religion. This was to be applied to the maintenance of such ministers as the taxpayers should designate or, if they desired, to the relief of the poor; but the Maryland Assembly never exercised this authority. The constitutions of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia provided that no man should be required to attend any church or to pay an ecclesiastical tax against his will. The constitution of Virginia ignored the subject of religion, but it came up in the first

meeting of the Assembly. The Episcopalians were in the ascendency in the Assembly although they had become a minority of the people. So that it was only after a warm contest that the advocates of doing away with the old disabling acts succeeded in 1776 in legalizing all forms of worship, and in releasing the Dissenters from paying parish rates and having their collection suspended until the next session. In 1779 they were entirely abrogated by the Assembly. The Religious Freedom Act of 1785, did away with all religious tests. The constitutions of New York, Delaware, and Maryland disqualified priests and ministers from holding civil office. Georgia would not permit them to be members of the Assembly. The constitution of Maryland prohibited gifts for pious purposes excepting grants of land not exceeding two acres each as sites for churches and churchyards.

The prejudice against the Catholic religion cropped out in the constitutions of New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, which required the chief State officials to be Protestants. Massachusetts and Maryland required all office holders to profess their belief in the Christian religion. South Carolina prescribed belief in a future state of awards and punishments; North Carolina and Pennsylvania, acknowledgment of the inspiration of the Old and New Testaments; Delaware, belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. The French alliance had much to do with lessening prejudice against Catholicism. In 1784, Rhode Island set an example of liberality in this particular by repealing its law withholding the suffrage from Catholics. In all the States the colonial laws for the preservation of the sanctity of the Sabbath were continued.

The constitutions of Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and the second constitution of New Hampshire alone made mention of the subject of education. The clauses in the first three requiring the establishment of schools for general education remained a dead letter. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania by 1787 had three colleges; Massachusetts

had the university at Cambridge, and a system of town schools; while New Hampshire and Connecticut had similar provisions for education, and Maryland continued its colonial system of county schools. Besides, by 1784 the latter had three colleges existing or authorized. In 1787, the New York Assembly passed an act creating a board of twenty-one members to be called "Regents of the University of the State of New York," to which was intrusted the visitation and oversight of all schools and colleges existing or which might be established in the State.

The most characteristic institution which was carried over by the colonies into statehood was that of slavery. It had been decided in the British courts to be contrary to the law of the land, so that the colonial legislatures and courts were without authority to give it legal status. Nevertheless, at the outbreak of hostilities it existed in every one of the United Colonies. No provision on the subject of slavery was made in any State constitution except that of Delaware, which provided "that no person hereafter imported from Africa ought to be held in slavery under any pretense whatever," and that "no negro, Indian, or mulatto slave is to be brought into this State for sale from any part of the world." In Massachusetts an attempt had been made prior to the Revolution to test the legality of slavery and although the case was favorable to the claimants of freedom it did not result in emancipation. The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts gave quasi-recognition of the legality of slavery by passing a resolution that no slave should be enlisted in the army. In 1777 a prize ship with several slaves on board was brought into the port of Salem by a privateer. The slaves were advertised for sale, but the General Court ordered them to be set at liberty. The declaration inserted in the Massachusetts Bill of Rights that "all men are born free and equal," was construed by the Supreme Court of that State to prohibit slavery. This position was sustained in 1783. A similar clause in the second constitution of New Hampshire was construed by the courts in that

State in the same way. An Act of Pennsylvania of 1780 forbade the introduction of slaves and gave freedom to all persons thereafter born in the State. In 1784, the Pennsylvania enactment was adopted in its essential respects by Connecticut and Rhode Island. In 1778, the Virginia Assembly, on motion of Thomas Jefferson, prohibited the further introduction of slaves, and in 1782 the colonial statute which forbade emancipations except for meritorious services was repealed. This repeal remained in force for ten years, during which emancipations were numerous. In 1783, Maryland followed Virginia in prohibiting the further introduction of slaves, and in removing the restraints on emancipation. At this time expressions against slavery as an institution were as forcible in the South as in the North. Jefferson pronounced it "a perpetual exercise of the most unremitting despotism on the one part and degrading submission on the other." Patrick Henry wrote: "Would anyone believe that I am a master of slaves of my own purchase? I am drawn along by the general inconvenience of living here without them. I will not—I cannot justify it! I believe a time will come when an opportunity will be offered to abolish this lamentable evil. Everything we can do is to improve it, if it happens in our day; if not, let us transmit to our descendants, together with our slaves, a pity for their unhappy lot, and an abhorrence of slavery." Washington said "that it was among his first wishes to see some plan adopted by which slavery might be abolished by law." New York and New Jersey followed the example of Virginia and Maryland in prohibiting the further introduction of slaves, but extended their acts to cover the domestic slave trade. In North Carolina the Assembly of 1777, on account of the trouble arising from freedmen, reënacted an old law restricting emancipation by making it necessary for the owner to obtain the consent of the County Court instead of as formerly that of the governor and council. Yet, in 1786, an act was passed declaring the introduction of slaves into the State to be of evil consequences

and highly impolitic, and imposing a duty of £5 per head upon all future importations.

Not only the States, but the general government as well required reconstruction to meet the demands of a wider mission. Congress lacked the authority which was necessary for the conduct of a stable government and for the administration of the various departments. The adoption of an American constitution was the subject of great popular interest. In 1775, a project of colonial union had been brought forward in Congress by Franklin, who was fertile in governmental expedients. In 1776, a committee of one from each State was appointed to draft articles of confederation. This committee reported twenty articles which after debate and amendment were incorporated into a new draft, but the press of other business and the departure of Congress from Philadelphia, in addition to the doubtful aspect of affairs at this time, July 12th to August 20th, led to the postponement of further consideration of the matter. On April 11, 1777, the subject was again taken up and warmly debated from time to time until November 15th, when the articles were adopted and sent to the State legislatures with a circular letter, soliciting for them "immediate and dispassionate attention as the only plan likely to be adopted by Congress at that time." It was further set forth in explanation of the delay of Congress in the preparation of the articles "that to form a permanent union, accommodated to the opinions and wishes of the delegates of so many States differing in habits, produce, commerce, and internal police was found to be a work which nothing but time and reflection, conspiring with a disposition to conciliate, could mature, and accomplish." During the winter of 1777–1778 the Articles of Confederation received the consideration of the various State legislatures and were approved by New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia. The other States proposed various amendments which were rejected by Congress. Nevertheless, by July 3, 1778, they were ratified by all the States excepting New

Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. New Jersey and Delaware were persuaded by Congress to ratify the plan, but Maryland stood out, taking the position that the western lands should be ceded to the general government by the States preferring claim to them. This action of Maryland prevented the ratification of the Articles of Confederation for two years.

In framing the Articles of Confederation and in the debates upon them three issues were regarded as vital: first, the method of voting in Congress, whether by States or according to wealth and population; secondly, the basis upon which troops should be raised and taxes apportioned; and thirdly, the disposition of the unsettled lands in the West. The first of these, against the vigorous protest of Virginia, was settled by retaining the practice in vogue in Congress of voting by States, the assent of nine States being required. The second question, relating to taxation, was fixed by imposing property qualifications. Troops were to be apportioned according to the number of white inhabitants.

The question of the western lands, however, was the crux of the discussion upon the Articles of Confederation. Six of the thirteen States had boundaries exactly defined. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, and the Carolinas extended, under their charters, to the Pacific, or to the Mississippi, that river having been established as the British western boundary. Under the proclamation of 1763, which annexed to Georgia the country west of the Altamaha and north of Florida, that State also claimed to extend to the Mississippi. By reason of certain alleged concessions of jurisdiction by the Six Nations to New York that State also claimed a vast western territory. The States which had no interest in the western territory contended that as it must be wrested from Great Britain by joint efforts it should become joint property. One after another, these States, however, were brought into line, with the exception of Maryland. This State held out till March 1, 1781, when it finally adopted the Articles of Confederation, but only

after it was agreed that the equitable right of the Union to the western regions should be respected.

The title given to the new constitution was "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union." Their purpose was stated to be the formation of a league of friendship for the common defence. The free inhabitants of each State were guaranteed the privileges and immunities of free citizens of every other State. In the Congress of the Union, which was to be a single body, provision was made for voting by States, each having one vote. This body had the sole right of determining war and peace, the quota of men that each State was to raise for the common defence, and the amount of funds which each was to supply. Congress also had the function of making treaties and alliances, of establishing prize courts and of granting letters of marque and reprisal. It also had the power of determining boundary or other questions arising between States, with the stipulation that no State should be deprived of its territory for the benefit of the United States. Such other matters as were important to the internal order of the country were given over to Congress: these were the borrowing of money, the regulation of the value of coin, the fixing of the standards of weights and measures, the establishment of post offices, and the making of regulations for the ordering of the army and navy. Local self government was protected by the powers reserved to the States, and these were expressed as follows: "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled. Among the powers thus reserved were the regulation of commerce and in a general way of taxation. Every State was bound to abide by the action of Congress in matters committed to it in the Articles of Confederation. Congress directed that the Articles when attested by its president be sent to the executives of the thirteen States, to the commander-in-chief with directions that they be read to the army, and to the ministers abroad

for communication to the courts of Europe, also that they be rendered into French and circulated in Canada.

The announcement to the public, on March 1, 1781, of the final ratification of the Articles made that day memorable. The greatest enthusiasm prevailed throughout the country. The Union was hailed as an indissoluble one and America felt that it had a fixed place among the nations of the earth. The new Federation already had its official standard to carry to the ports of Europe and unfurl from the public buildings of the federal government and of the States, for as early as June 15, 1777, Congress had voted "that the flag of the thirteen United States be thirteen stripes, alternately red and white; that the union be thirteen stars, white, in a blue field, representing a new constellation." On June 20, 1782, it adopted for a seal the American eagle holding in its dexter talon an olive branch, in its sinister talon a bundle of thirteen arrows, and in its beak a scroll inscribed "E Pluribus Unum"; over its head on an azure field are thirteen stars. On the reverse is a pyramid unfinished, with an eye, having over it *Annuit coeptis.* On the base MDCCLXXVI, and underneath *Novus Ordo Seclorum.*

The elements of weakness of the Articles of Confederation were many. They provided for no proper common executive. The new government was dependent upon State requisitions for revenue; its only courts were those of admiralty, which had no machinery for carrying their decisions into effect. The Articles limited instead of increased the powers of Congress. All real authority was reserved to the States. In matters over which Congress had jurisdiction the majority vote of the Continental Congress was changed, as has been said, to the assent of nine States. Thus the government was without those powers which are fundamental to the exercise of proper authority and for the guarantee of obligations with other nations. It was out of reason to suppose that anyone would trust a government whose sources of revenue were dependent upon the

voluntary action of the several States. The only element of power contributed to Congress by the Articles of Confederation was that giving full authority to measures passed by it upon subjects within its control. Hardly had the ratification been promulgated before complaints began to be made. The legislature of New York formulated a proposition to amend the Articles by authorizing Congress to employ the military force of the Union to compel the payments of requisitions.

The failure of the States to comply with the requisitions of Congress for money denoted an alarming decline in public spirit, but the practical side was very much more serious; the government embarrassment in the matter of finance was in the highest degree provocative of internal disorders. The utter inability of Congress under the Confederation to maintain the dignity of the nation, to provide needed revenue for the purposes of government, and to secure confidence abroad, made it clear to the States that their first effort in the way of adopting a national constitution had only resulted in securing articles of union which at best gave but a provisional government.

A movement toward a common administration of matters of commerce was inaugurated by a commercial commission representing the States of Maryland and Virginia which met at Mount Vernon on March 28, 1785, under the auspices of Washington. The commissioners prepared terms of a compact between the two States regulating the jurisdiction over the waters of the Chesapeake and the rivers common to the two States. Conformably to the wishes of Washington they requested Pennsylvania to grant the free use of the branches of the Ohio within its limits for the purpose of establishing the connection between that river and the Potomac. Having accomplished the specific matter for which they had met, they did not adjourn until they had passed to matters of general policy and formulated a recommendation that the two States bring into uniformity their duties on imports, their commercial regulations, and currency.

The action of Maryland and Virginia in this regard was the precursor to a federal convention which was called to meet at Philadelphia on May 29, 1787. The immediate effect of the Mount Vernon conference was the proposal by Maryland of a meeting of commissioners from all the States to regulate the restrictions on commerce for the whole. Madison saw at once the advantage of holding "a politico-commercial commission." He accordingly drafted a resolution to that effect, which was passed on January 21, 1786. The commission was called to meet at Annapolis. It was clearly evident that either more power must be vested in the general government or the confederacy would fall to pieces. In the meanwhile Congress was torn by discussions upon the subject of the failure of the States to meet their requisitions and matters arising out of the scope of subjects which should be considered by the Annapolis Convention. The commissioners assembled at Annapolis on September 11, 1786. Only five States were represented. The principal business was the concurrence in a resolution addressed to all the States urging them to agree "to meet at Philadelphia on the second Monday of the next May to consider the Constitution of the United States and to provide such further provisions as should appear necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the union, and to report to Congress such an act as when agreed to by them and confirmed by the legislatures of every State, would effectually provide for the same." On February 21, 1787, a committee of Congress reported entire concurrence in the proceedings of the commissioners and recommended the adoption of a resolution to be sent to the different legislatures urging them to have representatives at the Philadelphia convention. Thus was paved the way by the Seventh Congress for the adoption of the Federal Compact.

This great bond, the Constitution, between the sovereign States of America was the direct and sequential result of the events of the Revolution. Year by year as the patriots

strove to achieve their independence, they were unconsciously, but none the less surely, preparing the intellectual timber from which was to be built the fabric of the Constitution. We may trace in the structure of this frame of government the influence of each and every one of those years with which, in the present volume, we have been concerned. In the great compact, which in importance and stability ranks with the Magna Charta, may be perceived the direct result of those years in which the colonists, still loyal, were casting about for means whereby a union between them might be effected and at the same time the ties that bound them to the mother country might be preserved. Still more perceptible is the impress of the months when thought gave way to practical endeavor and antagonism to Great Britain found expression in the work of the committees of correspondence; and yet important are the influences arising from the military movements of which the first was the repulse of the British at Concord and the second the glorious defeat that is known in history as the battle of Bunker Hill. The jealousy and antagonism, the magnanimity and friendliness, the sufferings and defeats, the joys and victories of the war that raged from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, from the Penobscot to the St. John's, all gave impulse or direction to the elements from which was created the crown of the Revolution—the Constitution of the United States.

APPENDIX I

THE MECKLENBURG DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE MAY 19, 1775

Resolved, That whosoever directly or indirectly abetted, or in any way, form or manner, countenanced the unchartered and dangerous invasion of our rights, as claimed by Great Britain, is an enemy to this country, to America, and to the inherent and inalienable rights of man.

Resolved, That we, the citizens of Mecklenburg county, do hereby dissolve the political bands which have connected us to the mother country, and hereby absolve ourselves from all allegiance to the British crown, and abjure all political connection, contract, or association, with that nation, who have wantonly trampled on our rights and liberties, and inhumanly shed the blood of American patriots at Lexington.

Resolved, That we do hereby declare ourselves a free and independent people, are, and of right ought to be, a sovereign and self governing association, under the control of no power other than that of our God and the general government of the Congress; to the maintenance of which independence, we solemnly pledge to each other our mutual co-operation, our lives, our fortunes, and our most sacred honor.

Resolved, That as we now acknowledge the existence and control of no law or legal officer, civil or military, within this county, we do hereby ordain and adopt, as a rule of life, all and every of our former laws,—wherein, nevertheless, the

crown of Great Britain never can be considered as holding rights, privileges, immunities or authorities therein.

Resolved, That it is further decreed, that all, each and every military officer in this county, is hereby reinstated in his former command and authority, he acting conformably to these regulations. And that every member present, of this delegation, shall henceforth be a civil officer, viz: a Justice of the Peace, in the character of a "*Committee-man*," to issue process, hear and determine all matters of controversy, according to said adopted laws, and to preserve peace, union, and harmony in said county; and to use every exertion to spread the love of country and fire of freedom throughout America, until a more general and organized Government be established in this province.

[The above text is in the terms of the Resolutions read by Colonel Polk at the Mecklenburg County Court House on May 20, 1775, as the action of the convention of May 19th, and adopted by the citizens of the county. The Resolutions printed on pp. 177–178 are from the text of Martin's History.]

APPENDIX II

A DECLARATION BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED

WHEN, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established, should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to

which they are accustomed. But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies, and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history of the present king of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these States. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world:

He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.

He has forbidden his Governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; and, when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.

He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature; a right inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only.

He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.

He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly, for opposing, with manly firmness, his invasions on the rights of the people.

He has refused, for a long time after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the danger of invasion from without, and convulsions within.

He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose, obstructing the laws for

naturalization of foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands.

He has obstructed the administration of justice, by refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers.

He has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.

He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.

He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures.

He has affected to render the military independent of and superior to the civil power.

He has combined, with others, to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation:

For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:

For protecting them, by a mock trial, from punishment, for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these States:

For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world:

For imposing taxes on us without our consent:

For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury:

For transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended offences:

For abolishing the free system of English laws in a neighboring province, establishing therein an arbitrary government, and enlarging its boundaries, so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these colonies:

For taking away our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and altering, fundamentally, the powers of our governments:

For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.

He has abdicated government here, by declaring us out of his protection, and waging war against us.

He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.

He is, at this time, transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the head of a civilized nation.

He has constrained our fellow-citizens taken captive on the high seas to bear arms against their country, to become the executioners of their friends and brethren, or to fall themselves by their hands.

He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.

In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.

Nor have we been wanting in attentions to our British brethren. We have warned them, from time to time, of attempts made by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them, by the ties of our common kindred, to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They, too, have

been deaf to the voice of justice and consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace, friends.

We, therefore, the representatives of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in GENERAL CONGRESS assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name, and by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that, as FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which INDEPENDENT STATES may of right do. And, for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of DIVINE PROVIDENCE, we mutually pledge to each other, our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.

JOHN HANCOCK.

New Hampshire.
Josiah Bartlett,
William Whipple,
Matthew Thornton.

Rhode Island.
Stephen Hopkins,
William Ellery.

Connecticut.
Roger Sherman,
Samuel Huntington,
William Williams,
Oliver Wolcott.

Massachusetts Bay.
Samuel Adams,
John Adams,
Robert Treat Paine,
Elbridge Gerry.

Delaware.
Cæsar Rodney,
George Read,
Thomas M'Kean.

Maryland.
Samuel Chase,
William Paca,
Thomas Stone,
Charles Carroll, of Carrollton.

New York.
William Floyd,
Philip Livingston,
Francis Lewis,
Lewis Morris.

New Jersey.
Richard Stockton,
John Witherspoon,
Francis Hopkinson,
John Hart,
Abraham Clark.

Pennsylvania.
Robert Morris,
Benjamin Rush,
Benjamin Franklin,
John Morton,
George Clymer,
James Smith,
George Taylor,
James Wilson,
George Ross.

Virginia.
George Wythe,
Richard Henry Lee,
Thomas Jefferson,
Benjamin Harrison,
Thomas Nelson, jun.
Francis Lightfoot Lee,
Carter Braxton.

North Carolina.
William Hooper,
Joseph Hewes,
John Penn.

South Carolina.
Edward Rutledge,
Thomas Heyward, jun.
Thomas Lynch, jun.
Arthur Middleton.

Georgia.
Button Gwinnett,
Lyman Hall,
George Walton.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

VOLUME VI